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The history of the abaThembu chieftainship in the twentieth century has been very little 
studied. This thesis is the first attempt to examine the chieftainship in detail. It shows 
how the chieftainship was deeply divided, yet survived socio-political assaults from both 
within and without.  It focuses on the individuals who were successive paramount chiefs 
of the abaThembu, exploring how they helped shape the chieftainship over time, and on 
the impact on the chieftainship of state policy in the eras of segregation and then 
apartheid.  
 
The first chapter is an exegesis on the rule of Dalindyebo Ngangelizwe, whose 
readiness to succumb to government legislation compromised his traditional profile and 
diminished the institutional image of the chieftainship. The thesis then moves on to 
interrogate the impact of a long drawn-out regency on the stability and legitimacy of the 
abaThembu paramountcy. The thesis then turns to an assessment of the inroads of the 
first piece of major apartheid legislation to affect the chieftainship directly, the Bantu 
Authorities Act of 1951, on abaThembu unity.  In Chapter Four an analysis is made of 
how class divisions and economic factors in the Xhalanga-Glen Grey districts added to 
the resuscitation of traditional rule, within the context of government policy under 
apartheid and the development of the Bantustan system. The fifth chapter is in part a 
critique of the political environment in which the various forces that punctuated 
Transkei‘s road to self-government operated, and how these affected the crucial 
relationship between Sabata Dalindyebo and Kaiser Matanzima. Chapter Six attempts 
to portray the interaction of the forces that created a setting for the demise, and the later 
resurgence, of the Sabata dynasty.   
 
The conclusion of the study highlights the central aspects of the story of the abaThembu 
chieftainship- from 1920 to 1980 -that explain the vicissitudes of abaThembu 
paramountcy in the post-Dalindyebo era. This study will, it is hoped, be the basis for 
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This study explores a gap in the historiography of the Eastern Cape, for no previous 
scholar has focused attention on the vicissitudes faced by the abaThembu chieftainship 
in the period 1920-1980. This thesis examines the forces that shaped the changing 
concept of chieftainship among the abaThembu from the end of the first decade after 
the establishment of the Union of South Africa to the final decade of apartheid, before 
the transition began to a democratic state.  It is, then, concerned with the eras of racial 
segregation and apartheid and considers how the abaThembu paramount chieftainship 
was stripped of its powers in order to broaden the role of lesser chiefs in rural 
governance.1  
 
The year 1920 was a watershed in abaThembu chieftainship for in April  Paramount 
Chief Dalindyebo died.2 With his death the relative stability of abaThembu paramountcy 
came to an end, ushering in a gradual process of implosion within the abaThembu 
chieftainship. The state attempted to rebuild African chieftaincy as a means of 
decentralizing power to a conservative rural elite.3 The methods employed by the 
National Party government, and the colonial authorities before it, reached a climax in 
1980, in which year the historical abaThembu paramount chieftainship, which derived its 
legitimacy from the Great House of Mthikrakra through Ngangelizwe, Dalindyebo and 
Jongilizwe, was terminated. Chief Sabata Jonguhlanga was deposed, his own 
paramountcy abolished and that status simultaneously reinvented in the Qadi house, a 
junior household.  
 
This thesis, then, is concerned with continuity and change, stability and instability, over 
a sixty year period. The deposition and abolition meant a drastic reversal of the public 
status of customary structures. The government had declared invalid, and thus 
permanently dysfunctional, a house that was considered by its subjects who followed 
natural laws to be the producer of rulers.  This thesis will explore the forces at play, the 















environment at the time. Also examined will be the short and long-term effects of all 
these on the paramountcy, in the first instance, as a symbol of its incumbent and, in the 
second, as an office in the traditional hierarchy. In allowing the deposition of a national 
father figure the abaThembu custodians of custom publicly undermined and belittled 
their customary guidelines. Thus it was the previously venerated office of the paramount 
chief, rather than the disregard of customary protocol, that became the object of ridicule. 
The destructiveness of this action was fully demonstrated  in the deposition of Sabata 
Jongilizwe Dalindyebo from the paramountcy of abaThembuland. After 1980 the 
abaThembu chieftainship assumed a different profile and image as in essence it had 
lost its original political significance. It  was  the break in the continuity of Sabata‘s 
paramountcy rather than the invention of a new line of rulers in another house which 
tampered the image of  abaThembu paramountcy. Whilst the reburial of Sabata in 1989 
provided a platform  to resuscitate his paramountcy in the proclamation and subsequent 
installation of his son and heir, this was merely a renaissance of abaThembu 
paramountcy rather than the reversal of the effects of discontinuity. The current 
abaThembu Paramount Chief, Buyelekhaya, assumed on installation  symbolism of the 
renaissance of Sabata‘s royal status rather than a position of successor to either 
Bambilanga or Zondwa.  
 
This study primarily seeks to trace and analyse the events that slowly but surely brought 
about the dissolution of the kind of abaThembu paramount chieftainship that had at 
least outlived Dalindyebo. Much would depend on whether Dalindyebo had, during his 
paramountcy created a basis for continuity as a cornerstone for stability. The unpacking 
of the forces that were instrumental in the eventual deconstruction of the abaThembu 
paramountcy inevitably generates a wide range of questions: Did internal crises make 
the abaThembu chieftainship vulnerable from both within and without? Did the 
weaknesses that originated within the fabric of the Dalindyebo chieftainship attract 
destructive agents from without? What factors were involved in the making of Prince 
Sabata and how far did these contribute to his moulding as a future abaThembu 















years prior to Sabata‘s accession? What were his strengths when he came to power? 
To what extent did he empower his opponents by playing into their hands?  
  
The variety of problems that were manifest in the period of transition from Dalindyebo‘s 
paramountcy to Sabata‘s aborted term form a major basis of this study. An analysis of 
these problems should also expose the many forces whose impact made the 
abaThembu paramountcy so politically fragile. It will also discuss the extent to which the 
internal forces within the paramountcy complemented the catalysis produced by 
external elements, thereby threatening  the  institution‘s viability.  
 
By filling in the missing links in the story of the chieftainship under investigation this 
thesis will attempt to address the above questions. An effort will be made to identify and 
close the major gaps that exist in the abaThembu historiography by putting in place in a 
single continuous narrative the pieces that complement the history of abaThembu 
chieftainship. The twentieth century saw the most critical years in the affairs of 
paramount chieftainship in South Africa generally. The  abaThembu case was no 
exception. The last ten years of Dalindyebo‘s rule witnessed the dramatic 
transformation of South African chieftainship which caused dilemmas for both the 
coloniser and the colonized. The background to these will be examined to see how they 
threatened the strength of the colonized, in this case, abaThembu paramountcy.  
 
After a regency of about twenty-five years, Sabata Jonguhlanga succeeded his father 
Jongilizwe Dalindyebo. Did he practise what he professed to be standing for? Did he 
champion the rights of indigenous rule? These questions are linked directly to what 
informed his decisions and his subsequent actions. Was his attitude to life and world 
affairs inspired primarily by his reading of national histories? Was he motivated by 
national politics or self-interest? To what extent was Sabata‘s thinking influenced by his 
personal priorities, such as a commitment to preserve his birthright with himself as a 
visible symbol of abaThembu indigenous heritage? Sabata‘s comprehension of his 
obligations to his predecessors and his responsibility to the abaThembu nation needs to 















modus operandi. Was Sabata able to comprehend the multiple challenges that awaited 
him in a throne that had functioned for a quarter century under successive regents? 
given the turbulent circumstances of his  accession?  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Despite over half a century of gradual assault on, and progressive tampering with the 
institution of chieftainship, it outlived the governments that had, at different historical 
periods, attempted to erode its image in order to accomplish specific objectives. Whilst 
Ntsebeza and Mamdani in their respective works, Democracy Compromised and Citizen 
and Subject condemn as wholly corrupted such chieftainship as had been modified by 
successive colonial laws there is a sense in which the institution survives even as 
residue.  Testimony to the endurance of South African chieftainship finds its credibility in 
Nyamnjoh‘s assertion with regard to Botswana, namely, that Africans are far from giving 
up chieftaincy or making completely modern institutions of it. No one, it seems, is too 
‗citizen‘ to be ‗subject‘ as well‘.4 The essence of his argument is that the ability of the 
chieftainship to withstand and cope under changing material circumstances, be they 
pre-colonial, colonial and/or postcolonial, proves both its resilience and adaptability. It is 
also evidence of the extent to which the roots of chieftainship lie deep in the cultural and 
political fabric of traditional society. Nyamnjoh further argued that chieftainship owes its 
survival to its inherent strengths which have enabled it to withstand extinction, even 
though the appropriation of its essential features has left it nothing more than a 
‗residual‘ chieftainship. Nyamnjoh does not specifically identify the strengths that sustain 
the Botswana chieftainship but it emerges from his theory that the modern and the 
conservative acknowledge association with chieftainship even though this might be in 
varying degrees. Ngwenya in Oomen sums up the fundamental value of chieftainship to 
the cultural fabric of abaPedi society when he writes that ‗traditional leadership is our 
culture, you can‘t run away from it, even though it must change. It‘s like a branch where 
you have to slice away all the bark and buds until you are left with a new lean walking 
stick‘.5 Ngwenya acknowledges both the inevitability of change which the chieftainship 
cannot escape in a dynamic society as well as its utilitarian spiritualism but argues that 
















Terreblanche claims that it was Sir George Grey who first curtailed the authority of the 
Cape Nguni chiefs. He did this by both intervening directly in the structures of 
chieftainship and by undermining the social and material basis of their authority and 
power.6 This power base lay in the chiefs‘ rights to levy judicial fees and fines and 
receive gifts as the arbiters of amaXhosa law and custom.7 Bundy confirms that Grey 
believed it was essential to the furtherance of his policies to keep in check the power 
and influence of the ‘haughty hereditary chiefs----the major barrier to his intentions‘.8 
Mamdani summarizes in a condemnatory tone, the outcome of Grey‘s exercise by 
saying that in this way  ‗the social prerequisite of a single legal order was established in 
a colonial settler society, these being ‗appropriation of land, destruction of communal 
autonomy, and establishment of the freedom of the individual to become a wage 
worker‘.9 It emerges from the above excerpt that stripping chieftaincy, a ‗political form 
which recalls pre-colonial society‘ of its pre-colonial economic, social and political 
attributes was to effect a transfer of the centre of power from traditional leadership to 
the ‗civilizing‘ agents of the capitalist world.10 It emerges from the above theories that 
the fate of chieftainship was not one of Grey‘s primary concerns. It was simply a master 
tool in his scheme and without it his political designs would not be realised. An 
important observation as to Grey‘s socio-economic cum political experiment is that the 
target of his targets, the ‘warlike and treacherous chiefs‘11 were neither prospective 
allies and accomplices, nor weapons, but ‗silent‘ victims. In his naivety, Grey aimed at 
transforming the society, for the best and for its benefit ‗through [the chieftainship‘s?] 
dismemberment and dispersal.‘12  Grey‘s experiment yielded ‗direct rule‘ which, Glaser 
also confirms, consisted in weakening the chiefs and in monopolising authority by white 
magistrates who were assisted by African headmen.13 Les Switzer reaffirms that ‗the 
headmen, the main instruments of the colonial surveillance system in the Ciskei‘s rural 
African locations‘14 were answerable to the resident magistrate who selected them and 
paid their salaries. The headmen kept the magistrates informed about any African 
















It is apparent from the above that a typical chief emerged from Grey‘s integrationist 
policies with only a nominal and ‗passive‘ chieftainship, and  thus had temporarily lost 
his legitimate birthright. This was in contrast to what Nyamnjoh had endorsed because it 
hinged on the substitution mechanism in its promotion of the ascendancy of the 
headmen. The ‗divide and rule‘ principle that is manifest in the Grey‘s bureaucratic 
hierarchy of ‗headman versus chief‘ does not seem to have threatened the cultural 
value of chieftainship that Comaroff has defined with regard to the baTswana Tshidi 
chiefdom, that its subjects ‗conceptualise the chiefship as the centre of their political 
universe. The chiefship defines the political community; without it, the body politic would 
cease to exist.‗16 It also does not invalidate Oomen‘s meaning of ‗legitimacy of 
traditional leaders – an acceptance of the right to rule of the authority concerned, and a 
compliance that is more or less voluntary.‘17 It remains debatable, however, whether the 
‗silent‘ chieftainship of Grey‘s era conforms with Weber‘s political equation about the 
traditional authority which, while resting on a ‗web of verbal interpretation concerning 
the links with the past and the present‘18 also allows for a wide range of de facto social 
adjustments to occur at the same time that it sustains a sense of continuity with the 
past.19 To what extent then, did the Greyan brand of chieftainship reflect continuity from 
the past and adaptability to the changes that evolved with time? Or could it be simply 
regarded as a static symbol, incompatible with change? There is a sense in which 
Grey‘s chieftainship which had neither precedent nor was one itself was static even 
within its protective cocoon.   
 
The late 19th century annexations of the Transkeian Territories dealt chieftainship a 
further blow, though the annexations were, in a sense, a testimony to the failure of 
Grey‘s mid-century politics because resistance to colonial intrusion continued. Even the 
subtle ultimatum of ‗submit to absorption or succumb‘ had failed Grey‘s attempts to 
integrate Africans into the colonial economy. It must however be noted that in reality 
Grey‘s authority never extended as far as  the Transkei or abaThembuland,  except for 
















In Natal the Shepstone–inspired system of governing Africans through chiefs and 
African customary law rather than the magistrate and colonial legislation was favoured. 
It was from this ‗indirect rule‘-premise that Shepstone warned the Cape Commissioners 
of 1883 that the wisdom of keeping the ‗natives‘ under their own law was to ensure 
control of them.20 In her exposure of the indirect rule limitations Shula Marks subtly 
nullifies the Shepstonian stratagem. She suggests that indirect rule had complex 
shortcomings which tended to offset the government plans. Any chief whose services 
were needed by the Natal Government, Solomon kaDinizulu, for example, could always 
exploit the ambiguity of his position to his advantage: ‗in Zululand, as in colonial states 
all over Africa, the existence of a centralized  kingdom offered both advantages and 
dangers. Once conquered, the successful co-option of the existing ruling class–one, 
moreover, accustomed to exacting tribute- could lighten the burdens of a hard-pressed 
and thinly-manned colonial service. At the same time, the king provided an alternative 
focus of power‖21  for his Zulu subjects of old. The tradition of political and ideological 
hegemony which the amaZulu royal family had successfully established in the course of 
the 19th century was presumed to be poised to prop up  the authority of the king,  should 
it be revived.  
 
In South African chieftainship of the 1920s there was more than one example of a case 
where chiefs or paramount chiefs found themselves in compromised situations because 
of the political climate of the times. Marks‘s statement that the colonial authorities were 
often compelled to pursue a course of ambiguity for fear that if they did not the outcome 
might be counterproductive, appropriately addresses the diverse cases : ‗Everywhere in 
Africa at this time, British colonial authorities were handling traditional authorities with 
far greater subtlety than at the turn of the century.‘22 In certain instances the chiefs 
concerned adopted ambiguity for the sake of currying political favour with the colonial 
authorities at their wards‘ expense.  
 
It was probably the government orchestrated political weakness of the post-annexation 
chieftainship which made it receptive to the third mechanism of local government. This 















government culminated in a federation of the various district councils to form the 
Bhunga (United Transkeian Territories General Council-UTTGC) in 1931.23 Hammond-
Tooke categorically states that the general council system was explicitly designed to 
encourage non-traditional leadership to participate in local affairs.24Such a system then, 
marginalised the chiefs. It must be noted, however, that the Bhunga was largely, in 
Mayer‘s words, a ‗talking-shop‘ which deliberated on, and passed, ineffective 
resolutions. Administration still remained in the hands of the magistrates who continued 
to rule through the headmen, some of whom were chiefs in their subjects‘ eyes25. 
Beinart endorses this view in his claim that after annexation the magistrates were to rule 
through government-appointed headmen - except for a few paramount chiefs who were 
allowed to exercise limited influence.26 The lack of uniformity in the application of 
legislation often placed the beneficiaries in ambiguous positions which in certain cases 
cost them the wholehearted support of their peers and/or subjects. At the same time the 
ironic implosion of Grey‘s ‗civilising‘ experiment was already in the early 20th century 
nurturing an Africanist thinking in favour of the revival of chieftaincy. The gradual 
imposition of progressive ‗commoner headmen‘ on traditionalist communities, especially 
around Butterworth and related amaMfengu areas, speeded up the reversal of land 
imbalances and the restoration of communal rights. Nominal rather than indigenous 
chieftaincy suddenly became a preferred ‗alternative to puppet headmen and councils 
under the direct control of the administration‘.27 
 
Against this background must be understood the dilemma of some chiefs who saw in 
the Africanist-popular movements prospects for the restoration of their effective royal 
titles, yet at the same time they were unsure of the political correctness of unshackling 
themselves from their government-ordained ‗inactivity‘. Tile‘s crusade against colonial 
inroads and Dalindyebo‘s indecisiveness provide a relevant example here, as will be 
shown below. It is likely that, that turbulence prompted whites to rethink the question of 
goal-driven rural governance and thus the passage of the 1920 Native Affairs Act could 
have been regarded as an answer to the resuscitation of tribal bonds.28 It was 















the district council model in all former reserves29 though in the end only Ciskei adopted 
the Transkei‘s model of the General Council.30  
 
It was the passage of the Native Administration Act of 1927, described by Evans as a 
‗watershed event in the course of Native Administration‘31, which in its consolidation of 
the colonial policy of indirect rule in the ‗native reserves‘   advanced to a greater degree 
the influence and power of the Department of Native Affairs (NAD). Significantly, the Act 
revived African customary law as a means of maintaining state authority over the 
disintegrating African society in the reserves as well as of controlling the rate of 
proletarianisation.32 Harries has referred to the erosion of chieftaincy in some Transvaal 
areas during the 1930s, and subsequently confirmed that people looked to other 
political institutions for leadership, focusing their interest on the institutions that were led 
by the rising petty bourgeoisie. He has singled out Zoutpansberg as one such area 
where the Native Commissioners were unanimously opposed to the detribalisation 
process on the grounds that chiefs ‗were of great assistance in maintaining law and 
order.‘33 He claims that the South African War Office had, in 1905, articulated its 
concerns about the need to sustain chiefly authority as a way of checking its possible 
replacement by a wider and more unified political consciousness:   
The breakdown of the chieftaincy system does not seem altogether desirable, for a 
general fusion of the hitherto antagonistic tribes would then be possible and this 
would constitute a far greater danger to the white community than is to be 




Ethnologists and evolutionist anthropologists, such as Henri-Alexandre Junod, also 
bought into the idea of retaining chiefly control as a way of arresting the 
proletarianization of the African population. Edgar Brookes, described by Harries as ‗a 
liberal segregationist‘, also supported the creation of reserves in which Africans could 
‗develop along their own lines and under their own chiefs‘.35 In the same context must 
be understood the historical significance of Jack and Ray Simons‘s remark with regard 
to the National Party‘s objectives about the governance of the reserves. They confirmed 
Hertzog and Smuts‘s endorsement of the chiefs‘ empowerment when they condemned 
the neglect of tribal law by previous governments as well as the undermining of the 















men.36 Hull has given credibility to the above claim by drawing examples from Kenya 
and Zimbabwe. There colonial authorities hoped to neutralise African nationalism by 
appealing to ethnic feelings while bolstering the traditional local authorities.37 Beinart 
has also highlighted the threat that national political (extra-parliamentary) organisations 
posed to the government as another reason to empower chiefs so as to minimise the 
influence of such organisations.38 Hull further claims that in the 1930s the method of 
direct rule was  replaced by indirect rule which gave greater responsibility to the 
chiefs.39 It clearly emerges from the above that the government‘s patronage of 
chieftainship in South Africa, with comparative examples elsewhere in Africa, was a 
mere token, for in reality the institution had become a self–destructing instrument after 
being coerced or manipulated by the various governments for their specific purposes.    
 
Whilst the government‘s initiatives to thwart the ideas that were conducive to the 
development of popular chieftaincy did not always succeed, it must be conceded that 
the incompatibility of class interests sometimes worked in the government‘s favour. The 
1927 Act effectively restored chiefs to their former power in the reserves, albeit 
operating under the ‗Chief of Chiefs‘.40Dubow appropriately describes the act as  ‗this 
throwback to the Shepstonian system of nineteenth century Natal [which] effectively 
granted the NAD unrestricted powers to govern the reserves by proclamations‘.41 
Dubow seems to suggest that to a certain extent the Act drew from previous colonial 
legislations.  Evans confirms that the act leaned heavily in the direction of Natal‘s 
‗tribalist‘ model in its styling of the Minister of Native Affairs (MNA) as the Supreme 
Chief of all ‗Natives‘ throughout the Union and also where it permitted the minister to 
devolve his vast powers to any administrative official.42 This again was evidence that 
the repugnant parts of customary law had been removed and the autonomic law 
distorted in the name of ‗enlightened politics‘43 in order to realise the government‘s 
objective of inventing ‗official customary law‘. The significance of the ‗Chief of Chiefs‘ 
clause was that such an important official would in time be superseded by his Bantustan 
counterpart. The implication here is that the new governors-general would be vested 
with the absolute power of disposal in respect of offences or acts of misconduct 















becomes apparent that the 1927 Native Administration Act had visibly begun the 
process of co-opting chiefs as partners, thereby marking a departure from Sir George 
Grey‘s earlier scheme which had portrayed and treated them as condemned 
warmongers who were unworthy of chiefly office.  
 
 
Mqeke argues that there was no real active participation by Blacks in the administration 
of local affairs between 1894 and 1951 except in the council systems and in the 
restoration of civil and criminal jurisdiction of the chief‘s court.44 Against this background 
Mayer noted a major change in the system of local government in the reserves in the 
mid 20th century, in essence a change from direct rule to indirect rule as ‘henceforth 
local administration was to be based on the tribal authorities headed by the chiefs‘.45 
Mayer‘s statement must be understood in the context of Beinart‘s claim that in the early 
1950s the Nationalist government sought to bolster and further increase the power of 
chiefs through the Bantu Authorities programme.  The observation made here is that, 
whereas in direct rule the headmen exercised the chiefs‘ prerogative by the ‗grace of 
the government‘s white magistrate‘, in indirect rule the chiefs‘ authority was to be 
restored to the gratification of their constituencies but under the guidance of the 
Governor-in-Council.  
 
Ntsebeza has reinforced Hammond-Tooke‘s argument that the chiefs had gained in 
popularity during their ‗do-nothing-period‘. His argument also raises questions about 
some of the factors that informed the government‘s sudden decision to enlist the 
services of ‗natural leaders‘ and dispose of the ‗government‘s servants‘, the headmen: 
the erstwhile dispensers of unpopular orders who had earned the peasants‘ resentment. 
It appeared politically expedient to make use of the chiefs and their culturally legitimated 
authority rather than that of the headmen. This exercise would undoubtedly bring 
amenable chiefs closer to the bureaucratic hierarchy and also enable the government to 
control, through them, the rural communities in whose eyes the chiefs ‗had the 
legitimacy which the newer authorities could not have.‘46 Costa‘s apparent identification 
of the limitation of traditional institutions in the colonial state‘s transformation of 















‗abuse‘ chieftainship to promote its political interests. His upholding of both Sklar and 
Skalnik‘s argument that chieftaincy  ‗could provide the bedrock upon which to construct 
new mixed governance structures since chiefs serve as custodians of and advocates for 
the interests of local communities within the broader political structure‘,48 also confirms 
the pliability and vulnerability of the chiefs.   
 
According to Edwin Ritchken mid-20th century rural resistance was  characterised ‗by 
the creation of a number of seemingly anomalous alliances between various social 
forces, including traditional leaders such as paramount and ordinary chiefs, top 
Bantustan government bureaucrats, tribal authority councillors, traders and 
businesspeople, civil servants, landowners, migrants, women and the youth‘.49 This 
reinforces the idea that drawing the chiefs closer to the populace was aimed, inter alia, 
at preventing their rural constituencies from joining the radical fold. In so far as the new 
chieftaincy was a primary agency for community development, it was a modernised 
instrument. Oomen‘s statement that the ‘Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 envisaged 
traditional leaders as embedded in Tribal Authorities, who would assist and guide the 
chief in the administration of the affairs of the tribe, and in the performance of his other 
functions‘,50 endows the tribal authorities with  legitimating powers. The question that 
arises here is of the capacity of the tribal authorities, the legitimacy of whose 
constitution had not been tested and proven, to legitimate the right of any one natural 
chief to rule.  
 
What also transpires here is that the tribal authorities symbolised the core feature of the 
BAA, one that was to sustain the chieftainship it had authorised. In this context the tribal 
authority was a ‗transforming cum corrupting‘ tool because the chieftainship it 
legitimated was ‗official‘ rather than indigenous. This then was a distorted chieftainship 
which was neither completely traditional nor completely modern. Ritchken reiterates the 
above sentiment in his assertion that ‗the implementation of the Bantu Authorities‘ 
system in the 1950s and early 1960s transformed chiefs into paid bureaucrats‘.51 
Mayer‘s argument that the salaried chiefs stood  to gain in power and wealth and lose in 















position of the chief, seems valid. In many cases, however, such chiefs always emerged 
stronger even without the popular support because their positions were propped up by 
their patrons. Comments by isolated red-blanketed individuals in Mayer, to the effect 
that ‗when chiefs are paid by the government it is sure to be bad. They will be the yes-
men of the Europeans, and they will be harsh to us because they have the European 
government on their side‘, 52 is evidence that the rural communities eyed with distrust 
the chiefs not longer dependent upon their support as they had become government 
lackeys, which meant that they no longer served as a ‗checks and balances‘ mechanism 
on the chiefs‘ modus operandi. This radical brand of indirect rule by chiefs was 
particularly acceptable to the educated individuals who were attracted by the political 
package it promised.53 The divisive aspect of the Act is shown by the diverse responses 
it elicited.   
 
The fact that the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 was also intended as 
a means to co-opt the conservative rural elite and drive a wedge between them and the 
more militant black urban intelligentsia54 generates questions about the ‗purposive‘ 
chieftainship that was being rebuilt. The question of survival of chieftainship as an 
institution against the background of its having been rebuilt on the principle of dividing it 
from a section of its constituency creates ground for further debate. Beinart‘s reference 
to chiefs who initially did not commit to the government‘s scheme but later  succumbed 
to overbearing pressure suggests that the BAA chieftainship neither reflected ‗people‘s 
spirit‘  nor was responsive to it. Costa‘s perspective that ‗chiefs often availed their 
services to both the colonial and post-colonial despotic State, thereby betraying their 
responsibility to their communities‘55 gives credibility to the above argument.  It was a 
suitable tool at the disposal of individuals who would use it to serve their own and their 
patrons‘ interests. Nyamnjoh has referred to the revolutionary theorists‘ critique of 
chieftaincy on the basis that it was ‗appropriated or created by colonial, apartheid and 
postcolonial states for various purposes, including repression and the confection of 
bifurcation into ‗citizens‘ and ‗subjects‘ ‘.56 In that respect, and also because it had the 
potential to deconstruct and decentralise in its operational process, it ceased to be a 















indictment of the Hertzog‘s National Party/Labour Party coalition government‘s passage 
of the Native Administration Act of 1927. The unlimited authority that was vested in the 
governor-general in terms of Act No.38 of 1927 later filtered through to the prime 
ministers and presidents to become an instrument of power that caused havoc in the 
South African chieftaincies.  
 
 
Ritchken reiterates that the creation of Bantustans added a new dimension to the 
disintegration of traditional structures because it facilitated the formation of a 
bureaucratic elite. A factor of great significance is that the new class counted among its 
ranks chiefs, councillors, elected legislative assembly members and relatively well-
educated technocrats who filled positions in the regional administrations. As to the 
chiefs, their exposure to new networks of patronage that had been opened by the 
Bantustan government within rural elites diminished their accountability at the local 
government level. Costa‘s reference to ‗Higher-level chiefs‘ who built networks of 
patronage, through influence and/or control of appointments of their subordinates57 
complements Ritchken‘s argument. His view is that some chiefs failed to support the 
nationalist movement for fear of losing their lucrative positions while those who resisted 
colonialism and apartheid and colonial policies that subverted the interests of their 
communities were killed, jailed, or demoted for their political standpoints. This, he 
claims, exposes the governments‘ overbearing hegemony which was exhibited in its 
divide and rule policy. Costa proposes in this regard a comparative case of the exile of 
Kabaka of Buganda in 1953 who had defied a British governor. This is not to condone 
the collaborative stance of some chiefs, which is the argument that Holomisa seems to 
uphold in his statement that ‗if the chiefs betrayed their responsibility to their 
communities by collaborating with the State, then the State was at the center of the 
problem.‘58 The dilemma of the chiefs was that whilst exclusion from networks entailed 
exclusion from resources, their diminishing role in local matters created a political 
vacuum which made their position appear ambiguous.  
 
The extent to which the introduction of Bantu Authorities in the 1950s changed the 















literature seems to suggest that chiefs were more oppressive than headmen, this does 
not seem to have been the case in the Transkei. Chiefs and headmen in the Transkei 
were pretty much the same people and the changeover to Bantu Authorities did not 
make a big difference to the ordinary person. It was in the way in which the chiefs 
related to each other that the BAA made a really big difference. Whereas all headmen 
were equal under the magistrate, and the paramount chiefs had very little direct 
responsibilities, the Bantu Authorities created hierarchies of status, as between 
paramount chiefs, heads of Tribal Authorities and ordinary headmen. It was the battle 
over status that in some cases sharpened the contest between legitimate and aspiring 
paramounts.  
 
The second important change is that the chiefs acquired a higher profile vis-à-vis the 
apartheid state. The Apartheid or the Bantustan system needed and depended on 
chiefly support to boost its legitimacy. The rewards to co-operative chiefs were much 
greater than ever before, while punishment for non-cooperation was much harsher than 
ever before. The principal chiefs were therefore forced to commit themselves, such 
commitment being of great political importance. Both collaborators and non-
collaborators could be found among the abaThembu chiefs of the last decades of the 
nineteenth century, albeit that some such collaboration was induced rather than 
voluntary, as was the case of Aliva Dalindyebo.   
 
The preceding paragraphs portray a general picture of the vicissitudes of chieftainship 
and the factors and forces that have been instrumental in moulding the institution. While 
some of the examples proffered above relate to chieftainship as an institution it must be 
noted that each chieftainship is in the end and to a greater extent shaped by the 
challenges that confront it and in this regard abaThembu chieftainship is no exception. 
Whilst the theories discussed above seem to apply in varying degrees to the 
abaThembu paramount chieftainship of the period under investigation the extent of the 
damage to its core cannot be measured with accuracy. This is because the   institutional 
survival has been interrupted by periods of discontinuity which in turn is a setback to all 
















Not much has been published on the history of the abaThembu, compared with the 
material on the amaXhosa and amaMpondo. There are only two published sources by 
Africans, neither of whom is an mThembu. J.H. Soga included a chapter on the 
abaThembu in his The South Eastern Bantu (1930).59 W.D. Cingo‘s Ibali LabaThembu 
[A History of abaThembu] (1927),60 is a mere presentation of interesting facts about 
abaThembu of the House of Bhomoyi, its location and that  of its subjects. It does not 
venture beyond 1920, the year that has been identified as a turning point in the history 
of abaThembu chieftainship. Further, Cingo‘s work is not a product of archival research. 
Yali-Manisi‘s praise poems Izibongo zeenkosi ZamaXhosa-Eulogies of amaXhosa 
Chiefs (1952)61 includes a section on abaThembu chiefs. However, such artistic and 
literary sources always need to be authenticated and supplemented. 
  
Ella Wagenaar‘s 1988 Ph.D. thesis62 is concerned with a period before that under 
investigation, though it does give an invaluable background to the political activities of 
the 20th century abaThembu chiefs. Wagenaar‘s work gives a critical analysis of the 
circumstances which led to the breakaway of Matanzima from Ngangelizwe in 1865. 
Joan Broster‘s The Thembu (1976),63 deals exclusively with cultural aspects, especially 
beadwork. William Beinart and Colin Bundy in  Hidden struggles in rural South Africa 
(1987)64 only allude in passing to abaThembu history in the context where territorial 
legislation affected Transkeian Territories at large and (minimally) of the involvement of 
abaThembu in popular rural struggles, and do not deal with the survival of the 
abaThembu chieftainship between 1920 and 1980.  Beinart‘s The political economy of 
Pondoland 1860-1930 (1982)65 and his Twentieth-century South Africa contain little on 
the abaThembu. Touching on the pre-colonial status of chieftainship in his Twentieth-
century South Africa,66 he alludes to the fact that the size and shape of African 
chiefdoms was not static, and further, that their localised responses to colonial 
encroachments were inevitably characterised by a lack of unanimity on the methods to 
be adopted. The only time he refers specifically to abaThembu chieftainship is in the 
context of K.D. Matanzima‘s involvement in the events leading to the granting, in 1963, 
















A Claassens and B. Cousins in Land, Power & Custom (2008)67 deal largely with the 
diminishing role of chiefs in land administrative matters rather than with specific 
chieftainships. While their work contains a subtle warning to the would-be patrons of 
chiefly authority, it could well serve as a springboard for the study of abaThembu 
chieftainship. This is particularly so where land is a factor that is used to upgrade a 
chieftainship to give it corresponding jurisdiction. Land is thus used as the rationale for 
decentralizing a paramountcy, to the neglect and disregard of custom.      
 
The advent of ‗independence‘ for the Transkei, in which abaThembu politics of 
chieftainship played an important part, resulted in an upsurge in literature which touched 
on Thembu history without ever trying to understand chieftainship in terms of its own 
dynamics and those issues that directly affected it. W. Hammond-Tooke gives a reliable 
genealogical history of the abaThembu from the sevent enth to the nineteenth century 
in his Tribes of Umtata district. The fact that he highlights the universal paramountcy of 
Dalindyebo in abaThembuland is of great significance to the subject under investigation: 
he wrote that ‗each one of the abaThembu clusters was under its own chief and was 
practically independent except that they, individually, recognized Dalindyebo as king‘.68 
In his Command or consensus69 Hammond-Tooke does not specifically deal with 
chieftainship, but his outline of the ascendancy of headmen over hereditary chiefs does 
include abaThembu chiefs. Gwendolen Carter, Thomas Karis and Newell Stultz in 
South Africa’s Transkei70 explore the mutual relationship between the apartheid and the 
Bantustan regimes and though they do not analyse the impact of homeland politics on 
abaThembu chieftainship, they particularly mention K.D. Matanzima as a visible 
Transkei spokesperson. Patrick Laurence succeeds in portraying K.D. Matanzima as a 
major facilitator in Pretoria‘s excision of the Transkei Bantustan.71 His account of events 
inevitably exposes the ‗superficial‘ and, perhaps popularly acceptable, basis for 
Sabata‘s opposition to Pretoria‘s designs, and thus his parting of the ways with 
Matanzima, but that is only one aspect of the story of abaThembu chieftainship. 
Laurence‘s work does not cover the socio-political context within which Sabata operated 
















Ivan Evans makes reference to specific abaThembu chiefs in Bureaucracy and race,72 
but only in so far as they were factors in the evolution of native administration in the 
Transkeian Territories. K.D. Matanzima‘s liberal use of the provisions of the Native 
Administration Act of 1927 later in the 20th century to harass and banish those he 
perceived as political opponents73 is a relevant example here.  Whilst the sour 
relationship between Matanzima and Sabata make them important factors in Evans‘s 
work, he focuses more on how the apartheid Government allowed the indigenous 
governance to be ‗bastardised‘ or ‗vulgarised‘ in the hands of collaborators of 
Matanzima‘s type. 
 
Randolph Vigne has,74 written about the varying fortunes in the political activity of the 
Liberal Party (LP)  in the Transkei. He refers to abaThembu chiefs only in so far as they 
impacted on, or were influenced by, the LP‘s political activities. He mentions 
Matanzima‘s condemnation of the LP whose activities were anathema to him. Vigne 
confirms that Matanzima‘s attitude was in stark contrast to Sabata‘s, whose association 
with the LP was based on common opposition to the Transkei‘s march to self-
government.     
 
Roger Southall75 also refers to a few specific incidents that involved prominent 
abaThembu chiefs, when he writes about Transkei political debates and activities before 
self-government. In his portrayal of Transkei‘s road to self-government and eventual 
independence, he demonstrates that Matanzima and Sabata both used their party 
bases to fight over the abaThembu paramountcy. Newell Stultz in Transkei’s half loaf 
only hints at the prejudicial implications of the Bantu Authorities Act (BAA) for Transkei 
chieftainships without analysing the long-term political significance of the 
implementation of BAA on them. Barry Streek and Richard Wicksteed76 relate how the 
Matanzima brothers became self-appointed spokesmen for the Transkei without having 
a popular mandate and in the process, with Pretoria‘s connivance, unilaterally 
subdivided the abaThembu paramount chieftainship into two uneven multi-tribal blocks. 















and Mayer alludes to abaThembu chieftainship78 in the context of the elections 
preceding Transkei‘s self-government.  
 
Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela‘s autobiography is a narrative of his life and times in 
abaThembuland and in South Africa at large. His description of the circumstances 
around the appointment of Jongintaba Dalindyebo as regent reveals that his work has 
an important bearing on the 20th century abaThembu chieftainship. Some of the factors 
that had discredited Jongintaba as regent in 1920 were simply ignored in 1928. 
Mandela highlights other considerations, like Jongintaba‘s education, which Gadla 
Mandela upholds as an empowering factor for the prospective regent.79 
 
Lungisile Ntsebeza and Sukude Matoti have written a chapter entitled ‗Rural Resistance 
in Mpondoland and Thembuland, 1960-1963‘ in the first volume of The Road To 
Democracy In South Africa (2004). Lungisile Ntsebeza, Luvuyo Wotshela, Thembela 
Kepe and Sukude Matoti have also contributed a chapter on ‘Resistance and 
Repression in the Bantustans‘ in the second volume.80 Their emphasis in the latter is on 
both the radicalism of popular resistance to the implementation of the Bantustan policy 
and the reactionary and repressive response it drew from the South African 
government. In the context of Pretoria‘s unleashing the homeland leaders onto a 
recalcitrant populace, Kaiser Matanzima is depicted as a self-appointed spokesperson 
for South Africa‘s political designs in the Transkei. While Matanzima‘s consolidation of 
tribal authorities was necessary for both self-government and eventual ‗independence‘ 
to take shape, the main focus of the chapter is on the evolving political landscape in the 
homelands and Sabata‘s response to it in the ‗independent‘ Transkei, and how this in 
turn affected his party‘s political activity and the abaThembu paramount chieftainship. 
The authors succeed in portraying Matanzima‘s bureaucratically-sustained role in 
manipulating the situation, and the destabilising effect this has on both the political 
activity of the opposition and Sabata‘s paramount chieftainship.  
 
Ntsebeza‘s 2003 thesis81 is a critical discussion of the interaction of forces that were 















abaThembu paramountcy in the Xhalanga District. Though his study does not touch on 
all factors involved in the changing faces of the total abaThembu chieftainship, 
Ntsebeza refers to instances of Sabata‘s efforts to thwart Matanzima‘s aspirations to a 
chieftainship of a higher status. Ntsebeza‘s subsequent book Democracy 
compromised82 is a portrayal of the contradiction inherent in nurturing chieftainship 
within the context of democratic structures in a democratic South Africa. He devotes 
sections of his study to the socio-economic and political forces that hindered and/or 
retarded the resuscitation of chieftainship in the Xhalanga District. The amaMfengu 
resistance to the establishment of tribal authorities, which they did not regard as 
complementary to their social class, was one such force which interfered with the 
smooth implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act.  On the other hand, Matanzima‘s 
initiative in facilitating the establishment of tribal authorities in Xhalanga made Sabata 
feel insecure, for he regarded the action taken by Matanzima as his prerogative. Against 
this setting, Ntsebeza contextualises the exacerbation of the ongoing power struggle 
between Sabata and Matanzima. 
 
Shula Marks in her The ambiguities of dependence in South Africa,83 depicts the 
dilemmas that confronted both the state and the individual in its interaction with King 
Solomon Dinizulu, John Dube, George Champion and, later, KwaZulu‘s controversial 
Bantustan leader, Buthelezi, whom she appropriately describes as a man who 
‗embodies in his contradictory position all the ambiguities of a Solomon, a Dube, a 
Champion‘.84  At the same time the government had strategically to forestall a threat of 
a confrontation with a united front. Marks‘s discussion of the ‗politics of tightrope‘ is 
relevant to the narrative of the abaThembu chieftainship. This is, in itself, a narrative of 
dependence and of ambiguities that accompanied the various pieces of legislation, as 
much as one of interaction with forces that threatened to complicate relationships with 
the South African government.    
 
Nicholas Cope in his To Bind The Nation ; Solomon ka Dinizulu and Zulu Nation 1913-















and imperial forces. Though certain aspects of his work could be said to have parallels 
in the subject under investigation his focus is strictly on the vicissitudes of the Zulu 
monarchs. He highlights the fact that contemporary Zulu monarchs have demonstrated 
visible preference for politics of compromise above  those of activism. 85 
 
Machobane in his Government And Change  in Lesotho 1800 -1966 A Study of Political 
Institutions gives an overview of the politics surrounding the accession of Prince Bereng 
as Moshoeshoe 11 after the death of  Paramount Chief Seeiso Griffith on 26 December 
1940.  The role of Leabua Jonathan,  previously perceived as a political nonentity but 
later revealing himself as a cunning and devastating politician, makes him a subject of 
comparison with K.D. Matanzima. Both men are portrayed resorting to secular positions 
and  employing executive powers to bar or oust legitimate encumbents from their  
positions.  Machobane‘s book is, however, exclusively a history of Lesotho chieftaincy 
which merely presents a parallel in the Jonathan and Chieftainess Regent Mantsebo 
versus Matanzima and Sabata case. 86  
 
 
In a chapter entitled ‗Chieftaincy and the concept of articulation : South Africa circa 
1900-50‘,87 Beinart shows how chieftainship during the apartheid era, in which the 
compliant chiefs were active participants, was a creation of the state. His reference to 
the government‘s strategy of increasing the power of the chiefs through the Bantu 
Authorities Act has a direct bearing on this study, because abaThembu chiefs 
responded variously to the act, and this, in effect, created division among them. 
 
Barbara Oomen‘s book Chiefs in South Africa (2005)88 deals mostly with the issues of 
late twentieth century chieftainship. Its relevance to this study is in its interrogation of 
issues that relate to comparative studies on chieftainship and other factors that 
conferred status on otherwise junior traditional leaders during the apartheid era. 
Mahmood Mamdani‘s exposition89 of the politics of decentralised despotism and indirect 
rule also relates to the study of the abaThembu chieftainship, for abaThembu chiefs 
during the period under investigation operated under the rule of the Governor-General.  















systematically strengthened but were made accountable to a new consensus, one that 
emphasized the state as the determiner of the consensus‘.90 Mamdani sees apartheid 
as a form of ‗full-blown‘ indirect rule and this makes his work relevant to this study 
because apartheid provided a conducive political context for the moulding of 
abaThembu chieftainship. 
 
In his 1989 thesis,91 Rulashe mentions the abaThembu only in the context of a wrangle 
that affected the Zweledinga community in the Whittlesea district, while that of Marala 
entitled  ‗Investigation into the Transkei‘s position as a sovereign independent state‘92 is 
an examination of the criteria for sovereign statehood in the Transkeian polity rather 
than a study of abaThembu chieftainship.  
 
 
Harold Scheub, Ruth Finnegan and Ngwabi Bhebe have all produced convincing 
testimonies on the role of oral histories as essential sources in the historical writing. But 
neither Scheub‘s  book The uncoiling python ; South African Storytellers and resistance 
93 nor  Finnegan‘s The Oral and beyond; doing things with words in Africa94 as well as  
Bhebe edited Oral tradition in Southern Africa95  shed specific light on the  subject under 
investigation.   
 
  
In an unpublished manuscript, ‗Out  of court: the memoirs of a Black lawyer in apartheid 
South Africa 1950-1960‘, Wycliff Tsotsi characterises the harsh methods employed by 
K. D. Matanzima when he implemented the Bantu Authorities Act in those locations of 
Emigrant abaThembuland where there was resistance to it. Chief Bhekisizwe 
Mthikrakra‘s unpublished manuscript ‘UKumkani USabata Dalindyebo Ah! 
Jonguhlanga!‘96 is a rather disjointed account of a few incidents that relate to Sabata‘s 
youth and later political life.   
 
Only a few works, then, touch on the central question which this study seeks to address, 















chieftainship of abaThembuland over a period of six decades from 1920. These works 
include Lungisile Ntsebeza‘s Democracy compromised (2006,) which addresses 
aspects of the Xhalanga phase of the power struggle between Sabata and Matanzima , 
and Lungisile Ntsebeza and Mcebisi Ndletyana‘s brief biography of ‗Comrade King 
Sabata Dalindyebo‘.97 which exposes interesting aspects of Sabata‘s youth and later 
political life. Both briefly portray some of Sabata‘s political experiences in the land of his 
birth, his subsequent death in exile and his double burial in abaThembuland.   
SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
This thesis deals with aspects of the history of the abaThembu paramount chieftainship 
between 1920 and1980. It focuses on successive paramount chiefs,  and the changing 
contexts in which they operated. Reference to other parties is made only in so far as 
they interacted with, impacted on, and even influenced, the development of events in 
the abaThembu chieftainship of the period.  
 
The study begins by interrogating the paramount chieftainship of the Dalindyebo era in 
order to identify and scrutinise the bureaucratic and socio-political baggage it 
bequeathed to the evolving profile of the abaThembu chieftainship. It thus examines the 
impact of inconsistent customary procedures and anomalous practices on the operation 
of the chiefdom. Successive abaThembuland regencies and the legacy that they left for 
Sabata are studied.   Such an investigation of chieftainship will identify the factors and 
forces, both external and internal, which impacted on and destabilised the 
chieftainship‘s institutional fabric. It further seeks to establish which of the shortcomings 
and inherent weaknesses of the abaThembu paramountcy were beyond the capacity 
and the control of customary structures. This makes it necessary to investigate phases 
of instability between 1920 and 1980. The provisions of the 1927 Native Administration 
Act will also be examined in order  to shed light on whether or not it departed from the 
1920 Native Affairs Act, and to determine how far its functionality influenced the passing 
















Another objective is to compare and contrast the political philosophy and outlook of 
Sabata and Matanzima and analyse the significance of their perspectives on life for the 
future of the chieftainship. Did they influence each other‘s responses to the BAA, and 
inadvertently, for different motives and goals, help shape the other‘s actions? This will 
inevitably be linked to the ‗budding‘ Matanzima paramountcy as well as the jockeying 
between Matanzima and Poto for the domination of the Transkei‘s political arena prior to 
its self-government. Also analysed are events beginning with the arrest, trial and 
deposition of Sabata, as well as the circumstances around the creation of a new line of 
rulers in the house of Paramount ChiefJongilizwe Dalindyebo. The abaThembu 
chieftainship during Sabata‘s exile will only briefly be touched upon. In conclusion, the 
study will attempt to establish the extent to which Sabata was, in relation to the 
abaThembu chieftaincy, symbolizing the end of the traditionalist struggle and the 
beginning of a new one, that of nationalism. 
METHODOLOGY 
A variety of sources was used in the research process. Archival material held in the 
government archives located in Cape Town, Pretoria, Bhisho and Mthatha includes the 
correspondence between the Department of Native Affairs and the Chief Magistrate of 
the Transkeian Territories; letters from the Chief Magistrate of King William‘s Town;  
correspondence from the various magisterial districts of the Transkei and Ciskei which 
dealt with abaThembu affairs; files dealing with Transkei chieftainships and 
correspondence from the office of the Under Secretary for Native Affairs. Reports of 
government commissions into abaThembu affairs also fall under this category. Reports 
of various select committees on native bills; various government memoranda; reports 
and diaries of native commissioners; resident magistrate office records; records of the 
Chief Magistrate of the Transkei; government publications such as those of  the United 
Transkeian Territories General  Council and a wide variety of newspapers are available 
for the first half of the twentieth century. Reports of more general government 
commissions (the Native Affairs Commission of 1921; the Fagan Commission of 1948 
and the Tomlinson Commission of 1955; The Nhlapo Commission of 2003), 















utilised. The Mayibuye Centre at the University of the Western Cape proved to be a 
valuable repository of a wide variety of secondary sources on the history of the 
Transkei. The Centre‘s newspaper cuttings cover both the Transkei‘s pre-and post-
independence eras.  
 
Fieldwork and oral research were essential in all stages of this study. Interviews were a 
vital component of this project even though they were sometimes very difficult to 
authenticate and verify. Members of the abaThembu royal family from both the 
Dalindyebo region and its western counterpart were interviewed. Those interviewed 
included the customary uncles to the 20th century generation of abaThembu kings and 
chiefs, namely the Joyi brothers (Bangilizwe and Thwalimfene and their cousin 
Anderson Delagubhe Joyi) descended from the Great House f Ngubengcuka through 
Shweni. They were asked questions relating to the general abaThembu history of the 
early 20th century as well as their personal experiences as opponents of the Bantu 
Authorities Act. Bangilizwe Joyi shed further light on his activities as a member of the 
‗Joyi gang‘ (King Sabata‘s advisers), and on the events leading to their banishment 
while Anderson explained his role in the resistance to the self-government and eventual 
Bantustan status of the Transkei. He also tried to elucidate the factors that were 
involved in his appointment as acting King of the abaThembu just before and after King 
Sabata‘s reburial. Pumeza Joyi-Notununu, Bangilizwe‘s daughter who is passionate 
about chieftainship, was a valuable informant. Interviews, in some cases, yielded more 
than was expected. They are a source that can never be exhausted because 
sometimes a single interview opens possibilities for others. Although not all the 
information desired   was got  from interviewing sessions, most of the people identified 
as key informants on this subject yielded useful material.  
 
The historically informed remnants of the Mandela (excluding Rolihlahla, whom it was 
not possible to meet) and Mbekeni families (including the now late Dr W. Kheyizana 
Mbekeni), descended from the junior house of Ngubengcuka, were asked questions 
about the death of King Dalindyebo Ngangelizwe and the criteria used in the nomination 















because he had personal experience of both Dalindyebo and Sampu Jongilizwe, though 
he was sceptical of Matanzima‘s power-hungry tactics. Rev J.E.B. Ndungane (now 
deceased) shared his experiences with Jongilizwe Dalindyebo in the initiation school. 
The living members of King Sabata‘s immediate family including his great wife, 
NoMoscow, and son, King Zwelibanzi (Buyelekhaya) Jonguhlanga, and Patrick 
Dalindyebo were able to clarify the circumstances surrounding the first burial of their 
husband and father. Nopenge Mgolombane, Sabata‘s sister from NoKapa Jongilizwe 
(now resident at Ncise) was asked questions relating to her father‘s schooling, his role 
as paramount chief and his last days.  
 
The descendants of the House of Mvelase (T. M. Mbambisa, a Transkei Qhudeni 
mThembu who was named after the retainer of the Great House of Mthembu), M. 
Mpahlwa, M. Dlulane, B.B. Maphosa and elderly remnants of the Mangisa Family were 
eager to answer questions relating to their co-existence in the Transkei alongside their 
politically ‗senior‘ cousins from the junior house of their common ancestor mThembu. 
Ngangomhlaba Matanzima was, and is, an important oral informant because even 
though he belongs with  the old order of abaThembu chiefs  he has lived to see the 
chieftainship of the new era, and is actively involved in the efforts to get the government 
to accord the amakhosi better recognition and more administrative responsibility. T. 
Tshunungwa (now deceased) revealed another dimension concerning Matanzima‘s 
unauthorised incorporation of the land of amaTshatshu baThembu in order to have his 
chieftainship elevated at their expense which, Tshunungwa argued, had as good a 
claim. Other contemporary chiefs from the Mgudlwa family and the co-operative 
bureaucratic chiefs were also interviewed. Chief Jonginyaniso Mthikrakra of Tyhalara 
was an important interviewee because of his personal experience of most of the events 
referred to in the study. Mda kaMda‘s knowledge of matters of chieftainship and his 
interaction with Sabata has made him an invaluable informant.  Major General 
Bantubonke Holomisa, who was head of Transkei at the time of the reburial of Sabata 
and is a mThembu subject, proved to be an indispensable informant in the compilation 















consultations that took place between his office and the elders of the abaThembu clan 
before the exhumation and reburial of King Sabata‘s remains.   
 
Other informants who have contributed in no small measure to this study are Nobantu 
Gobodo, H. M Tsengiwe, B. Mkumatela and Mandlakazi Jama (née Nonkonyane) as 
well as Wandile Kuse and his sister Nohayinje (Hygienia). They shed light, inter alia, 
particularly on the diverse responses of the Xhalanga people to the installation of 
community and/ or tribal authorities. Nomqondiso Malotana from Gqebenya Location 
(Lady Frere) also reported on the conditions that governed land holding in the Glen 




Chapter One discusses the socio-political state of abaThembu chieftainship from about 
1920 until the death of Dalindyebo‘s heir in 1928. It analyses the forces that sustained 
abaThembu paramountcy during this period.  
 
The second chapter interrogates the successive regencies of Jongintaba and 
Dabulamanzi to determine if, and how, the twenty-five year period from 1928 to 1954 
secured or weakened the Dalindyebo paramountcy.    
Chapter Three discusses the advent of the Bantu Authorities Act in abaThembuland in 
the 1950s. It also explains how the diverse responses to the implementation of the Act 
created fertile ground for the triumph of the forces that tampered with abaThembu unity.  
 
The fourth chapter describes how socio-political and economic factors retarded or 
facilitated the revival of tribal authorities in the districts of Xhalanga and Glen Grey. It 
also shows how Matanzima presumptuously used the resuscitation of authorities as a 
base for the BAA to undermine the abaThembu paramountcy and to outwit Sabata.  
 
Chapter Five analyses the aspects of the rivalry and jockeying for the control of 















of self-government as testimony to Sabata‘s first loss in his series of political battles with 
Matanzima. The chapter also presents the conferment of paramountcy on Matanzima 
as an event that ratified both the geographic and the political division of the abaThembu 
chieftainship. It is argued that the simultaneous operation of the two paramountcies 
pushed Sabata into fighting for the undoing of the decentralisation of his paramountcy.  
 
Matanzima on the other hand utilised his state office, supported by his bureaucratic 
paramountcy, to push through Transkei‘s independence. This would enable him to 
silence the opposition from a position of power and thus methodically isolate Sabata.  
 
Chapter Six focuses on the practical implications of the division reflected in the demise 
of Sabata dynasty and the simultaneous invention of the Bambilanga line of rulers, all in 
the House of Jongilizwe.  It is argued that Matanzima‘s creation of the Bambilanga 
paramountcy implied a hierarchical gap between the two, and that this automatically 
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FROM DALINDYEBO TO JONGILIZWE c. 1920-1928. 
INTRODUCTION 
The abaThembu chieftainship has, over a period of almost two centuries changed 
cyclically. The evolutionary pattern reflected in the above process has made the subject 
of chieftainship an attribute of the pre-colonial, colonial, post-colonial and democratic 
eras. The abaThembu chieftainship throughout its history, has been naturally subjected 
to indigenous law and, subsequently, to various forms of what Sanders has described 
as ‗distorted autonomic customary law.‘1 The contemporary abaThembu chieftainship 
has clearly outlived the colonial and apartheid regimes. Its survival has made imperative 
the analysis of the catalytic effect of the external forces on the internal processes of the 
subject chieftainship to determine the impact of the interactive operations on the 
historical institution.    
 
This chapter discusses the image that the abaThembu chieftainship presented around 
1920, and the extent to which its attributes were sustainable beyond the Dalindyebo 
era. It will be argued that Dalindyebo‘s rule reflected the ‗benevolent paternalism----and 
purposive bureaucracy‘2  which according to Dubow was the government‘s ultimate goal 
with regard to chieftainship. The focus here is on how the political environment that 
prevailed during Dalindyebo‘s rule and the social and political situation within the 
abaThembu kingdom influenced and facilitated his modus operandi. The chapter also 
analyses Dalindyebo‘s legacy as is reflected in the transition from his paramountcy to 
the accession of his heir, Sampu Jongilizwe, in 1924. The chapter thus interrogates the 
ways in which the stability of the abaThembu paramountcy was nurtured during the 
Dalindyebo era and whether any measures were put in place to sustain it afterwards. 
Finally, the chapter examines the highlights of Jongilizwe‘s brief reign and the extent to 



















ABATHEMBULAND DURING DALINDYEBO’S PARAMOUNTCY    
 
Dalindyebo was born into a kingdom that had long lost its political coherence as a result 
of a breakaway of his clan‘s founding ancestor, Bhomoyi, from Mvelase, the heir of 
Mthembu.3 This first recorded split took place in Northern Nguni territory. Bhomoyi‘s 
amaDlomo cluster eventually became assimilated into the Southern abeNguni unit, 
where they established themselves as a great house in their own right. E. J. Warner, a 
government agent with the Emigrant abaThembu,4 and J.G. Strijdom, the South African 
Prime Minister,5 have provided mutually corroborative testimonies about the 
establishment of Emigrant abaThembuland in 1865.6 Strijdom acknowledged that the 
colonial government was instrumental in the creation of the semi-independent 
chieftainship of the Emigrant abaThembu, under Rhaxothi Matanzima, claiming that:  
These sections of the Thembu tribe thereafter regarded themselves 
as independent of the main body of the Thembu tribe, although they 
always acknowledged that the heir to the Great House was their 
senior, and therefore the paramount chief of all the Thembu.7  
 
Dalindyebo was therefore destined to rule abaThembuland which, though contiguous, 
was not really politically consolidated. Furthermore, the colonial annexation of the 
abaThembu polity which coincided with his accession in 1885 implied the demise of that 
kingdom‘s genuine political independence. Dalindyebo was, however, still at the apex of 
chieftainship in a politico-traditional context, even though his paramountcy was inferior 
as a result of colonial meddling. The Department of Native Affairs‘s Secretary (SNA) 
spelled out Dalindyebo‘s nominal paramountcy in a letter wherein he warned against 
Dalindyebo being addressed as a ‗paramount chief‘ as that title applied exclusively to 
the government.8 In this directive one senses an example of what Sanders has 
described as capturing custom and tearing it from its folk roots9  while also distorting 
autonomic law in the name of  ‗enlightened politics‘.10 The bureaucratic instruction not to 
address Dalindyebo as king or paramount chief conformed to the dispensation with 
regard to the chiefs that existed at the beginning of the 20th century. The prestige and 
status he embodied as a paramount chief was demeaned once his title was 
downgraded: a move surely taken to strengthen the government‘s position and to 
















Dalindyebo presented an interesting comparison with his predecessor, King 
Ngangelizwe, whose activities and experiences showed that his embrace of colonial law 
came about as a result of induced compliance. The induced consent brought forth 
benefits like the house that the government built for Ngangelizwe on the site of the 
Wellington Prison in Mthatha. A home in Mthatha gave Dalindyebo an invaluable 
opportunity to attend St John‘s Missionary School.11 This arrangement also enabled the 
authorities to keep an eye on the activities of their wards, especially the major 
beneficiary, Ngangelizwe, who was known to be 'a man of ungovernable temper‘ 12. 
Zwelodumo has confirmed that Ngangelizwe hoped that education would endow 
Dalindyebo with wisdom and logical thinking.13 It thus becomes clear that exposure to 
education nurtured expectations about the heir in Ngangelizwe as much as it gave the 
authorities a hint of a chieftainship with a difference. The question of whether 
Dalindyebo would choose to extricate the abaThembu crown from its colonial shackles, 
or comply, was a choice of great political significance for the future and autonomy of the 
abaThembu chieftainship.  
 
GOVERNMENT REACTION FORCES DALINDYEBO TO DITCH TILE  
The first threat to Dalindyebo‘s relationship with the colonial authority was posed by 
Reverend Tile, who otherwise symbolised the colonialist‘s traditional ally, the Christian 
church. Tile‘s factoring himself into abaThembu politics, as early as 1874,14 during  
Ngangelizwe‘s reign, had as its visible benefit spiritual gratification for the colonial 
government rather than genuine political gain for the non-christianized Ngangelizwe. His 
setting up of a Thembu Church in 1884 which he planned to have headed by 
Ngangelizwe implied a genuine invention of universal regal authority in abaThembuland. 
While the genuine motives for Tile‘s initiative are not clear, it is also an aspect of great 
historical significance that Ngangelizwe did not perceive the better educated Tile as a 
rival. A typical 19th century chief would have viewed with suspicion any visible proximity 
between his subjects and agents of Christianity. There was a political irony in the case 
at hand where political ties in an apparent national context were forged between a 















as a broker, perhaps a dishonest one from the government‘s perspective, cannot be 
ruled out. It must be assumed that the short-sighted Ngangelizwe thought he would, in 
the strength that Tile symbolised in his eyes, gain socio-political security, both important 
and immediate, as a counter to the government‘s political presure.  When the colonial 
erosion of chiefly power became a visibly progressive process in the last decade of the 
nineteenth century, the government changed tone and tune. Tile was suddenly viewed 
more as a rival authority than a pacifying agent. Tile‘s curious manoeuvres evoked the 
government‘s unease with what they perceived to be a malign influence. What the 
government feared most was that Tile‘s continued -perhaps domineering- interaction 
with the recently ascended Dalindyebo would, if unchecked, soak abaThembu chiefdom 
into an unprecedented union of customary ritual and indigenous Christian rites. The 
government grew even more jittery when Dalindyebo, their model chief, visibly threw his 
weight behind Tile, the self-appointed abaThembuland re-unifier. This could well have 
been seen by the abaThembu progressives as Dalindyebo‘s daring effort to break loose 
from the colonial restraints. The government then warned Tile to make the 
administrative and advisory services at Dalindyebo‘s court the exclusive prerogative of 
the magistrate. This was not an anomaly under a system in which the authority flowed 
downwards from the white magistrate who was answerable to the chief magistrate of 
the Transkeian Territories.15  
 
The government‘s protests intimidated Dalindyebo to the extent of making him retract   
his support for Tile. This, coupled with Mvuzo Matanzima‘s insistence on the secrecy of 
his patronage of the meetings revealed Dalindyebo‘s lack of both territorial authority and 
political power to back Tile‘s initiative of re-inventing the politico-religious hierarchy in 
abaThembuland. It must also be noted that the Dalindyebo‘s missionary education 
meant that his and Tile‘s perception of the abaThembu nation‘s political predicament 
was compatible.  Saunders bears testimony to Dalindyebo‘s apparent understanding of 
Tile‘s grand national designs in his claim that Tile initially enjoyed the ‗full favour of the 
new, mission-educated Paramount‘.16 Saunders further confirms that Tile acted as 
Dalindyebo‘s spokesperson before the chief magistrate, and also complained on his 
















Mvuzo Matanzima‘s express instruction- presumably to Dalindyebo- to keep as a 
closely guarded secret18 his attendance at Tile‘s meetings convened to discuss the 
resuscitation of abaThembu unity was of political interest. Dalindyebo was not likely to 
interrogate Mvuzo on account of his ingenuity, for though easily persuaded, he had not 
shown that he could be kept persuaded. One of these meetings had been convened in 
November of 1890 at the insistence of Dalindyebo for the express purpose of discussing  
‗ways in which the Thembu could again urge their demand for a united Thembuland‘.19 
Odendaal‘s emphatic description of Tile as a ‗fervent Thembu nationalist‘,20 rather than 
a religious reformer, draws attention to the two roles that Tile played in abaThembuland. 
It also inadvertently focuses attention on the motives that could have prompted 
Dalindyebo and Matanzima to attempt the restoration of the national abaThembu 
dominion to its former political status. The disentangling of abaThembu paramountcy 
from the religious tutelage of colonial origins was critical to any revival of its past glory. 
A fact of great historical significance in the politico-religious saga is that the interests of 
the various parties were incompatible. The restoration of the abaThembu chiefdom 
would surely impact upon Matanzima‘s almost half-century-old seniority in Emigrant 
abaThembuland. Any ‗pontifical‘ prestige that would accrue to Tile, should the historical 
restorative restructuring materialise, would inevitably work against the government‘s 
grand objectives. Tile‘s proposal to have district magistracies abolished would have put 
Dalindyebo on a par with the chief magistrate. It would also have centralised the 
abaThembu territorial chieftainship and helped undo both the objectives and the 
benefits of the execution of the émigré‘ abaThembu settlement experiment of 1865. It is 
also politically significant in that the government‘s interests were better served in the 
perpetuation of the split between Ngangelizwe and the Rhaxothi Matanzima of the RHH  
of Mthikrakra. 
 
DALINDYEBO’S EQUIVOCAL INTERACTION WITH THE GOVERNMENT  
Dalindyebo‘s rule often placed him in critical situations in respect of his interaction with 
government. He compromised his popularity with his subjects when he deferred to the 















the abaThembu aversion to an exercise which would have a negative economic impact. 
Matanzima had barred land surveying in St Mark‘s District after witnessing its 
consequences in the neighbouring Glen Grey. He asked the interpreter to admonish the 
Cofimvaba magistrate thus, ‗Mr interpreter, kindly tell the blue-eyed boy that 
abaThembu aren‘t ready yet for this imposed land-surveying process‘.21 Dalindyebo‘s 
failure to support Matanzima‘s objection portrayed him as someone who lacked courage 
to exercise his own free will and inevitably endorsed, blindly, every government 
command at the expense of abaThembu patriotic spirit.  
 
Dalindyebo‘s constitutional authority was, like that of the other chiefs in the region, 
limited by the policy of direct rule.22  His powers were further weakened by the 
government‘s appointment of location headmen, non-traditional stipendiaries who 
assumed, inter alia, the function of land administrators.23 The new system had no room 
for hereditary chiefs who previously personified all administrative and executive 
authority.24 Matanzima‘s letter  of 1901 to the resident magistrate of Cofimvaba proves 
that the  system of headmen was perceived by chiefs as both a threat and major 
political impediment to their authority. Mvuzo pleaded thus  
I wish the magistrate could give me some ground solely for myself, 
that I should not be ruled over by headmen who are troublesome and 
quarrel for nothing, more especially now as they pay no attention to 
what I say, that is why I wish to be given a place of my own to live ---
-- I believe I have been loyal to the government and hold a higher  
position than the headmen.25 
 
The above request must be seen in the context of earlier applications by both 
Dalindyebo and Matanzima for farms in the Ncihana valley (Elliotdale) and Qamata 
Basin26 respectively. The applications were clearly motivated by the chiefs‘ desire to 
escape being subordinated to headmen who they regarded as commoners and 
therefore inferiors. Of great historical significance for the paramountcy of Dalindyebo 
was the reiteration by the SNA that the chiefs should not be allowed to own land and 
permit people to live on it. It was feared that should the forbidden practice be endorsed 
by granting land to chiefs, chiefly power which had been broken by conquest would be 















their power by turning government land grants into personal fiefdoms. The two chiefs 
were eventually granted farms27 after the Cape Parliament had passed the Glen Grey 
Act which provided for a system of ‗Native Councils.‘28 
 
The above act paved the way for the inauguration in 1895 of the General Council of the 
Transkei (TGC) by the representatives of Transkei southern districts (Butterworth, 
Tsomo, Idutywa and Ngqamakhwe). Ntsebeza confirms that the chief magistrate of 
Mthatha presided over the TGC, a body that included the magistrates of the southern 
Transkei districts with their councils and eight members drawn in equal ratio from the 
four districts. The administrative framework of the future TGC developed into the 
UTTGC.29 Dalindyebo‘s reign, with his active involvement, saw the establishment of the 
UTTGC,30 appropriately named the General Council of abaThembu and the government  
magistrates.31 He was one of the three paramount chiefs reported to have attended the 
sessions of the Bhunga in its early years.32 This led Dower, an official from the DNA to 
commend Dalindyebo as ‗a trusted member of the General Council, [who] has been a 
loyal and consistent supporter of the Government‘.33 Mayer‘s description of the Bhunga 
as a ‗White-dominated talking shop in which the educated [the likes of Dalindyebo and 
Jongintaba later] were best qualified to take part‘34 raises questions about the negative 
impression such association created of Dalindyebo. It also brings to light the conflict of 
interests between the colonialist and the traditionalist as personified by the abaThembu 
paramountcy. 
 
What endeared Dalindyebo to the government would surely invite prejudice towards him 
from both the traditional elements and extra-parliamentary quarters? This notion 
becomes implicit in Mbeki‘s interpretation of the origins of the Bhunga and the effect 
that body had on the political life and functioning of traditional governance. His 
affirmation that the Bhunga‘s installation of a pseudo local government was intended to 
shield the white government from any protest action35 is corroborated by Odendaal. He 
has defined the Bhunga‘s objectives in training people to ‗look to themselves, through 
their own elected representatives, for the redress of the wrongs they suffered‘36 as 















enhance chiefly status. The Government‘s pretended condescension is also apparent in 
the remarks of some abaThembu chiefs about their perception of the Bhunga 
establishment. Anderson Joyi acknowledged during an interview that he and his brother, 
Ndabankulu, eventually prevailed upon their father Zwelibhangile to withdraw altogether 
from the Bhunga sessions. They asked him to provide examples of cases where 
learners demonstrated to their instructor how to teach them. The confrontation was 
enough to convince Zwelibhangile eventually that the UTTGC was indeed a platform 
where chiefs imparted to the white magistrates methods of governing the black 
communities.37 Paramount Chief Dalindyebo‘s apparent patronage of a system that was 
progressively facilitating the assault on the chiefs‘ power base exposes him as one who 
was caught up in the politics of the ambiguities of dependence. His failure to be part of a 
patriotic, even national abaThembu front, also presents his critics with a political puzzle 
which further finds justification in a memorandum of the Secretary for Native Affairs 
(SNA). He commended Dalindyebo thus   
Dalindyebo has been consistently loyal and very helpful to officers of the 
Government. His services are always requisitioned where any opposition is 
expected to be offered to the orders of Government or in the administration of 
laws. At the time of the annexation of Pondoland he volunteered to accompany 
Major Henry George Elliot with 15,000 men.During the outbreak of rinderpest he 
worked hard in order to induce his people to accept the advice of Government 
by inoculating their cattle. He thus incurred the sore displeasure of a section of 
his people by whom threats against his life were made.38 
 
Whilst it is apparent that the Government was more concerned about the 
accomplishment of its goals than with Dalindyebo‘s chiefly image, he also clearly failed 
to appraise his chiefship. Even though he presents a fair comparison with Solomon 
kaDinizulu in Marks‘s Ambiguities of dependence there still exists incompatibility of 
motives and methods between the two men. While Solomon was always ready to tender 
‗abject‘ apologies after each willful exhibit of insubordination,39 Dalindyebo seemed to 
lack the power to take a visible stand against all that smacked of government orders. 
Yet the value the two men added to the colonial governance of their followers was, 
ironically, the reason the colonialists always strove to retain their loyalty. Dalindyebo 
failed to recognise his political worth to the government in the facilitation of their political 















simply by his blind co-operation. In Zwelodumo‘s words ‗Dalindyebo chose to be a lone 
fighter for no reason. His focus was on the Government, his benefactor, and he 
preferred that the abaThembu should follow behind him. He was an egocentric ruler 
who always looked out for greener pastures for himself‘.40 Zwelodumo‘s comment 
confirms the government‘s preference for a man who was prepared to trade for anything 
that was likely to bring him personal gain.  
 
DALINDYEBO IN THE FOREFRONT OF THE CHIEFS’S RESPONSES TO EXTRA-
PARLIAMENTARY OVERTURES  
Another political development that exposed Dalindyebo‘s indecisiveness was the 
apparent erosion or denial to the Blacks of political rights in the constitution of a unified 
South Africa.41 This was reflected in the release by the South African National 
Convention of its draft version of the South Africa Act which brought forth an historical 
African agitation. The Native Convention proposed amendments to the racial provisions 
of the draft South Africa Act.42 The TTGC also added its voice to the protests by 
forwarding a petition through the Governor of the Cape Colony asking for the 
expurgation of the ‗colour line in the South Africa Act.‘.43 Dalindyebo was one of the 
signatories of the UTTGC petition.44 That all appeals went unheeded was evident in the 
draft act where relevant clauses remained unchanged. This meant that Paramount 
Chief Dalindyebo who had been publicly commended by the government for his co-
operation was also not accorded the right to represent his own people politically. Mvuzo 
Matanzima and other abaThembu chiefs who had sided with the government in the 
amaMpondomise Rebellion of 1880-8 and amaGcaleka War of 1878-79 also reaped no 
political rewards. The government‘s insensitivity to African demands for a right to 
participate in the political process belittled and estranged the chiefs from their 
constituencies. Their compromised leadership catapulted them into the fold of the 
‘emerging African elite which was more than ready to assume leadership on behalf of 
their traditional compatriots in political challenges‘.45  
 
Against this background must be understood the communication of Dalindyebo with 















the first two years of the Union Government.46 The return from abroad of Alfred 
Mangena, a former Vice President of the South African Native Convention, and his 
assumption of an advisory role to Dalindyebo, was expected to impact on the political 
inclinations of the paramount chief. It is also in this context, inter alia, that Dalindyebo‘s 
attendance at the Universal Races Congress of 1911 in London must be seen.47 This  
was a multi-purpose exercise aimed at luring the chiefs into the fold of the extra-
parliamentarians. It would also afford Dalindyebo an opportunity to interact and rub 
shoulders with the leadership of the radicals while he was being exposed to world 
politics. At the same time, as part of an intensive crusade to draw the chiefs into extra-
parliamentary politics, Rubusana emerged as an adviser to Dalindyebo while Jabavu 
maintained regular contact with other Transkeian chiefs.48  
 
The Union Government‘s failure to accommodate Black people in its political 
dispensation exposed their political constraints to the traditional leaders. They soon 
realised that they shared common problems with the African community at large.  They 
threw their support behind a radical leadership that promised to address their 
grievances and correct political anomalies. It is in this context that must be understood 
the symbolic reaction against the racial discrimination that was evident in the gathering 
in Bloemfontein of African leaders from all over Southern Africa on 8 January 1912. The 
delegates included leading members of the African elite and traditional chiefs among 
whom was Dalindyebo.49 He was at the forefront of the initial responses of the 
abaThembu chiefs to overtures from extra-parliamentary organisations. He also became 
one of seven paramount chiefs who were recommended for adoption as Honorary 
Presidents of the SANNC.50 The fact that his visible honours in the nascent struggle did 
not appear to be promising anything tangible must have disappointed all the 
constituencies that had hoped to lure him. Furthermore, Dalindyebo‘s failure to utilise 
his honourable positions and dignified profile to consolidate the struggle against racial 
injustices gives credibility to Zwelodumo‘s claim about Ngangelizwe‘s earlier 
assessment that Dalindyebo lacked firmness of character. This defect in his character,  
which his father had hoped education would correct, was complemented by 















that he always looked for an opportunity to line his own nest, and thus abaThembu 
interests would always be of secondary concern to him.  
 
Dalindyebo also witnessed the passing of the 1913 Land Act. Its core terms and 
application of, especially where it concerned the allocation and distribution of land- the 
basis of pre-colonial economies- challenged the chiefs‘ authority. As a consequence of  
the hardships brought about by the act, the chiefs were once more drawn towards 
members of the extra-parliamentary organisations who were more than ready to 
consolidate their support among them. This faction, it is presumed, did not anticipate 
any resistance to their objectives in abaThembuland whose Paramount Chief had 
directly participated in the inauguration of the Congress. Unfortunately the chiefs‘ 
obsession with land matters overrode all other issues of interest to the Congressmen. 
The leadership of these organisations, in fact, shared the chiefs‘ grievances over the 
loss of land, and welcomed their patronage because it brought with it the funds which 
the chiefs contributed to their cause.51 At the same time the Dalindyebo factor was of 
political significance as security against the indiscriminate destruction of the chiefly 
office, and for the ‗to and fro‘ evolutionary history of the abaThembu chieftainship and 
struggle politics in South Africa.  
 
Chieftainship was still of political significance in the tribal environment, and through it 
many an ordinary man could join the Congress. Unfortunately the chiefs were impatient 
and wanted an immediate undoing of the Land Act and all its implications for the 
communities of which they were guardians. It was this failure of the Congressmen to 
reverse the implications of the Land Act and its terms that subsequently put a damper 
on the chiefs‘ spirits and weakened their enthusiasm for extra-parliamentary politics.52 
The government, on the other hand- expected them to co-operate by giving up their 
hereditary right to land, so as to complement its own objectives. The above analysis 
highlights the incompatibility of interests which the chiefs faced which was what possibly  
made an alliance with the Congressmen difficult. The failure of the abaThembu 
Paramount Chief and other chiefs to entrench their position within the Congress meant 















raises an intriguing question. Equally significant was Dalindyebo‘s dilemma, evident in 
his failure to utilise his credibility with the government to take up the grievances that 
affected the chieftaincy generally. His attempt to appease the British government was 
evident in the message that he sent to the Governor-General of South Africa at the 
beginning of the First World War, namely : 
I pray that the Dominions of His Majesty, on this side, and beyond the sea may 
be held in safety, and to this end I desire to declare that I and the people over 
whom I am placed will be faithful and true, and loyal in our service to His 
Gracious Majesty and will be peaceable and obedient to the law in all respects 
and we will be ever ready to assist the Government of His Majesty whether it be 
by maintaining peace within our borders or by rendering such services as we 
may be called upon to perform.53 
 
The First World War had pre-occupied the British government and made it vulnerable to 
anti-colonial protest. There had never been a more opportune moment for any colonial 
people to press their demands. Instead of making common cause with the extra-
parliamentarians Dalindyebo,   
the principal Chief of the Thembu tribe…..(with) a large following, larger than 
probably that of any other Native Chief within the Union….A trusted member of 
the General Council ….. A loyal and consistent supporter of the Government and 
in receipt of a subsidy of  £200 (R400.00) per annum.54    
 
showed his concern for external  rather than domestic affairs. His annual allowance was 
too good- and appeasing- to forfeit for some abstract supra-national cause.  It is very 
likely that some government official had a hand in the goodwill messages that 
Dalindyebo sent to the government in the light of Mbekeni‘s claim that Dalindyebo acted 
under very strict surveillance. He was obliged to be compliant towards the government 
so as to erase both the bad image and memory of Ngangelizwe.55  Dalindyebo‘s 
apparent compliance, did not, however, produce guarantees from the government about 
the restoration of the abaThembu chieftainship to its former status. Soon after 
Dalindyebo had professed loyalty to the British government, he became one of fifteen 
signatories to a petition which requested the Governor-General to extend W. T. 
Brownlee‘s term of office as chief magistrate of Mthatha. The petitioners included chiefs 
















By his large experience, Mr Brownlee ---is a man with a sharp eye, prompt in 
quelling any disturbance. Therefore the people of Thembuland implore the 
Government, most respectfully, that he may be pleased, during this time of evil, 
to let Mr Brownlee continue in the office of the Chief Magistrate of the 
Transkeian Territories. We make this request because a new Chief Magistrate 
may be unknown to our people.56 
 
It was significant that the Governor-General acknowledged the receipt of the letter-cum-
petition, but at the same time requested that he be informed about ‗the (socio-political) 
standing of the signatories of the petition.‘57 The Supreme Chief could only have wanted 
information about the credentials of petitioners to gauge, monitor and even keep their 
influence in check. It must also be presumed that retaining Brownlee in the key position 
of magistrate would nurture old alliances and facilitate continuity in government policies. 
MLINGO MATANZIMA BECOMES CHIEF UNDER DALINDYEBO’S PARAMOUNTCY 
 
The conduct of affairs in western abaThembuland indicated that the Emigrant 
abaThembu were treating Dalindyebo‘s paramountcy as nominal and exploiting it by 
exercising an illegitimate autonomy. Mvuzo had been visibly pursuing this by reporting 
to the conniving government on the affairs of his Emigrant abaThembu community. 
What follows shows that while the Emigrant abaThembu appeared compliant, they were 
resistant to being beholden to more than one overlord, something that would contradict 
the terms of their inducement to split in 1865. The Cofimvaba magistrate‘s report must 
be understood against this background, namely, that  ‗Regent Nqwiliso [son of Rhaxoti’s 
brother, Duli,], and other Thembu notabilities brought to the office Mlingo, son and heir 
of Chief Mvuzo for recognition as Chief of the tribe, he having now assumed that 
position at the request of the people.‘58   As chief and successor to Mvuzo who had died 
in October 1903, Mlingo adopted Mhlobo as his salute name.59 The resident magistrate 
accordingly confirmed the chieftainship of Mhlobo over the emigrant abaThembu 
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                                                            KD Matanzima (d.2003) 
 
Kaiser Matanzima confirmed that Nqwiliso Duli did fill his father, Mlingo‘s, position 
during Dalindyebo‘s paramountcy because his father was only 13years old when Mvuzo 
died. Nqwiliso, a cousin of Chief Mvuzo, was nominated as guardian and regent during 
the minority of Mlingo. Matanzima also affirmed that Nqwiliso was the legitimate choice 
because his father ‗Duli was the younger brother of Rhaxothi having been born directly 
after him. He was a very unreasonable bully who continued to impose himself on 
Mhlobo long after he had officially withdrawn from the regentship‘.61 
 
 
Mhlobo had been chief for only five years when Magistrate Young complained about his 
excessive drinking which interfered with the discharge of his duty.62As a result of his 
alcoholism Mhlobo missed meetings that were regularly scheduled with the magistrate. 
The administration in Mhlobo‘s location deteriorated and caused the magistrate‘s office 
great concern, judging from his remark, ‗it is therefore obvious that the mal-
administration of his location is likely to affect his neighbours---the time has come when 
the government must need to act drastically‘.63  Kaiser Matanzima (KD), an unrelenting 
teetotaler confirmed his father‘s hopeless alcoholism which, in his own words ‗brought 















above is that Dalindyebo did not appear to participate in the dealings between the 
magistrate and the heavily-drinking Mhlobo. This was in contrast to the supervisory role 
that Jongilizwe later exercised in this region.  When on a formal visit to the Cofimvaba 
District in 1927, Paramount Chief Jongilizwe found Mhlobo sick and indisposed and 
noted that his chiefly duties were neglected as a result of his deteriorating health. He 
immediately suggested to the magistrate that a substitute be appointed.65 
REGENCY FOR JONGILIZWE : SILIMELA PAVES THE WAY  
At a point when the Department of Native Affairs (NAD) was undergoing transformation 
from ‗a tradition of pragmatic paternalism‘66 to the practical implementation of a notion of 
‗protective segregation‘ that was embodied in the 1920 Native Affairs Act67 Paramount 
Chief Dalindyebo died. Switzer has affirmed that until 1920 the NAD was manned by 
officials who viewed themselves as ‗secular missionaries‘ whose duty was to protect 
Africans as wards of the state and act as their ombudsmen in matters relating to 
government.68 Dalindyebo, an acknowledged state ward, died on 22 April 1920 while 
preparing to attend a session of the General Council in Mthatha. His death elicited the 
following tribute from the SNA : 
Dalindyebo, Chief of the Thembus, a numerous tribe comprising the greater part 
of the population of the Umtata, Engcobo and Mqanduli Districts. The History of 
South Africa hardly furnished a finer example of a native chief than was 
Dalindyebo and his services were of great value to the Government and I 
therefore strongly recommend that his funeral expenses be met out of the public 
funds.69 
 
While the Secretary of Finance undertook on the government‘s  behalf to finance the 
funeral of the Paramount Chief, a model for  his office,  he also emphasised the 
exceptional nature of the authorisation and warned against regarding it  ‗as constituting 
a precedent for applications of a similar nature in future‘.70 Welsh described the 
ceremonial procedure of the interment of Dalindyebo in his kraal after a Christian 
funeral service ‗a happy compromise between the past and the future, typical of the 
present status Thembu‘.71 The government‘s involvement in the funeral was, from a 
political perspective, a demonstration of both its colonial superiority and its obligation 
towards a subject people. It must however  be noted, that what was interpreted as a 















was indeed trapped in the ambiguities of dependence on  the  government. The 
abaThembu paramountcy was at a crossroads because of Dalindyebo‘s reluctance to 
challenge the government in any way. While he could not be described as totally  
apolitical, he could also not be labelled even a moderate revolutionary. He left his 
successors a paramountcy that was hamstrung by an alien law, something he had not 
dared to challenge in his life-time. 
 
When Dalindyebo died his heir was still a sixteen years old Lovedale scholar. This was 
Billy Joel Sampu the son of Nohajisi Makhaula, the Great Wife.72 The death of the 
Paramount Chief while the heir was still a minor meant that traditional procedures and 
customary guidelines had to be observed in the election of a regent. The issue of major 
importance in this case was the unanimity of the chiefdom in nominating a regent. A 
new and unexpected development - a cultural anomaly at the time - was the 
involvement of Nohajisi in the deliberations to nominate a regent for Sampu.  
 
David Jongintaba Dalindyebo, Sampu‘s younger brother by custom, was nominated and 
rejected. The turning down of Jongintaba was informed by various factors: he was 
young and therefore lacking status; little was known about the steadfastness of his 
character; he was a persona non grata with the Great Wife.73 He had previously been 
appointed an umsengi (milker) son of the Great House, an appointment that conferred 
on him the status of a messenger to the Great Wife.74 Nohajisi‘s supposedly wilful 
involvement in traditionally ‗male‘ only‘ domain, and considering the attachment of the 
abaThembu to tradition gives one an idea of how coveted and vulnerable Dalindyebo‘s 
crown was. Mbekeni confirmed that Nohajisi was indeed vociferously against the 
appointment of Jongintaba as regent for Sampu. Her objection was also borne out of 
her insecurity at the possible loss to the Jongintaba progeny of her son‘s natural right. 
She was particularly troubled by the fact that Jongintaba had gone abroad to fight in the 
World War 1, and had come back very boastful and arrogant about the military honours 
he had received.75 Cingo, as if to justify Nohaji‘s fears, has confirmed that King George 
V had expressed gratitude to David Jongintaba Dalindyebo for his contribution, in one 















excerpt captures the moment of the King‘s presentation, viz.,‗to David Dalindyebo by 
Order of His Majesty King George V in recognition of outstanding services rendered in 
connection with recruiting for the South African Native Labour Contingent‘.77 It is 
therefore, obvious that Jongintaba‘s possibly exaggerated military glory, made the 
mother of the heir still in his minority feel anxious. She probably could not guarantee 
that such an accomplished military man as Jongintaba was now claiming, and publicly 
acknowledged, to be, would readily relinquish the throne when the time came for 
Sampu to take over.   
 
The subtle but effective, and  perhaps powerful, role of gender as symbolised by 
Nohajisi in the process of electing a regent for her son was acknowledged as a force in 
the politics of  the abaThembu chieftainship. That her opinion was acknowledged can 
be seen in the fact that after she had died the grounds for her objections to Jongintaba‘s 
regency and his nomination were simply ignored or not upheld. Nohajisi had upheld  her 
opposition to Jongintaba‘s nomination by affirming in a letter to the chief magistrate that 
the appointment of Jongintaba - in the context of custom younger than the infant heir - 
as regent was foreign to abaThembu customary practices.78 She even declared her 
availability for regency in her anxiety to secure the throne for her son. While the 
magistrate endorsed her comment on the irregularity of appointing a son from ‗a minor 
house to be regent for the Great Son or elder brother‘79 he expressly disapproved of the 
appointment of a woman as regent.  
 
The feuding that became a feature among the wives of the deceased monarch in the 
royal household during the interregnum was bound to exclude Nohajisi for any 
leadership level because it revealed lack of unanimity in the royal household. In all 
instances of conflict the Great Wife emerged as the provocative, self-appointed 
manager over her partner widows. In one instance she removed furniture, money and 
stock from the Xhiba House of Nopalamente through the services of a stock inspector.  
This pushed Nopalamente to seek the intervention of the regent-in-waiting. In the 
context of the royal establishment the Xhiba wife was the most junior and customarily 















practising chiefs.80 Nohajisi‘s actions could, therefore, at best be described as lacking 
diplomacy and interpersonal skills, thus disqualifying her as regent.  She later sent a 
certain Jack Mthikrakra to count the sheep and goats that belonged to noNayile, the 
Qadi wife of Dalindyebo, without noNayile‘s knowledge. This was another 
provocationon, given the role of the Qadi House in the chief‘s establishment. 
Zwelodumo has confirmed that the Qadi House was a supporting house, one that was 
tasked to look after the physical needs of the Great House. This house had a duty to 
provide regents in the case of the minority of the heir. There was no likelihood of 
anyone from that house ever posing a threat to the Great House because of their 
awareness, and public acknowledgement, of their junior status.81 Nohajisi was now 
setting out to provoke her support base by her seemingly unwarranted actions. 
 
Nohajisi later affirmed her reliance on Chief Silimela, ‗the great son of the first Qadi to 
the Great House of King Ngangelizwe‘.82 Zwelodumo, Silimela‘s grandson through 
Zwelihle, has confirmed that his grandfather indeed came from the house that 
supported the Great House of Ngangelizwe.  Though he was older than Dalindyebo in 
years he was, by custom, a younger brother. Ngangelizwe had observed during 
Silimela‘s youth that he was endowed with natural wisdom, the gift of oratory and  the 
dignity-cum- prestige befitting a royal. These attributes became conspicuous as he grew 
up and always drew comparisons between the heir and his counterpart from the Qadi 
House. It was Silimela‘s apparent diplomacy and strategic approach in the handling of 
the affairs of the kingdom, even as a young prince, that persuaded Ngangelizwe to send 
him to the Ngcobo District. In Zwelodumo‘s words ‗Ngangelizwe called his Qadi House 
son in and informed him that the time had come to remove him to the Ngcobo District 
where his chieftainship would be installed.‘83 Ngangelizwe‘s action was motivated by a 
desire to forestall an unfair competition between Silimela and Dalindyebo who was 
evidently not the former‘s match in wisdom and eloquence.84  
 
Chief Silimela of Quluqhu in the Ngcobo District was ultimately unanimously 















never previously given Dalindyebo any reason to fear him.  The separation of the scions 
of Mthikrakra had worked well. It therefore made sense even at this time of crisis to 
fetch Silimela to come and officiate as regent for his brother‘s young heir. The 
abaThembu elders believed that the wisdom he had shown as a young man could only 
add great political value to the Dalindyebo paramountcy. It had been common practice, 
even earlier, to fetch him from Quluqhu, whenever there was a controversy.85 
Something that strongly counted in his favour was that he had previously acted for 
Dalindyebo during his visits to England for health (1910) and political reasons (1911) 86 
He was the first from Ngangelizwe‘s Qadi house to be regent.87 Some of SilimeIa‘s 
descendants, like Hlathikhulu from his Right Hand house, later acted as regents at 
Bumbane on occasion, and were chosen on the strength of an exposure to the legacy of 
wisdom of, and the grooming they were presumed to have received from, their 
predecessor. Mveleli Busobengwe Silimela acted as a Deputy Paramount Chief under 
Bambilanga in the mid 1980s. Mdanjelwa Silimela, Zwelodumo‘s youngest uncle acted 
as Paramount Chief just before the reburial of Sabata Jonguhlanga during 1988-89.88  
 
Silimela demonstrated his political astuteness when asked by the magistrate about his 
availability if an offer of regency were made to him. His response was that the 
government had first to explain why and how the nomination of Jongintaba was wrong 
and inappropriate.89 It is presumed that his thinking was that abaThembu had to be 
convinced that the correctness of the choice of the regent derived from the correct 
application of the customary procedures. This would not only guard against the 
imposition of a regent over an unreceptive kingdom, but would also consolidate, rather 
than sabotage, Ngangelizwe‘s kingship. Silimela‘s response also demonstrated that he 
was sensitive to the possibility of a rift that was inherent in the choice of a regent for 
Sampu. His discretion portrayed him as someone who valued abaThembu unity more 
than the honour that the regency status, described by Jonginyaniso as very lucrative‘,90 
would confer on him.  
 
Chief Silimela Ngangelizwe assumed the position of Chief Regent for abaThembuland 















regent and a £60 allowance as headman in the Ngcobo District. The resident magistrate 
suggested that the whole salary be paid at one point for Silimela‘s convenience.91 
Mbekeni confIrmed that it was important that whoever was regent should add value to 
the position by maintaining the dignity and prestige of the abaThembu Paramount Chief. 
It was against this background that the regency allowance was calculated, so as to 
recompense the incumbent for services rendered and for expenditure incurred in 
maintaining the dignity of the Paramount Chief. These services included convening the 
meetings of the chiefdom, liaising and consulting with the magistrate in Mthatha and 
overseeing the administration of the estate of Paramount Chief Dalindyebo.92  
SAMPU JONGILIZWE TAKES OVER FROM SILIMELA  
 
Silimela performed his last important duty as abaThembu chief regent on July 1924. 
This was when he informed the resident magistrate that the abaThembu people had 
decided ‗to ask the Government to allow Sampu to tak  over the duties of Paramount 
Chief of the abaThembus and permit Regent Silimela to return to his own location in the 
District of Engcobo‘.93 It is clear that the Regent‘s term had been too short for him to 
have made an indelible mark, given his reputation for wisdom and being well-spoken. It 
must also be understood that Silimela was regent during the heir‘s schooling years, a 
fact which makes it clear that four years was too short a time for Sampu to be available 
for mentoring, especially considering that during this period he was at school at 
Lovedale.94 Silimela‘s goodwill and readiness to hand over the royal office to the 
legitimate heir supports the informants‘ testimony to his integrity.  Bhekisizwe Mthikrakra 
endorsed Zwelodumo‘s claim that the reigning abaThembu King, Buyelekhaya 
Zwelibanzi, has maintained a good connection with Silimela‘s house. He reports that the 
Silimelas are always invited to grace the royal occasions at the Bumbane Great Place. 
In Zwelodumo‘s words, ‗Silimela‘s prestige star  still shines at the Tyhalarha Great Place 
as is evident from their acknowledgement of his legacy - intlantsi yobunganga buka 
Silimela isalayita nangoku koMkhulu eTyhalarha‘.95  
Now that Silimela was offering to step down as regent the magistrate was expected to 
recommend the abaThembu people‘s request to the government, and also seek its 















is approved by the Government, it is the wish of the people that you should attend a 
meeting of the Tembus at the Great Place towards the end of September on the 
occasion of the customary formal installation of Sampu as Chief‘.96 Magistrate Young 
accordingly suggested 1 October 1924 to be the effective date for the accession of 
Sampu Jongilizwe. Young further ordered Silimela to attend a quarterly meeting that 
was scheduled for 26 August 1924, where he would elaborate on matters that were 
connected with Jongilizwe‘s appointment.97 In September the magistrate‘s office 
confirmed in a letter to Silimela the government‘s approval of the appointment of Sampu 
Jongilizwe as Paramount Chief of the abaThembu people.98 Of great historical 
significance for the changing faces of the chieftainship of the 1920s was the fact that the 
abaThembu elders sought the government‘s approval in the matter of Jongilizwe‘s 
accession.  
 
That Young, in his capacity as a government official, was to sanction the coming to 
power of a natural ruler was proof that indigenous authority was progressively 
succumbing to national legislation. Government-imposed procedure was different in its 
application in the case of Jongilizwe from what had been the practice when his junior 
counterpart Mhlobo Matanzima came to power in 1914. Mhlobo‘s accession was an 
internal matter of the Emigrant abaThembu where Nqwiliso and some senior men 
simply presented their new chief to the magistrate as ‗Chief of the tribe, he having now 
assumed that position at the request of the people‘.99 A credible explanation for this 
would probably be found in the different strategies that were employed in respect of  the 
institution of chieftainship by the  former Cape Colony  and its  successors in office, the 
Department  of Native Affairs (DNA). The DNA was beginning to make a visible impact 
in the 1920‘s as against what had happened during the war years when government 
authorities were considerably pre-occupied with establishing the best method of 
governing the rural people.  
 
Jongilizwe was the first abaThembu Paramount Chief to come to power under the aegis 
of the Native Affairs Act of 1920. Against this background  Magistrate Herbst, acting on 















message that was to be read at the  installation of Jongilizwe. The Governor-General 
subtly hinted at his overriding authority in the appointment of chiefs when he 
commented on Jongilizwe‘s inexperience for the responsible position he was acceding 
to. At the same time he remarked emphatically that they were, in this instance, merely 
conceding to the abaThembu wishes. There was an irony in the supreme chief‘s 
acknowledgement that  
it will be a difficult post to fill for your late father was an exceptional man. He 
worthily earned high respect and gratitude of the Government by his consistently 
loyal and faithful services under all and every circumstances.100 
 
The Governor-General‘s concerns possibly arose from Jongilizwe‘s active involvement 
in a strike while at Lovedale,101 where angry students smashed everything that was in 
their way.102 While the Premier‘s message clearly obliged J ngilizwe to walk in the 
footsteps of his father, it also persuaded him to adopt his father‘s councillors, (grey 
heads‘), as his advisers. It must be understood that the erstwhile councillors would not 
only facilitate the transition from the Dalindyebo era to the new one, but would also 
ensure a continuity from Dalindyebo‘s style of doing things. It was significant that Herbst 
offered the new Paramount Chief the best assistance from the magistrate‘s office in the 
event of any conflict arising between him and his father‘s ‗greyheads‘.103 Under normal 
circumstances conflict would only arise if there were a lack of co-operation between 
Jongilizwe and his councillors on the question of the pursuance of Dalindyebo‘s 
approach to matters of chieftainship. Be that as it may, herein is to be found the germ 
that was to destroy both the autonomy and the limited democracy that was inherent in 
the indigenous authority, and also attack the system of checks and balances that had, 
from time immemorial, been the prerogative of the councillors. The government‘s 
stepping forward as a guarantor and guardian of Jongilizwe‘s chieftainship, given its 
extraneous import, was of historical significance for the perpetuation of Dalindyebo‘s 
type of paramount chieftainship. Its subsequent pledge to protect the abaThembu 
institution from being challenged and perhaps eaten from within, gives credibility to the 
















Yali-Manisi has, in one of his praise poems, portrayed the accession of Jongilizwe as an 
occasion for the rebirth of the unity of the House of Mthikrakra. Time would tell how far 
Manisi‘s vision of Jongilizwe‘s reign would be realised. The following excerpt, which was 
preceded by a pronouncement of Jongilizwe as king of all abaThembu, is worthy of 
consideration:                   
Bukhulu bakho bugqithe naseluhlangeni; 
Your greatness has transcended the national borders 
Bubekiw’ezincwadini nanguRulumente; 
It has been inscribed in the Government statutes 
Ubekiwe nangamadun’akowenu; 
You have been declared as King by your family elders 
Ubekiwe nguJongintaba noDabulamanzi 
You have been installed by Jongintaba  and Dabulamanzi 
Wakubek’uMhlobo noNqwiliso; 
Hailed as King by Mhlobo and Nqwiliso 
Babek’itholelendlu enkulu; 
Proclaiming King the issue from the Great House104 
 
The reference and the apparent acknowledgement of Jongilizwe as the universal king of 
the abaThembu was historically significant, by reason of its bearing on modern day 
abaThembu chiefs‘ politics. It must be noted that those alluded to, Jongintaba and 
Dabulamanzi as well as Mhlobo and Nqwiliso, were descendants of King Mthikrakra 
through Ngangelizwe and Rhaxothi Matanzima respectively.  
 
It is necessary to look at the factors that moulded Jongilizwe before elaborating on his 
actual rule. He, like all Ngangelizwe‘s descendants, acquired his lower primary 
education at St John‘s College Primary School.105 He later proceeded to Lovedale 
where the authorities sometimes granted him leave of absence to enable him to attend 
the Bhunga sessions in Mthatha.106 The early exposure to chiefly debates that were 
contextualised in the UTTGC was particularly valuable to the one worthy to succeed 
Dalindyebo, once a valuable member of that body.  It was also while at Lovedale that 
Jongilizwe and the likes of the historical King Sobhuza of the amaSwazi got involved in 
a strike that led to their expulsion en masse. Jongilizwe‘s surviving daughter, Nopenge 
Mgolombane has confirmed that her father enthusiastically participated in a strike while 















in everything, never wanting to miss out on anything‘.107 In this way Nopenge subtly 
plays down Mbekeni‘s rather biased claim that Jongilizwe was influenced into joining the 
strike by older boys, including the likes of Buqaqawuli Mgudlwa and Sobhuza. 
 
 After the Lovedale strike of 1922, Jongilizwe was sent to the circumcision school where 
one of his fellow initiates and age mates was Reverend Bhekamandla Ndungane.108 
The last school that Jongilizwe attended before becoming a chief was Clarkebury 
Institution, which is historically regarded as the abaThembu national school, isikolo 
sikaNgubengcuka/ Ngubengcuka‘s school.  King Ngubengcuka had granted William 
Shaw permission to establish it on his land in 1830.109 It was while at this institution, in 
1923, that Jongilizwe wrote to the magistrate, asking for £22 for the payment of school 
fees, his organ/piano teacher as well as his washerwoman.110  The princely pampering 
appears to have been a common practice with the children of royals in the 20th century. 
Phyllis Mabona confirmed that her former schoolmate, Ntombomhlaba Poto Ndamase, 
who subsequently became the mother of the present amaRharhabe chief, 
Maxhobayakhawuleza Sandile, had an attendant fellow student, impelesi, while a 
student at Healdtown.111 It must be presumed that in the case of Jongilizwe the 
pampering was meant to instill in him a sense of prestige and awareness of his royal 
and superior status. This would hopefully help rehabilitate the prince‘s former behaviour 
and involvement in activism which did not befit a royal from Dalindyebo‘s household. 
The importance of extra-curricular exposure can also not be underplayed in view of the 
profile of the chieftainship during the period under investigation.  
 
Soon after Jongilizwe was declared Paramount Chief, the DNA initiated a process of 
transferring Dalindyebo‘s farm  to his ownership. Once the magistrate had confirmed the 
heirdom,112 the Prime Minister‘s office recommended to the Governor-General the 
approval of the transfer of the ‗Tyhalarha farm situated in the District of Umtata, 
Tembuland, from the estate of the late Dalindyebo, Chief or Headman of the Tembus, to 
Jongilizwe Dalindyebo.‘113 There could have been no better reminder of the benefits of 
past compliance to Jongilizwe, the beneficiary of this transfer. Within hardly a year of 















Council recommends the payment to Councillor Chief Jongilizwe Dalindyebo, while 
attending the meetings of the General Council, of such additional allowance as may be 
considered reasonable, having regard to his position as Paramount Chief of Tembu 
people‘.114 The motion was taken up by the DNA which accordingly recommended that : 
Jongilizwe Dalindyebo, by virtue of his position as Chief of the Tembu, be 
granted a higher allowance than is ordinarily payable under the regulations to 
members attending meetings of the Council….The tribe is the largest and most 
important in the Territories and the allowance to the late chief was specially  
increased because of his influence in the interests of the Council movement and 
of the additional expense to which a native of his rank was put while staying in 
Umtata. 115  
 
In nurturing the UTTGC, the interests of the Government generally, and the DNA in 
particular, were served best. It must also be noted that, during the time under 
discussion, that is 1925, the DNA was processing the application for an increase in the 
subsidy for Paramount Chief Jongilizwe‘s mother, Headwoman Nohajisi of Sithebe 
Location.116 This was in line with the DNA‘s conciliatory approach to the House of 
Dalindyebo. 
 
Jongilizwe demonstrated an approach in the execution of his duties that could at best 
be described as unorthodox or out of touch with regard to the prescriptions of 
government legislation. This could have been informed by the vows he made on his 
accession to restore the administrative role of the abaThembu chieftainship, which was 
perceived by critics to have slipped out of Dalindyebo‘s hands into government control. 
The procedure followed in the appointment of a certain Makhaula serves to illustrate his 
involvement in the appointment of headmen in the area under his jurisdiction. In 1925 
the Paramount Chief Jongilizwe together with Headman Candilanga and some 
members of the Bhaziya community introduced Mvumbi (Vayeke) Makhaula to the 
magistrate and requested that he should be appointed headman of Location No.6 of 
Bhaziya.117 This was evidently a departure from the post-annexation practice, where the 
appointment of headmen was the prerogative of the government. Once on a formal visit 
to the Cofimvaba District Jongilizwe discovered that due to sickness, Mhlobo 
Matanzima‘s chiefly duties were neglected. He suggested to the magistrate that a 















probably anxious that Mhlobo‘s manifest inefficiency would expose the abaThembu 
chieftainship to more manipulation by state authorities. Here again Jongilizwe‘s 
approach, a visible departure from Dalindyebo‘s unreactive policy,119 appeared to be in 
line with his intention to consolidate the authority of the abaThembu paramountcy.  His  
fears were justified in view of the fact Mhlobo did not have a good record as chief.  
 
There were other incidents which show Jongilizwe‘s sensitivity to the gradual and yet 
determined encroachment of the DNA on the terrain of abaThembu chieftainship. One 
such incident involved Chief Siphendu, a descendant of Chief Hlanga who had been 
deposed from kingship by Jongilizwe‘s ancestor some 200 years previously. Siphendu 
Bacela had sanctioned circumcision in his village during the mourning period following 
Silimela‘s death. When Jongilizwe accused (and subsequently summoned) Siphendu of 
breaking abaThembu law, Siphendu showed no remorse. Instead he contended that he 
was of the ‗same blood rank as the Paramount Chief120 and that the latter had no right 
to dictate to him in matters affecting the economic conditions of his own people‘.121 
When Jongilizwe reported the conflict to the District Magistrate Norton, at the same time 
hinting that he intended to fine Siphendu for violating  abaThembu law, Norton was 
quick to issue a warning to the effect that ‗fining was a matter the Government would 
never sanction‘.122 The inference to be drawn from this was that the government was 
not only abetting insubordination, but was also poised to protect Siphendu should 
Jongilizwe dare punish him. It must be noted that Siphendu was not to be protected for 
his own sake but rather as a reminder to Paramount Chief Jongilizwe of the status of his 
rank in relation to the Governor-General‘s office. It is also interesting to observe how in 
this case  the government presented itself as both an arbiter and a court of appeal. The 
government‘s stance in this regard undermined the traditional hierarchy of the 
abaThembu chieftainship and the conventional observance which the institution 
prescribed. This would, in the long-term, damage the power base which sanctioned the 
















What was clear from the Siphendu case was that the government viewed all chiefs as 
equals among themselves, and that it presided above them as supreme authority with 
the sole prerogative to reward and punish where and when it deemed fit. The opposing 
stances of both Jongilizwe and the magistrate in the Siphendu case give credibility to a 
number of accounts of Jongilizwe‘s aspirations.  While Nopenge unreservedly describes 
her father as someone who could exhibit contradictory emotions,123 Mbekeni portrayed 
Jongilizwe as ‗a fine, tall and stately fellow who was simply full of youth spirit rather than 
being carried away by his traditional status‘.124 Mbekeni also confirmed that Jongilizwe‘s 
greatest ambition on taking office was to improve on his father‘s administrative style 
and, if possible, make amends. Zwelodumo has endorsed this and gone even further to 
say that 
King Jongilizwe had an intellectual gift of appreciating the value in chieftainship 
and in rule by consensus as if he had lived under our democracy. He was brave, 
fearless and endowed with unbelievable courage in a way that made him a 
contrast to his father, Dalindyebo, our fathers would always tell us. 125 
 
From the moment Jongilizwe assumed the paramountcy he is reported to have warned 
his councillors that he was going to  ‗turn the clock backwards in an effort to return the 
abaThembu conduct of traditional affairs to what it had been: to selfless chiefly 
governance that was characteristic of abaThembu chiefs‘.126 He defined this as rule by 
consensus where he and the councillors would always take into account the people‘s 
needs, opinions and decisions, ‗we are going to pronounce on people‘s decisions not 
mine‘ .127  Zwelodumo remarked further that  ‗Jongilizwe spent the few years of his rule 
trying to heal the political rifts and blunders and also making amends for the 
shortcomings that had punctuated his father‘s rule‘.128 
 
 
Jongilizwe‘s term also witnessed the dismissal of Gadla Mandela as a headman. The 
event in question also shows how the Union government law willfully bypassed the 
Paramount Chief and disregarded the hierarchical order in resolving matters that 
affected the chiefdom. The incident involved complaints made by some residents of 
Mvezo Location about Gadla Mandela to Amos Dinga, a Black constable. The 















were regarded as grounds for dismissal of the accused.129 The charges brought against 
Mandela were evidence of irregularities when viewed from the perspective of Union 
legislation. His actions were otherwise acceptable in the normal application of 
customary law. While not condoning all charges, it must be pointed out that the 
application of Union law bore some politico-economic advantages for the ordinary man, 
and these had clearly been detected by some elements in Mvezo Location. The charges 
included the unauthorised allocation of arable land to individuals, some of whom were 
issued with, and others without,  receipts (obviously because such grants had not been 
authorised by the office); ignoring unlawful land occupation and thereby exposing the 
occupiers to  a later  painful loss of land at the insistence of the government.  
 
An  examination of the following events will demonstrate how the ‗tribesmen‘ exploited 
the loopholes that came about as a result of the incompatibility of the two administrative 
systems : A typical Union headman issued the applicant with a confirmatory note after 
he had received a beast pre-payment, and this note was to be produced at the 
magistrate‘s office. The next step was the official grant of land to the applicant. Instead 
of the process ending here some mischievous applicants demanded the pre-payment 
beast back from the headmen. A certain Mphekula admitted in his statement to have 
done this but he claimed that he never got his beast back. Mandela, on the other hand, 
viewed land distribution, and the revenue that came with it, as his traditional 
prerogative. He obviously iewed it as a task in the discharge of which he would not be 
guided ‗by laws of the King of England, but by Thembu custom.‘130 As a result of the 
charges brought against him, after which he was also obliged to make a statement to 
Constable Dinga, Mandela was dismissed from the post of Headman of Mvezo Location 
with effect from 1 October 1926.131 The dismissal was decisive and final, as he was 
warned that he ‗should attend at this Office immediately to draw the balance of pay due  
to  you‘.132 Peter Limb in his biography of Nelson Mandela has also commented on the 
squabbles surrounding Gadla‘s loss of his royal position. .133  As early as 8 October a 
meeting of the residents of Mvezo Location was called where Ntabezulu Mthikrakra was 
unanimously nominated as a replacement for Gadla Henry Mandela. Ntabezulu was the 
















The termination of the Mandela royal headmanship spelled out clearly both the 
government‘s condescension towards, and its perception of, the dignity of the 
abaThembu chieftainship. The exercise showed  the direction in which the government 
policy regarding the governance of the Blacks  was moving. The single act of dismissal 
was one of many that was making ineffective the abaThembu chiefship. It must be 
noted that the Union magistrate did not consult with Jongilizwe prior to the execution of 
the dismissal order. Against this background must be understood that Jongilizwe had, 
coincidentally, become chief in the same year that Hertzog became prime minister. The 
latter held both the premiership and the portfolio of Native Affairs. It was, therefore, 
Hertzog‘s department that in 1925 had accused Mandela of misconduct and 
subsequently discharged him.135 
 
An event of historical significance occurring during Jongilizwe‘s reign was the visit of 
Edward, Prince of Wales, to the town of Mthatha in 1925. The Paramount Chief 
honoured Prince Edward by presenting him with thirty head of dehorned cattle. The 
beasts were in turn re-donated to Jongilizwe to generate income for the extension of the 
Sir Henry Elliot Hospital, the only health institution in the town.136 Whilst there is no 
record of Jongilizwe‘s reaction to the Prince‘s gesture of cultural condescension it must 
be stated that the redonation is not a norm among the Southern baNguni. Dr Guy 
Daines has affirmed that the monies were used to pay for ornamental gates that still 
stand at the entrance to the hospital. Dr Welsh inaugurated the gates in 1927 in his 
capacity as medical superintendent.137These gates, ironically enough, not only 
symbolise Jongilizwe‘s contribution to the embellishment of the major hospital of the 
Transkei region, but are also a tribute and monument to his short-lived reign.  
 
Another highlight of Jongilizwe‘s reign was the passing, in 1927, of the Native 
Administration Act of 1927 (NAA) by the Union Government. This act, a political 
landmark of Hertzog‘s government policy with regard to the Blacks, gave the Governor-
General authority, inter alia, to constitute a new chiefdom and order the removal of the 















important for this study was the bureaucratic right the act gave to the Governor-General 
to ‗recognize or appoint any person as a chief or headman in charge of a tribe or of a 
location‘.139  
 
The impact of the NAA on the abaThembu chieftainship can only be understood when 
the political status of South Africa, a member of the British Commonwealth at the time of 
the legislation, is put into perspective. The Governor–General as supreme chief was a 
representative of the British crown, and thus exercised all the prerogatives vested in the 
King in respect of South Africa. When the country became a republic in terms of Act 
No.32 of 1961, the State President of South Africa superseded the Governor-General 
as supreme chief.140 The application of the NAA would mean that the terms of the 
appointment of Jongilizwe to Paramount chieftainship and those of his successors 
would change.    
 
After ruling for only four years, Jongilizwe (the first abaThembu Chief and, incidentally, 
probably the first chief in the Transkei region, to have owned a motor car),141 died of 
enteric fever on 6 July 1928.142 His daughter, Nopenge, attributes her father‘s death to a 
quarrel he had had with the members of a Kondlo family from the amaQoma clan. He 
fell ill after he had shot at his opponents, giving his family reason to believe that his 
death was a result of food poisoning.143 Chief Jonginyaniso has claimed that Chief 
Jongilizwe‘s short reign is better remembered in abaThembuland for an incident which 
resulted in some families of the Mvulane deserting their village. This was subsequent to 
a quarrel between the Paramount Chief and a certain man involving a woman. 
Jongilizwe not only shot at his enemies but also banished them from his immediate 
vicinity (though not from abaThembuland). His illness and eventual death after this 
incident, is attributed by his family to the determination of his opponents to punish him 
for his high-handedness, rather than to enteric fever. Mthikrakra has reported that those 
that he chased away found refuge in the Elliotdale district where they are still settled 
today. He also remarked that evidently Jongilizwe had inherited his grandfather 
Ngangelizwe‘s temper.144 Chief Zwelodumo jocularly confessed that one trait that they 

















This chapter has revealed three aspects about the abaThembu paramountcy of the 
period 1920-28. These are the somewhat varying leadership styles and their political 
value on the paramountcy, the criterion used by the authorities to gauge and measure, 
in particular, Dalindyebo‘s performance and lastly, the incompatibility of the indigenous 
and Union government‘s criteria in assessing performance. Dalindyebo has been 
portrayed in this chapter as someone who seemed to regard his leadership as a 
function of the office he held rather than an exercise that originated in his desire to be of  
service to his subjects. Jongilizwe‘s reign was unfortunately too short to be used as a 
fair basis for a comparison with his father‘s. He had, however, promised to improve on 
his father‘s reign and there is evidence that his death possibly interrupted a reign that 
had begun well.  
 
The chapter has also described how the independence and autonomy of abaThembu 
chieftainship was compromised under Dalindyebo. It has been shown that the erosion of 
indigenous autonomy of the abaThembu paramountcy was a gradual process,  
orchestrated by both the authorities‘ bureaucratic policies and Dalindyebo‘s 
egocentricism. In the eyes of the government, Dalindyebo was a good chief who led by 
example. To his abaThembu critics, however, he paid little regard to the abaThembu 
interests and needs, preferring instead that his subjects should follow behind. This 
chapter has shown that in this respect Dalindyebo failed the abaThembu nation. 
 
This chapter has shown that the political climate during Dalindyebo‘s rule favoured the 
white South Africa‘s interests. This was in the period that followed the annexations and 
at a time when Ngangelizwe‘s warlike activities were still remembered by his 
contemporaries. Mbekeni‘s remark about Dalindyebo being under strict surveillance 
reinforces the above thinking. It has been argued in the chapter that Dalindyebo‘s 
responses to the government overtures which earned him its commendations better 
reflected the criterion it used to measure the extent of his compliance  than any other  















chapter has thus presented as a comparative study of personalities, and assessment of 
leadership styles and the influences that determined the attitudes of the various players.  
 
The chapter has portrayed Dalindyebo to be both cowardly and timid in his willingness 
to curry favour with the government. His failure to back Reverend Tile‘s initiative and 
efforts to establish a national abaThembu church with himself as its head shows that he  
missed an opportunity to boost his paramountcy for the benefit of abaThembu nation. 
His responses and reactions to situations in which all that was expected of him was his 
spiritual support; his ambivalence in the  conduct of the  political business of the 
chiefdom;  and  his interaction with parties whose interests were incompatible, portrayed 
him as a weak-willed individual. It has further shown that the gravitas deriving from 
Dalindyebo‘s traditional status - which  might have influenced the extra-parliamentarians 
to take up the aborted Tile-Dalindyebo concensus - was of little consequence. The 
chapter has revealed that because the much adored abaThembu Paramount Chief was 
unable to reconcile his obligations as a chief beholden to the government with his  
sympathy with the progressive cause  he was unable to gain the support of either the 
apolitical or  the progressive among his people. It is also shown that Dalindyebo‘s 
educational background cannot be ignored. The fact that he was educated inspired  
confidence in him and in  his people,  as it did in the government.  He was considered 
by the state to be an enlightened chief who could be used as a bridge between tradition 
and the new dispensation. Members of the extra-parliamentary organizations are also 
presumed to have had faith in an educated paramount chief who could relay to his 
followers franchise issues and effect of legislation on land rights on them.   
 
The chapter has portrayed Dalindyebo as someone who attracted to his person all 
factions none of whom could in the end boast of having won him over. He could at best 
be described as one who held a precarious balance, maintained a delicate equilibrium 
and in the end earned for his nation a good name in the government‘s eyes. He was 
easy to persuade but difficult to keep persuaded. The question asked, then, is who 
benefitted most from Dalindyebo‘s actions:  the government, the abaThembu, or himself 
















It has been made clear that by his active involvement in the establishment of the 
Bhunga, a body to which he gave up  his very traditional status for that of a  sub-chief in 
the pay of the government,  Dalinyebo weakened the status of his  chieftainship. His 
reaction to the implications of the Land Act and land surveying portray him as a leader 
that was not responsive to the needs of his subjects.  
 
In fairness, however, it has been argued that Dalinyebo at least  left his successors a 
stable chiefdom,  albeit at a price. That he left behind an heir too young to succeed to 
the paramountcy was a weakness and a limitation, as well as being of political 
advantage for the chiefdom. It is shown that had Regent  Silimela had a longer term the 
abaThembu chieftainship could perhaps have had a better future. The chapter has 
shown that the resolution of the regency crisis after Dalindyebo‘s death was one of the 
few instances which proved that customary law had mechanisms in place to move 
forward. The availability of Silimela for regency validated the traditional function of the 
Qadi House.  
 
Finally this chapter has, by its allusion to Jongilizwe‘s promise when he came to power,  
hinted that his premature death possibly robbed  the abaThembu of an opportunity to 
experience national renaissance.   
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CHAPTER TWO  
THE ERA OF REGENTS : ABATHEMBU CHIEFTAINSHIP 1928-1954 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The death of Paramount Chief Dalindyebo came at a time when the institution of 
chieftainship was beginning to appear impermanent. He had served abaThembuland in 
a way that through him endeared the abaThembu to the authorities and eventually 
earned him political benefits through his equivocal diplomacy. It meant the government   
lost someone whom they had effectively used for short- and long-term benefits, and that 
it robbed them of a mediator through whom its peace was brokered with the 
abaThembu and their allies. Regent Silimela‘s term did not mark any significant 
departure from the socio-political systems that were in place during Dalindyebo‘s rule. 
This situation surely worked well for the image of the aba hembu chieftainship in the 
eyes of the government.   
  
The question that might have confronted both the critics and admirers of Dalindyebo 
was whether his successors would be able to continue his interactive policy with the 
government. The kind of problems that surfaced after his death suggested that there 
was a potential for a long drawn-out conflict. Much was expected of Dalindyebo‘s heir, 
Jongilizwe. In the light of these great expectations, this chapter begins by examining the 
state of abaThembu paramountcy at the time of Jongilizwe‘s sudden death. It looks at 
both the leadership vacuum and the crisis that confronted a kingdom whose reputation 
in the past was that it had been ably led.  
 
It is argued that certain forces woven  into the abaThembu customary fabric  threatened 
to complicate the succession to the paramountcy after the death of Jongilizwe. The 
chapter focuses on the nature of the problems that emerged, and explains the rationale 
for the procedures and measures that were followed to address the crisis that had no 
precedent in the recorded history of abaThembu chieftainship. The strengths and 















will be identified to see which of the two systems was of assistance to abaThembu 
paramountcy in regard to the problem of succession.  
 
The chapter analyses the forces that were instrumental in the survival and endurance of 
the abaThembu paramountcy during the twenty-five year regency which inevitably 
brought about a long, though not lasting, disjointedness in the Jongilizwe dynasty. 
Aspects of both the indigenous and ‗official customary law‘ - such as was legislated by 
the Union government - will be examined to see if there were any challenges to the 
smooth operation of the abaThembu paramountcy from 1928 to 1954. This analysis will 
be taken a step further by the interrogation of both political systems to see if their 
strengths and/or weaknesses inadvertently or by government design sometimes 
sabotaged the authority of the successive regents. The chapter further examines the 
extent to which either  or both of these systems worked towards either strengthening or 
weakening the stability of the abaThembu paramountcy.  
 
The final section of the chapter will deal with the unceremonious exit of Dabulamanzi, 
the last of the regents. It will be argued that the circumstances around the deposition of 
Dabulamanzi, the domestic politics involved in the exercise as well as the instruments 
used to effect it at the instance of the abaThembu elders and patriotic councillors were 
all evidence of the power inherent in indigenous law. The chapter will also explain the 
limitations of ‗official customary law‘, as seen in the system‘s failure to veto the regent‘s 
dethronement. Finally, there will be an interrogation of the possible impact of these 
events on the future of the abaThembu paramountcy, and its readiness for the next 
incumbent.    
 
 
CARVING A WAY FORWARD: ABATHEMBU CHIEFTAINSHIP AFTER THE DEATH 
OF JONGILIZWE 
 
The death of Jongilizwe created a unique problem in the history of the 20th century 
abaThembu chieftainship as a chief had died before taking a Great Wife. It also brought 
discontinuity, albeit temporarily, in the hereditary line of rulers descended from the 















Great Place on 6 July 1928 for the sole purpose of nominating a regent.1 This is an 
office which, by securing the rights of the house that produces heirs, perpetuates and 
upholds the principle of legitimacy. The abaThembu deliberations culminated in the 
nomination of David Jongintaba Dalindyebo for appointment as regent during the 
minority of the (as yet unidentified) heir.  
 
The nomination of Jongintaba showed an inconsistency, and perhaps a non-adherence 
to or disregard of customary guidelines. On Dalindyebo‘s death, the regency of 
Jongintaba was opposed on grounds that seemed convincing at the time. These were 
based on political and customary considerations, the personal sentiments of the Great 
Wife as well as considerations of Jongintaba‘s social profile.  Nohajisi‗s death meant 
that her objections were irrelevant. The other objections were now positively relevant 
and, perhaps, politically convenient. Mandela in his autobiography has described the 
controversy surrounding the appointment of Jongintaba to the position of Chief Regent. 
He claims that when the opinion of his father, G dla Henry Mphakanyiswa Mandela, 
(whom he has acknowledged as kingmaker and adviser) was sought in connection with 
the above appointment, he recommended Jongintaba,2 on the grounds that the  regent-
designate ‗was the best educated. Jongintaba……would not only be a fine custodian of 
the crown but an excellent mentor to the young prince.‘3 It would seem that Mandela‘s 
choice was informed more by a progressive spirit than by customary norms. The fact 
that during the 1920s, being progressive was synonymous with colonial   thinking and/or 
indoctrination was in itself politically ironic. Jongintaba‘s only administrative experience 
was acquired while he was an ordinary headman of Mqhekezweni Village.4 This makes 
his competence as a prospective mentor for the prince rather questionable, while his 
lack of status would, ironically enough, make him an ideal choice as a disinterested 
custodian of the abaThembu crown. No evidence  has yet been found to prove that 
Jongintaba ever lived with the heir at his provisional abaThembu Great Place. Had this 
been the case it would have demonstrated a step towards effective mentoring, as  much 
as it would have created an uneasiness amongst all those who were jealously guarding 
the political interests of the Great House of Jongilizwe. This study argues that the 















were raised against his regency in 1920.  Other than disregarding the late Nohajisi‘s 
objections it became clear that Gadla Mandela‘s opinion was dominant. He 
recommended Jongintaba, not on the basis of customary criteria, but rather on the 
grounds of his educational qualifications.  
 
Mandela has reported with some pride that his ‗father‘s choice was ultimately accepted 
by both the Thembus and the British government‘.5 Jongintaba was the first mThembu 
Chief to be appointed under the provisions of the NAA of 1927. Young emphasised the 
fact that the nominee ‗was 42 years of age and his loyalty is [was] beyond question‘.6 
The fact that Jongintaba was a christianized chief was perceived by the government as 
a possible guarantee of his loyalty. Further, Jongintaba‘s Christian inclinations could 
well have qualified him a proper heir to the Dalindyebo legacy. This comment should not 
detract from Mandela‘s unselfish and patriotic intentions in the choice of the chief 
regent.  
 
Young endorsed a recommendation for a payment of ₤40 a year as compensation to  
Jongintaba who would act as regent until a procedural appointment had been made at a 
meeting representative of the abaThembu and their chiefs.7 Welsh, as Chief Magistrate, 
supported the temporary appointment of Jongintaba pending the holding of a further 
meeting of the chiefdom to make a permanent appointment.8 In his August report to 
Welsh, Young confirmed that  ‗at a meeting of the Tembu people held at Bumbane on 
the 11th instant, which was attended by responsible Chiefs and Headmen of the Districts 
of Umtata, Engcobo, St Marks, Mqanduli and Elliotdale, David Jongintaba Dalindyebo 
was nominated unanimously as Regent‘.9 Jongintaba‘s temporary appointment was, in 
this way, ratified.  
JONGINTABA BECOMES CHIEF REGENT 
The accession of Jongintaba led to the transformation of his household in the 
Mqhekezweni Village of the Mthatha District into the Great Place. Mandela has 
confirmed that for as long as Jongintaba was the Chief Regent Mqhekezweni was the 















Jongintaba‘s nomination was a positive sign which must have been an indication of the  
solidarity and cohesion of the abaThembu kingdom as regards this matter. Young,   
however, remarked pertinently  with regard to Jongintaba‘s conduct prior to his regency, 
saying that ‗during the past three or four years he has reformed and I feel sure that he 
will fill the post satisfactorily‘.11 Mbekeni, a contemporary of Jongilizwe, expressed a 
different view when he remarked that ‗Jongintaba and Ndumiso [a cousin to the regent] 
were both careless, very mischievous and extravagant. Jongintaba did not find it easy to 
shed the stigma of extravagance even when he was regent. He did not disappoint those 
who knew him to be a lavish spender by shedding his old habits‘.12 While Mbekeni‘s 
claims appear to justify Ntsebeza and Ndletyana‘s findings about Jongintaba‘s well-to-
do image which could not be matched by his successor, Dabulamanzi,13 their assertions 
seem to inadvertently validate Mbekeni‘s reports about his extravagant cousin. 
Magistrate Allison‘s remark to the chief magistrate to the effect that sometimes 
Jongintaba presented himself in the magistrate‘s office under the influence of alcohol14 
also supports Mbekeni‘s claim.  
 
The Chief Regent‘s primary task was to oversee the traditional process of designating 
the legitimate successor to Jongilizwe Dalindyebo. The declaration of the heir would, 
inter alia, also serve the purpose of conferring  on the status of regency a practical and 
political image. The fact that Jongilizwe‘s premature death did not pre-empt a clear-cut 
succession by any one of the sons he had at the time of his death created a rationale 
for a political precedent which distinguishes the abaThembu chieftainship as unique. 
There was a pressing need to invent an ideal situation in order to regularize the 
predicament of a chiefdom without a designated heir. In this context it seemed logical to 
apply Comaroff‘s standard prescription which had, from time immemorial, governed 
succession procedures and processes among patrilineal societies. It was that ‗the heir 
must be the eldest son of his father‘s principal wife‘.15 This apparent political formula 
needed to be given a practical meaning in the context of the abaThembu chieftainship in 
order to keep in check any possible manipulation of the regal status by rival claimants 
















A paramount chief had died leaving behind four widows none of whom was designated 
a ‘Great Wife‘.  While Jongilizwe lived it was a matter of public assumption that he was 
yet to take in a Great Wife‘. Without the house designated the Great House for the 
Great Wife, the legitimacy of the heir was only a theoretical concept. There did not 
seem to have been political precedents of the kind that confronted the abaThembu in 
the post-Jongilizwe era. With the death of Ngubengcuka in 1832, without an heir, his 
Great Wife, Nonesi, imported Mthikrakra from the Qadi House and brought him up on 
her lap.16 Mthikrakra‘s heirdom was created in this way. The practical and physical 
aspect of the role of the Great House in validating the legitimate status of the heir was 
also demonstrated and made visible. The abaThembu custom of creating the heir by 
absorbing a child from the supporting house, eQadini, had been put into practice. A 
similar experiment is currently ‗work in progress‘ with regard to the Great House of  
Silimela. The heir, Jonginyathi has no issue and this has forced the elders to invoke the 
custom by absorbing the first born male from Silimela‘s Qadi House, the house from 
which Chief Zwelodumo (an important informant in this study) originates through Chief 
Busobengwe. The created heir in this case, whose chieftainship is held by Zwelodumo 
at Quluqhu (Ngcobo), is Chief Zwelodumo‘s minor son, Kamvelihle.17  
 
The predicament that existed in abaThembuland after the death of Jongilizwe called for 
a socio-political reconciliation between cultural practices and bureaucratic formulae. 
Otherwise the NAA as a prescribing instrument would have no room for application. 
What Crais describes as a ‗cross-cultural  encounter of a political kind‘18 in the context 
of colonial conquest I qualify as a cross-politico-cultural encounter between the 
indigenous and colonial political systems in a rather inflexible setting. It must also be 
noted that the regency status of Jongintaba could only be legally prescribed after the 
heir had been declared. In this regard the customary practice must be seen to be both a 
fundamental and consummating factor which would give meaning to, and enable, the 

















THE CHIEF REGENT PRESIDES AT THE GRADING OF JONGILIZWE’S WIVES 
 
Jongilizwe had married NoNciba by whom he had two sons named Nxeko and 
Mthandeni as well as a girl named Nompumelelo. No-Ashiya, Jongilizwe‘s first wife had 
two sons named Matoti and Mvuyelwa. In NoKapa‘s house one girl, Nopenge, was 
born. The fourth wife, Novoti had a daughter called Nompucuko.19 Novoti was to give 
birth soon.20 This fact was instrumental in the decision taken at the meeting of 11 
August 1928 to shelve the proclamation of the heir until after Novoti‘s confinement. It 
must therefore be assumed that Novoti‘s giving birth to a baby boy on 28 November 
192821 was what brought to a close the exercise of designating Jongilizwe‘s successor. 
The birth took place in the early hours of the morning at Jongintaba‘s Mqhekezweni 
Great Place under the midwifery of No-England Jongintaba.22 
 
The delay in designating the heir was an anomaly in view of the fact that Jongilizwe had 
three sons from his other wives at the time of his death. This situation makes it 
imperative to interrogate the extent to which the ranks of the wives of King Jongilizwe 
prescribed the differing statuses of his male children. It was this latter factor which 
necessarily called for the re-ordering of the houses of Jongilizwe in relation to one 
another. This exercise, itself a political precedent in the 20th century history of 
abaThembu chieftainship, highlighted the importance of the hierarchy of the royal wives 
as a decisive factor in the ranking of the sons.  A fact of great historical significance is 
that both the re-ordering of the wives and ranking of the sons would keep in check the 
conflict of claims of co-wives and regulate rival claims by Jongilizwe‘s sons at some 
future date. It must be noted that the definition of the regency was given a practical 
meaning in the identification of the legitimate incumbent.This would enable the 
abaThembu to uphold the regency, not just as a stop-gap to effect continuity in 
governance, but also as a consolidating factor. It was thus within the context of the 
authority vacuum that a meeting of the abaThembu notables in September 1929 must 
















As Novoti had given birth to a boy it was a matter of political urgency to finalise the 
grading of Jongilizwe‘s wives so as to complete the process of nominating his 
successor. The abaThembu unanimously graded the royal wives as follows: No-Ashiya, 
the first wife to be married,23 a Poswa maiden from a commoner background was 
ranked as the wife of the RHH.24 NoKapa was allocated the Xhiba House, (an 
independent house/the seed -bearer).25 Nonciba, a Qiya maiden from the amaHlanga 
clan of Mqanduli was ranked the Qadi to the Great House.26 Since it was customary for 
the Great Wife of a chief to be a non-mThembu and, if possible, of royal blood,27 
Nonciba was automatically disqualified on the grounds that she was a Qiya-Hlanga: 
‗Hlanga and Dlomo are the same thing. Her marriage with Jongilizwe out of which 
Nxeko and Mthandeni were born was found to have been incestuous.‘28 Novoti was the 
only one who met the requirements to qualify for the position of Great Wife when the 
abaThembu chiefdom met to establish the ranking of the four widows on 23 September 
1929.29 This daughter of Gwadiso Nogemane of the Khonjwayo clan, a junior 
chieftainship, was accordingly nominated the Great Wife.30 The nomination as Great 
Wife of the last of Jongilizwe‘s wives to be married31 qualified her infant son Sabata, as 
the future Paramount Chief.   
  
The historical significance of this meeting at which the widows were graded, itself a 
political precedent, derived from the fact that it fell outside the provisions of the 1927 
Native Administration Act that legislated on, and/or legitimised chieftainships at the time. 
Yet it seemed to be an imperative customary and cultural dialogue without which the 
abaThembu chieftainship of the post-Jongilizwe era would not have been officially 
sanctioned. 
 
The nomination of Novoti as Great Wife was, in Comaroff‘s prescription, the culmination 
of both the rationalization and explanation of the succession formula in the house of 
Jongilizwe.32 The declaration of the heir and successor to Jongilizwe was both an 
achievement and a tribute to the Chief Regent. The rationalisation of the process 
referred to above was reinforced by the further stipulation that if the heir (in this case, 















prescribed by the ranks of their mothers. The abaThembu were unanimous in their 
decision that ‗the present children of----Jongilizwe must not be divided by any 
illegitimate children ‗picked up‘ by his widows‘.33 This is how the rights of Jongilizwe‘s 
descendants were secured.  
 
The nomination of Sabata as heir also conferred on the regentship a notion of definite 
impermanence and/or political limitation. As effectively regent from 7July 1928, 
Jongintaba was paid ₤40 per annum in addition to the ₤30 subsidy he drew as the 
headman of Mqhekezweni Village.  Over and above the ₤70 the regent would be in 
receipt of ₤500 per annum34  ‗as subsidy to the Chief of the Thembu Tribe-this amount 
is actually being paid for the support of the members of the family of the late chief‘.35 
The above allocation shows clearly that the treasurer, in this case, the chief regent, 
received no incentive. The biggest slice was thus not for use by him as he pleased, 
even though there were no checks and balances to monitor his expenditure.     
BROWNLEE RECOMMENDS INCREASE FOR JONGINTABA 
 
Hardly a year after his appointment, Jongintaba requested, through the office of the 
magistrate, an increase in his allowance. The government in their response explained 
that it was not ‗possible----to exceed that amount without special approval of 
Parliament‘.36 The implementation of the NAA (sic) of 1927 should be seen in the 
magisterial response. The parliamentary symbol that the SNA alluded to was that the 
Governor-General was actually supreme chief and the chief regent was merely an 
appointee.  Mamdani reiterates that ‗the Native Affairs(sic) Act of 1927 gave the 
Governor-in-Council an unqualified right to appoint whomsoever he considered suitable 
to a chiefship‘.37  Much as Jongintaba was a prince of blood, in his new position he was 
a government appointee by virtue of both the application and operation of the act at the 
time of his accession to regency. His period as regent illustrates best the extent to 
which the legislation of the early 20th century had restricted the abaThembu chiefs‘ 
source of revenue. The chief regent in turn found himself in a dilemma that had come 
about as a result of the incompatibility of the traditional law with the official customary 















substitution of what Sanders calls ‗autonomic law‘ by ‗invented tradition‘ or ‗official 
customary law‘ which was embodied in the Union government legislation.38  The 
government ‗s  dilemma became clearly apparent in a letter that Magistrate Brownlee 
wrote to Herbst, the SNA, in which he wrote ‗I hasten to ask you if you can in any way 
influence the Prime Minister to give this man a salary consistent with the high office 
which he holds‘.39 Brownlee went on to draw Herbst‘s attention to the size of 
Jongintaba‘s territory:    
You know the Territories intimately and you know that the Ngubengcuka family 
are regarded as paramounts not only in the Umtata district but also in those of 
Mqanduli, Engcobo and Cofimvaba. The Thembu of Lady Frere district----
recognize this family as that of their one time Supreme Chief.  This position is no 
doubt one of great honour, it certainly is one of great responsibility, and no one 
now living knows better than I do the tremendous influence which the head of 
such a family can exercise over their people. Fortunately for us, in the last fifty 
years and more, that influence has been on the side of law and order, or in other 
words, has been on the side of the Government. That influence cannot be 
appraised in terms of money, for it is beyond all price---The Tembu is the 
premier chief of the Cape Province, but I think his salary is less than that of the 
Pondo chief, whose country was taken over from them against their wish and at 
a much later date than that of the Tembu.  In the case of the Tembu and their 
chiefs, the obligations we owe them are enhanced by the fact that it was they 
who spontaneously requested the Government to assume their rule over them 
and their country.  If you consider carefully what we have taken from these 
people and compare it with what we give them in return I think you will begin to 
realize how much we owe them materially alone.40 
 
Brownlee‘s plea reflected the behind-the-scenes manipulation of government‘s policies 
by former and incumbent bureaucrats. His confiding in Herbst the reasons for his 
personal interest in Jongintaba‘s case portrays the ‗man on the spot‘, Herbst, as an 
official whose politically strategic position was such that he could make things happen.  
 
Brownlee warned the government to guard against losing what they had 
‗unscrupulously‘ taken from the colonised, and advocated that they should rather adopt 
an appeasement approach when dealing with exceptional administrative cases. While 
he suggested that little increments such as the one requested by Jongintaba could 
never compare with what the ‗Supreme Chief‘ had, over time, gained from the 















and still hoped, to acquire. As an experienced official, Brownlee was aware that his 
government had not, over almost half a century, produced any law which had proved 
adequately equipped to regulate the socio-political and economic aspects of 
chieftainship. The government‘s failure in this regard made the assimilation of 
indigenous law   into official customary law difficult, as a result of which the institutional 
chieftainship continued to pose a challenge to the successive administrative systems. It 
is clear that Secretary Herbst‘s office had at its disposal fundamental authority to 
influence major decisions by simply putting forward motivations and recommendations 
for his seniors to act on. This was the reason Brownlee ‗hastened‘, without too much 
loss of time, to plead firstly with Herbst for preferential treatment and special 
concessions to be given to Jongintaba, the ‗Premier Chief of the Cape Province‘.41 
 
 Against this background Brownlee advocated the nurturing, at all costs, of the loyalty of 
co-operative chiefs like Jongintaba. His political domain was extensive and it was 
important that he be helped and encouraged to play and fulfil his role as ‗national 
provider‘ satisfactorily. This would guarantee him the loyalty of his constituency while 
through him as a loyal chief, the Supreme Chief would rule the abaThembu. Rapport 
between government officials and the abaThembu chiefs, such as Brownlee was 
proposing, would be truly symbolic of the emerging political order of post-colonial 
abaThembuland. He was for ‗pacification through concession‘ in order to produce a 
political environment that would be conducive to the creation of orderly systems of 
administration. If Jongintaba‘s allegiance to the government was nurtured at all levels of 
the administrative ladder the abaThembu kingdom would not only be easy to govern but 
would also be a model to be emulated by other Cape Nguni chiefdoms. The assumption 
was that the benefits that the government had bestowed on the abaThembu as a result 
of their good conduct and loyalty would be an incentive to the other chiefs. 
Jonginyaniso‘s reference to the extensive travelling that Jongintaba had to do almost on 
a daily basis, gives justification to Brownlee‘s plea to the government. The chief regent 
was expected to visit, on a regular basis, his customary mother, Nopalamente, at 
Dalindyebo‘s eXhibeni   House. It was here that Novoti had been traditionally initiated as 















Great Wife‘s home and at the homes of the other three wives.  The distance between 
the provisional Great Place and the Jongilizwe widows‘ homes at Tyhalara warranted a 
special travelling allowance.43 Ngangomhlaba has praised Jongintaba as a great patriot 
and lover of his people who visited all the different corners of abaThembuland whenever 
an opportunity presented itself. If Ngangomhlaba‘s testimony is anything to go by, then 
Jongintaba deserved a sizeable allowance to be able to cover the great distance to 
Western abaThembuland. The crucial question was, however, whether the government 
preferred to govern abaThembuland as two separate entities or as one whole. This 
would reflect in their response to the application for an increase in subsidy, for, if the 
decentralised abaThembuland served the government‘s interests better, then 
Jongintaba‘s extended visits to Western abaThembuland would surely be regarded as 
an unwarranted expenditure.    
 
An evaluation of Jongintaba‘s term as regent reveals on the surface that his execution 
of duty was greatly handicapped by either insufficient funding or his bad management of 
finances. In almost all correspondence with the Magistrate‘s office he was pleading for 
an increase to his subsidy. A number of factors could have precipitated Jongintaba‘s 
financial predicament. Whilst the failure to balance expenditure with income always has 
a negative impact on financial management, it is likely that his stipend as a headman, 
his subsidy as Chief Regent and his allowance for Jongilizwe‘s family were simply not 
sufficient to enable him to cover his many financial commitments. It was not within the 
ambit of the Colonial government to acknowledge or even to recognize some of these 
commitments. It must be presumed that among these was the obligation to pay back the 
favour of Gadla Mandela whose persuasive skills had won Jongintaba the position of 
regency. Nelson Mandela has testified in his autobiography that Jongintaba had not 
forgotten that it was due to his father‘s intervention that he had become chief regent.44  
‗In time, Jongintaba would return the favour in a way that my father could not then [in 
1928] imagine.‘45Jonginyaniso revealed in an interview that the chief regency was 
generally perceived as a lucrative position and for that reason it was always coveted.46 
This is not to say that Jongintaba was not culturally obliged to sustain members of his 















symbolised in regulatory legislation was both obstructive and destructive in the 
execution of cultural obligations which were vital and invaluable as a bonding factor in 
the indigenous community. Mandela has also claimed in his book that Jongintaba‘s 
household was later joined by Nxeko, the son of Jongilizwe from Nonciba‘s house.47 It is 
noteworthy that Nxeko had an allowance that was paid on a monthly basis to his mother 
while he in fact was residing elsewhere. In addition to supporting some members of his 
extended family, Jongintaba also kept them clothed and paid for their education. 
Mandela has provided no evidence to the effect that he had a bursary or scholarship 
even when he studied at Fort Hare, and this suggests that Jongintaba possibly 
sponsored his university education. The chief regent was prevented by legislation from 
augmenting his income by unorthodox means because that was perceived as irregular 
practice which was characteristic of a ‗barbarous people.‘48  He was therefore forced to 
abide by his dependency status. There was little likelihood, however, that the magistrate 
would have knowingly assisted him with material benefits of any kind, had Jongintaba 
solicited educational funding for the son (Nelson) of a man (Gadla Mandela) who had 
only a decade earlier defied the summons from one of his predecessors. Jonginyaniso 
further revealed that Jongintaba travelled frequently to Quluqhu (Ngcobo District) to 
consult with Chief Silimela.49  Silimela‘s counsel was regarded as of great value in the 
House of Dalindyebo. There is no evidence to suggest that financial allowance was 
made available for these consultative journeys.  
 
Jongintaba‘s poor financial management obviously embarrassed the government,  
some of whose officials wished  to consider him as  competent. It also made Novoti, the 
Great Wife, lose confidence in him as one who was capable and competent to manage 
the estate of Chief Jongilizwe and attend to the needs of his extensive family. In a letter 
written on 6 April 1932, the SNA alluded to a misunderstanding between Novoti and 
Jongintaba. The misunderstanding had apparently arisen from his failure to ‗adequately 
discharge his responsibilities towards the family of the late chief‘.50 This was due to the 
fact that the regent had become seriously involved financially, firstly 
by reason of the…debt for which the estate of the late chief (Jongilizwe) was 
liable and which had to be met from the subsidy paid to the estate, secondly, by 















was compelled to incur heavy expenditure in extending hospitality to visitors and 
in otherwise suitably maintaining the dignity of the Great Place.51 
 
The SNA made it clear in his reply that ‗out of the amount of ₤500 the ₤120 was for the 
support of the late Chief‘s family while the ₤320 was for the Chief Regent. The ₤60 was 
for the minor heir‘.52In one of his personal applications for increase in subsidy 
Jongintaba had stated thus his personal circumstances:  
You are aware that I am a native, and as such keep no accounts of my 
expenditure, --- I maintain and support my late father‘s family, which is rather 
large, my late brother‘s family and my own. I have a son attending school at 
Healdtown Native Institution, for whom I pay £14 a year as school fees. In 
addition to the above, I have a great number of dependents, who look to me as 
head of the tribe, and according to Native Custom it is part of my duty to extend 
hospitality to visitors of the Great Place, which is in itself a heavy drain. I would 
respectfully beg that my allowance may be increased to £500.53  
 
The government‘s reluctance to address Jongintaba‘s complaints gave the impression 
that it was confronted with demands it had not anticipated and thus had not put systems 
in place with which to assess their validity. That the government underestimated the 
responsibility of sustaining a transformed abaThembu chiefship was also evident in their 
flat refusal to pay for the education of the ‗heir apparent‘ and his brothers. They made it 
clear that ―‗the Authorities of the institutions [Clarkebury in the case of Sabata and 
Healdtown in the case of Nxeko] must look to him for the payment of any costs 
incurred‘.54 Jongintaba‘s extravagance drove an uncle, Dikiso (Dickson) Mbekeni, to 
advise Ndumiso Mthikrakra, the regent‘s cousin, to seek a job with a legal firm so as to 
be able to help pay back the debts. Ndumiso subsequently secured such work,55 even 
though there is no evidence that he ever paid in full Jongintaba‘s numerous debts. Proof 
that the government wanted to see Jongintaba improving his overall management of 
finances and thereby earning his trust is evident in the letter that Magistrate Davidson 
wrote to the chief magistrate in 1929. In it  Davidson remarked  that ‗I have most 
carefully observed the manner in which he has performed his duties as Chief Regent 
and have no hesitation in confidently stating that it has been most satisfactory and 
therefore recommend that his allowance be increased from ₤40 to ₤70 per annum from 
the 1st July 1929‘.56 Davidson‘s observation was not, however, vindicated by 
















Jongintaba had also inherited Jongilizwe‘s old car. The extensive travelling made it 
necessary to send the car in for service on a regular basis, and this exhausted the 
regent‘s total allowance as much as it drained the government resources.57 Against this 
background it must be understood that a subsequent application was made on behalf of 
the chief to the chief magistrate to provide a state car to enable the ‗state chief‘ to 
execute his official errands. According to the information that Magistrate Lonsdale got 
from Jongintaba ‗the Tembus had  promised to contribute [money] to enable him to get 
a new car and it was necessary for him to purchase a new car to enable him to go 
round and hold meetings and collect the money.‘58 While passing on the regent‘s 
request, Lonsdale unequivocally stated that he was ‗not prepared to recommend his 
application. With his last car he has not had competent drivers and the result has been 
very heavy debts for repairs‘.59 The following was a response to a letter written on 19 
July 1934 the tone of which reflected great impatience on the part of Jongintaba:   
I have the honour to request you to be good enough to forward and support my 
application for a car to enable me to carry out my duties and obligations both to 
the Government and the Tembu people. I wish to point out that the area 
occupied by the Tembus is a large one comprising immediately the districts of 
Umtata, Mqanduli, Elliotdale, Engcobo, St. Marks and Xalanga as well as 
Tembuland Proper and the district of Lady Frere down to the Border of 
Queenstown in Emigrant Tembuland. In addition the Tembus are also located in 
Indwe, Dordrecht and Burgersdorp where they will look to me as their head and 
who are dissatisfied that I have so far been unable to visit them. I feel that it is 
essential I should be in close touch with the people, visiting them, hearing their 
complaints and seeing the conditions under which they live and being present at 
the installation of Headmen, etc., so that I may be able truly to represent these 
factors to the Government and thus secure a contented people. I have heard 
complaints that I do not visit the people often enough and this leads to the 
people drifting away and being without a recognized head.60 
 
Correspondence between the Mthatha magistrate and his senior counterpart also 
reveals that Jongintaba‘s debts continued to dog him even after his death, to the extent 
that the government did not, initially, find it easy to fix the stipend for the regent who 
took over after him. The magistrate‘s office was unable to distinguish between official  
















JONGINTABA TRAPPED IN THE CONSTRAINTS OF DEPENDENCE 
 
The period of Jongintaba‘s regency is best illustrated by the back-and-forth movement 
that was reflected in successive governments‘ policies. These policies were aimed at 
making the traditional governance conform to government‘s political interests. In this 
context Jongintaba was a chief by the grace of the Governor-General and thus was a 
stipendiary chief. Such a chief was, by virtue of the operation of the NAA of 1927, 
barred from accessing income from the formerly traditional sources of chiefly revenue. 
His needs were, as prescribed by Parliament, to be provided for in the stipend that he 
received from the ‗Supreme Chief‘. This was essentially a simple application of the ‗cut-
and-paste‘ kind. In this context the chief regent was an indispensable tool with an 
invaluable role in the political experiment of transforming the abaThembu chieftainship 
to a shape and political unit acceptable and amenable to the government. It was 
therefore unlikely that the government would allow even a man of Jongintaba‘s stature 
to accept contributions from his natural constituency for the purpose of buying a car. 
Such a step would be in direct opposition to the official objectives of transforming 
customary chieftainship into a civil institution. The dilemma that confronted the 
government here was that while it was replacing what it was destroying it also was 
learning it had to confront. This was the ‗many-headed Hydra‘ that existed within an 
indigenous chieftainship.  
 
Brownlee had displayed sensitivity and alertness to this fact in his earlier pro-Jongintaba 
plea to Magistrate Herbst. The abaThembu people‘s offer to help the regent pay for a 
new car, obviously a response to his earlier appeal, best reveals the options that were 
open to exploitation by someone who was suddenly confronted by restraints of the type 
appropriately described by Shula Marks as ‗constraints of dependency.‘62 At the same 
time the readiness of the abaThembu to contribute something towards the means of 
transport for their Paramount Chief  supports Mayer‘s claim that in the eyes of their 
most conservative followers the natural chiefs had the legitimacy which the newer 
authorities [Supreme Chief] could neither have63 nor comprehend. Mayer‘s so-called 
‗red followers‘ acknowledged Jongintaba primarily as a legitimate member of their ruling 















might not even have been aware that their chief was a government stipendiary. It is 
even possible that those who did know did not think that the rigid stipulations of the 
‗Supreme Chief‘ were applicable to them. There was thus little likelihood that they would 
regard the government‘s involvement as either freeing them from their responsibility and 
obligation to their chief or removing from their natural leaders the aura they derived from 
their royal birth. It is argued that for ordinary abaThembu to help their chief  purchase a 
car implied that they did not think that their chieftainship was supported by the White 
government‘s material resources but it existed by the good grace of the people 
themselves. Unfortunately the paramountcy of Jongintaba could not operate except 
within the political climate of its time. On the one hand the Governor-General-in-Council 
did not seem willing to meet Jongintaba‘s every need and respond to his  persistent and 
sometimes repeated pleas for this and that. The same government could not easily 
abandon the abaThembu ‗Paramount‘ who was an indispensable political figure in the 
Bhunga debates. Jongintaba‘s regency coincided with the time when the UTTGC was 
evolving politically. It was for this reason that the chief magistrate took the initiative in 
recommending Jongintaba‘s special allowance for attendance at the Bhunga sessions :  
I have the honour to recommend that Regent Chief David Jongintaba 
Dalindyebo be paid an allowance of ₤40 for attendance at each General Council 
Session, and to request that ministerial approval be sought for this payment in 
terms of Section 3 of Chapter IV of the Regulations published under 
Government Notice No.1607 of 1927. 64 
 
The government was committed to sustaining the thread that linked it to the abaThembu 
chieftainship. This can be seen in the fact that each time Jongilizwe‘s widow, Novoti, 
lodged a complaint about Jongintaba directly to the magistrate‘s office, she was  
advised to do so through the regent‘s office. This was obviously a means of entrenching 
Jongintaba‘s role as an indispensable and yet government-dependent link between the 
people and the Governor-General. It was imperative that the government should give 
Jongintaba a semblance of authority over the people, as well as confer on him, for 
them, the status of a mouthpiece, while it controlled him and through him the 
















There were other incidents that occurred during Jongintaba‘s regency which revealed 
the tension between official customary law and the abaThembu traditional law. One 
example was an insult by a certain Palo of Qamata to the dignity of both Jongintaba and 
Dalubuhle, the acting regent during Kaiser Matanzima‘s minority. Both chiefs admitted 
that ‗their custom had been outraged‘65 but the constraints of the official customary law, 
their guiding principle, were evident in the following comment in chief magistrate‘s letter. 
He remarked that Jongintaba and Dalubuhle ‗would have had no difficulty in dealing 
with the man according to their custom but they had decided to leave the matter in the 
hands of the magistrate to bring him to his senses‘66 because it was the Governor-in-
Council‘s prerogative to punish wrong-doers. Further, as Lacey says, to keep his 
position and the support of his fellow tribesmen, ‗a chief had to bow to greater control by 
white officials acting in the name of the white Parliament.‘67 The above comment was 
further evidence of the extent to which the legislation had undermined the autonomy of 
the indigenous law as well as its success in compromising its autonomic authority.   
 
Jongintaba‘s impatience and apparent suspicion of the government‘s every move  
manifested itself more clearly during his last years as chief regent. Clearly   these were 
years of disillusion, ironically, for both the traditional authorities and government. That 
they were probably also years of political improvisation for the authorities who did not 
seem to have brought forth a workable and an ideal form of government for the Black 
majority cannot be denied. The twelve years of Jongintaba‘s regency had clearly shown 
that the government‘s efforts to modify indigenous chieftainship were not a properly 
calculated exercise. The chieftainship of Jongintaba‘s time comprised different elements 
of imposed legislation which were unrelated to the customary institution. Added to this, it 
had difficult issues to address. It had survived the onslaught of the 1920 Native Affairs 
Act. It was undergoing a re-inventive process under the NAA of 1927.  It was, at a local 
government level, operating under the auspices of the UTTGC which was a corollary of 
the 1920 NAA. All these legislative pieces were presupposed to have an inherent 
competence to transform the indigenous chieftainship to a ‗particularistic‘ Blacks-only 
governmental institution which would symbolise their ‗non-involvement in the white-















albeit that he was unaware of that fact, can be seen in the letters of officials like 
Brownlee who pleaded, in vain, that his grievances be addressed. 
 
After ten years in the office Jongintaba probably realised that the government was not 
going to concede anything. His harangue to the magistrate at a quarterly meeting held 
at Mthatha on 21 July 1941 for chiefs, headmen and ordinary people must be seen in 
the context of a paramount chief who was losing touch with his constituency. The 
government‘s tardiness to improve Jongintaba‘s financial situation led him  to perceive 
the ‗Supreme Chief‘ to be the author of his financial woes which were bound to affect 
his political standing. His expression of displeasure at the Governor-General‘s visit to 
certain abaThembu regions without prior consultation with him must be seen in the light 
of his desperation to unite and rally the abaThembu behind his person. He viewed the 
‗unofficial visit‘ not only as ‗customarily unofficial‘ but also as a political threat and a 
slight to his authority. Hence his protest to the ‗Supreme Chief‘ that he and his officials 
were ‗dividing the Tembus and undermining my authority‘.69  
 
The government‘s disregard of his pleas for increase of allowances robbed him of 
regular contact with his constituency. He justifiably viewed his subjects‘ loss of 
enthusiasm in matters of the chiefdom, which was reflected in their poor attendance at 
tribal meetings, as ominous for the survival of the abaThembu paramountcy over a 
united kingdom. Whilst he knew how to enforce the attendance of meetings by 
employing customary law, his government-derived authority was circumscribed by the 
political prescription of the Governor-General. ‗The power of compulsion, uswazi, to 
compel people to attend the Chief Regent‘s meetings‘70 was not included in the 
provisions of the NAA of 1927. Jongintaba desperately needed uswazi and thus blamed 
the magistrate for withholding it from him. His invocation of customary weapons to 
address a lack of co-ordination, revealed the varying strengths of official legislation and 
customary laws. It also showed his absolute confidence in the effectiveness of the 
indigenous law to address culture-related matters as against the restraints that limited 
the scope of the ‗official customary law‘ that he was now subject to. Lacey‘s comment 















as an apology for Jongintaba‘s action in the above regard. It must be noted that  non-
attendance at meetings during his regency was more an indictment on the 
ineffectiveness of the weapons of the ‗Supreme Chief‘, and thus the inability of his office 
to sustain the remnant of the chief regent‘s authority. The chief‘s reaction also proved 
the correctness and relevance of Comaroff‘s statement that ‗chiefs are not impassive 
observers in the process of their own evaluation‘.72 Jongintaba could not afford to see 
his authority slipping through his fingers. The incompatibility of the two versions of 
customary law comes out in the wrangle over uswazi. It seems that once Jongintaba 
realised that the government was neglecting him, he desperately drew closer to his 
natural constituency. After all, his leadership over them was primarily prescribed by birth 
even though officially and secondarily it was sanctioned by the ‗Supreme Chief‘. This 
was a way of pursuing traditional avenues of self-strengthening once he realised that 
the official chieftainship was incapable of empowering him politically.  There was little 
likelihood that the abaThembu would reject him because in their eyes he was a chief by 
birth irrespective of the Government‘s option not to vote him into a position of power by 
granting him authority to employ uswazi.  
 
Jongintaba‘s insistence on uswazi was aimed at sustaining the rapport between the 
ruler and the ruled, something that would not counterbalance the established legitimacy 
of any chieftainship. The problem confronting him was that the Governor-General, in the 
words of Sanders, ‗lacked independent knowledge of African customary law‘. 73At the 
same time Jongintaba‘s insistence on uswazi’ was not likely to be acceptable to any 
authority that was committed to abolishing customary practices and institutions which 
were regarded as repugnant to its laws. It was thus obvious that the government‘s 
failure to properly provide for him, as reflected in his letters, made it impossible for him 
to fulfill some of his obligations. This recognition of his helplessness drove him to 
extremes. He missed meetings and important appointments, ostensibly due to 
sickness,74 and these, apparently, were indications  of his disillusionment with a system 
he had earlier patronised. He was also disappointed when the chief magistrate could 

















When Jongintaba died on 19 August 1942 he was still negotiating with the government 
to help him resuscitate his chiefly dignity. This the Government had not done after 14 
years of Jongintaba‘s regency during which period various appeals were made to that 
effect, some from renowned Government officials like Brownlee. It cannot be said that 
Jongintaba made no mark during his term. Bennie credits Jongintaba for ruling 
abaThembu wisely and for his encouragement of the establishment of clinics in 
abaThembuland. Claims that he co-operated with the missionaries of all 
denominations76 bear testimony to Mandela‘s claim that ‗at Mqhekezweni religion was 
part of the fabric of life….The regent took his religion very seriously‘.77Jonginyaniso 
confirmed that the legacy that Jongintaba, an important member of the Methodist 
Church of Southern Africa, left the abaThembu of the Tyhalarha Village where the Great 
Place is located, was a church. The villagers still worship in the church that Jongintaba 
built less than a kilometre from King Ngangelizwe‘s grave.78 Jongintaba died, leaving 
behind Sabata, the heir, who was still a scholar at Clarkebury.79   
DABULAMANZI SUCCEEDS JONGINTABA AMID CONTROVERSY 
The death of Jongintaba left abaThembuland once more without a ruler. The 
abaThembu custom which had earlier excluded from the status of an heir the heir‘s 
elder brothers did not specify whether they could hold the regency for him. The 
nomination for the position of regency fell on Dabulamanzi, the son of Dalindyebo from 
the RHH. Soon after his nomination, Chief Sipendu Bacela raised an objection in a letter 
to the chief magistrate. This was on the grounds that the abaThembu custom did not 
sanction the election of a regent from the RHH while80 ‗we [abaThembu] still have a son 
in the Great House. This kind of election is out of our custom and creates a great 
inconvenience among the people.‘81 It is significant for the history of the abaThembu 
chieftainship that Sipendu pleaded with the government ‘to grant [abaThembu at large] 
permission to investigate and solve all native customs according to their tribes [customs 
prescribed by specific chiefdoms].‖82 Sipendu argued that Headman Melithafa 
Mthikrakra, a descendant from Dalindyebo‘s Great House, should be considered.83 His 
request, if granted, would probably have been diametrically opposed to the 















fully discussed at the meeting ---- and it was there decided that it was not contrary to 
custom for the heir in the Right Hand House to act as regent for his nephew- the heir. 
The position would be different if he was chosen to act for a brother in the great 
house‘.84 The grounds for Sipendu‘s objections were politically valid, especially in the 
light of the testimonies from the current abaThembu chiefs. Melithafa‘s mother‘s status 
was not clearly defined and this fact affected his eligibility for regency. Further,  
unbeknown to most custodians of abaThembu crown was the fact that the nomination of 
Dabulamanzi was also influenced by Jongilizwe‘s wives. They voiced their complaints 
about Melithafa‘s autocracy and cruelty to Meligqili, Dabulamanzi‘s younger brother,  
and were outright in their preference for Dabulamanzi who they were convinced was 
meek.   
 
Jonginyaniso has further confirmed that Dabulamanzi‘s nomination was not sanctioned 
by custom. His argument is that  ‗the offspring of the RHH are excluded from regency 
because they are perceived as a threat because they always put forth claims, kuba 
bayabanga, and they are never willing to hand over to the heir when the time has 
come.‘85 He explained further that ‗usually the RHH wife is the one who is married first, 
and very soon afterwards she is given her rightful share of everything, and provided with 
a home of her own so that she has no excuse, whatsoever, to focus on the estate of the 
Great House‘.86 Zwelodumo has also given an account of how bitter his father‘s eldest 
brother, from the Silimela‘s RHH was, when he had to hand over the crown to whom it 
belonged. He recorded that : ‗Hlathikhulu came up with all sorts of stories claiming that 
after all he was also of royal blood and the eldest of all Silimela‘s sons‘.87  
 
This statement does not dispute the claims of the Nhlapo Commission with regard to the 
RHH ranking second in importance to the Great House.88 It only serves to highlight that 
Dabulamanzi‘s choice was both ill-conceived and a violation of custom and traditional 
norms. Whilst Jonginyaniso mentions that Melithafa Mthikrakra was not preferred by the 
abaThembu on the grounds of his bad temper, it is very likely that the reasons that 
according to custom disqualified Dabulamanzi accounted for the government‘s 















entrenching customs and traditional institutions was more likely to prefer an individual 
whose candidature was questionable. The likely complications and/or disputes that had 
been hinted at in Sipendu‘s protest and Jonginyaniso‘s comment would hopefully be 
resolved in a manner befitting a bureaucratic chiefship.  
 
Ultimately the nomination of Dabulamanzi was confirmed in a letter of 18 November 
1942 from V. M. de Villiers to the Chief Magistrate. The letter endorsed the unanimous 
nomination of Dabulamanzi as Regent at a meeting that was held on 7 November 1942 
at the Bumbane Great Place. The meeting was attended by Chiefs, Headmen and the 
abaThembu people of Mthatha, Engcobo, St Marks, Mqanduli and Elliotdale.89 Soon 
after the ratification of the appointment, the SNA processed the conferment on 
Dabulamanzi,  
in terms of Section 12 of the Native Administration Act No.38 of 1927, ….of 
jurisdiction to hear and determine civil claims arising out of Native Law and 
Custom brought before him by Natives against Natives resident within the area 
of his jurisdiction. 90 
 
The above notice, which appeared in the SNA‘s minute of 29 October 1943 must be 
regarded as having validated the regency of Dabulamanzi on the basis that it was 
official in terms of the official customary law. The chief magistrate informed Mears that  
Dabulamanzi ‗has now assumed the important office of Regent of the Tembu Tribe with 
its attendant responsibilities and is residing at the Tribal Great Place on the Tyalara 
Farm‘.91 
THE VICISSITUDES OF ABATHEMBU CHIEFTAINSHIP UNDER DABULAMANZI 
As chief regent, Dabulamanzi inherited the responsibility of Jongilizwe‘s family and that 
of the regent who had just died. Other than the fact that he was the second chief of the 
abaThembu people to operate under the 1927 NAA, his regency had no precedent. This 
was both in terms of the circumstances surrounding his appointment as well as his 
responsibilities. He also had to contend with an heir (then 14 years of age) who was fast 
approaching his majority. This latter factor called for more vigilance on the part of 















Great Place‘ did not seem good for the reinforcement of its dignity and prestige, even 
though Dabulamanzi‘s residing not far from Novoti‘s place was an advantage as far as 
mentoring the heir was concerned. 
 
The government had, in the regency of Dabulamanzi, a politico-administrative challenge 
to correct some shortcomings in certain aspects of Jongintaba‘s rule. The government‘s 
refusal to ‗accept legal responsibility for the settlement of claims lodged against the 
estate of the late Jongintaba Dalindyebo, who was paid a substantial allowance both in 
his personal capacity and as regent‘ was an indictment of the Supreme Chief. His office 
had failed to put stringent measures in place to monitor how Jongintaba spent the 
allowances and subsidies he received. It must be presumed that the experience that the 
Governor-General‘s office had with Jongintaba as regent gave it  an idea of what parts 
of the customary practices and institutions were repugnant to the legislation, and thus  
needed to be outlawed and/or abolished. It was possibly this state of affairs that partly 
contributed to the passing, in 1951, of a much refurbished Act as the Bantu Authorities 
Act (BAA).  
 
The immediate problem for the new chief regent was the liquidation of the debts of his 
predecessor, a matter that was soon taken up with the DNA. Hemming, a Native 
Representative in Parliament recommended financial assistance for Jongintaba‘s widow 
in a letter to the SNA.92 This is how he presented the case for No-England:  
I have no quarrel with the Statement on which that refusal (by the Government 
to grant No-England financial assistance) was based knowing that the facts are 
correct, but I would ask you to approach her request from a different angle…. I 
would remind you that Chief David Dalindyebo served in South West Africa and 
later proceeded to France with the Native Labour Contingent and that he acted 
as Chief Regent for a period of approximately 14 years.  There is no sympathy 
for her in the heart of the present Regent owing to unfortunate divisions among 
the Tembu people. I would point out that during the lifetime of the late Chief 
David, his wife would be regarded as in the position of the mother of the people.  
It would not look well that upon the death of Chief David, particularly in view of 
his services to the Government when he was in better health, that his widow 
should be, as I believe her to be, in actual want. On the other hand I feel it would 
strengthen the position of the Department if some regular assistance however 
















Hemming‘s reference to the cold relationship between No-England and the  chief regent 
is credible in view of the fact that Dabulamanzi had earlier lost the regency position to 
Jongintaba, No-England‘s late husband. No-England desperately wanted the 
government to pay her a pension grant, and had expressed her wish thus to Mears  ‗my 
late husband was Chief Regent of Tembuland----but since his death I have no pension 
of any kind and I am in great distress as a result‘.94 The government was adamant that 
the widow‘s plight did not justify a grant. No-England reported that  the magistrate‘s 
response to her ‗was that the government had been sympathetic in that it had agreed to 
pay off the debts owed by my late husband and that he [the magistrate] could not now 
make further representations on my behalf‘.95 It is interesting to note that when the 
government wanted to veto No-England‘s application for a pension grant, it justified its 
refusal to accede to her request by drawing on the common practice of traditional family 
life. Magistrate Clarke remarked in a letter to the chief magistrate that in accordance 
with accepted Native ideas he (Justice, No- England‘s son) will doubtless look after and 
care for his mother and there is no reason to suppose that she will ever be in any actual 
need as regards either food or clothing‘.96  The  government was not,  therefore, about 
to be persuaded to grant No-England pension as the following remark testifies: ‗no 
provision is made by the Government for the payment of a pension to you and there 
would consequently be nothing gained by making representations through a member of 
Parliament‘.97 The magistrate obviously felt slighted by the idea of No-England 
addressing her problems to individuals rather than through the representative of the 
Governor-General. No-England, for her part, was caught up in a ‗no dialogue political 
encounter‘ which impelled her to exploit whatever options that seemed available to 
someone in her plight. What transpires in Hemming‘s plea was that the former allies of 
the government, such as Jongintaba, were qualified perpetual beneficiaries. Their 
entitlement to government favours was dictated partly by services that had been 
rendered and partly by uncertain expectations of what might be.  
 
Whilst there was a whole host of officials who imparted the same message to different 















contention that ‗their [the officials‘] mission was to establish areas of control, if need be 
to ‗pacify‘ their new subjects, and to create orderly systems of administration among 
‗barbarous people‘98 seems to hold ground in the ‗Mears versus Hemming and 
Hemming-No-England versus Mears‘ uneven dialogue. What the administrators failed to 
do in mid 20th century abaThembuland was to effect a reconciliatory dialogue between 
colonial theory and indigenous practice so as to forestall a race for power between 
officials  and/or individuals. Race for power was manifest in the practice of authority, 
and once people like No-England, whose focus was on short-term gains, discerned it 
they utilised it to their advantage. In the process they were unjustifiably hurt, more by 
the consequences of the ‗power race‘ than by their well-conceived initiatives the aims of 
which were material rather than stakes in the new political dispensation. The apparent 
lack of co-ordination between the offices of the SNA, the G vernor-General and its 
satellite departments, was reflected in Mears‘ reaction to No-England rather than in the 
response to Hemming. This was destined to work against the legitimacy that the 
‗Supreme Chief‘ intended to bestow on its new brand of chiefly authority in 
abaThembuland.  
 
Correspondence from, and about Prince Sabata also reflected that the regent‘s 
indifference to him had become public knowledge. Sabata, who had possibly noticed 
the Regent‘s uncaring attitude at a critical age in his physical and social development, 
did not seem to be settled and stable. The SNA had earlier also expressed concern 
about the chiefly attention that Sabata was accorded by his peers ‗he is too near to his 
people and that many of the scholars at Clarkebury belong to his tribe and accordingly 
give him the extreme respect paid to a chief‘‖99 when, in fact, he was a learner among 
other learners in a learning environment. It was against this background that Mears 
even recommended that Sabata be sent to a school outside the Transkei where he 
would be treated like any other learner.100 
 
The aura of natural chieftainship that is always ingrained in people‘s minds really landed  
Sabata in what could be called a royal trap while at Clarkebury. This was evidenced by 















volition, the dignity101 that befitted his princely status in the larger community, albeit in a 
so-called inappropriate environment. A claim by N. Dana that she was also an 
attendant, impelesi, of the late Stella Sigcawu at the Healdtown Institution is proof of the 
government‘s indecisiveness in regard to the treatment of young royals at the 
institutions of learning at that time.102 It was also significant that after so many years of 
regency rule in abaThembuland, during which period none of the regents resided at the 
home of the Great Wife, the political status of the future traditional father of the 
abaThembu was known even by the youth. The only thing that stood between Sabata 
and paramount chieftainship was his minority, rather than political votes. The 
government officials justifiably feared that if Sabata were made conscious of his chiefly 
status he might not focus on the primary purpose of his being at an educational 
institution. For the government an educated Sabata would not nly take what had been 
achieved by his predecessors a step further but would also facilitate their objectives 
even more. That an accomplished Sabata would match up to, and be complemented by 
his Western abaThembuland junior counterpart, K.D. Matanzima, was another 
consideration of the Supreme Chief‘s staff.  
 
Sabata‘s change of schools continued to make his education a cause of great concern 
to those interested in his welfare. His school life history traces him to Lovedale, 
Clarkebury, Healdtown, Bensonvale (Sterkspruit), a school in Kroonstad where Mr D.W. 
Cingo was principal. Magistrate Mears expressed thus the concerns of abaThembu 
about Sabata‘s apparent apathy to education:   
These people are most anxious that he should ultimately receive an advanced 
education and that he be not less qualified than Kayser Matanzima, the present 
head of the RHH. They fear that when Sabata takes over he may be dominated 
by Kayser unless he learns to stand on his own (mental) feet.103  
 
The Methodist Parsonage personnel‘s offer must be seen in the above light. They  
voluntarily helped facilitate Sabata‘s education. In December 1945 Rev C. C. Harris 
confirmed in a letter to the Mthatha Magistrate, Mears, that Rev E.W. Grant had, with 
the approval of the Chief Regent, agreed to be the guardian of Sabata.104 Sabata‘s 















Sabata ‗is a chip off the old block and is already growing ‗gay‘ and has reached the 
stage of a ―show off‖ before the girls. He will grow out of this of course. But I expect 
complications‘.105 Harris, obviously reflecting on Sabata‘s presumed good background 
went on to say that ‗he is made of good stuff and should be able to take his place 
worthily in the tribe after a bit‘.106 Concern was always expressed by the educated 
abaThembu, like Dr Xuma, whose communication with Reverends Harris and Grant 
through the SNA was aimed at facilitating Sabata‘s education and ultimate placement at 
Healdtown in 1946.107 In a subsequent letter, he pledged to Dr Xuma that he would 
administer the ₤5 per month allowance on behalf of the Magistrate.108 Xuma 
subsequently wrote to the missionaries to thank them for their ‗prompt action on the 
above-mentioned matter. It has brought great relief to many a mind that was concerned. 
I highly appreciate your kind cooperation and assistance in the matter‘.109 By 1949 
Sabata seemed not to have settled at school. A letter written by the SNA to Yates 
reported that Sabata was in Cape Town collecting school fees from his ‗tribesmen‘ 
because Dabulamanzi was indifferent to his plight and neither could he be available to 
countersign cheques110 presumably for payment of school fees.  
 
The place the Government seemed to be according education in the mentoring 
programme of the heir was an interesting feature of the evolving official chieftainship in 
abaThembuland. Though education had not been an essential requirement in the 
indigenous chieftainship of Southern Nguni the government expressed  a commitment 
to expose Sabata to more education than his predecessors had acquired. The 
government did not only view education as a complement to good character and 
conduct, but also as a tool to inculcate a measure of flexibility in the minds of those who 
had been exposed to it. This would be shown in the abaThembu chiefs‘ continuous 
amenability to official customary law and all that went with it in a cultural sense. A 
successful transformation of traditional governance depended greatly on the 
enthusiastic contribution by the chieftainship agency itself. Whilst the government‘s 
objective in encouraging chiefs of this era to avail themselves of educational 
opportunities was an established fact, it is also clear that there was incompatibilty 















educated chief, education could be either a ladder for reaching greater heights in power 
or a tool to resist the government‘s inroads into their political terrain. Education could 
also be a weapon to uphold, counteract and oppose or offset unacceptable ideology. In 
this latter context therefore, uneducated or poorly educated chiefs would not be properly 
equipped to stand their ground in the early 20th century which was a crucial period of 
‗chieftainship in transition‘.  
 
Mears also reported on the existing fears in abaThembuland as to whether 
Dabulamanzi could be trusted to have the capacity to instil into Sabata a sense of the 
value of education. There were certain individuals who were anxious  ‗lest Dabulamanzi, 
the Regent, who is not a progressive man and lacking in education, may somehow or 
other stand in the way of Sabata‘s educational progress‘.111 These concerns seemed 
justified. He had failed to pay fees for Nompumelelo, the daughter of Nonciba 
Jongilizwe, when the former was at Indaleni Industrial High School in Natal. He was 
also not regular with the ₤2 payments of allow nces to Nopenge, the daughter of 
Nokapa Jongilizwe.  Albert Nxeko, the eldest son of Nonciba, was at Healdtown and his 
school fees were also in arrears.112  
 
While the atmosphere was not clear around the abaThembu paramountcy there was, as 
subsequent discussions will prove, better stability in the Western division of 
abaThembuland. Practical historical factors were instrumental in the apparent political 
imbalance of the abaThembu Great Place. Jongintaba had succeeded Silimela as chief 
regent, and Paramount Chief Jongilizwe who ruled briefly between the two regencies 
had died before he could make a lasting imprint. This had a negative effect on the 
fluidity of legitimate governance in the principal domain of abaThembuland. It also made 
for an inevitable comparison of regencies because their regimes were so vastly 
different. Whilst Jongintaba appeared on the one hand to be a carefree patriotic lover of 
his people who was criticised by some for not doing enough, Dabulamanzi was hardly 
praised by anyone for anything. A government committed to modernising the 
institutional chieftainship seemed to have become particularly sensitive to the 















stifle the government‘s objectives in wanting to educate Sabata. The question of 
whether the regency, a stop-gap in monarchical governances, is a successful exercise 
or not in the politico-traditional context does not seem to have been answered by the 
regency of Dabulamanzi.  
 
As chief regent, and thus acting as paramount chief of all the abaThembu, Dabulamanzi 
was always invited to attend meetings to nominate chiefs and/or headmen for the 
various locations and/or villages of abaThembuland. In this regard by 1951 the 
magistrate‘s office saw it fit to regulate the expenditure of the chief regent. The 
magistrate‘s correspondence reflects that the chief regent‘s travelling allowances were 
calculated on the basis of distances covered, ‗ 
the distances shown [on the claim form] are the correct distances for the direct 
routes from Tyhalara to the points (Quluqu, 18 March 1950, Silimela‘s domain, 
for the nomination of a successor to the late Chief Busobengwe Mthirara); 
(Qumanco, 1, March 1950, for the nomination of a successor to the late Chief 
Zamiwonga Mgudlwa); (Nkondlo, 22 June 1950, to participate in the enquiry into 
the conduct of Sakela Dalasile) in the districts mentioned and are considerably 
less than if he had travelled by main road via Umtata.113  
 
It must be presumed that the magistrate‘s monitoring of Dabulamanzi‘s financial 
expenditure somehow impacted on the chief regent‘s payment of school fees for 
Jongilizwe‘s children. Further, the visible lack of communication between the chief 
regent and the heir to the throne, which was ominous for the unity of abaThembu 
chieftainship, seemed to aggravate an already emotionally charged situation.  Whilst 
Sabata did not seem to be settled in any one of the schools [that] he was sent to, it is 
also a fact that official correspondence reflects complaints originating from him or his 
mother about the continued irregular payment or non-payment of his school fees. This 
was always due to either the failure of Dabulamanzi to sign the cheques for payments 
or simply unavailability of the same to give an explanation for his slip-shoddiness. 
Mear‘s letter of 17 February 1949 to J.J. Yates had reported on Sabata‘s going about  
‗soliciting contributions‘114 towards the payment of school fees. He subsequently 
remarked thus ‗Sabata should not be wandering around like a commoner in this way‘.115 















followers ‗as an act of courtesy. He is at Langa collecting money from his tribesmen to 
cover the costs of furthering his education at Kroonstad at Mr W. D. Cingo‘s school‘.116 
In a subsequent memorandum of the interview of 23 December 1949 between the chief 
regent and the magistrate, Dabulamanzi admitted knowledge of Sabata‘s visit to Cape 
Town but stated at the same time that the object of Sabata‘s visit was unknown to him. 
‗He (Sabata) did not inform the Chief Regent of the purpose of his visit to Cape Town 
and has not written to him since leaving‘.117 The above excerpt shows that there was 
neither a father-son relationship nor a regent-heir communication between Dabulamanzi 
and Sabata. Even though Dabulamanzi confessed to having provided Sabata with an 
escort (Mvulayehlobo Mthikrakra, Zwelibangile Joyi, Zitulumane, Bangindawo) for his 14 
days‘ visit to Cape Town118 obviously to monitor and protect the heir, it can be argued 
that the idea of such an elderly company made up of abaThembu elders definitely made 
Sabata more conscious of his status as their paramount chief-in-waiting than as their 
school-going ward. Such sense of self-importance as he probably felt was not likely to 
incline him towards school. Reasons that would have made the elders readily 
accompany the heir on a visit, the purpose of which had not been properly spelled out, 
were either political obligation or uneasiness and/or perceived indifference of the chief 
regent to the paramount chief-in–waiting.  
 
Dabulamanzi agreed to the chief magistrate‘s suggestion to write to the Cape Town 
Native Commissioner to arrange for Sabata‘s return from Cape Town. He went on to 
say that Sabata has been influenced by others to take over the tribe and this is the 
reason for him not wishing to return to school‘.119 Whilst Dabulamanzi‘s piece of 
information was possibly an eye-opener to the White official who had neither the ability 
to gauge the chief regent‘s personal ambitions nor the wisdom to predict such 
ambitions, his comments generate more questions. The timing of the regent‘s statement 
is questionable. It came at a time when all who were interested in the welfare of Sabata 
were concerned about the regent‘s visible lack of interest in the heir‘s academic 
advancement. What kind of a mentor would allow such an important ward to undertake 
trips for unspecified purposes? Did he view the trip to Cape Town as a way of getting 















alleged to be influencing Sabata? Was Dabulamanzi entrenching his position and thus 
clinging to power? Was he genuinely interested and/or committed to Sabata‘s education 
or did he see it as a ploy to take the heir‘s mind off his abaThembu paramountcy? The 
comment of the chief magistrate on Dabulamanzi‘s remarks was of great historical 
significance. He pointed out ‗that there were certain conditions governing Sabata‘s 
appointment as Paramount Chief of the Tembus.  For instance, he had to be married 
and have attained the age of 25 years. He also had to be considered suitable for 
appointment‘.120  
 
The magistrate‘s suggestion of age in numerical terms as one of the conditions was of 
little relevance to the Southern Nguni custom and thus not applicable to Sabata‘s case. 
This is not to say the correctness of the argument and the universal application of the 
requirement are to be disregarded in toto. The overriding factor is that the attainment of 
maturity in traditional society was signalled by going through specific rites of passage 
(circumcision in the case of males) rather than by calendar days. Colonel Maclean‘s 
claim that there was no specified period at which circumcision was to take place other 
than the marks of puberty supports the above claim. It was thus a cultural milestone 
which if and when delayed, practically put the individual‘s socio-political development 
and occupation of public office on hold.   
 
Maclean has identified circumcision as a ‘national rite, venerable for its extreme 
antiquity‘121 and prevailing amongst all the tribes of South Eastern Africa. ‗As respects 
the significance of the rite, it bears a strictly civil character, being the rite by which the 
youth of the male sex are introduced to the rank and privileges of manhood‘.122  ‗Being a 
man meant that one knew how to conduct oneself in all circumstances, was able to bear 
the responsibility of being the head of a family and could endure any amount of 
hardship‘.123 The above views therefore nullify the magisterial condition of calendar age 
and marriage status as effectively preventing Sabata from assuming his political 
position. Stapleton rebuts this view in his claim that Jongumsobomvu Maqoma‘s reason 
for delaying Sandile‘s passage into manhood (at age 17 in 1837) had a lot to do with his 















chief-in-waiting had to have a stable character) smacked of the government‘s intention 
of phasing out indigenous chieftainship so as to make way for the government‘s version 
of it.  
 
While the government‘s apparent intentions to make Sabata an educated chief were 
good superficially, it is doubtful if the import of its so-called well-conceived objectives 
were the same as those of Dabulamanzi. In the same context, while Dabulamanzi‘s 
prodding Sabata to go to school could have been a simple execution of duty and 
responsibility on his part,  it can be argued that  factors that maintained his status and 
extended his term were technically opposed to the forces that were likely to act as a 
check on his ‗indefinite period‘ type of regency.  The prolongation of Sabata‘s education 
inevitably extended Dabulamanzi‘s term in office, making it possible for him  to entrench 
his position of chieftainship among his subjects. The government‘s inconsistency on the 
question of conditions governing accession to chieftainship did not, however, have 
practical models in abaThembuland. Sabata‘s f ther, Jongilizwe, who was sent to 
circumcision school in 1922 at age 18, acceded to the chieftainship in 1924, at age 
20.125 Notes of an interview between the SNA and Sabata with other abaThembu men 
on 23 February 1949 reflect that the relationship between Sabata and Dabulamanzi was 
not one of father-son, Sabata accused the chief regent of not being interested in  
my education. He has refused to collect my allowance regularly. It is true that I 
was given ₤40 to come here [Cape Town], but it was not enough because I had 
just left circumcision school and had no clothes. I am going home [from Cape 
Town] on the 12th and I am going to do private studies as no arrangements have 
been made for me to go to school. I was late for Lovedale last year because I 
only came from circumcision school in March, 1948.126 
 
Ntsebeza and Ndletyana have quoted Mda Mda‘s testimony that the abaThembu 
demanded   that Sabata be installed after he had been hurriedly sent to the circumcision 
school in 1948.127 The meeting that followed must be seen in the light of the 
developments alluded to above. At a meeting held in the chief magistrate‘s office on 24 
June, 1949 prominent abaThembu chiefs made it clear that the time had come for 
Sabata to take over as king. Chief Justice Mthikrakra‘s opening remark on the subject 















they had to decide what to do with the Chief Elect. They had now come to the end of 
things-the young chief now wanted his father‘s ―blanket‖-his late father‘s position as 
Paramount Chief of the Tembus.‘128 Chief Mthikrakra also made the magistrate aware 
that  ‗there were difficulties ahead and the results would be bad. They - the Tembus - 
had now come to him to help them, to sympathise with them and to help by having 
Sabata installed as paramount chief of the Tembus.‘129 Chief Zwelibhangile Joyi echoed 
Mthikrakra‘s sentiments, ‗according to custom the chief could take control at this present 
age (at 21 years). He would not rely on himself. The chieftainship really vested in the 
older men and the other chiefs who advised him in all matters. They also relied on the 
experienced magistrate and native commissioners‘.130  
 
Harold Ngqangqeni who spoke after Joyi made it clear from the start that the 
abaThembu had surrendered their country peacefully to the government, but that being 
under the government did not mean that their customs had changed. ‗He is their King - 
no vote need be taken - he is born their King. The vote of the people is only taken in 
connection with the appointment of a Headman, and only in the case of a Headman is 
the age of man taken into consideration.‘131 His further remark that ‗Sabata will go to 
school but he must first be appointed Chief so that he need not look back,‘132 was 
significant when viewed in the context of abaThembu politics of chieftainship at the time. 
His implicit suggestion that as soon as Sabata had been appointed he would nominate 
one of his councillors to act for him, and only then would he be able to ‗devote all his 
time to his studies‘133was also significant because it reflected a national sentiment that 
education was of secondary importance. When a councillor, Bangindawo Baso, spoke 
he dwelt on the apparent neglect of the homestead at the Bumbane Great Place and 
cited this as the reason why Sabata needed to be home. He challenged the chief 
magistrate to visit Bumbane, and summed the situation up by remarking that ‗it 
(Bumbane) had improved considerably since Sabata had returned (from school)‘.134 
Chief Vululwandle Mthikrakra was the last to speak and he also echoed the sentiments 
of the other speakers, adding further that Sabata‘s uncles would assist the government 
















The unanimity of opinion that wanted Sabata to be given chieftainship gives the 
impression that the abaThembu elders were trying to forestall a possible replay of the 
Ndlambe-Ngqika tussle of the early 19th century.135 Ngqangqeni‘s suggestion that 
Sabata would, once appointed, choose a caretaker-councillor was not only an indication 
that the current regent should step down but also an announcement that Dabulamanzi‘s 
subtle ambitions could no longer be tolerated. If Sabata‘s claims about Dabulamanzi‘s 
lack of interest in the affairs of the Great House were anything to go by, then 
Dabulamanzi‘s motives with regard to Sabata were indeed suspicious and a cause for 
concern. 
 
A subsequent meeting held on 15 September 1949 revealed that there was more to the 
mud-slinging between Sabata and his uncle/ political father.  Vululwandle Mtikrakra 
accused the chief regent of keeping them in the dark in so far as the affairs that affected 
Sabata were concerned. He substantiated his accusations by mentioning that the  
the Tembus were not aware that Sabata was not at school [at some stage]- the 
Chief Regent had never called them together and informed them of this fact. In 
the second place they had not been told that Sabata had been circumcised. 
They had looked to Dabulamanzi to make these events known. In the third place 
they had heard rumours that Sabata was ill-they had not been informed of this 
fact by Dabulamanzi. When he had been appointed, he had been told to notify 
the Tembus of happenings affecting Sabata.136 
 
In defense of Dabulamanzi, it is puzzling that he was accused of keeping Sabata‘s 
circumcision to himself in view of Mda‘s authoritative claim that an abaThembu faction 
first had the prince circumcised and then called for his installation.  
 
The sensitivity of Vululwandle‘s reference to the abaThembu people being kept in the 
dark about, inter alia, Sabata‘s circumcision (March 1948)137 is better understood and 
perhaps justified when relating it to Ngxamngxa‘s explanation of the ritual that is 
attendant upon the circumcision of the royals. He has affirmed that among isiXhosa 
speakers,: ‗a prescribed order must be followed when the operation is performed on the 
son of a chief….Among the Thembu usosuthu’s son [presumably the chief] is the 















him‘.138 The amaXhosa followed the same pattern but their rationale was that the blood 
of the chief‘s son, who is the second to be circumcised, falls upon that of the first 
initiate. The reasoning here was that the previous soaking of the earth with blood would 
destroy the possibility of contamination of the blood of the chief‘s son. In the same vein 
the blood of the subsequent patients would fall upon the prince‘s and  ‗prevent sorcerers 
harming him by means of contagious magic‘139 The amaBomvana followed the same 
pattern, with the ‗wiper of the blood of the chief‘ isula legazi lenkosi, preceding the 
prince in the operation. In the light of the above, the abaThembu seemed to have had a 
valid grievance against Dabulamanzi, because the customary procedures that Sabata 
had undergone in the circumcision process were not only the regent‘s prerogative, but a 
national obligation.  
 
Dabulamanzi‘s claim that ‗the Chief Magistrate had suggested that Sabata go back to 
school---he was not of age for the appointment as Chief yet, and also because by being 
educated he would be more able to tackle the big job of Chieftainship‖140 was thus both 
irrelevant and questionable. The abaThembu‘s pledging that Sabata will go to school 
made Dabulamanzi‘s concern seem unimportant.141 This is not to say that the 
government did not have specific expectations from the products that they were 
grooming. It is clear that the sentiments of the chief regent and the government 
reflected socio-political incompatibilities. The above perception becomes clearer when 
viewed in the light of the following remark that was made at a meeting held to further 
discuss Sabata‘s schooling. ‗The Tembus had then asked and expected Chief 
Dabulamanzi to lead them, to suggest something.‘142 Dabulamanzi then reserved his 
opinion on the most expected ‗suggestion‘ which had been mooted at earlier meetings, 
and this was the accession to chieftainship of Prince Sabata. Instead he reiterated the 
chief magistrate‘s suggestion that  ‗Sabata should go back to school‘.143 Dabulamanzi‘s 
failure to substantiate his motives for wanting the heir designate to go back to school 
were not based on the belief that education would benefit  him and it raised questions 
about his political intentions. Chief Jonginyaniso states categorically that ‗Dabulamanzi 
simply did not want to relinquish the paramountcy to Sabata.  He brought forth all sorts 















for that matter, who was even older than Jongilizwe, Dalindyebo‘s son from the Great 
House‘.144 Joyi also claims that Dabulamanzi‘s only achievement was ‗to occupy the 
regency seat, he was a very lazy person who derived great satisfaction from simply 
being known as a King and he wouldn‘t let go‘.145 
 
It was also significant that in his testimony at the meeting, Dabulamanzi admitted to 
having called Chief Daliwonga Matanzima to discuss the issue of Sabata‘s schooling. 
His summoning of, and subsequent interview with, Matanzima was of historical 
significance in view of the fact that the latter was the son of Mhlobo, his counterpart 
from Western abaThembuland. His regency, provided he had no ulterior motives about 
the Great Place, was politically strategic for the reason that it enhanced the centrality-
and dignity of the principal Great Place. At the same time his apparent indifference to, 
and indecision in, matters that affected Sabata was reason to fear a replay of the 
Maqoma-Sandile power struggle. It must be noted that the chief regent operated from 
the Tyhalarha Farm, a situation that had the potential to induce both ease as well as 
uneasiness if the incumbent was suspected of being very ambitious. Whilst Bumbane 
was a home for Sabata, it was also the historical and political headquarters of 
abaThembuland, and for that reason Sabata‘s future palace.  
 
The fact that Dabulamanzi solicited the RHH (Matanzima‘s) opinion to resolve the 
problem of the abaThembu Great House could have been regarded as indicative of the 
unanimity of the House of Mthikrakra and, therefore, a positive sign. Be that as it may 
Dabulamanzi‘s arrangement of a two-man conference between himself and Matanzima 
had the potential for making the patrons of the GH agitated on justifiable grounds. 
Whilst Dabulamanzi was perceived to be devising every trick to cling to power, it was 
unlikely that Matanzima, whose RHH chieftainship was to a great extent entrenched, 
would discourage Dabulamanzi from doing the same. Matanzima who was slowly but 
surely embracing the politics of chieftainship could only strengthen the case of the RHH 
to split and re-invent its autonomy, and in that way re-invent the abaThembu laws of 
succession to kingship if Dabulamanzi‘s suspected ploy were to work. Such a move 















similar breakaways in the past. It would also de-stabilize the abaThembu paramountcy. 
Jonginyaniso confirmed that Daliwonga Matanzima was wiser, and also demonstrated 
amazing cunningness when Dabulamanzi indicated that he would want to settle in 
Western abaThembuland if and when he had handed the chieftainship over to Sabata. 
Matanzima would not accept him because he saw him as a threat.146 His fears were 
justified because in 1949 his descent from the RHH of Mthikrakra was old and thus 
entrenched, as against that of Dabulamanzi which, though it was new, was an inherent 
threat in the fact that it (his descent) was directly from the Great House of Mthikrakra. 
Dabulamanzi was also senior in terms of age and political influence. Daliwonga‘s RHH 
chieftainship was from the fourth generation and dated back to the mid-19th century, but, 
his rank had not been appreciated for almost a century. His aspiration for dominance in 
the area of St Marks was resisted by the strong custodians of customary law. 
Dabulamanzi‘s overtures had the potential to destabilise abaThembu chieftainship, 
simply by subtly trying to help establish the  authority of Right Hand Houses in a region 
where their  junior status was not celebrated.  
 
At the meeting of 15 September 1949, it became clear that to a group of abaThembu 
who considered themselves ‗the near relatives of Sabata‘147 the main issue of the 
meeting was not Sabata‘s schooling but the return of the throne of Jongilizwe to his 
Great House. The report referred to claims that  
the Chief Regent had told them [abaThembu Chiefs who were invited to the 
meetings  purportedly called to discuss Sabata‘s schooling] that if they wanted to    
have Sabata appointed Paramount Chief they must go before the Chief     
Magistrate and discuss the matter with him--- The unanimous decision of that  
meeting had been that Sabata should be appointed Chief now.148 
 
OFF-SADDLE! THE POWER INHERENT IN INDIGENOUS LAW UNSEATS  
DABULAMANZI  
 
The impatience of the abaThembu elders was demonstrated when they employed  a 
traditional interdict to force Dabulamanzi to vacate the regency in favour of the heir:    
‗he had been made to off-saddle outside the Great Place and to walk in [while attending 
the meeting of 15 September 1949 at Bumbane]. Chief Vululwandle [Jonginyaniso‘s 















to abaThembu custom no one is allowed to enter the gate of the Great Place on 
horseback except the chief. Under exceptional circumstances a councillor could be 
allowed to enter the chief‘s premises on horseback.150 Entering the Great Place on 
horse-back would have implied that Dabulamanzi had the freedom of the premises and 
that no one was higher than him. On the other hand dismounting outside the palace 
gates clearly meant that his business at the Great Place was simply to attend the 
meeting like the other guests. It was at this point that the chief regent expressed his 
willingness ‗to hand over the Chieftainship to Sabata.‘151 On the insistence of the 
attendee councillors and chiefs that Sabata must be given his place, ‗He, Dabulamanzi, 
had informed them that he was not refusing Sabata the chieftainship but that the matter 
was in the hands of the Chief Magistrate.‘152 Dabulamanzi‘s hinting that his relinquishing 
of the crown would be of no effect because  
it was not for Chief Regent to appoint Sabata. The Governor-General, who was 
the Supreme Chief of the Union had to appoint Sabata………he (the Chief 
Magistrate) thought the people, Sabata and the Chiefs could put it out of their 
heads that Sabata would be appointed before he attained the age of 25 years153  
 
showed his pretended ignorance about his own culture. This comment had already 
been addressed by Zwelibhangile earlier  when he said that ‗the chief was born old - he 
was never a child in their eyes‘. As far as the Tembus were concerned there was no 
age limit.154 
 
Whilst the government emphasised the age factor as an important condition in the 
matter of Sabata‘s accession it also became evident that there was a collision between 
the two  political systems – the Union government‘s and traditional - during the years 
preceding Sabata‘s accession.  
The last years of Dabulamanzi‘s regency were a time of discontent among his subjects. 
There were complaints that Dabulamanzi was selling the land of abaThembu to the 
Whites, and a song was coined to that effect. It ran thus ‗who is the chief that is selling 
our land? it is Dabulamanzi‘.155 Jonginyaniso‘s testimony about Dabulamanzi‘s waning 
popularity is also supported by Ntsebeza and Ndletyana‘s mention of some of the 















in abaThembuland. His accession at a time when the state was introducing the 
Betterment Schemes was, on its own, bound to set him on a collision course with his 
constituency. The culling of the stock which was an important aspect of the Betterment  
Schemes was an attack on the economic system of the rural communities. The fact that 
Dabulamanzi escorted the magistrate during the tours that were undertaken to market 
the unpopular measures portrayed him as an enemy of those whose welfare and 
property had been entrusted to him for protection. His vain pleas of neutrality combined 
with his unwavering and strange backing of the magisterial pronouncement that Sabata 
had first to acquire a good education before assuming the paramountcy made him 
appear equivocal indeed. His playing second fiddle to Botha Sigcawu when he let him 
hand over the ‗golden scroll‘, a welcoming gesture, to the British Royal family traded off 
the abaThembu monarchical prerogative in a way that inadvertently elevated Botha to 
prime paramountcy. To the patrons of  the abaThembu paramountcy, Dabulamanzi had 
clearly demonstrated that he was unable to rise to the expectations of a solid 
paramountcy and therefore unfit for the position he continued to hold. The fact that 
Sabata was already officiating as an uncrowned paramount chief156 was bound to make 
Dabulamanzi‘s paramountcy uneasy.  Dabulamanzi was evidently seen as both a threat 
and a source of both belittlement and insecurity to the abaThembu paramountcy. There 
is an extent to which the inception of the quarter century regency, its operation and 
particularly its ending neither symbolised nor presaged stability in the future abaThembu 
chieftainship.    
CONCLUSION  
The post-Jongilizwe chieftainship demonstrated in the conduct of affairs in the 
interregnum and during the ‗era of regents‘ the shortcomings of instituting rulerships in a 
setting where there is neither standard practice to adhere to, nor criteria to serve as 
models. It has been shown that the minority of the heir was one of the key limitations in 

















The chapter has shown that while the eventual election of Jongintaba appeared to be 
the result of a unanimous decision, albeit upheld and endorsed with the seal of White 
authority, that of Dabulamanzi came across as an ill-conceived political experiment 
whose execution defied abaThembu custom altogether. In this context the visible use of 
selective norms in the nomination and election of both abaThembu regents has been 
highlighted. It has been shown through Dabulamanzi‘s regency that domestic conflicts 
had a potential to be more dangerous to the unity of the House of Dalindyebo than 
government  authority.  The chapter has also shown that the unchecked involvement of 
the colonial factor in abaThembu affairs sometimes served as a catalyst.  The election 
of both Jongintaba and Dabulamanzi, one after the other, has been shown to have been 
not customarily regulated, and this was ominous for the unity of the House of 
Dalindyebo. The apparent discord which sometimes threatened to surface could hardly 
be expected to help resuscitate the unity of the House of Mthikrakra.  
 
The chapter has shown as political irony Dabulamanzi‘s upholding of the Governor-
General‘s exclusive prerogative in the matter of appointing Sabata to the chieftainship,  
and his eventual dethronement by the application of traditional instruments. It has been 
shown that the dethronement of Dabulamanzi was proof of the power that is inherent in 
customary law. The chapter has also demonstrated that there was a point beyond which 
the official customary law could not go. It could not rescue Dabulamanzi from the 
application of traditional methods of deposition as in the ‗off-saddle‘ instruction the 
finality of whose meaning he, rather than his government benefactors, knew. The 
chapter has therefore shown that there were cases in which the Union legislation  was 
limited in its application. It was significant that there was no provision in this legislation 
to undo or even reverse what had been done. Though Dabulamanzi continued longer as 
chief regent after 15 September 1949, he was more of an office holder than a reigning 
monarch.  
 
The chapter has, in the methods of operation and government reaction to certain 















of abaThembu paramount chieftainship which had a potential to weaken its institutional 
fabric and challenge its stability.  
 
Through the evaluation of the impact of the Black Administration Act of 1927 on 
abaThembu chieftainship the chapter has hinted at the defects of the legislation and 
thus the rationale for an improved bureaucratic instrument to mould chieftainship into a 
shape that would hopefully conform to the political designs of the government. 
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The effective application of indigenous procedures to bring about the vacation of   
abaThembu paramountcy seat was a culmination of a long drawn-out and subtle feud 
between the paramount chief in-waiting and the chief regent. The uncle-nephew contest 
itself portrayed the tension between the state‘s legal system and traditional law, and 
also the failure of the dialogue between the two political systems. Evidence of the 
inherent weakness of state law became conspicuous in the operation of dual 
chieftainship under Dabulamanzi and Sabata even before the prince was legally 
installed by the government. That Sabata was apparently privy to the government 
messages which he then disseminated to the community, as did the chief regent whose 
prerogative it was, was further proof that the state system had unplugged leaks.1  
 
This chapter then begins by examining the impact on Sabata‘s accession of the wrangle 
over the abaThembu paramountcy. It seeks to determine whether the unceremonious 
stepping down of Dabulamanzi precipitated or reinforced the division within the House 
of Dalindyebo or consolidated the paramountcy. It is argued that while the deposition 
cleared the way for Sabata, and thus appeared to be a pre-emptive crisis resolution, the 
turbulent atmosphere that characterised it did not augur well for the future of the 
paramountcy. The chapter then looks at the political image that the abaThembu 
paramountcy projected following  the emotionally charged mood of the dethronement. 
This, it is suggested, became a real threat to the consolidation of the abaThembu 
paramountcy.  
 
The fact that the abaThembu invested their hopes in Sabata as the one who would 
restore the paramountcy to its pre-Dabulamanzi image2 tended to blind them to the 
problems that affected the institution. The chapter interrogates the celebration of 
Sabata‘s accession well before the event in relation to the Government‘s indifference to 















accession. There is no doubt that Sabata inherited a paramountcy that was threatened 
with an infrastructural instability. Dabulamanzi‘s acquiescence to  the government, 
reminiscent of Dalindyebo‘s paramountcy; the rift between the chief regent and his 
subjects which was a result  of their  displeasure with Dabulamanzi‘s support for the 
government schemes;  and the government‘s  biased involvement in abaThembu affairs 
– all of these were symptoms of that instability. 
 
The chapter demonstrates that while Dabulamanzi‘s dethronement revealed the 
limitations of the official customary law, the subsequent statutory ratification of Sabata‘s 
accession exhibited the insuperable authority that the Governor-General derived from 
the latest purpose-designed Bantu Authorities Act (BAA).  
 
The chapter hints at the difficult choices Sabata had to make once he occupied the 
paramountcy seat. It exposes the divergent forces whose reconciliation was crucial for 
the continued stability of abaThembu paramountcy. If Sabata chose to pursue 
Dabulamanzi‘s collaborative policy he stood to alienate his subjects some of whom had 
taken up cudgels for him by unseating his predecessor. Should he decide to 
demonstrate a departure from Dabulamanzi‘s pro-government stand, he would surely 
attract the government‘s displeasure. In this context the chapter portrays Sabata‘s 
consultative approach in governance as proof that he was a worthy successor to 
Dabulamanzi, one who would close  the gaps that had emerged between the ruler and 
his subjects, and in this way eventually secure the throne for the GH of Jongilizwe.  
 
The chapter also explains the destabilising impact of KD (Matanzima) on Sabata‘s 
nascent paramountcy. KD had cunningly turned down Dabulamanzi‘s posting to the 
Glen Grey District despite Sabata‘s endorsing the idea. He had obviously watched with 
self-interest the uneasy atmosphere that pervaded the abaThembu paramountcy and 
possibly identified the loopholes to be exploited for personal and political gain. This 
chapter has shown KD‘s responses to the BAA to be dictated more by his personal 
















Finally, the chapter analyses Sabata‘s dilemmas, and locates his major problem in his 
inability to juggle his interests as a national father with his obligations as a chief by the 
grace of the Governor-General. It is argued that  the narrative of Sabata‘s paramountcy 
can be found in  his vain efforts to prevent  the national office that the abaThembu 
paramountcy symbolised from being stripped of its autonomy by the DNA through the 
BAA; to defend his birthright from being politically diminished at the instance of K.D. 
Matanzima; and to forestall Matanzima‘s efforts to outwit him wherever and whenever 
an opportunity arose. Matanzima‘s manoeuvres were aimed at imposing his illegitimate 
right to senior chiefship, and this, itself,   was interfering with the abaThembu traditional 
hierarchy and was, therefore, a destabilising factor. The chapter concludes by 
explaining how the BAA accomplished the government‘s objectives, thanks to 
Matanzima‘s facilitating role, and  how it made the abaThembu paramountcy vulnerable 
by indirectly but methodically  undermining, Sabata‘s authority whenever possible.   
 
 ABATHEMBU CHIEFS’S RELATIONSHIPS ON THE EVE OF THE BAA  
 
The unseating of Dabulamanzi was clearly in the context of a ‗House of Dalindyebo 
divided‘,  and in this way it was ominous for the paramountcy. On the other hand the 
celebratory mood surrounding Sabata‘s imminent takeover seemed to hush it all up. 
Mbekeni confessed that in the atmosphere of exultation and great expectations he also 
named his first-born son Zulu-Liyazongoma - It is thundering in abaThembuland the 
king’s installation is imminent.3 The eventual installation document  was to read thus,  
‗Chief Sabata I now in the name of the Government install you as Paramount Chief of 
the Thembus and will later ask you to come forward to receive your letter of 
appointment‘.4 A month later the secretary of the Minister of Native Affairs, H.F. 
Verwoerd, confirmed Sabata‘s appointment ‗in terms of section 2(7) of Act No. 38 of 
1927 as Paramount Chief (King) of the Thembu Tribe of the Natives resident in the 
districts comprising the area known as Thembuland, including Emigrant Thembuland 
and Bomvanaland, with effect from the 1 July 1954‘.5 
  
At this point it is necessary to locate the Government‘s sentiments in the ‗exit versus 















government the maturity that befitted the rank of a paramountcy because he bore, in his 
person, prospects for the maintenance of the status quo in the continuity of the 
implementation of the government‘s schemes. Ntsebeza and Ndletyana have 
highlighted the notorious Rehabilitation Scheme which included the detestable culling of 
stock,6 and which, paradoxically, endeared Dabulamanzi to the government and 
recommended him as a model paramount chief. The abaThembu complaint that the 
socio-economic status that he projected was not in keeping with the traditional esteem 
of their paramountcy was probably of little concern to the government if his standpoint 
promised to serve its objectives well. Further, it was probably his knowledge  of his poor  
socio-economic standing in the eyes of the abaThembu that prompted Dabulamanzi to 
hold on to a paramountcy that the government sanctioned. This was for his own good 
during the period when the  Governor-General was both supreme and kingmaker. It is 
therefore argued that the above situation, by putting in practice Marks‘s theory of the 
‗ambiguities of dependence‘ bore great significance for the future of even the partial 
autonomy of the abaThembu paramountcy. In fact, Dabulamazi‘s towing of the 
magistrate‘s line - which earned him the government‘s favour- rendered him as a traitor 
in the eyes of the patrons of the abaThembu paramountcy.                                          
 
The installation of Sabata aroused different perceptions from different quarters. The 
government was not expected to be enthusiastic about the accession of a man who was 
being thrust on it by a pressure group which wilfully disregarded the procedures and 
methods prescribed by the terms of the NAA of 1927. An important clause in the act 
stipulated that the Governor-General had the bureaucratic right to ‗recognize or appoint 
any person as a chief or headman in charge of a tribe or of a location‘.7 Ntsebeza and 
Ndletyana have hinted at the lukewarm response of the magistrate at the idea of 
Sabata‘s becoming a king and this attitude confirms these negative perceptions while 
also raising questions. Sabata and the rest of the Jongilizwe family were without doubt 
associated with Dabulamanzi‘s critics. A situation such as the above was enough to 
cause disquiet in government circles at a time when another phase of reforming the 
institutional chieftainship, the BAA, was in the offing. The question of whether the exit of 















it proffered for both the return (of the abaThembu paramountcy to the Great House of 
Jongilizwe) and restoration (of the same to the image it had projected before the 
Dabulamanzi era) would be answered in the progressive unfolding of events. In another 
context the question of whether Sabata‘s take-over secured the paramountcy for 
Ngangelizwe‘s dynasty and/or made it vulnerable to forces from without and within the 
House of Mthikrakra was a matter of speculation at the time. It is enough to mention that 
the assumption of the paramount chieftainship by Sabata resulted in the abaThembu 
elders, interested critics and overbearing bureaucrats focusing on the abaThembu 
paramountcy. His accession brought about hope of the transformation of  chieftainship 
generally and the rebirth of the abaThembu paramountcy  in particular.  
 
Well before Sabata‘s accession, but at a time when his restlessness was already 
manifest, the government crafted and introduced a  new piece of  legislation.8 This was 
the BAA of 1951, which, as its constitutional mandate revealed, was purpose-designed, 
even though it purported to be a natural successor to the NAA of 1927.  
 
THE BANTU AUTHORITIES ACT OF 1951: RATIONALE, TERMS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
Change in continuity was implied in the administrative reforms which were primarily 
aimed at restructuring the governance of the Blacks. The socio-political context for the 
evolution of the BAA was located in a combination of determinant influences which also 
informed the factors that prescribed responses and reactions the act elicited. These 
were the post-World War II popular reactions to the Betterment projects,9 which, in 
Evans‘s analysis, the DNA had compounded with the act.10 Another factor was the 
Bhunga‘s bureaucratically imposed political impotence11 and its subsequent readiness 
to phase itself out of rural governance. This political gesture facilitated the smooth 
introduction of the innovative legislation in the BAA.12 The inability of the Native 
Representative Council (NRC) to extricate itself from its dysfunctional role,13 was also a 
crucial factor, because in its disempowerment was located the empowering element for 
the white minority. The National Party‘s victory at the polls in 1948 influenced them to  















National Party in power.14 Against this background must be seen their ‗cut and paste‘ 
policy which saw the NRC being replaced by the BAA.  
 
Mayer has defined this instrument as a chief-dominated structure in which traditional 
leaders would wield power in their natural domains, and where there would be neither 
jockeying for franchise rights between black and white nor a ‗swamping‘ of the white 
minority by the African majority.15 Carter, Karis and Stultz have summed up Verwoerd‘s 
principal objective of the proposed law as being ‗the restoration of the prestige, the 
authority of Native law and custom, which would be achieved by providing the Bantu 
Authorities with administrative, executive, and judicial powers‘.16  
 
Therefore the urgent need to promote party goals gave the new government  a rationale 
for devising new bureaucratic instruments that would methodically stifle potential 
opposition to its grip on power. Oomen has proposed the need to spearhead a 
developmental revolution in the rural areas as another factor that formed the reason for 
the BAA legislation. Against this background must be understood the concept of a 
modernised chieftaincy which suddenly came into play as an apparatus that would 
complement the efforts of the ‗technocratic officials clutching development manuals and 
spouting a rhetoric of betterment, modernity and development‘.17 Oomen‘s comment 
that  
It was only after the National Party‘s victory in the 1948 elections that the 
volkekundiges at the Native Affairs Department decided unequivocally to invest 
in traditional authority as the major mode of rule in the reserves, and to unleash 
the latent power of the Bantu‘s own system….to play a leading part in the 
programme for the development of the Bantu community18  
 
reinforces the idea that the NP‘s victory influenced government‘s  reasoning, dictated its  
modus operandi, and blindly focused it  on its singular goal, namely  the acquisition (and 
retention)  of power as the ultimate prize. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives as quoted 
in Marala, has outlined the Bill and its provisions thus :  
The Bantu Authorities Bill, implementing Dr Verwoerd‘s announcement, was 
introduced in the Senate on June 5 1951.  It made provision for the abolition of 
the Native Representative Council, and empowered the Governor-General to 















headman or chief of the tribe or community, constituted with due regard to native 
law and custom, and a joint tribal authority for any number of tribes or 
communities; a regional authority chosen from chiefs, headmen, and councillors 
or tribal authorities, and exercising control over two or more areas for which 
tribal authorities had been established; and a territorial authority, chosen from 
members of regional authorities and exercising control over two or more areas 
for which regional authorities have been established.19 
 
Maylam has also endorsed this, and added that in between the tribal authority and the 
territorial authority was the regional authority, which was a conglomeration of tribal 
authorities.20 Oomen has added that the  
 
BAA of 1951 envisaged traditional leaders as embedded in Tribal Authorities, 
who would assist and guide the chief in the administration of the affairs of the 
tribe and in the performance of his other functions, which are to maintain law 




REACTION AND RECEPTION: ABATHEMBU CHIEFS’ RESPONSES TO THE BAA 
 
The NP delegated the DNA officials to unveil the BAA. Against this background must be 
understood the central argument of Eiselen, the SNA, in his presentation to amaZulu 
Chiefs at Eshowe in December of 1951. In an apparent apologetic and yet manipulative 
tone that seemed to justify the NP‘s retreat from direct involvement in the administrative 
affairs of the indigenous communities, Eiselen endorsed the NP‘s about-turn. He argued 
that  
the task of the chief could never be undertaken with complete success by a 
stranger like a Native Commissioner or any government official who cannot live 
and grow with and develop together with the people. The stranger, more often 
than not, wants the Bantu to jump to a new form of life. He is apt to cut the roots 
of the Bantu plant while he applies the fertilizer of civilization.22  
 
Eiselen‘s Eshowe presentation appeared to be an appropriate introduction to the 
interview that Verwoerd, the Minister of Native Affairs, and Young, the Under-Secretary 
of Native Affairs, subsequently had with the leading Transkeian chiefs. The chiefs heard 
it confirmed that the council system was henceforth to be substituted by the Territorial 
Authority which was  ‗a Body of chiefs and leaders of the people of the Transkeian 















The Minister gave the chiefs freedom to choose between being represented by a white 
member of parliament as the chief‘s point of contact with the government  ‘through 
whom he would speak to, and make his wishes known to the Government‘24 and a 
system in which a black person would be treated  ‗as a child with a separate personality, 
to give him opportunity to develop into a separate person‘.25 Verwoerd condemned the 
former on the grounds that it bound the chiefs and their constituencies to the Union 
Parliament  ‗where you can never gain full development‘.26  
 
Verwoerd‘s offer talked to group leaders as much as it talked to group sentiments. The 
potential of the presentation to be divisive could be seen in the different interpretations 
and perceptions it conveyed to his audience with its diverse goals and ambitions. The 
fact that the government had doubted Sabata‘s fitness for the regal position27 was 
historically significant in its hint at the little confidence they had in the abaThembu 
paramountcy. Ntsebeza-Ndletyana‘s  claim can be seen to be credible in Magistrate 
Yates‘s blaming of other abaThembu royals for Sabata‘s seeming instability,28 while at 
the same time he conceded that  ‗outweighing these considerations to my mind, is the 
fact that he is the rightful successor by birth to the Paramountcy and the people are 
unanimous in desiring his installation.‘29 This thesis argues  that were the government to 
have its way,  it would have disqualified Sabata from the paramountcy, and that it  did 
not was again proof of the strength inherent in indigenous law.  
 
The eventual installation of Sabata Jonguhlanga as abaThembu paramount chief 
automatically conferred on him the prerogative to respond to the government proffers on 
behalf of the composite abaThembu cluster. It must be noted that the headquarters of 
all the abaThembu tribal authorities, prior to the advent of the BAA, was at the Bumbane 
Great Place, the seat of both their paramountcy and Regional Authority. The question of 
traditional hierarchy was thus a factor of great historical significance because it 
reinforced the concept of both the seniority and prerogative to sanction or not to 
sanction the implementation of the act in abaThembuland. Of similar importance was 
the fact that the BAA was the first government enactment that Sabata‘s office had to 















important to mention at this point that Sabata was still entrenching his person and 
authority in his new paramountcy.   
 
K.D. Matanzima, in the meantime, had been installed as amaHala chief in 1940. This 
fell short of his ambitions for recognition as regional chief of Emigrant 
abaThembuland.30 He had entered and re-entered the Bhunga, under whose auspices 
the chiefs‘ power was visibly declining.  An arrangement that guaranteed increased 
authority for the chiefs via the BAA was a bait to which KD was not least susceptible.31 
Mandela, who by his own admission, looked up to KD Matanzima as both his mentor 
and role model during their student days at Fort Hare, has admitted that his efforts to 
dissuade his customary nephew  from embracing tribal politics were in vain.  Mandela‘s 
insistence that the Bantu Authorities was a retreat from democracy in its emphasis on 
rights prescribed by birth as in chieftainship was rejected by Matanzima. Mandela who 
hoped that Matanzima‘s intelligence could be better invested in the national struggles 
was grieved by his failure  to win his role model over to his political sentiments.32 
Laurence has confirmed that Verwoerd made the act optional in order ‗to dangle it 
before the chiefs, with its intention of bringing them back into the administrative system 
and its promise of greater powers as the bait‘.33 
 
Young read the original draft of a ‗Notice of Motion‘ which gave a clear picture of the 
Transkeian Territorial Authority (TTA) as  
constituted as to be fully representative of the people of the Transkeian 
Territories, (through the Paramount Chiefs, Chiefs and leaders of the Tribes 
residing therein), … approves in principle that it is the proper medium without 
the intervention of intermediaries for direct contact with the Government, as 
represented by the Honourable the Minister of Native Affairs, in all matters 
affecting the political, material, social and economic life of the Natives in 
these Territories, and requests the Government to devise ways and means in 
which such direct contact can best be effected.34 
 
Kaiser Matanzima saw it fit to ‗jump the gun‘ at Verwoerd‘s presentation of the act. He 
immediately welcomed the new dispensation in which he probably identified an 
empowering factor, commenting that ‗it looks as if under the Bantu Authorities system 















Chiefs. In the older days we had enough power to combat the hooliganism in our tribes 
with the result that we have had very few hooligans.‘35  
 
Evans has confirmed that the Transkei was initially not very enthusiasitic about what  
the architects of the BAA claimed was to be a chief-dominated system.  Matanzima was 
an exceptional chief in that he expressed both a positive interest and enthusiastic 
anticipation of the act. He was particularly impressed with the prospects of an elevated 
chieftainship that were implicit in Verwoerd‘s plans.36 His insistent petition for more 
power for the chiefs revealed him to be a traditional exclusivist who saw in the 
implementation of BAA a guarantee for the security of his personal power within the 
context of a universal chieftainship that was endowed with unrestrained authority. 
Bangilizwe Joyi‘s remarks are proof of Matanzima‘s greed for power, namely that  
‗Daliwonga adored chieftainship passionately. He viewed it as a ladder that would help 
him climb high in order to rise above others and rule over them, the one thing he wanted 
most‘.37 Matanzima‘s response to the government‘s presentation was obviously the kind 
that Verwoerd most wanted to hear. ‗Hooliganism‘ could mean anything for Matanzima, 
including extra-parliamentary political activities which were already becoming a visible 
nuisance to the NP government. His clear vision about the need for testing the flexibility 
of the parameters of power in order to satisfy the whims of individuals is revealed in his 
suggestive remark. He argued against the appeal from the court of the ‗tribal‘ authority 
to the court of the Native Commissioner. ‘ This is not to our liking‘, he remarked. ‗[t]he 
appeal should be first to the regional Chief and thereafter to the court of the Native 
Commissioner.‘38  
 
It is hard to believe that Matanzima would have argued for the devolution of additional 
authority to the regional chief if he did not entertain hopes of being one in the near 
future. His arguments portrayed him as a self-appointed spokesman for all the chiefs 
amongst whom he probably felt more important and superior intellectually perhaps by 
virtue of his university education. It was apparent in his response that he already had a 
vision in which a properly networked hierarchy of authority, dominated at the apex by 















was an aspiring spokesperson), would be self-supporting. Such self-sustaining and 
efficient chieftainship would not warrant any interference by the government except as 
the ultimate court of appeal for the people. It was significant that Matanzima in his 
presentation of the case for the chiefs, disregarded protocol in his failure to either 
caucus or consult with the other chiefs, particularly the paramount chief, on an issue 
that was not his prerogative. His presumptuousness in this regard vindicates once more 
Joyi‘s comment about his customary nephew to the effect that  
Daliwonga‘s greed for chieftainship of the highest order blinded him to the fact 
that when whites want to tackle an enemy inside its domain they first split it 
within its ranks so as to undo the unity of opposition, and in that way  gain easy 
entry.39  
 
Sabata responded thus to the BAA presentation ‗[i]f there are people who are a 
nuisance the Paramount Chief should have the right to remove them from his area‘,40 as 
if to say that his kingdom did not need the BAA or any other political structure to resolve 
its problems. This comment which was presented as a response also purported to be a 
warning to Matanzima‘s subtle and yet preposterous plea for power.  
 
Ntsebeza and Ndletyana have confirmed that Sabata immediately opened up the issue 
of the BAA for debate in the true indigenous tradition of rule by consensus. Mda‘s 
remark that Sabata did something that was unheard of in [the 20th century] 
abaThembuland portrayed the new paramount chief as a progressive chief:  
He not only gave us [Transkei Organised Bodies] an audience, but called 
meetings for us to speak. He gave us a platform to speak, knowing that we were 
going to say things that were anti-government. He wanted people to hear what 
we came to say, and then decide what they wanted.41 
 
It became clear from the beginning that Sabata‘s consultative approach to the 
government overtures on BAA differed from Matanzima‘s dictatorial style.  
 
 Anderson Joyi attributed the intensification of disunity in his ancestral house of 
Ngubengcuka to the advent of the BAA in abaThembuland, ‗it was in the proposition of 
that Act that the unity in the House of Ngubengcuka disintegrated well nigh 















chiefs through the office of the chief magistrate of the Transkeian Territories, offering 
elevated chieftainships as rewards for those who accepted the BAA. Sabata made it 
clear that abaThembu would have to decide if they ‗do not want the new law their word 
must prevail, I cannot override them even though I am their King‘.43 Mda Mda‘s 
submission at the Nhlapo Commission has confirmed  Sabata‘s vehement opposition to 
its introduction within the area of his jurisdiction. Mda has referred to an ‗all Transkei‗ 
meeting that was held at the instance of the paramount chief to discuss the BAA.  The 
meeting, which included Matanzima, unanimously refused to commit the Transkei to the 
implementation of all forms of repressive laws. Matanzima is believed to have accepted 
the BAA following the government‘s campaign to sell and disseminate its new policy 
through its information officers. According to Mda this came about only after Young had 
conferred with Matanzima and the sequel to this development was the establishment of 
the Tribal Authority of Western AbaThembuland at Qamata.44 Matanzima‘s jurisdiction 
at the time covered only 22 amaHala locations.45 Streek and Wicksteed have confirmed 
that after he had taken over from Dalubuhle46 he initially displayed a reluctance to 
commit himself to the acceptance of the BAA, but later capitulated and accepted the 
new act in principle. Joyi has claimed that his response was swift and positive especially 
when the magistrate confronted him for the second time with the fact that his 
chieftainship, which corresponded to the district status, was not anything to boast 
about.47 Clearly in the acceptance of the act by anyone with Matanzima‘s ambitions for 
chieftainship there were visible prospects of the acquisition of additional power.  It is 
not, however, clear what senior chieftainship Sabata would have been in line for, 
considering the fact that he alone in the whole of abaThembuland was, both by birth 
and customary prescription, already at the apex of the traditional hierarchy. Joyi 
confirmed that  the enthusiasm of an educated person like  Matanzima for chieftainship 
surprised them, and the magistrate was most likely aware of Matanzima‘s personal 
vanity. The magistrate‘s offer promised territorial and personal aggrandisement, and 
that and other benefits were indeed irresistible for anyone who held a junior 
















The differing responses of Sabata and Matanzima on the question of the 
implementation of the BAA were significant.  In this regard the reasons for the reactions 
of the two most important chiefs in abaThembuland were of utmost importance.  Sabata 
believed that the abaThembu input was invaluable in the deliberations that would 
determine their response to the government proposals. The same government had, 
earlier on, reluctantly agreed to install him as paramount chief. Sabata knew very well 
that it was due to the pressure exerted by the custodians of the Dalindyebo 
paramountcy that he had eventually been installed. He would thus have found it hard to 
disregard the wishes of abaThembu, especially because he was aware that 
Dabulamanzi had come under fire for his apparent support of the government 
measures.  The advent of the BAA  therefore exerted pressure on Sabata  to take a 
stand for either the abaThembu cause or the promotion of the Governor-General‘s 
bureaucratic goals.   
 
MATANZIMA ENTRENCHES HIS AUTHORITY IN THE COFIMVABA DISTRICT 
Matanzima had already in the early fifties in a typical egotist manner assumed the role 
of spokesman for the Matanzima family. His nomination of Mlimandlela Matanzima as a 
replacement headman for his deceased father, Mzola, must be seen in the context that 
‗it is the wish of the people of Ncora Flats location that Manzamdaka Sabata, brother of 
Mzola, be appointed to act as headman with effect from 9/6/1950 while their nominee, 
Mzola Matanzima, is away at work earning money to pay his father‘s debts‘.48  
 
MZOLA IN THE RHAXOTI FAMILY TREE 
  Ngangelizwe              Rhaxothi Mthikrakra (Ah! Matanzima) 
 
                                    Mvuzo (GH)               Sabata (RHH)    
                                        
                                    Mhlobo     Sidingo    Mzola    Galadile Manzamdaka49 
                                            
















Matanzima also felt slighted when Magistrate Norton failed to notify him about a  
meeting he had arranged to discuss the appointment of a headman for the Lower Qitsi 
Location. Norton subsequently remarked that ‗Chief Matanzima took exception and 
appears as a result to have established, so far as that location is concerned, that he is 
the senior Chief and as such must be referred to in such matters‘.50  
 
In other instances Matanzima‘s intervention sowed dissension between father and son. 
This was the case when he recommended that Ntabezwe Nyikima Matanzima be 
replaced by his son Velile arguing that ‗[h]e [Velile] is a responsible man and it is our 
wish that the acting headman should be one whom we can respect.  He was brought up 
amongst us by Ntabezwe and he is a man who will control the people and earn their 
respect‘.51 The magistrate, taking a cue from Matanzima, instructed  ‗Velile to take over 
the Acting Headmanship, subject to confirmation by the Government‘.52 When Nyikima 
showed displeasure with Matanzima‘s divisive interference in his family matters 
Matanzima saw fit to demonise him further    
I wish to invite your attention to the conduct of Nyikima, who is trying 
to disturb the proceedings (Nyikima has retired into the distance and 
his voice can be heard talking to himself).  He is drunk and there are 
others like him who should be replaced by men with a sense of 
responsibility. 53 
 
This was clear evidence that Matanzima was establishing a compliant socio-political 
infrastructure for himself and a solid launching pad from which to impose his authority 
beyond his immediate surroundings. His clamouring for recognition and his 
condescending attitude showed that he already saw himself as a vital link between the 
government and the people of Cofimvaba. He  was already in a position of strength in 
his home base when the BAA became a factor in the abaThembu chiefs‘ politics. It was 
from this consolidated position that he set out to expand his original amaHala domain 
after unilaterally embracing the BAA. Most local headmen had been turned into his 
henchmen, with him as their spokesman. He presumptuously confirmed that the BAA 
had been accepted by all and sundry in his district, ‗after discussing it at length at the 
Qamata Great Place‘.54 This was supposed to have taken place at a meeting convened 















correspondence made no reference to Sabata‘s opinion in both the sanctioning of the 
meeting and its key deliberations. Matanzima‘s bold announcement provoked Sabata to 
summon him to his court and in that way directed him to the local magistrate.  Thorpe, 
in turn, advised  Matanzima to ignore the summons and warned Sabata to refrain from 
obstructing the administration of government.55 When Sabata advised Matanzima to 
observe indigenous protocol in his conduct of affairs, he was reprimanded for interfering 
with the execution of government orders. Sabata‘s aim was to thwart Matanzima‘s  
facilitating role in the implementation of the abhorrent act  and any action to  the 
contrary was a defiance of his  authority.   
 
It became clear that there was collusion between the government and Matanzima,  who 
was emerging as the government‘s  ‗man on the spot‘. True t  Mda‘s claim, K.D. was 
thus launched on a course of disobedience to his Paramount Chief.‘56The government‘s 
subtle acknowledgement of the importance of Sabata‘s compliance in the smooth 
implementation of the BAA was revealed  in Young‘s letter to Eiselen. He hinted that a 
reconciliation between Sabata and Matanzima was a prerequisite for the introduction of 
Bantu Authorities in Thembuland , saying  that ‗until the Tembu trouble is settled, the 
Bantu Authorities will be retarded‘.57  
 
Evans highlights the fact that the rivalry between Sabata and Matanzima over the 
leadership of the abaThembu people predated the 1950s. The events of the mid-
twentieth century which were characterised by Matanzima‘s  ‗crisscrossing the Transkei 
urging the acceptance of Bantu Authorities‘58 were merely evidence of the escalation of 
the long-existing rivalry. Evans makes the different responses of Matanzima and Sabata 
to the BAA a phase in their civil feud which eventually pushed Sabata into a leadership  
role amongst opponents of the new policy while Matanzima emerged as the champion 
of the government schemes. Evans‘s condemnation of the government‘s interventionist 
role which favoured the cooperative chiefs to the extent of abetting their recalcitrance 
and disregard of custom complements his earlier claims.59 Against this background 
must be understood the negative perception given by the government‘s apparent 















behaviour‘ of Matanzima‘s supporters. They assaulted opponents, destroyed property 
and violently broke up public meetings that were held by anti-government elements. It 
must be borne in mind that the anti-government elements were naturally associated with 
anti-Matanzima forces, and this situation gave Matanzima an excuse to fight personal 
opposition under the guise of enforcing  an acceptance of government measures for the 
long-term benefit of the people. It was in the latter context that headmen Damane‘s 
complaint about Matanzima‘s gatecrashing and subsequent assault of attendees at a 
meeting held at his Ncora Location elicited a partisan response rather than the  help he 
had asked for from the Chief Magistrate: 
 
As headmen now come under tribal authorities, Headman Damane would be 
wise to obey and cooperate with Chief Matanzima who is the head of the tribal 
authority and a responsible man who will not victimise Damane for the past 
opposition to Chief Matanzima. You should support Chief Matanzima‘s 
authority.60 
 
Matanzima‘s next move was to replace, with the government‘s connivance, amaMfengu 
headmen in the St Marks District with his hand-picked individuals. In this context must 
be seen the subsequent confirmation by the resident magistrate to the chief magistrate 
that Matanzima had been granted civil jurisdiction over No.18 Ngxwabangu Location in 
the District of St. Marks. This communication signified the expansion of Matanzima‘s 
area of jurisdiction as well as the progressive incorporation of the amaMfengu 
communities into his amaHala domain. The gradual incorporation of these historical 
non-baThembu   communities was done despite the fact that they professed their loyalty 
to the House of Ngangelizwe, for ‗as the Fingos [amaMfengu] are not a clan of the 
Thembu tribe, but live in Tembuland, they are to be regarded as falling direct[ly] under 
the Paramount Chief, the other local chiefs having been appointed as chiefs of the 
respective clans‘.61 J. C. Qongqo had been appointed to be the presiding abaMbo chief 
by the communities from the following locations the Ngxwabangu No.18, Ngqwaru Hills 
No.7, Ncora School No.14, Ngcaca No.16, Mtshanyane No.17 and Mahlubini No.38. 
These communities in concert opposed all moves to merge them with the amaHala 
group, arguing that their case was similar to that of amaGcina, amaBomvana, 















abaThembu under Paramount Chief Sabata.62 While the abaMbo communities were 
vehemently opposed to absorption by the amaHala Tribal Authority, Matanzima was 
boasting throughout the Cofimvaba District that his influence was prevailing in areas 
that were outside his domain. The truth of Matanzima‘s claims became evident when on 
5 July 1956 Thorpe informed Headman Pinzi that ―Chief Matanzima has been requested 
[presumably by the same official] to hold a meeting in your location to explain the 
importance of stabilization to people.‖63 The government‘s encouragement of 
Matanzima‘s violation of custom and disregard for Sabata‘s authority is exposed in the 
Magistrate‘s follow-up letter to Headman Pinzi which advised him ‗that Chief Kaiser is to 
hold a meeting in his[your] location‘.64 The paramount chief naturally expressed his 
dismay at this development of events because his opinion and permission had not been 
sought prior to the holding of a meeting by Matanzima in Pinzi‘s amaMfengu location.  
 
It was thus becoming clear that Matanzima was gradually assuming the position of an 
unqualified government agent in his self-co-option as a facilitator of the implementation 
of the BAA in abaThembuland. Evans has given credibility to the above claim in his 
comment that ‗Matanzima emulated his administrative superiors and denied any 
connection between Bantu Authorities and development plans. The conflation, he 
claimed was due to agitators in the AAC and the ANC;----- Matanzima assured the 
patently sceptical and agitated chiefs that the Bantu Authorities is not rehabilitation‘.65 
His insistence on the latter was, however, contradicted by people‘s experiences66 and 
this convinced them that developmental schemes were an essential part of the BAA 
package. The case of Headman Ntliziyo of Nobhokhwe Location in the Cofimvaba 
District also confirms the collusion between the government and Matanzima in the 
promotion of government‘s measures. The government did not, in principle, oppose 
Matanzima‘s desire to be present at the installation of Ntliziyo even though Nobhokhwe 
Location was outside his domain. Whilst the Nobhokhwe community was looking 
forward to joining Matanzima‘s amaHala Tribal Authority as soon as it was established, 
they were vehemently opposed to stabilisation, an essential settlement-related 
component of the BAA, and as Evans has confirmed, Matanzima‘s trump card. In 















[Daliwonga Matanzima] has publicly declared his support for this scheme and is 
prepared to use his influence to persuade the people of Nobokwe and other locations to 
accept the scheme‘.67 Matanzima‘s stance in this respect was perfectly in line with the 
government‘s plans, and was possibly instrumental in the Cofimvaba Magistrate‘s 
recommendation that Matanzima‘s desire to attend Ntliziyo‘s installation be honoured, 
as  an ‗ invitation to attend the installation ceremony at Nobokwe at this stage would be 
tantamount to official recognition of his [Matanzima‘s] jurisdiction over this location. A 
refusal on the other hand would certainly lead to antagonism and non-co-operation on 
his part‘68 at a time when his assistance was so essential. Proof that the magistrate was 
aware of the irregularity and impropriety of allowing Matanzima to assume Sabata‘s 
prerogative at the installation of Headman Ntliziyo was his assurance that ‘recognition 
of his [Matanzima‘s] authority at this stage will not embarrass the Department or 
encroach upon the rights of the Paramount Chief‘.69 Thorpe at the same time asked for 
approval from the chief magistrate, to accede to Matanzima‘s request.  
 
It gradually became clear that the extension of Matanzima‘s power base to the locations 
that previously paid allegiance to the paramount chief was gradually trimming Sabata‘s 
political domain. This unwarranted assault on Sabata‘s prestige and authority forced 
him to fight a two-frontal battle to resist the implementation of the BAA and to check the 
threat to his paramountcy. The BAA appeared as a weapon that the government had 
made available for Matanzima to carve his climb to a senior status in the traditional 
hierarchy, and this objective, if realized, would inevitably offset Sabata‘s prime position 
in the ladder of power.   
 
Also of great significance was the Governor-General‘s equivocation in his censuring of 
Matanzima. In public the government condemned his presumptuous actions but in their 
official correspondence, which was not accessible to the public, they encouraged his 
recalcitrance. When Sabata‘s legal representatives reported to the chief magistrate that 
Matanzima continuosly belittled Sabata with his life-threatening remarks,‘telling people 
that the Paramount Chief has no right to set his foot in Cofimvaba and has even gone 















appear concerned about the negative implications of the rumour and the need to 
redress it in a way that would guarantee Sabata free and safe passage in the region. In 
another incident a Mfengu headman, de Wet Mateta, came under pressure from the 
pro-Matanzima elements in the Cofimvaba District. He had been deposed on the 
recommendation of Matanzima who subsequently replaced him with a headman of his 
choice. Sabata‘s challenge to Matanzima‘s overbearing action on the grounds that the 
proposed replacement was obstructing the execution of the government-sponsored 
Betterment Schemes did not effect the reversal of the ill–conceived appointment.71 The 
only reason the government could have upheld the choice made by Matanzima would 
have been to limit Sabata‘s influence in the area and entrench Matanzima‘s image as 
the paramount chief‘s counterpart. Such a victory would have symbolised progress in 
the government‘s political exercise as well as the extension and expansion of 
Matanzima‘s power base. It is clear that once the rival candidate, in this case KD‘s 
choice, was in place the way would be open for him to incorporate Mateta‘s community 
into his amaHala ‗Tribal‘ Authority at the expense of Sabata‘s political influence.   
 
Two years later a certain Whindus Qongqo once more challenged the fact that the 
abaMbo community of Ngqwaru Hills whose founders included his ancestors, was 
suddenly treated as if it was part of the amaHala Community. The community in 
question had, from time immemorial, readily and willingly paid allegiance to King 
Ngangelizwe. He articulated his community‘s complaint by declaring that it ‗is one of the 
most difficult and painful problems to suddenly turn to another authority which has been 
newly introduced by Bantu Authority Act just a few years‘.72 Qongqo‘s comment was 
based on the fact that his forebears had been friendly with King Ngangelizwe, to the 
extent that when taxation was introduced they gladly made their payments at Ngcobo,   
 
there being no such thing as Cofimvaba then. Cofimvaba had been introduced 
after the arrival of the Emigrant Tembus …. The ancestors of the Emigrant 
Tembus found us already firmly established in this location which gained its 
name after my ancestor, Mqokwana Location under Chief Ngangelizwe.73  
 
Qongqo contended that if the BAA was aimed at reviving ‗ancient Bantu life and living‘74 















founders of the Nobhokhwe community. Qongqo‘s message was that King Ngangelizwe 
had provided for, and nurtured the loyalty of, his family to the House of Ngangelizwe. 
These gestures obliged the Mqokwana Community to make it their lifetime commitment 
to pay homage to Sabata. Unbeknown to Qongqo was the fact that the logic of 
arguments was not a strong enough factor to be weighed against the worth of what 
Matanzima was likely to deliver on a platter to the government if the latter organization 
connived with him in extending his power base. Proof that Qongqo‘s petition was in vain 
is that eventually all the abaMbo communities in the Cofimvaba District fell under the 
amaHala Tribal Authority.  
 
The other area where the government appeared to be poised to back Matanzima‘s local 
‗imperialistic‘ tendencies was in the amaGcaleka village of St. Marks. The forebears of 
this community had been settled in the village long before the coming of the Emigrant 
abaThembu. The amaGcaleka not only rejected Matanzima‘s chieftainship over them 
but also reacted ‗violently‘ to the idea of incorporation into the abaThembu cluster. Their 
rejection was based, inter alia, on the fact that their customs differed in some respects 
from those of abaThembu.75 The amaGcaleka were greatly disturbed by the closeness 
of their headman, Mfebe, to Matanzima, and they alleged that he was ‘selling out to the 
Tembus’.76 The government seemed to be convinced, not without justification, that 
Matanzima had to be made chief of the subject village for the implementation of the 
BAA to be effective. To this extent they  considered  ‘curb[ing’ Kitchner Bantom, an 
influential mGcaleka who ‘would have nothing to do with the Bantu Authorities unless 
they have a head of the Gcaleka royal blood nominated by the Gcaleka Paramount 
Chief’.77  
 
The Chief Magistrate, Ramsay admitted in his letter to the SNA that he had ‗definitely 
refused to recommend‘78 a mGcaleka head for the subject amaGcaleka community, 
obviously because he would resist Matanzima‘s authority and the BAA. Eventually the 
amaGcaleka Community which had been legitimately ruled by successive descendants 
of King Sarhili also became part of the amaHala unit. Even when Salakuphathwa Sarhili 















in the St Marks District should be under Chief Matanzima. This was to be the case 
despite the reports to the effect that ‗[p]eople there fear[ed] they would lose their identity 
as a tribe if they have no one of amaXhosa Royal Blood over them‘.79 That the present 
chief of the amaGcaleka in the St Marks region is a member of the Matanzima family is 
of great historical significance in the story of the evolution of Daliwonga Matanzima‘s 
paramount chieftainship. It proves that Matanzima‘s political ambitions were upheld 
above those of the national sentiments of amaXhosa clan. These developments implied 
that the subchieftainships under Matanzima had increased, and this factor was also 
used later to justify the appointment of Matanzima to be the head of the whole of 
Western abaThembuland.  
 
It soon became clear that the Cofimvaba District was both in a political and physical 
sense an impenetrable westward line which Sabata was forbidden to traverse. The 
above perception was reinforced by the reports that reached Sabata which confirmed 
Matanzima‘s life- threatening remarks against him were he to set foot in Cofimvaba. An 
article that appeared in Imvo Bantu [Imvo zabaNtsundu] revealed that  
 
the Government has prohibited the Paramount Chief from going to 
Cofimvaba. The Paramount Chief suspects [and had reason to] that 
these articles have been inspired by Chief Kaiser.  Chief Kaiser 
styles himself the Chief of the Emigrant Tembus despite the fact that 
the Authorities have informed him that he is not such a chief but only 
a chief of the 22 Hala Locations in the District of Cofimvaba.80  
 
The twenty-two amaHala locations which made up Matanzima‘s original Tribal  Authority 
had progressively expanded to cover the whole of the Cofimvaba District. With Sabata‘s 
apparent prohibition from showing his presence in Cofimvaba, all indications were that 
abaThembuland was slowly splitting into two power blocks. The government‘s 
calculated reluctance to bring Matanzima to order gave him leeway. The seemingly 
unhindered expansion of his territorial base in the Cofimvaba must be seen in this 

















At the same time the Governor-General‘s universal authority was partially and 
ingeniously factored in the efforts to reduce Sabata‘s immediate jurisdictional area. The 
reports that reached the Bumbane Great Place alluded to a meeting which the Elliotdale 
magistrate held in his office with the amaBomvana delegation. The amaBomvana were, 
as reported, informed by the magistrate that ‗they did not come under the [jurisdiction of 
the] Paramount Chief‘.81This was paradoxical in view of the fact that the government 
had recently backed every effort by Matanzima to impose his authority over the abaMbo 
and amaGcaleka communities of Cofimvaba. This appeared to be an assault on 
Sabata‘s jurisdictional authority than a case of excising a cluster for the purpose of 
placing it where it belonged. When the legal representative of Sabata questioned the 
SNA about the legality and customary appropriateness of the gathering, the government 
went to great lengths to justify and prove the ultimate goodness of the objectives of the 
meeting; as it would reveal the origin and the historical identity of the amaBomvana and 
undo their subjection to the abaThembu cluster:  
 
Only a person with an abysmal ignorance of Transkeian tribal history would write 
of the Bomvanas as being a section of the Tembus – that is the Bomvanas of 
Elliotdale. During the last century the Bomvanas were being harried by the 
Pondos and fled South. The Tshezi section broke away from the main tribe and 
placed themselves under the Thembu [sic] chief who settled them in what is now 
Mqanduli District. They are loyal to the Thembu Paramount Chief. The main 
body of the Bomvanas fled to into Gcalekaland (now Willowvale) and ―bought 
themselves in‖ by paying cattle to Hintsa. The Gcaleka Chief settled them in 
what is now Elliotdale District. During the last Gcaleka-Thembu War these 
Bomvanas fought with the Gcalekas against the Thembu. Bomvanaland was 
ceded to the Cape Government by its own Chief Moni quite independently of the 
cession of Thembuland and at a different time. 82 
 
The government‘s approach to the amaBomvana problem did not address the 
irregularity of a government official holding a meeting with Sabata‘s subjects without his 
knowledge. Neither did it condemn the engagement of individuals-with neither a 
mandate from their group nor permission from their paramount chief-in an affair that 
affected the abaThembu chiefdom at large. It also did not censure the violation by the 
whole exercise (whose aim appeared to be to methodically diminish Sabata‘s territorial 
authority) of Sabata‘s dignity. It once more became clear that Sabata‘s power base was 















kingdom tampered with. The Elliotdale affair was evidence that indeed while the 
endorsement of the BAA would hopefully bring prospects of recognisable chieftainship 
for some individuals for others it could well justify territorial truncation to achieve the 
opposite. Furthermore, Sabata was called upon to withstand, if he could, the piecemeal 
excision of the tribal authorities in his region if his paramountcy was to remain 
consolidated.  
SABATA STALLS YOUNG’S ORDER TO CREATE REGIONAL CHIEFTAINSHIP 
FOR MATANZIMA 
 
It was obviously in a bid to announce his person as the legitimate paramount chief of 
the whole of abaThembuland that Sabata visited the Cofimvaba District with the 
approval of the resident magistrate in December 1955. At a meeting Sabata  specifically 
told chiefs, headman and other attendees, of his intention to appoint for himself a 
deputy chief who would serve  the Cala and Cofimvaba districts. He announced that 
that ‗I have come here to tell you that as there is no chief in this district I am going to 
appoint a deputy to myself and will make an announcement of my appointment 
later‘‖.83Sabata‘s announcement   simply meant that all chiefs in abaThembuland were 
expected to rule in his name as a ‗chief above all chiefs‘. An educated Matanzima 
probably sensed a slight in Sabata‘s seemingly patronising visit and unexpected, and 
perhaps uncalled for, message. His response could best be interpreted as a subtle 
mobilisation of his constituency against Sabata‘s intent. To this effect Sabata‘s meeting 
was quickly followed by a similar gathering on 23 December 1955 at the Qamata Great 
Place. At the meeting Matanzima explicitly called upon his constituency to discuss and 
make comments with regard to the motives and professed intentions of Sabata‘s visit to 
Cofimvaba..84  
 
Matanzima clearly took advantage of being a ‗man on the spot‘ and made the people at 
the meeting look up to him as their sole chief. It was unlikely that anyone person could 
marshal enough courage in an atmosphere so life-threatening to profess loyalty to 
anyone other than him. While it cannot be said for certain that Sabata‘s approach 
lacked diplomacy and tact, it is clear that on the day in question he lost his foothold in 















Others, like Mankayi, upheld the independence of Western abaThembuland. Mankayi 
argued that when Dalindyebo Ngangelizwe opened his country to land surveyors Mvuzo 
(the son of Rhaxothi Matanzima) chose not to.85 The surveyors would thus have 
understood fully well that Dalindyebo‘s nod strictly confined their activities to 
Dalindyeboland. Mankayi‘s reference to this exercise was obviously a reminder that 
Dalindyebo‘s opening his land to surveying was a unilateral decision, the wisdom or 
foolishness of which would continue to justify the division of abaThembuland.  
 
Gqada Mbandezi remarked that Sabata had no right to appoint his so-called ‗deputy 
chief‘ there-‗because we have our hereditary Chiefs‘.86 Daniel Letlaka, a local teacher, 
immediately proposed that a delegation be appointed for the purpose of reporting the 
‗Sabata incident‘ to the Native Commissioner (NC) as well as to furnish him with 
minutes of the Qamata meeting. He also charged that ‗it is clear that our progress in 
Emigrant abaThembuland is being retarded. It is because we are supporting the policy 
of the present government. Chief Daliwonga and his people have accepted the Bantu 
Authorities Act. Chiefs who do not support the Government are hostile towards Chief 
Matanzima‘.87 Letlaka‘s comment, which confirmed that Matanzima was a government 
symbol is  supported by Southall‘s claim that Chief Daliwonga‘s ‗star was rising fast in 
the official firmament because of his zealous support for the Bantu Authorities system 
and separate development in general‘.88 George Matanzima stated that ‗the  heir of the 
Great House cannot enjoy the property of the Right Hand House ---- Chief Daliwonga is 
being attacked because of his acceptance of the Bantu Authorities Act‘.89 Matanzima‘s 
uncle, Chief Dalubuhle declared that the ‗Government should warn Jonguhlanga 
[Sabata] to remain in his own country. We know that he is a Paramount Chief of his own 
country but he should not interfere with Matanzima‘s loyalty to the Government‘.90 
Edward Nonyondla‘s comment that ‗[w]e have led a very loyal and peaceful life here, 
and we do not wish our loyalty interfered with. Chief Daliwonga is our Chief in 
Emmigrant Tembuland‘,91 was a clear declaration that they neither recognised nor 
acknowledged any one who claimed seniority over Chief Matanzima. Indeed the degree 
of patronage for the latter that reflected in the above remarks was equally matched by 















claim that in the BAA is to be found the germ that led to the disintegration of the House 
of Ngubengcuka. Ntsebeza and Ndletyana have also endorsed the fact that the BAA 
sparked contestation over the paramountcy of abaThembu, with the central question 
being the legitimacy of Sabata‘s authority over Emigrant abaThembuland.92 
 
The positive outcome of Sabata‘s visit to Cofimvaba was that it persuaded Matanzima 
to hold an ‗in-house referendum‘ which in turn afforded him an opportunity to measure 
his popularity. He was also able to test his support in his home base against that of the 
Sabata. It is possible that his submission about Cala to the Native Commissioner of 
Cofimvaba was made round about this time. The recent assurances given, whether 
extracted or voluntarily, empowered him to approach, with self-interest, any questions 
that would impact on his position and role as a recognisable chief among abaThembu 
chiefs. After all, his Cofimvaba constituency had made it clear that his chiefship above 
them was unrivalled even by Sabata. In his submission he included Cala on a list of 
districts (Mthatha, Elliotdale, Mqanduli, Ngcobo, St Marks) that ‗are under the control of 
some recognised Chiefs of Chiefs under the Paramount Chief of Thembuland‘.93 
Matanzima further questioned the fact that Cala was regarded as having no Chief 
controlling it, and argued that ‗my submission is that I am the Chief recognised by the 
people of Cala to whom they pay allegiance in succession to my father Mhlobo‘.94 He 
cited the collection of money by the Emigrant abaThembu (St Marks, Xhalanga-of which 
Cala was part-and the Glen Grey) in 1948 for the purpose of erecting his tribal office at 
Qamata as a  ‗clear proof of [the Cala] peoples‘s loyalty to him;‘.95 He further supported 
his claim for recognition as chief of the Emigrant abaThembu by claiming that Cala 
people had approached him in 1945 to have a school established in Xhalanga :  ‗they 
voluntarily agreed to collect a tribal fund for that purpose. All the moneys collected were 
handed over to me and I opened up a Trust Account with the Native Commissioner‘s 
Office in Cala‘.96 
 
In the light of the developments alluded to above,  the impact on Sabata of Young‘s 
order which authorised him to appoint ‗Kaiser Matanzima as Chief Of Emigrant 















of the acceptance of the BAA which Sabata would neither endorse nor sign before 
conferring with ‗leading subordinates and people of the two districts of Cofimvaba and 
Cala‘.98 There was indeed violation of custom in a case where the government 
authorised Matanzima‘s appointment without prior consultation with Sabata whose 
prerogative was to ratify the customary legality of such a political exercise. This not only 
reflected the contradictions that were inherent in the government‘s bureaucratic 
procedures, but also the methodical and systematic erosion of Sabata‘s authority by a 
government that had given itself a mandate to resuscitate chiefly authority through the 
BAA. Anderson Joyi has affirmed that for the status of any chief to be elevated to a 
higher rank the incumbent had to present an ox as an emblem to his superior. In the 
latter context Matanzima would present Sabata with an ox. The name of the ox would 
be bestowed on the house whose chieftainship was being upgraded. Matanzima 
deliberately ignored this customary practice, and instead claimed that the token stick he 
had earlier received from the Prince of Wales entitled him to senior chiefship. Joyi 
strongly refuted Matanzima‘s claim on the grounds that if the ‗stick‘ was of any 
traditional significance in the political context the chiefs Ndarala (of amaNdungwane), 
Stokwe (of amaQwathi), and Tyhopo (of amaGcina) who had also been recipients of the 
‗foreign‘ political symbol would have equally qualified for the rank that Matanzima was 
claiming for himself.99 Sabata went ahead and convened a meeting for 9 June 1956 at 
his Bumbane Great Place. Matanzima was invited to attend the gathering to present his 
case and explain his position to the paramount chief in front of other chiefs100 as 
prescribed by customary law. Chief Matanzima did not attend the meeting despite his 
undertaking to the chief magistrate and Young to do so.101 Matanzima‘s failure to attend 
the Bumbane meeting without giving an excuse was a slight to the Sabata‘s ‘s dignity 
and obviously unacceptable. His defiance of the ‗Authorities‘ in this way warranted 
disciplinary action against him by the government. Instead his recalcitrance did not 
deter the Government from appointing a commission to investigate the legitimacy of his 
claims to supreme chieftainship in Emigrant Thembuland. This was in disregard of the 
fact that the validity of such claims would have legally derived from the status of 
















Young followed up by holding separate interviews with Sabata and Matanzima in an 
effort to draw them closer to each other. These could well be the same interviews that 
Anderson Joyi mentioned earlier, which the DNA officials held with Sabata and 
Matanzima to, inter alia, tout for the BAA. Ramsay, drew up an agreement which he 
expected both chiefs to sign. He later claimed that Matanzima was ready to sign this 
agreement while Sabata when alone gave the impression that he would sign only to 
backtrack and pay heed to his advisers when they were with him. It was believed that 
Sabata‘s advisers persistently persuaded him ‗first to hold a meeting of all Thembu [sic] 
Chiefs and elders to discuss the matter of the implementation of the BAA‘.102 
Matanzima‘s readiness to sign would surely expedite his upward climb in the ladder of 
chieftainship. This document, which anticipated a meeting that had been postponed 
because of Sabata‘s illness, was essentially an exhortation ‗ f chiefs, headmen and 
people to accept Bantu Authorities and assist the officials in every way in establishing 
tribal units‘.103 Young later confirmed in a letter that at a subsequent meeting Sabata 
and his patrons had asked for an adjournment so as to be able to present the issues 
affecting abaThembu to a gathering of abaThembu at large. While the BAA presented 
an ideal weapon to accomplish the objectives peculiar to both chiefs it is not easy to 
believe that Young would have retracted his order if Sabata had changed his mind and 
embraced the controversial act.  
 
On 3 August 1956 Ramsay wrote a letter in which he expressed disappointment at the 
fact that the envisaged meeting of the abaThembu Chiefs and Headmen had not taken 
place  
owing to the bad state of Chief Sabata‘s health. He is almost 
continually sick and unable to function as a chief. In several cases 
chiefs and headmen are ready to form tribal authorities but wish to 
consult the chief first and are unable to see him …The chief‘s illness 
is inherited alcoholism and consequent complications.104 
 
Sabata‘s illness could be perceived as both an advantage and a disadvantage because 
it afforded them an opportunity to find an amenable substitute. The chief magistrate‘s 
remark, based as it was on a doctor‘s findings, that  ‗unless Sabata can receive 















prejudiced pronouncement from both the doctor and the government official about a 
man who lived for another thirty years after this date. The latter remark is also 
suggestive of the futility of perceiving a physically unfit Sabata as neither a threat nor an 
obstruction to government‘s plans. Ironically, Sabata‘s illness was a political setback of 
great historical significance for the history of abaThembu paramountcy. Since he was 
chief by customary law his assent was essential if the government were sincere in its 
intentions of honouring the chieftainship. The chief magistrate required a doctor‘s 
written confirmation of Sabata‘s sickness to be able to justify finding a substitute for him. 
There was already a plan in government circles to convene a meeting of all abaThembu 
Chiefs and royal headmen with a view to nominating ‗a regent or deputy‘ to carry on the 
business of the chiefdom. It was to be expected that the government would use its 
influence to identify a government-disposed candidate for regency. The apparent 
inappropriateness of the BAA as a tool to revive chieftainship is clearly revealed in the 
chief Magistrate‘s claim of disappointment at the obstructiveness  of abaThembu 
custom, saying ‗Tembu custom does not permit of a ‘locum tenens’ for a paramount 
chief while the chief is alive and in possession of his faculties‘.106 It must be noted that 
in the case in hand the abaThembu custom, with all its seeming obstrucive features, 
served to secure for all times, Sabata‘s position as paramount chief.   
 
THE BANISHMENT OF JONGUHLANGA‘S ROYAL COUNCIL AND THE SURVIVAL 
OF THE DEPORTEES 
 
The security of the centrality of abaThembu paramountcy could not be guaranteed now 
that Matanzima was being earmarked for regional chieftainship. The BAA on its part 
appeared to be losing its direction as Sabata tried pull together his kingdom backed by 
an inner ‗Royal Council‘ constituted by the chiefs Bhalisile Nkosiyane, Thwalimfene and 
Bangilizwe Joyi, and Mcgregor Mgolombane. The implementation of the BAA in 
abaThembuland had since degenerated to a power struggle which translated into a 
Sabata‘s abaThembu paramountcy versus Matanzima‘s aspirations for the St Marks 
centred regional chieftainship. While Matanzima‘s most powerful ally was the DNA 
personnel Sabata depended for advice on his ‗royal advisers‘ men who were chiefs by 















with regard to abaThembu affairs. One of these prominent royal councillors, Nkosiyane, 
was a former civil servant, who acted as Sabata‘s secretary, editing and interpreting all 
his correspondence.  
 
THE POSITION OF JOYI WITHIN THE HOUSE OF NGUBENGCUKA 
Ngubengcuka +Nonesi (GH)                        +MamQwathi Fubu (Qadi to the GH)              
 
 
                 Mthikrakra  created heir at infancy                          
 
 
                Mthikrakra                                    Mthikrakra      Shweni           Joyi107 
 
Bangilizwe confirmed that their strategy was that the ‗King should adopt all possible 
delaying tactics and avoid an outright rejectionist response to the government-imposed 
‗Authorities‘. They hoped that things would sort themselves out without the offensive 
legislation being applied in abaThembuland‘.108 
 
The apparent indecisiveness of Sabata put his ‗Royal Council‘ in a bad light. The 
government and some elements from within abaThembuland accused the ‗Royal  
Council‘ of denying all access to Paramount Chief Sabata, who himself was accused of 
playing double standards. Ramsay also remarked in a letter that  it ‗is quite clear that 
Sabata is trying to run with the hares and chase with the hounds … He is admittedly in a 
very difficult position and is not strong enough to take a stand on his own‘.109 Sabata 
would argue that consulting with the abaThembu people through these councillors on 
matters affecting his chiefdom was in keeping with the custom. It must be noted that the 
tribal authority was at the bottom of the hierarchy of authorities. Against this background 
therefore it made sense that the formation of such a body should demonstrate, as much 
as was possible, visible participatory democracy  by, and for, those it was  intended to 
serve rather than those (the government) whose political interests it was designed to 















of the chiefs that made up the ‗Joyi gang‘ (Royal Council) because of their stand on the 
BAA was evidence of the act‘s divisive impact in  the abaThembu chiefs‘ ranks.  
  
The affidavit of Ephraim Neyi Sangoni of Qokolweni Location (Mqanduli- Mthatha) must 
be understood in the light of both the diversified responses of abaThembu chiefs to the 
BAA and the divide and rule approach of the government in abaThembu affairs. 
Sangoni‘s report, based on personal observations at a meeting held at Bumbane on 22 
March 1958, confirmed Sabata‘s harsh condemnation of the people who reported his 
activities to the magistrate‘s office. He claimed to have been singled out as a ‗spy and 
renegade‘.‘There are people here who will run to Umtata and say all I have said but I do 
not care‘,110 Sangoni reported, adding that many at the meeting spoke against the 
acceptance of the nomination of any mThembu to a  ‗Bantu‘ Authorities body. These 
included the Joyi brothers who were the main speakers against the BAA. Thwalimfene, 
of ‗Joyi gang‘, in show of confidence in his king, was reported to have remarked, that  
they  would  ‗not nominate any members, you are our chief … people nominated by the 
government will never be able to come here to the Great Place. They‘ll have to remain 
in their kraals‘111  
 
Thwalimfene‘s sentiments were endorsed by Masebenza Sandlana who remarked that  
they could  ‗never have two rulers–the Chief magistrate and the Paramount Chief. The 
Chief Magistrate must go. He‘s not born here and the Paramount is‘.112 This was an 
indication of abaThembu rejection of, and resistance to, the imposition of imported 
political systems and their associated practices. Sabata for his part was reported to 
have stated that he would not express his opinion on the BAA for fear of being 
victimised by the C.I.D. members, some of whom might have been present at the 
meeting. Sangoni also reported that the attendees at the meeting elected a delegation 
which was to report to the magistrate that the abaThembu rejected the BAA and were in 
disagreement with the government‘s policy. The delegation which consisted of Sabata‘s 
nominees included the controversial Ephraim Sangoni, Thwalimfene and Bangilizwe 
Joyi, Rev Cuba, Gebenga Sasa, David Makongolo, Masebenza Sandlana, Ngangelizwe 















appeared to refute the issues that were, at that time, polarizing the  abaThembu people. 
It exhibited a symbolic unity and appeared to present a united front to the magistrate. In 
the light of the above events must be contextualised a report believed to have originated 
with MacGregor Mgolombane (of the Joyi gang) which claimed that the ‗Mthatha 
Natives Racial groups‘ had rejected the BAA. Ramsay‘s letter contained a report which 
noted that the act had been repeatedly rejected on 10 December 1956, 14 September 
1957, 18 November 1957 and 22 March 1958.114 Matters were made worse by Sabata‘s 
anti-government remarks to journalists from New Age and Imvo, his  comments at the 
Bumbane Great Place meetings, as well as his verbal attacks on the government during 
a recent visit to the Reef,115 all of which attracted the attention of the security police. His 
remarks were a factor behind the government‘s decision to delay the ratification of his 
appointment to paramountcy116 in accordance with the BAA.117 It was also noteworthy 
that the chief magistrate acknowledged in a letter to the SNA that he had recommended 
that ‗in view of his [Sabata‘s] past record and recent conduct, that the appointment be 
withheld until such time as he shows that he has turned over a new leaf‘.118 In the same 
letter Ramsay admitted that his recommendation was not in accord with the fact that 
‗the time had come to appoint Sabata as Paramount Chief [King] of the abaThembu 
chiefdoms residing in the districts of Mthatha, Mqanduli, Ngcobo, St Marks, Xalanga 
and Elliotdale‘.119 Though the government had reluctantly installed Sabata in 1954 it 
became clear that his rejection of the BAA caused uncertainty about the future status of 
his paramount chieftainship. The situation was fuelled by rumours (which Mgolombane 
claimed to have got from ‗reliable sources‘) that Sabata‘s rejection of the ‗Authorities‘ 
might cost him his paramountcy. Mgolombane took it upon himself to verify the validity 
of the rumours with the Chief Magistrate ‗s Office, noting that he ‗was rather surprised to 
learn from reliable sources the rumour that if Paramount Jonguhlanga does not carry on 
nominations for the rejected above Act he is to be dismissed as Paramount‘.120 Ramsay 
denied the rumours on the basis that the ‗Bantu Authorities Act is not enforceable 

















Other than Sabata‘s opposition to the act, a detailed account of the abaThembu 
objections to the implementation of the BAA, and the reasons for such opposition were 
expressed in an unpublished document entitled  ‗Memorandum on the Difficulties and 
Tensions Arising from the implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act in Tembuland‘.122 
The co–authors of the memorandum were Nkosiyane, Bangilizwe and Thwalimfene Joyi 
and Mgolombane.123 Tsotsi has written thus about some of the reasons for the 
condemnation of the BAA, and the opposition to its implementation as reflected in the 
abaThembu memorandum   
 
The implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act in Tembuland … had 
strengthened the hand of those who had always opposed it as a fraud, a divide-
and-rule measure for the purpose of exploitation. So far from strengthening the 
position of the Paramount Chief of the Tembus and preserving the unity of the 
Tembu Nation, the Bantu Authorities Act in operation had proved to be a source 
of weakness and disunity. It was primarily for this reason that at several 
representative meetings of the Tembu Nation the Bantu Authorities Act (not only 
its implementation) had been roundly condemned and rejected. This had placed 
the Paramount chief, who had at all times been ready and willing to co-operate 
with the Government, in an embarrassing and invidious position and has made 
him an easy target of those careerists who see in his discomfiture prospects for 
their own promotion.124 
 
The memorandum was presented to the C.B.Young‘s one-man commission which sat in 
Umtata from 4 to 6 March 1958.125 The presentation was made at a meeting that Young 
had convened to investigate reasons for the abaThembu rejection of the BAA.126 Mda 
has added that Matanzima‘s claim to senior chieftainship was another brief of the 
commission.127 Tsotsi, expressing the dilemma in which Sabata found himself  said:   
‗the Paramount Chief sided with the people‘s representatives in his heart, but was 
naturally reluctant to come out openly against his employers to whom he owed his very 
rank‘128 in terms of the NAA of 1927. Earlier the Mthatha magistrate had required the 
Great Place to submit the names, occupations and addresses of people who wished to 
make representations at the enquiry, together with the main points of such 
representations.129 This instruction possibly originated in the office of the Minister of 
Bantu Development and Administration, De Wet Nel, who had initiated the appointment 















the BAA and this fact strengthens Mda‘s claim that the ‗Commission was designed to 
achieve a predetermined goal‘.130        
                                                                                                     
Young‘s commission was arranged without the knowledge of, or consultation with the 
Paramount Chief. In his letter to the Mthatha magistrate Sabata remarked that  
[y]ou told me in your office that the inquiry is to be held consequent[ial] upon the 
deputation (referring to the Joyi gang who had presented the memorandum to 
the SNA in Pretoria) that went to Pretoria about the Bantu Authorities Act … I 
must know the full Agenda of the inquiry …. The Tembus are also requesting 
humbly that the said inquiry should be conducted at the above place (Great 
Place, Bumbane) which is their Palace.131 
 
The mandate of the commission was to determine the reasons for the rejection of the 
BAA by the abaThembu,132 even though reasons for opposition to the measure were 
clearly specified in the memorandum. It must also be noted that the government‘s 
interrogation of the rejection of the BAA contradicted its earlier undertaking via Ramsay 
that the act was not by any means to be rammed down people‘s throats without their 
consent. 
 
A testimony by Sangoni recorded in Ramsay‘s letter reflected the perception that 
Nkosiyane, Mgolombane and the Joyi brothers, were regarded as agitators from whose 
hands Sabata needed to be rescued. Ramsay recorded that at meetings at his [Sabata] 
Great Place he does not favour Bantu Authorities, but when interviewing officials he 
does. He brings Sangoni and Justice to the Magistrate but at home favours the 
Nkosiyane gang and rebukes these two councillors‘. 133 A ‗native clerk‘ by the name of 
H.V.O. Mgudlwa, and an interpreter, F. Poswa, were also not viewed favourably by the 
government. The magistrate‘s office staff had a strong, though unverified, suspicion that 
the two had passed official and confidential information to Sabata and his advisers, for 
use in their fight against the implementation of the BAA. Ramsay made a point to the 
SNA ‗that mention is made in the account, of the memorandum, which would appear, 
accordingly, to be not from the Tembus but from Mgudlwa, Nkosiyane, Joyi and 
Attorney Tsotsi‘.134 Poswa, was described as only an ‗interpreter clerk‘, yet his name 
was frequently mentioned alongside those of the enemies of the government in the 















Secretary of Native Afairs to the SNA confirms that Young‘s enquiry, which was 
attended by all abaThembu chiefs, important headmen and over 300 abaThembu, 
embraced various aspects of abaThembu tribal affairs and political structures. Items of 
the commission that impact on the subject under investigation relate to the allegations 
by the ‗Joyi gang‘ against the Chief Magistrate Ramsay; the dispute between 
Paramount Chief Sabata and Matanzima; Sabata‘s jurisdiction; the position of the 
amaBomvana chiefdom in relation to the abaThembu paramountcy; and the alleged 
subversive elements in the abaThembu chiefdom.135 Tsotsi claims that Young was more 
interested in hearing the chiefs express their views, and for this reason he did 
everything he could to muzzle the authors of the memorandum.136  
 
At the time when the findings of Young‘s commission were made public all the members 
of the ‗Joyi gang‘, had been banished. It had become clear well before the deportations 
that something was going to be done to them. In Young‘s minute of 17 April 1958 to the 
chief magistrate he drew attention in  his memorandum to the removal of four persons 
from the Transkei in terms of section 5(1) (b) of Act No. 38 of 1927‘.137 The Nhlapo 
Commission has endorsed Tsotsi‘s confirmation that the banishments to the Northern 
Transvaal were a sequel to the Young Commission and, further, that the deportees 
were the opponents of Matanzima‘s claim to independence from the legitimate 
abaThembu paramountcy.138  
 
The banishment of the authors of the abaThembu memorandum revealed the high-
handedness of the government. No one deserved to hear the results of the commission 
more than those who had written the memorandum on behalf of, and for, the 
abaThembu cause. Young‘s report expressed his satisfaction at the banishment of 
those he believed were the stirring elements behind the abaThembu rejection of the 
BAA. He made it clear that the abaThembu delegation had, by visiting his Pretoria 
office, forced him to institute an inquiry so as to establish the identity of the opponents 
of the Government measures in abaThembuland. He stated that Sabata needed to be 
protected from those who posed as his advisers and mouthpiece when in fact they were 















their chief, he condemned all the members of the ‗Joyi gang‘ for forcing his hand to 
banish them. 
Who came to see me in Pretoria? And who thought I would accept 
the statements without the fullest inquiry? ―I did not banish them. 
They banished themselves by their own actions, Could anyone 
imagine that these people could think that they could control the 
Tembu Tribe?139  
 
Young further emphasised that his actions were prompted by his desire to protect 
Sabata‘s confidence from being abused by the people who pretended to love him. The 
actions of such people, if uncurbed, would eventually destroy chieftainship and thus the 
whole abaThembu nation 
The chief is the symbol of the Tribe. The chief is the spirit of the 
forefathers of the Tribe. He is the candle, the lamp, the light. What 
happens when the candle dies to the life of the Tribe?----The fact 
that certain people have been banished is not unreasonable. It is in 
the interests of the Tembu Tribe.140 
 
The deportation of the four chiefs on 30 May 1958 before the commission‘s findings 
were made public diminished the weighting of Sabata‘s constituency; undermined the 
democratic principle involved in the election of the ‗Royal Council‘ as an abaThembu 
national advisory body; and damaged almost irreparably the relations between the 
South African Government and the Great  House of Dalindyebo.  
A cousin of the deportees, Anderson Joyi, broke the news to 
Attorney Tsotsi when he reported that catastrophe has befallen the 
House of Joyi, last night the police invaded our home and took away 
my two brothers, Bangilizwe and Thwalimfene. You must help us.141  
 
Joyi also made it clear that his kin had been banished to unknown destinations. 
Bangilizwe confirmed that they were sent to different regions all of which were beyond 
the Cape‘s northern borders. Nkosiyane was sent to Soekmekaar, while Thwalimfene 
and Mgolombane (who took his wife with him) were banished to Kuruman. Bangilizwe  
was sent to a village in Louis Trichardt where he worked in a creosoting compound. 
They had to survive in their various villages as the villagers did, or be content with an 
allowance of £2 per month. While Bangilizwe Joyi commended the attitude and 















trying to survive so far from home where each and every one of them was made to feel 
as if he had chosen to abandon his family. Bangilizwe also expressed amazement at 
the docility and apoliticalness of his fellow-villagers in Louis Trichardt. He further 
confirmed that they had virtually no contact with each other in their respective areas of 
exile, except for Thwalimfene, who sometimes served as Mgolombane‘s herdman. At 
the end of 1959 the deportees were suddenly secretly removed by the ANC 
messengers who took them to Maseru in Lesotho. Here all three men were 
accommodated by Messrs Tyhali and Tyeku, while Nkosiyane was taken to Qachas 
Nek. It was during this time that Mgolombane secured a temporary debanishment order 
on the grounds that the letter that authorised his deportation had been addressed to 
Ngombane (rather than Mgolombane). Very soon Bangilizwe was accommodated at the 
home of Mr W. M. Tsotsi, who had since sought asylum in Basutoland.142 
 
Legislation that was intended to bring about indirect rule through chiefs ended up 
polarising the abaThembu chiefs and removing some to environments they were not 
familiar with. In 1960 they were in Basutoland, a country of relative freedom at the time 
where the ANC‘s Letele looked after their welfare. Bangilizwe confesses that his sojourn 
in the baSotho country afforded him the opportunity of regular visits to his family in the 
Bhaziya village of Mthatha District. He recounted with a sense of satisfaction at how, for 
the duration of his banishment and sojourning in abaSotholand, he successfully  
evaded, on a regular basis, the instruments of ‗apartheid system‘. On several occasions 
he would arrive home towards midnight and disappear before the next day dawned. 
Sometimes he negotiated his way by mingling with the village herds as the herdboys 
drove these home in the early evening.  ‗My clever wife would never exhibit any visible 
excitement at seeing me, and this guaranteed me safety during my clandestine visits‘.143 
The other three deportees were further surprised in December 1963, by the receipt of 
debanishment letters from the government. Bangilizwe claimed that he only received his 
in April 1964, and the explanation given for the delay by government officials was that 
the government did not know anything about him. On the return of the deportees, the 















progressive thinkers, and had become a tool that was utilised to make and unmake 
abaThembu chiefs.144 
 
The ‘give and take‖’ exercise that was applied by the government to both the political  
‘conformist’‖ and ‗non-conformists‘ as punishment or reward as each case deserved is 
what caused the BAA to be considered a divisive weapon in abaThembuland. To 
illustrate the above argument the letter from the General Secretary of the Transkei 
Organised Bodies Attorney Canca, to the Editor of the Daily Dispatch is cited.  In his 
letter Canca defended the deportees against the accusation that they were ‗causing 
tribal strife and assuming the prerogative of the Paramount Chief. Would the Chief 
Magistrate care to quote instances to prove this charge? The evidence at our disposal 
reveals that, so far from causing tribal strife, the deportees fought zealously for the 
promotion of Tembu tribal unity’.145 Canca also extracted from the Mthatha magistrate‘s 
letter to the amaBomvana chief, Gwebindlala, wherein an account was given of how 
Gwebindlala had lost his chiefship as a result of opposition to the BAA.  Gwebindlala‘s 
sin was his failure to attend Young‘s inquiry session at Bumbane Great Place. At the 
inquiry the chief would be required to present two speakers who would, in turn, veto the 
abaThembu claim that the amaBomvana chiefdom was part of abaThembuland. The 
two speakers would then argue from this premise in favour of the BAA Proclamation: ‘in 
view of the fact that there is a strong agitation amongst the Tembus against the 
Proclamation and that you [Gwebindlala] yourself are against it and capital might 
possibly be made from this fact by the Tembus’.146 The failure of Gwebindlala to 
respond to the magistrate on the above issues exposed him to threats of possible 
charges for disobeying the magistrate‘s ‘lawful order’. He would also be prosecuted if 
he failed to ‘attend the meeting at Bumbane, which is in the interests of the many 
thousand people of the Bomvana tribe who you[referring to Gwebindlala] represent’.147 
Canca has testified in his report that Gwebindlala was subsequently deposed from the 
chieftainship for failing to comply with the instructions of the magistrate. His empathetic 
remark about Sabata is also worthy of note :   
 
[t]he Paramount Chief was also in danger. On several occasions, the 















contrary the star of the collaborationist Captain Kaizer Matanzima 
ascended from nowhere to a pinnacle hardly distinguishable  from 
that of the Paramount Chief himself. Then the deportees began to 
sound alarm for which they were deported.148 
 
It is evident from the above account that the struggle to preserve abaThembu 
paramountcy had become linked to the whole issue of implementation of the BAA. The 
question of retaining it intact or living with a decentralised paramountcy was pivotal to 
towing the government‘s line. Further, the government was anxious that if the 
abaThembu paramountcy was to be decentralised this needed to be justified. This 
would be done by making sure that the paramountcy indeed exhibited a dual-tribal block 
in the progressively budding Emigrant abaThembuland which was gradually being 
matched by the dimunition of original territorial paramountcy of Sabata.  
 
THE CHIEF MAGISTRATE PLEDGES SUPPORT FOR DALIWONGA’S CLAIM TO 
REGIONAL CHIEFTAINSHIP 
It had also become clear in Young‘s report that the Government endorsed Matanzima‘s 
claim to regional chieftainship. Ramsay had hinted to the SNA that next to the 
acceptance of BAA by chiefs, headmen and people, and the subsequent establishment 
of ‗tribal‘ units, Matanzima‘s desire to be recognised as chief of Emigrant Tembuland‘149, 
presumably a well-deserved reward from his benefactor, was the only outstanding 
matter.  
 
The DNA‘s backing of Matanzima‘s claim to the regional chieftainship was clearly 
politically linked to his acceptance of the BAA. In the same vein Sabata‘s loss of favour 
with the government had something to do with his opposition to the government‘s 
schemes and his subtle rejection of the BAA. The government‘s opinion about him is 
made clear in Ramsay‘s letter to the SNA :  
Sabata‘s misdemeanours are widely known, particularly his 
opposition to Bantu Authorities and his statement that he will fight 
Bantu Authorities to the last drop of blood. The meetings at his Great 
Place at which the agitators fulminated and the lives of loyal 
headmen and councillors were threatened were held in his presence 
and under his chairmanship … The Chief‘s attitude towards Bantu 
Authorities etc. changed only when Mr. Young arrived to hold the 















position. Up to that time Sabata was publicly flouting the 
authorities.150  
 
In a subsequent letter the SNA recommended an increase in Matanzima‘s stipend, ―the 
second most important chief in Tembuland‘.151 The Government‘s habitual practice to 
demonise Sabata was matched by their orchestrated enthusiasm to shower Matanzima 
with praises. The following excerpt shows that in the government‘s eyes, Sabata was no 
match for Matanzima, on whom the SNA had earlier heaped lavish praise.   
 
Although lower in rank he is nevertheless a chief of considerable 
importance with a number of sub-chiefs under him. He is moreover a 
mature man of outstanding character and ability as well as good 
education e.g. he holds a B.A. degree. He is the traditional leader of 
the Natives in the St. Marks and Xalanga districts (also known as 
Emigrant Tembuland) and it is foreseen that the Natives in the Glen 
Grey district of the Ciskei will also elect to fall within his arm of 
jurisdiction when Bantu Authorities have been established for that 
area. Steps are consequently being taken to have Daliwonga Kaizer 
Matanzima appointed by the Governor-General as Chief of the 
Natives in Emigrant Tembuland comprising the districts of St. Marks 
and Xalanga.152 
 
The government had clearly assumed the prerogative to make and sustain 
chieftainships. Young further explained the government‘s position in relation to 
chieftainship:    
while it was the tradition of the people to love their chief it is the duty 
of the Government to recognise that chief, it is the duty of the 
Government to nominate that chief, it is the duty of the Government 
to ensure that he represents that tribe. Some chiefs are good, some 
are not so good. It is not the person who is a chief, it is the 
blood/candle lamp.153 
 
This was not surprising considering that an important outcome of Young‘s inquiry 
related to the legitimacy of the chieftainship of Matanzima, who, in Young‘s words, had 
 
produced a great deal of evidence. You will also recall that his reply to a 
question from me made a very significant statement. He said that he recognises 
Sabata as the Paramount Chief of Tembus.  He also said that all he wants is the 
recognition of the traditional status of his own forefathers. He will recognise 
Sabata as the Paramount Chief but he [Sabata] must not interfere in his own 















who will deny that Chief Matanzima is a man of standing. He is a man of 
education. He is a man of example. He has proved his loyalty154  
 
It must be noted that Sabata as abaThembu paramount chief had every legal and 
customary right to be involved in the district affairs of any corner under his territorial 
jurisdiction. Therefore the extension of Matanzima‘s authority inevitably diminished 
Sabata‘s political domain. The government substantiated Matanzima‘s claim even 
though Sabata had repudiated it several times. Matanzima‘s enthusiasm in 
complimenting Young‘s commission on its achievements must be seen in the 
background that it had, to his gratification, made his dynasty a senior factor in the 
abaThembu traditional hierarchy. The government‘s failure to check this development at 





The chapter has shown that the NP government used the BAA to entice Matanzima and 
to exploit his greed for power, and that in unleashing him it nurtured his self-interest. It 
has been argued that the whole process of implementing the act in abaThembuland 
gave Matanzima a position of power which drew attention to himself as a self-interested 
champion or agent of the NP government, albeit that he did not have a mandate from 
the territorial chiefs. It is doubtful if the proponents of the act would have applied the 
legislation effectively without the facilitating role of the internal disciple that the 
compliant Matanzima turned out to be.   
 
The chapter has further shown that the ongoing disagreement which had become a 
feature in the relationship of Sabata and his junior cousin prior to the implementation of 
the act served as a stimulant to its implementation. It urged Matanzima to do whatever 
was objectionable to Sabata with vigour and zest so as to portray him as the worst 
government opponent, and in this way earn the Government‘s favour. The chapter has 
revealed Matanzima as someone whose subsequent actions proved beyond doubt that 
he saw Sabata as a major stumbling block to his acquisition of power in the same way 















political authority. He therefore blindly fought Sabata to rid himself of the political 
impediment than to promote the application of Government measures. The BAA was, 
for Matanzima, a means to an end.  
 
The chapter has demonstrated that Sabata‘s stalling of the implementation of the act  
provided Matanzima with an invaluable opportunity to systematically map out his ascent 
with the government‘s connivance. His manipulative skills were exposed, tested and 
proven effective in the short term, and in the end he was furnished with a political 
instrument that would enable him to outwit Sabata at every turn. The question of what 
course the politics of the abaThembu chieftainship would have taken, had Sabata 
readily embraced the BAA, will always confound the researcher. In the same context the 
political irony that was implicit in Sabata‘s strategic shilly-shallying on the question of 
the BAA which inadvertently made Matanzima run into luck generates questions. These 
are about whether Matanzima was a short-sighted opportunist or a somewhat naïve and 
excitable collaborator who, according to Laurence once confessed to his entering the 
‗Bhunga in order to destroy it‘155 and in that way to make room for the so-called 
‗chiefship power-booster‘ the BAA. The chapter has also shown that the banishment of 
the ‗Royal council‘ was counterproductive in that it inadvertently internationalised the 
politics of abaThembu chieftainship in a way that the government would have least 
predicted and desired. How the deportation of the ‗Royal Council‘ nurtured resistance to 
the BAA instead of intimidating the opponents to the act has also been revealed in the 
chapter.    
 
The chapter has portrayed Matanzima as someone who exhibited by his actions that he 
saw the BAA, on the one hand, as an instrument with which to provoke the 
obstructionist Sabata. This was evident in his assumption of the prerogative of a 
paramount chief in instances where he imposed informally and illegitimately his 
influence in areas of abaThembuland that were outside his tribal jurisdiction; when he  
betrayed Sabata to the South African government by facilitating the implementation of 
the BAA in abaThembuland despite the King‘s strategy of stalling the introduction of the 















greater abaThembuland but in the immediate neighbourhood of Sabata (as was the 
case in amaBomvanaland). The chapter has shown that, in the end, Matanzima‘s self-
seeking actions in the short term helped entrench in a strong position of power the 
House of Mhlobo, his father‘s house, rather than that of Rhaxothi Matanzima.  
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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BANTU AUTHORITIES ACT OF 1951 IN THE 
XHALANGA AND GLEN GREY DISTRICTS 
INTRODUCTION 
The implementation of the BAA of 1951 in the Xhalanga-Glen Grey districts appeared to 
be a test of the potential of the act to revive, mould, modify and, in some cases, invent 
institutional chieftainship. In this context must be understood the procedures which the 
architects of the legislation had to follow to make sure that the ‗Authorities‘ in the two 
western abaThembu districts would be properly anchored.  
 
Mqeke‘s remark that the tribal authority, a body that wielded power over a 
conglomeration of locations, was an indispensable infrastructure for the BAA,1 hints at 
its extra-ordinary importance as a dual-purpose organ. Against this background the 
chapter looks at the extent to which the political infrastructure, if any existed in the 
subject region, was administratively mature enough for the ‗Authorities‘ to thrive on. The 
chapter talks to the concepts of change and continuity which were implied in the 
transformation of rural governance and subsequent implementation of the act in the two 
districts.  
 
The level of receptiveness of the communities in these districts to the new legislation, 
and the reciprocal role of the internal factors to the manoeuvres by external elements is 
analysed. The focus is on the examination of the social and political factors to determine 
the extent to which their very diversity and incompatible interests retarded or facilitated 
the installation of the BAA. It is argued that the class and social divisions attracted 
Matanzima‘s pro-government intervention which, in turn, accelerated the resuscitation of  
the Gecelo-Stokwe chieftainships as well as those of Manzezulu and Zwelihle. The 
chapter identifies this acceleration in the above process to be the complicating factor in 
the installation of the ‗Authorities‘, as was Matanzima‘s proactivity. In this context the 















tribal government,  when, in fact, the NP found in it the logical basis for resuscitating or 
even instituting tribal rule in the need to anchor and support the rule by ‗Authorities‘.  
 
The chapter portrays Matanzima as an unqualified successor to the Governor-General 
as he dangles incentives in imitation of his erstwhile benefactor and successfully splits 
the ranks of amaMfengu. It analyses the role of material and political benefits in 
determining amaMfengu responses to the legislation and the extent to which these 
factors retarded or facilitated the installation of the ‗Authorities‘. The chapter discusses 
the irony implied in the fear of both the rejectionists and embracers of ‗Authorities‘ in  
the impact of chiefly rule on their continuing class status and material benefits. In this 
context the chapter reveals the BAA as an instrument which Matanzima conveniently 
used to revive the chieftainships of amaGcina, amaQwathi and amaHala in the 
Xhalanga-Glen Grey districts and to paralyse amaMfengu cultural sentiments.       
 
The chapter further shows that the contiguity of M tanzima‘s and Xhalanga-Glen Grey  
areas afforded him exclusive visibility and regular visits in the area and, in this way,  
accelerated the installation of the ‗Authorities‘. Matanzima is identified as a force that 
was instrumental in compromising the original objectives of the act once the ‗Authorities‘ 
were in place. It shows how the BAA outlived its purpose particularly once  it was used 
openly to empower Matanzima and emasculate Sabata by delegitimising his authority in 
the western periphery of abaThembuland. Sabata‘s failure to entrench his authority in 
Xhalanga-Glen Grey is discussed, as is the methodical way in which his ‗defeat‘ by 
Matanzima was to prove calamitous for the abaThembu paramountcy.   
 
The chapter reveals Matanzima as an unqualified, yet presumptuous advisor to the local 
magistrate in the installation of ‗Authorities‘ in the recalcitrant Mnxe Location. It reveals 
that in his locally assumed Governor-General‘s position Matanzima successfully turned 
Msengana and Mrwetyana into his allies and the technical opponents of their fellow 
amaMfengu. The chapter also reveals his incomparable role in the restoration of the 
indigenous rule in Xhalanga-Glen Grey districts. It shows that Matanzima‘s initiative in 















realisation that it was the only route to acquiring what he most wanted - the supreme 
chieftainship. The chapter demonstrates how  his  initiative earned him political rewards 
in the westward expansion of his jurisdictional area  against  Sabata‘s whose 
uneasiness at Matanzima‘s proactivity is seemingly informed by his attempts to make 
sure that his paramountcy remains unshackled.  
 
VICISSITUDES OF ABATHEMBU CHIEFTAINSHIP IN THE XHALANGA–GLEN  
GREY DISTRICTS PRIOR TO THE BAA  
 
The respective roles that Matanzima and Sabata played in the implementation of the 
BAA in the Xhalanga-Glen Grey districts were very crucial because they either 
promoted or thwarted the attainment of the government‘s objectives. In this way they 
transformed the exercise of implementing the BAA into a milestone in the continuously 
unfolding history of abaThembu chieftainship. In the case of Xhalanga-Glen Grey 
districts where there was no support base for the ‗Authorities‘ it was imperative to create 
an ideal situation. The socio-economic and political environment in the region appeared 
to be neither receptive nor conducive to the new legislation because chieftainship had 
been dysfunctional for about 100 years.  
 
This dated from Sir Harry Smith‘s unprovoked annexation of Mthikrakra‘s country in 
1847.2 The annexation violated the king‘s land rights in the area that was bounded by 
the Ndwe River in the east, and the Klaas Smit and Black Kei rivers in the west and 
south-west respectively. It also pushed the chiefs Gecelo (of the amaGcina), Ndarala (of 
the amaNdungwane), Gungubele (of  the amaTshatshu) and Stokwe Ndlela (of  the 
amaQwathi) into the anti-government camp in the subsequent Mlanjeni War. Queen 
Nonesi‘s dissociation with the warring chiefs earned her both the government‘s approval 
and the right to establish her Great Place at Gqebenya in the Glen Grey District. The 
status of the abaThembu paramountcy was, from the time of the establishment and 
recognition of Gqebenya Great Place, circumscribed by Colonial authority and thus 
compromised. Nonesi‘s colonial prize because of her benevolent neutrality in the 
Mlanjeni War estranged her from her constituency of minor abaThembu Chiefs. This 















Nonesi‘s forfeiture of Mthikrakra‘s country to the government conferred on her a 
nominal, rather than practical, status because she had lost her subject‘s national home. 
The subsequent landlessness of the abaThembu chiefdom negatively affected the 
prestige and influence in respect of the status of Nonesi‘s ruling house. She did not 
have sufficient land to offer to attract, or even retain petty chiefs as a way of 
consolidating her following, and had thus lost political control over them.  
 
The mid-nineteenth century Cattle-Killing episode also revealed a challenge to Nonesi‘s 
authority in its division of abaThembu between those who refrained from killing and 
those who ignored her pronouncements against it. Her visibly waning authority and 
decline of her prestige as a national symbol manifested  impotent leadership which was 
ominous for the central authority of the abaThembu paramountcy.    
 In the light of the events alluded to above it is clear that the potential for implosion 
within abaThembu polity was great when Rhaxoti Matanzima led his breakaway faction 
in 1865. A desire for individual autonomy was supreme in  Matanzima‘s motives. A fact 
of relevance to this study was that when Gecelo and Stokwe settled in Xhalanga after 
the split they carried with them chieftainships that were imported concepts whose 
practical meaning derived more from their colonial benefactor than from the loyalty of 
their so-called subjects. These make-do colonial chieftainships were further dealt a fatal 
blow following  Gecelo and Stokwe‘s active involvement in the Gun War. Ntsebeza has 
similarly shown that the Gun War and the subsequent Commission of Inquiry  ‗gave the 
colonialists an opportunity to formally abolish chieftainships in Xhalanga‘.3  The loss of 
chieftainship status left the two houses with truncated territories in the farms that they 
each subsequently received from the government.  
 
Gecelo‘s descendants still retained the Mbenge Farm on the eve of the implementation 
of the BAA. Ntsebeza has hinted at the ambivalent position of the Government in 
Gecelo‘s case,  where land ownership entitled him as the landlord to exercise authority 
over people whose primary need was simply habitable land. It would appear that 















tenants. The government‘s conferring of an official title on the landlord in order to justify 
their recognition and legitimation of his natural authority, as well as its tax exactions on 
the Mbenge Farm tenants,4 all implied indirect control on both parties. Dubow‘s concept 
of  ‗purposive bureaucracy‘5 would probably apply to the case at hand, where the 
colonial authority confirmed Gecelo‘s authority by infringing upon it. It must be noted 
that investing Gecelo with ‗government headmanship‘ tampered with his autonomic 
authority; made Mbenge Farm tenants beneficiaries of ‗benevolent paternalism‘ ; and 
also usurped Gecelo‘s prerogative by depriving him of the revenue that was his right. 
Significantly,  the government‘s factoring itself in the governance of the Mbenge Farm 
would also well anticipate its political objectives with regard to the subsequent 
application, terms and conditions of the BAA in the Xhalanga District. The very 
endorsement of Gecelo‘s headmanship implied colonial conscription, and this fact 
automatically pre-empted the rule by ‗Authorities‘. An advantage for the government 
was that a people residing on Gecelo‘s property were not likely to defy his authority and 
escape punishment which it was his natural right, rather than the government‘s, to mete 
out . It was thus deemed necessary by the government to first conscientise Headman 
Gecelo about his politico-official position in the hierarchy of ‗Authorities‘ to enable the 
Supreme Chief‘s authority to filter down through him to the tenants. Proof that both the 
government and the headman were trapped in a semi-feudal arrangement was reflected 
in the chief magistrate‘s letter to the SNA. In it Ramsay reiterated  that the government 
did not have the authority to strip Ngonyama Gecelo of overlordship over his personal 
property  ‗as he is the owner of the farm which comprises the location‘.6  
 
In the case of Stokwe‘s widow, Emma, the government appeared to have been 
persuaded to consider her person (perhaps also as a daughterof King Sandile of the 
amaRharhabe) than her rather insignificant status as Stokwe‘s widow. Stokwe‘s 
chieftainship had never been on par with Gecelo‘s and thus it had never been solidly  
grounded. Emma also did not have a spokesman to take up her cause and this situation 
put her at the mercy of a government that was intent on consolidating its administrative 
authority over the affairs of Blacks. Ntsebeza has claimed that the apparent reason the 















the Commission had found that she was marginalised following her ostracisation.  There 
was also the factor of not wanting to alienate the dethroned chiefs or their families, on 
the grounds that they still had supporters.7 This contention is credible, especially when 
viewed against the socio-political vulnerability of the two ex-chieftainships. Their 
resuscitation would surely provide an infrastructure for the implementation of the BAA in 
the Xhalanga-Glen Grey area.  
 
It is thus clear that the government had both an advantage and a disadvantage in the 
case of Xhalanga where it stood to win the loyalties of Gecelo and Stokwe should it 
revive their chieftainships. What spelled disaster was that it could not guarantee any 
established following for the two chiefs in whose areas homogeneity was non-existent. 
The DNA was thus called upon, as a matter of urgency, to effect such changes in rural 
governance as would facilitate the continuity of the implementation process. The 
chieftainships of Gecelo and Stokwe  were thus recognised, albeit passively, and, had 
to be seen to be supported from below or by the communities at the headmen level. It 
was at this point that the juxtaposition of the otherwise divergent elements in the 
Xhalanga District presented challenges that were born out of the statistical composition 
of the chiefdoms under discussion. The subtle incompatibilities that were symbolised in 
the division threatened both the establishment and survival of the envisaged Gecelo-
Stokwe chieftainships, even though these institutions posed as melting pots for the 
competing outlooks of their otherwise culturally diverse subjects. Whilst it is true that the 
two chiefdoms could boast of numerical strength from their reinforcement by other 
clusters such strength was not necessarily a sign of political stability because it was 
devoid of cultural essence and unity. This lack of unanimity in the Xhalanga community 
was a dynamic socio-political clash. The irony of Xhalanga‘s political situation was that 
the compatibility between the pre-colonial socio-cultural practices and the indigenous 
political system had a parallel in the mutually complementary relationship that existed 
between the missionary‘s Christian religion (as symbolised in the amaMfengu outlook 
















The compatibility which seemed peculiar to each of the two otherwise divergent socio-
political systems could not reconcile them. Instead it portrayed the Xhalanga situation 
with regard to government‘s objectives as a clash of politico-cultural attitudes. In the 
context of the progressive conflict there was the age-old perception of amaMfengu 
cluster as the unenthusiastic patrons of the Southern abaNguni chieftaincy. It was, 
however, imperative that chieftainship be revived to create the necessary infrastructure 
for the BAA, and for this purpose the amaMfengu needed  to be enlisted as group.  It 
became necessary, therefore, to have in positions headmen from all social groups 
whose conduct was amenable to the government‘s objectives. This was to help 
reinforce the hierarchy of ‗Authorities‘ by propping up the prospective Gecelo-Stokwe 
chieftainships. The execution of these government objectives was exactly what the 
Mnxe amaMfengu villagers objected to because they viewed the government‘s 
measures as generally oppressive.  
 
Magistrate Mundell of Cofimvaba had hinted t the importance of enabling the 
headman‘s office to function under the authority of a chief rather than two or more 
independent petty chiefs, so as to allow for the smooth functioning of the ‗Authorities‘ at 
tribal level.8 Mundell‘s remark could only be complemented by Matanzima‘s initiative 
because he had earlier made a submission to have himself recognised as a ‗chief of 
chiefs‘ over Xhalanga. This was in 1953, when with the help of his attorney brother, 
George Matanzima, he made attempts to have his area of jurisdiction extended to cover 
the whole of Cofimvaba and Cala. At the time the paramount  chief designate, Sabata,  
was becoming impatient at Dabulamanzi‘s apparent reluctance to vacate the 
paramountcy seat.  Matanzima, who possibly saw a loophole in the apparent 
uneasiness between Sabata and Dabulamanzi, decided to exploit the situation by 
pushing his personal agenda. He made various claims in his bid to have his jurisdiction 
extended to Cala. At the meeting where Matanzima put forth his claims the chief regent   
confirmed that while the abaThembu (amaNdungwana, amaJumba) were amaHala 
because of their descent from Chief Hala, Kaiser Daliwonga was chief of only the 
amaHala of St Marks District. He reiterated that the districts of Xhalanga and Lady Frere 















Matanzima‘s claim that the Cala people had called upon him in 1945 to help establish a 
school in their district, saying further that he did not know why the school was named 
after Daliwonga Matanzima. In response to Matanzima‘s insistent claim of Cala, 
Dabulamanzi pointed out that  ‗Cala had been the kraal of Chief Dalindyebo and that if 
they wished they, of the Great Place, Umtata, could appoint a Chief and take him to 
Cala. Cala fell under the Great Place at Umtata and not under Kayser‘.9 The implication 
was that Cala was an outpost, ithanga,  which, as an extension of the Great Place, 
carried a status that was inferior to the Great Place. This appeared to imply that even if 
Matanzima  incorporated Cala he would not by any means qualify for seniority. 
Dabulamanzi summed up by making the following comments when called upon to 
explain Kaiser Matanzima‘s position as a chief  
The Chief [Regent], was of Dalindyebo‘s Right Hand House and Kayser was 
subordinate to him.10 Ngangelizwe had been the eldest son and heir and 
Matanzima son of the Right Hand House. Dalindyebo was the son and heir of 
Ngangelizwe and therefore the Right Hand House of Dalindyebo would be 
superior to the Right Hand House of Matanzima. He, the Paramount Chief 
[Regent] was of Dalindyebo‘s Right Hand House and Kayser was subordinate to 
him.11 
 
The above message with regard to Matanzima‘s ambitions about Cala was of great 
historical importance for the politics of abaThembu chieftainship.  
 
The Xhalanga District in particular became the ideal testing ground for various  reasons. 
As indicated above there was the proactive disciple that Matanzima was in the 
execution of government schemes. In addition Xhalanga bore visible symbols of the 
erstwhile indigenous government in the nominal chieftainships of Gecelo and Stokwe. 
The government was pushing vigorously for the resuscitation of the two chieftainships 
which were believed to have a measure of political influence. Against this background 
must be understood Ramsay‘s acknowledgement that for any piece of land to qualify for 
inclusion into the ‗Authorities‘ on the basis of Proclamation 180 of 1956 it had to have a 
‗location‘ status, as well as his subsequent proposal that the Mbenge Farm be declared  















use Gecelo‘s headmanship as a stepping-stone to the imposition of the BAA in 
Xhalanga.  
 
The episode concerning Headman Vumazonke‘s Ndwana residents‘ must also be 
regarded to have pre-empted the ‗Authorities‘. Vumazonke had, in 1950, demarcated 
sites for some people who emerged from the Glen Grey and Ndwe farms. Nxazonke of 
Ndwana and his fellow petitioners complained to the chief native commissioner (CNC) 
about Vumazonke‘s demarcation of sites on land designated as commonage for the 
residents of Ndwana Location 17, thereby  ‗blocking the way for our stock [Nxazonke et 
al.] going to and from the commonage‘.13 Vumazonke had, by distributing land without 
proper authorisation assumed the prerogative of a magistrate. That the so-called 
magistrate‘s prerogative was in the context of rural governance, the chief‘s right cannot 
be overemphasised. Vumazonke obviously intended to augment his income from fees 
the ‗newcomers‘ would pay him. This should serve to explain why some headmen in the 
Xhalanga-Glen Grey districts were ready to join forces with any crusade that was anti-
chieftainship. Being a ‗mischievous‘ headman of Vumazonke‘s type,14 according to 
Nohayinje,15 in a position that would have been held by a chief, entitled the holder to 
turn the office into a lucrative post. Vumazonke‘s conduct was not only condemned by 
the magistrate but he was also instructed  ‗to remove and deport to their homes, all the 
people we are [have] petitioned against from the commonage‘.16 When the magistrate 
fined Vumazonke for his administrative irregularities he retaliated by imposing even 
harsher rule on his Ndwana Location petitioners. It soon became clear that there was 
nothing the victims could do in a system where the headman was the only one 
accountable to the magistrate.  
 
It must be assumed that the complainants were obviously not reconciled to the idea of 
land that had belonged to their forefathers being allocated to strangers without their 
approval. Nohayinje Kuse has confirmed that his grandfather was one of the people on 
the receiving end of Vumazonke‘s unauthorised land allocation. She affirmed that the 
problem was not so much one of land shortage at a time when that commodity was so 















The beneficiaries of Vumazonke‘s allocation were looked down upon and also viewed 
with suspicion because they came from the farms, a fact which earned them the name 
oomaBhulwini, the boere people, the new-comers. They brought with them livestock in 
big numbers as well as dogs. The allocation of land to this category of strangers 
aroused the jealousy of the Ndwana Location residents who claimed to have been born 
and bred there, ‗borners‘. Their farming activities were focused mainly on agriculture 
even though they practised small scale pastoral farming. They had their small gardens 
the sizes of which were not limited by land shortage. They now saw the land which they 
had regarded as their sons‘ being given to oomaBhulwini who had brought along such  
ill-behaved children who, together with their fathers, were master thieves. Vumazonke 
stood to get more than he had bargained for from the newcomers who quickly made 
their sons available as his diligent herdboys, while their fathers made him a beneficiary 
of the many skills they had learnt on the farms. The newcomers never hesitated to 
augment Vumazonke‘s livestock on a regular basis and the ‗borners‘ believed ,with 
reason, that whatever the new-comers channelled to  Vumazonke they replenished by 
stealing from the local farmers like themselves. They even made use of their children 
who were skilled in work but also ingenious thieves. Kuse also affirmed that Headman 
Vumazonke offered no resistance to the implementation of the rule by ‗Authorities‘, and 
instead co-operated with Matanzima when the latter was seeking to revive the 
chieftainships of Gecelo and Stokwe in Xhalanga. His proximity to the prospective 
chiefs and to Matanzima made him privy to the government schemes while he 
continued to retain his pseudo-chieftainship over the recently augmented Ndwana 
community. His compliance enabled him to play an indispensable role in the eventual 
establishment of BAA in the Xhalanga District and his home was one of those that 
served as stopovers for Daliwonga (Matanzima) during his visits to Cala.17  
 
DALIWONGA HELPS INSTALL ‘AUTHORITIES’ IN XHALANGA AMID SOCIAL 
DIVISIONS  AND AMAMFENGU RESISTANCE 
 
In the context of establishing the political infrastructure for the establishment of ‗rule by 
Authorities‘ the rejection of, or resistance to, ‗Authorities‘ took place in the Xhalanga 















division threatened any prospective success of the government‘s plans. The division of 
the Xhalanga community, between the educated Christian ‗progressives‘ and 
uneducated patrons of all traditional norms,  threatened to obstruct the installation of 
‗Authorities‘. Gecelo and Stokwe and their respective wards were aligned with the 
traditional camp with whom they were on par culturally and otherwise. The chiefs‘ plans 
to boost their numbers by absorbing all and sundry suggest the political imperative of 
converting amaMfengu to the idea of the ‗Authorities‘ to make the chieftainships viable. 
Across the visible social division there was a tendency to split between those who 
supported the government objectives and those who publicly professed their non-
collaboration stance even among the amaMfengu.18 Ironically the traditionally 
unaffiliated neutral amaMfengu were ideal candidates to boost the numerical image of 
any chieftaincy but this did not necessarily imply there were pr spects of unity. The fact 
that they had been excluded from  decades of tribal affiliation in the 19th century did not  
offer a political advantage for any evolving, budding or reviving chieftainships like those 
of Gecelo and Stokwe. The incorporation of amaMfengu elements, was, therefore both 
good and bad in the long and the short term. What is of historical significance is that 
some of the long-term negative consequences were actually grounded on short-term 
positives. This social dividing line threatened the stability of the abaThembu community 
and was ominous for the implementation of any chief-centred government legislation. 
Further, the divisive social inequality between the two groups was a slight to the dignity 
of the prospective chiefs, Gecelo and Stokwe, who would obviously patronise and be 
patronised by one or the other of the two factions in their lands.  
 
 
As has been indicated earlier, Matanzima had expressed a self-interest in the 
incorporation of Xhalanga. It was not, however, clear how he would handle meetings 
held to replace or appoint headmen, especially in the case of amaMfengu candidates, 
because such meetings were always politically charged. It must be presumed that 
resignations and deaths provided opportunities to appoint people who would not defeat 
the government‘s plans. It must also be noted that the amenability of certain individuals 
from the amaMfengu faction to the government‘s legislation did not stop others from 















hierarchy of  the ‗Authorities‘. An example of this was the retirement of Headman 
Gagela of Mchewula Location No.10 whereupon the name of Turvy Foloti was 
proposed.19 Foloti‘s candidature was rejected by the residents  on the grounds that  ‗he 
is heathen and uneducated, and that he is therefore not likely to advance the interests 
of the location generally‘.20 Of great historical significance for the history of revival of 
chieftainship in Xhalanga was that Foloti was appointed  anyway over a community that 
was divided in their acceptance of him. His lack of formal education was possibly what 
made him an ideal candidate for the purpose and mission of a government that was 
intent on making use of local and co-operative human resources to promote the 
establishment of rule by ‗Authorities‘. Any candidate that was not acceptable to the 
community due to his inferior educational standard was likely to execute, with utmost 
loyalty to his mentoring chief, the government instructions,  even to a people  who were  
averse to all forms of traditional rule. Foloti‘s acceptance of a placement in the hierarchy 
of ‗Authorities‘ was undoubtedly to help the government in its bid to restore the old 
powers to the chiefs while also delegating additional powers to them. While his social 
status could not compare with Msengana and Mrwetyana‘s who probably perceived 
themselves as second-in-command to Matanzima  in Xhalanga at least, they were all 
essential organs in the hierarchy of political instruments that were at the disposal of 
government. 
 
Another relevant example relates to the resignation of Headman Alfred Tsengiwe, after 
which Edmund Zengetwa was immediately appointed to act in Tsengiwe‘s  place. The 
magistrate made it clear that Zengetwa would act until an appointment to fill the 
vacancy had been made.21The magistrate‘s letter of 23 November to the chief 
magistrate confirmed the recommendation and subsequent appointment in a permanent 
capacity of Robert Msengana, ‗a married man of 37 years who had passed standard 
eight‘.22 Msengana‘s appointment was, according to the new dispensation, 
administratively procedural because it conformed to the terms of section 2(8) of Act 38 
of 1927. The government sanctioned Msengana‘s appointment, irrespective of whether 
it was acceptable or not to his wards. It must be noted that while the position of 















incumbents‘ expectations from the office were different from what the government 
expected its appointee to deliver with regard to its objectives. Ntsebeza highlights the 
case of Msengana, who, though, he was a headman by governmental approval, did not 
necessarily embrace chieftainship.23 This aspect brings in an interesting dimension to 
the contradictions that characterised the evolution of ‗Authorities‘ in the amaMfengu 
locations of Xhalanga. Msengana‘s case seems to be classic in its portrayal of the 
compatibility of his and the government‘s interests which did not necessarily imply an 
agreement as to two parties‘ motives and goals. What was significant was that 
Msengana‘s acceptance of headmanship, even though he was not a patron of 
chieftainship, would crown with success the government‘s aims of imposing the BAA, 
the core of which was chieftainship. It must also be noted that any outward rejection of 
the headman‘s position and visible opposition to the government‘s measures was surely 
unwise for anyone who had his eyes on politico-economic advancement. The possible 
loss of material and other benefits was what in some cases tempered opposition to the 
whole package of chieftainship.   
 
Tyeku has confirmed that individuals of Msengana and Mvinjelwa‘s thinking were 
primarily lured by power that was vested in the positions they had accepted. He 
reiterated that headmanship of a ‗Community Authority‘ carried with it an immediate 
socio-political status. It is further argued  that government legislation was informed by 
the NP‘s goal of maintaining and monopolising political power in a non-competitive 
environment. Similarly, in the context of the BAA,  the government promised power to 
the prospective bearer of the chieftainship. Matanzima‘s desperation for official power 
inevitably drew him into the web spun by the Nationalist Government. He seemed  
determined to again thwart Paramount Chief Sabata‘s naturally derived authority in 
Xhalanga and Glen Grey, two areas where his was questionable. The amaMfengu 
headmen who preferred to sacrifice their patriotic sentiments were, to a great extent, 
also enticed by power. It might have seemed for a while that the exercise of 
implementing the BAA afforded the parties who had a stake in the process opportunities 















the legislation on ‗Authorities‘ in Xhalanga and elsewhere was, primarily, to serve the 
interests of the ruling class.        
 
It must also be noted that the amaMfengu cluster took into account different 
considerations in the selection of a headman, even though the appointment was in the 
end made by the magistrate‘s office. While the government expected its headmen, as 
its loyal servants, to facilitate its policies to the best of their ability, a typical amaMfengu 
headman was not only expected by his constituency to advance their interests but also 
to represent their sentiments at all hierarchical levels and to be their spokesman. These 
roles made up their criteria in the choice of an office-bearer who would be distinguished 
from the rest. Msengana‘s acceptance of the headman‘s office from the ‗Authorities‘ 
portrayed him as both a dissenter and a sell-out of the amaMfengu sentiments. There is 
a sense in which his subtle political ambivalence justified his apparent pro-government 
stance while it also came across as having been an apology for the amaMfengu 
aversion to the ‗Authorities‘. While Msengane‘s position was informed by the prospects 
of material gains from his benefactor, his fellow amaMfengu- who condemned his 
choice of political office -  were intimidated by the possibility of losing economic benefits 
should the application of the BAA be given a go-ahead. They also feared that the socio-
political status which their Christian education as well as rule by White magistrates had 
bequeathed to  them would be eroded if chiefly governance, which was associated with 
intellectual backwardness, was introduced.  Whilst Ntsebeza‘s claim of social and class 
divisions which mirrored the Xhalanga community reinforces the above explanation, 
schisms born out of individual interests, ambitions and  the aspirations of individuals 
with self-interests also threatened to undermine the consolidated amaMfengu resistance 
to the implementation of rule by ‗Authorities‘.  
 
Msengana‘s availability for a community authority headmanship seemed to help realise 
Magistrate Mundell‘s formula of enabling the headman‘s office to function under the 
authority of a chief. Such a chief was obviously Matanzima who would have enticed 
Msengana by the power inherent in the most senior position in the community, an 















could be expected that his appointment would win over the amaMfengu to the 
government‘s measures, it would also afford Matanzima an entry point into Xhalanga 
local politics. There was therefore a sense in which Msengana‘s headmanship 
symbolised an instrument that was at the disposal of Matanzima which could thus  be 
used to smother Sabata‘s voice.   Kuse has claimed that Matanzima cleverly offered all 
sorts of incentives to attract anyone he could use to gain access into Cala affairs. 24An 
interesting development was the fact that at a Bumbane meeting which Matanzima did 
not attend though invited to explain his claim for chieftainship of Emigrant 
abaThembuland, certain groups from Cala and Cofimvaba openly rejected him. The 
Cala group was reported to have informed their magistrate on the day of the meeting 
that ‗they, representing the majority of Cala headmen, did not want to be under Chief 
Kaiser at all‘.25  
 
There was also evidence that Matanzima‘s self-assertiveness was tampering with the 
traditional norms that prescribed the hierarchy and seniority of chiefs within the ruling 
house. His moves to incorporate Cala were believed to be obstructing Sabata‘s moves 
to secure placements in Xhalanga for his three brothers, Matoti, Nxeko and Mvuyelwa. 
This was so despite the customary stipulation that ‗the brothers of the Paramount Chief 
cannot be appointed Chiefs over the 22 locations in Cofimvaba over which Kaiser is 
Chief but they can be appointed as Senior Chiefs to Kaiser in the areas outside these 
22 locations‘.26 Young admitted that it would count against Matanzima‘s chances of 
incorporating Xhalanga (Cala) District into his district if the three brothers were brought 
that close. It is also a fact that it would give Sabata safe passage in what Matanzima 
regarded as his terrain and invariably obstruct the implementation of BAA if Sabata‘s 
influence prevailed.  
 
It thus became clear that the installation of ‗Authorities‘in Xhalanga was politically linked 
to Matanzima‘s personal interests. In this light must be understood the question of 
pursuing the upgrading of his chieftainship in the context of implementing the 
‗Authorities‘. To this effect the chief magistrate had also requested the Cala magistrate 















the results turned out to be unfavourable for Matanzima but favourable for Sabata 
Ramsay confessed that the government intended to use the regional authorities as a 
weapon to thwart the wishes of the Xhalanga people. The government‘s interests would 
be better served had they preferred Matanzima over Sabata, which was not the case. 
The government would make use of Matanzima in all instances when its plans were 
being  obstructed. Ramsay remarked that 
I am not perturbed at present over the position. When regional authorities are 
established it will be seen whether Xalanga wishes to link up with St. Marks in a 
separate regional authority for Emigrant Tembuland authority or whether it will 
side with the Paramount chief‘s Tembuland authority. It would be paradoxical 
were Matanzima to be recognised as chief of St. Marks and Xalanga and then 
later Xalanga decided not to throw in its lot with him, so it is just as well that the 
matter of jurisdiction should await the formation of regional authorities.27 
 
In the Mnxe location No.11 the government had no luck in its efforts to bring about 
compliance. Efforts to put in place an amenable infrastructure for the establishment of 
rule by ‗Authorities‘ were counterproductive. Instead of the desired outcome being 
produced, friction flared up between those who were opting for the government 
proposals and their opponents. An interesting development of this phase in Xhalanga 
politics is how the local divisions cut across the amaMfengu faction without necessarily 
implying that the dissenters were embracing chieftainship. The disagreement in 
Xhalanga over the acceptance or rejection of the government‘s legislation had a very 
negative impact on abaThembu chieftainship. It however, became a groundbreaking 
event that afforded Matanzima the point of entry into the Xhalanga‘s local affairs either 
as broker for government policies or an arbiter with self-interest. It also opened a 
political vacuum that inadvertently served as a testing ground in the jockeying for power 
between Sabata and Matanzima. While the disagreement reinforced the existing split it 
also revealed a new dimension to the material factors as a primary force that 
determined the amaMfengu resistance to, or acceptance of, the government measures.  
 
An interesting observation that is made here is of the extent to which Matanzima was 
enabled by the internal developments in Xhalanga to exploit the factionalism to boost 















advantage of both the government and his ultimate personal benefit. One case related 
to the death of Headman Manzana, who was presumed to be a supporter of the 
government. In correspondence with the chief magistrate,  the magistrate  revealed  that  
‗Manzana, the Headman in question, maintains that the complaints against him are 
made because he is in favour of stabilization whereas many in his location are bitterly 
opposed to it‘.28 Manzana‘s death was a propitious event for the people of Mnxe for 
obvious reasons, but it soon appeared that it was of advantage to the government as 
well. Manzana‘s Mnxe Village quickly submitted their candidate‘s name to the 
magistrate for appointment in an acting capacity. This was Jonas Mntungwa,29 a 
recognised opponent of chieftainship.30 The government went ahead and appointed 
Solomon Mrwetyana as acting Headman of Mnxe Location 1131 and in this way ignored 
the choice of the villagers. Mrwetyana was a compliant headman who had ‗already 
shown himself to be a loyal supporter of the government and Matanzima‘.32 His  
preference for the retention of Gecelo as amaGcina Headman was also hinted at in the 
resident magistrate‘s letter to the chief magistrate. It must be noted that Mrwetyana‘s 
appointment was going to strangle anti-government sentiments and dampen the 
amaMfengu opposition to the government. This appointment did not only mark an 
assault on the core opposition to the government‘s measures, but it was also evidence 
of its ability to manipulate opposition. Magistrate Wronsley  confirmed in a letter to the 
Chief Magistrate that it was ‘the Eqolombeni Community Authority, in consultation with 
Chief K.D. Matanzima… [that] appointed Solomon, as Acting Headman of Emnxe 
Location No.11, with effect from 29th August 1958, pending the appointment of a 
permanent successor to the late Manzana‘.33 
 
This obstructive resistance to the ongoing implementation of the BAA in Xhalanga is 
further reflected in the minutes of the 27 February 1959 meeting between the Mnxe 
delegation and the Cala magistrate. The meeting took place in the magistrate‘s office 
and clearly revealed that the attitude  - either negative or positive - of the Mnxe Location 
residents to government-appointed headmen was to be a decisive factor in the 
establishment of rule by ‗Authorities‘ in the Xhalanga District. Whereas the government 















Tyeku had, at the meeting held in February, expressly stated that his Mnxe Location 
was vehemently opposed to the headmen appointed by the community authority. When 
a question was put to him by Marsberg, the Native Commissioner, as to whether they 
would accept a headman appointed by a community authority, Tyeku‘s response was    
‗the  Location will not accept him if he is appointed by the Community Authority‘. 34 
Marsberg further put it to Tyeku that the ‗law prescribed that the Community Authority 
must appoint a headman‘.35 In an apparent effort to draw the attention of the Mnxe 
Location‘s representative to the implications of their stand with regard to the issue of the  
headman in question Marsberg remarked ‗that in terms of the Law the Community 
Authority must appoint a Headman, and what you are telling me means that the Emnxe 
people won‘t accept the law. Is that correct?‘Tyeku‘s response to the Native 
Commissioner‘s question was also direct, ―[y]es, that is what the people say. They will 
not accept the law‘.36 
 
It was clear that in the Mnxe Location the community authority was regarded as an 
extension of the government. It appeared that any headman appointed by any office 
regarded as an arm of the government was viewed as a facilitator in the execution of 
the ‗Government measures like stabilization‘.37 The Location residents regarded the 
community authority as an instrument of the DNA  to be used to prop up chieftainship 
and in turn to be used by the the same institution to prop up the hierarchy of the 
‗Authorities‘. It became clear from Tyeku‘s interview that the process of establishing the 
BAA in the Xhalanga District was, in fact, the application of the government‘s law to a 
people, some of whom dreaded the consequences of what they perceived to be a 
grossly undemocratic exercise. H. M. Tsengiwe confirmed that the Xhalanga 
communities opposed chieftainship and any infrastructural bodies that purported to lay 
the foundation for it. They preferred rather to hide behind the magistrate and policemen 
as their rallying points.38 It must be noted that preference for the above offices was 
evidence of the duration and extent of colonial inroads upon indigenous law. From a 
critical point of view, the above situation was a political rebound which reflected an irony 
of the government‘s ‗to and fro‘ policies. N. Gobodo also endorsed Tsengiwe‘s 















headman appointed by the magistrate would be neutral and therefore good for all 
communities in the region. She stated that people were suspicious of the choice of a 
community authority because they believed that such a candidate would bring about 
clashes among the diversified communities. In such clashes the stronger faction which 
would have been backed by the government for upholding its policies would win against 
the weaker one.39 Given the fact that the stronger party would have been one of loyal 
supporters of the government it thus becomes clear that the choice of the community 
authority would be a ‗divide and rule‘ exercise.  
 
When he was interviewed by Marsberg  Tyeku confirmed that his opion was informed by 
the Mnxe resident‘s fear of manipulation by the chiefs‘ if the community authorities were 
given a right to appoint headmen. The amaMfengu cluster feared that a headman 
chosen by the community authority in consultation with a chief would be open to bribery 
by factions who were more interested in favours, particularly land favours.40 This is not 
to say that no other clans held land in Xhalanga. Kuse has confirmed that her 
grandfather, a member of the abaThembu clan, would boast of the vastness of the land 
he owned when he moved from Tarkastad to settle in Xhalanga in 1865.41 Any form of 
meddling with land allocation would obviously impact negatively on the amaMfengu 
because they were the major landowners in the Xhalanga District. This state of affairs 
raises the question of the role of landownership status in retarding, thwarting or 
promoting the implementation of the BAA in Xhalanga. In addition, there was the 
question of benefits to be gained which would only be determined by the roles that the 
interested parties played in the government‘s exercise. The government sought a 
politically convenient method of governing Blacks in the reserves, and therefore was 
depending on the chiefs to perform this task and absorb and diffuse the tensions.  No 
chief who put himself first would deny himself the semblance of power so long lost to 
their predecessors which the government offered him. There was an anticipation this 
time around that the institution would endure because it was being restored by a 
government that had proved its political might in 1927 when it tampered with the 
authority of chieftainship. In the light of the above the government saw some prospects 















Matanzima  saw in the community authorities a way of accessing  power for himself and  
also a systematic means of defeating Sabata.  
 
The enthusiastic involvement of Matanzima in the appointment of a headman for 
Xhalanga‘s Mnxe Location was obviously a means to an end, to  help him acquire more 
power than he was entitled to, while the government was interested in the execution of 
its objectives. The appointment to headmanship of Mrwetyana, ‗regarded as an 
extremely loyal supporter of the Government and its policy‖42 appeared to address both 
Matanzima‘s quest for land-based political power and the government‘s apparent 
impatience at the stalling of implementation of ‗Authorities‘ in the Xhalanga District. 
While Matanzima appeared to be ready for whatever reward his new bargaining position 
promised to offer, Mrwetyana also seemed ready, like Msengana before him, to 
sacrifice the amaMfengu interests for  his personal benefit. That these cultural interests 
did not promise any benefits in the long term justified their being disregarded for the 
time being. 
 
Whilst the Mnxe Location No.11 rejected any headman that was appointed by the 
community authority (the Eqolombeni Authority in the present case) there has been 
reference to prominent amaMfengu individuals who availed themselves of the 
headmanship of community authorities simply because it appeared to be a lucrative 
position.  A letter of 29 February 1959 from the Cala magistrate to the chief magistrate 
confirmed Mvinjelwa to be  ‗the best headman in this District (Xhalanga)‘ who had been 
threatened with assault on account of his support for the BAA  - to the extent of being 
forced to leave a meeting in which the Mnxe people had taken part.  What was meant to 
be the implementation of rule by ‗Authorities‘ in the Xhalanga District resulted in a rift  
between the opponents and supporters of the BAA. Those that worked against the law‘s 
implementation like Jonas Mntungwa, Swelindawo Vena, Mabanga Mboyiya and Ben 
Tyeku were considered troublemakers. The magistrate, speaking for the government,   
appeared committed not to give the so-called trouble-makers any sense of victory over 
the community authority. He would not give in to their demand to have a headman 















justified the removal of ‗troublemakers‘ from the Xhalanga District. The magistrate‘s 
reference to the roles of Mntungwa and Vena in the ‗disturbances which arose at the 
installation ceremonies (Stokwe, Gecelo) at the Matanzima Secondary School last 
August‘43 and their subsequent conviction was evidence that opponents of the 
government‘s schemes were kept under surveillance. In a letter to the chief magistrate, 
Matanzima endorsed the appointment of Mrwetyana who had earlier expressed a wish 
to step down in the face of opposition from people who wanted a headman appointed by 
the magistrate by saying ‗i]t will be against the interests of good government in that 
Location (Mnxe) if Mrwetyana should be deposed as a result of the agitators of this 
political clique‘.44  
 
The implementation of the rule by ‗Authorities‘ in Xhalanga seems to have contradicted 
Mayer‘s statement that in modern democratic societies  ‗groups that become elite will 
tend to attract some political power and groups that have political power will tend to 
attract some elite status‘.45  Instead, Mrwetyana‘s case reflected a separation between 
social prestige, which influenced the amaMfengu to scoff at chieftainship, and the self-
interest, which informed Mrwetyana‘s positive response to the government‘s overtures. 
That the Mnxe Location residents were not prepared to back down in their demand was 
seen in a deputation to Chief Magistrate Ramsay of Mnxe people led by Tyeku. They 
demanded that a permanent headman be appointed by the Magistrate: ‗[t]hey would not 
accept one appointed by the community authority and -- would not have a headman 
who was in favour of stabilisation‘.46 While Ramsay solicited  Matanzima‘s opinion on 
the recalcitrance of Tyeku‘s delegation he proposed that the Mnxe people  ‗be left 
without a headman at all‘.47 Matanzima‘s response to Ramsay‘s report was 
confrontational for he  viewed the Mnxe crisis as a test of strength between himself as  
‗the man on the spot‘ and the government. His attitude was evident in the following 
remark to the Chief Magistrate : 
If the people of Emnxe have any reasons to oppose the appointment (of 
Mrwetyana in terms of Section 11(8) of Proclamation No.180 of 1956 as 
amended) they should consult the Eqolombeni Community Authority in the first 















me. If they adopt neither of these two courses the Department should not 
consider their complaint seriously.48  
 
Matanzima was obviously ready for a conflict with the opponents of the BAA in 
Xhalanga. The longer they took to comply, the longer it would take  for his chieftainship 
to be upgraded. His advice to the government to ignore the Mnxe crisis if its villagers 
chose to ignore his options was an indication that in his mind he had already 
incorporated Xhalanga into St Marks. He was clearly putting himself forward as an ally 
of the government as well as delegating his person to deal with the case of Mnxe 
headmanship. It seemed that in the end he would restore the authority of chieftainship 
with himself as the incumbent at the expense of the government authority. That this was 
the kind of naturally evolved ‗Native democracy‘Verwoerd had, according to Nugent, 
conceived need not be over-emphasised.  
 
 It must be noted that the government‘s methods were employed to yield long-term  
results in which White superiority would be permanent. In this regard to re-invent a 
chieftainship that would be continuously nurtured in a ‗proper native democracy‘ 
became the Nationalist Government‘s primary objective. The government did not, 
however, have proper criteria for the institution they were recommending except to 
guarantee that government by ‗Authorities‘ was the ideal political environment for the 
envisaged chieftainship. What they omitted was to put in place measures which would 
preserve, guarantee and safeguard the political remnant of what at that point in time 
was left of the abaThembu chieftainship. The failure of the Nationalist Government in 
this regard created fertile ground for a power struggle between Paramount Chief Sabata 
and Matanzima. The feud inevitably, and in an ironic twist of events prepared the 
ground for the DNA by enabling it to implement the BAA in an abaThembuland whose 
chiefly office was progressively becoming polarised. Against this background must be 
understood the events, referred to in the previous chapter, which occurred as a 

















In the Xhalanga District Matanzima was again the primary target of opposition together 
with a minimal tolerance of a titular chieftainship of the House of Ngangelizwe as a 
compromise. With the advent of the BAA Gecelo and Stokwe became primary 
candidates for chieftainship in the Xhalanga District. The two individuals were at best 
pawns in the hands of both Matanzima and the government and at worst an inadvertent 
threat to the socio-economic rights and political freedom of their so-called amaMfengu 
subjects. They were part of the reason the amaMfengu cluster preferred magisterial 
rule, both as symbol of uniform treatment and an equalising factor among the 
amaQwathi, amaGcina, amaXhosa, abaThembu and amaMfengu. In the determination 
of each of the above parties to promote and advance its own interests and objectives is 
to be found the major obstruction to the application of the BAA in the Xhalanga District. 
Matanzima‘s arranging to have the two men installed at Matanzima Secondary School, 
was both to showcase his prospective subchiefs and to impose them over the 
recalcitrant amaMfengu. Ntsebeza puts the installation of Ngonyama Gecelo and 
Jamangile Stokwe as sub-chiefs of Xhalanga on 12 August 1958 at Matanzima 
Secondary School.49 The magistrate‘s description of events reports on Matanzima‘s 
arrangements to have Stokwe and Gecelo installed at their Great Places on the 20th and 
27th September 1958 respectively. Matanzima explained that ‗the intention of these 
ceremonies is to preserve the tradition of introducing the chief to his people and to 
caution him in their entire presence and also to caution the tribes‘.50  
 
 
The major involvement of Matanzima in the installation of Gecelo and Stokwe,  and the 
fact that the ceremony was, according to Ntsebeza‘s informant, held at the Matanzima 
Secondary School, a place in which Matanzima possibly considered himself to have a 
free passage, makes Matanzima appear an architect of the two chieftainships. 
Ntsebeza claims that the event turned out to be a major demonstration against 
chieftainship (presumably much against the intentions of the DNA strategists). It is 
argued here  that  what the installation of indigenous rulers at what public premises like  
a school symbolised was a cultural slight to the institution of chieftainship except to  the 















Matanzima‘s power in making things happen according to his political designs. The 
school premises lacked the aura and dignity that befitted any chief‘s installation. This 
immediately, in mind and in actuality, stripped the chiefships concerned of the 
naturalness of the institution and conferred on it the characteristic artificiality of official 
customary law. Further, the choice of the Matanzima Secondary School as a venue for 
the installation was subtly provocative and confrontational in more than one way. The 
amaMfengu cluster, which publicly denounced chieftainship, formed the bulk of the 
‗school people‘ and had taken the initiative in the establishment of the school. It is 
doubtful if they would have consented to the use of their educational symbol as a 
makeshift traditional site. The installation ceremony at the school at Matanzima‘s 
instance would, as it certainly did, split the Xhalanga community between those in 
favour of the insitution and those that opposed it. What was f primary importance to 
Matanzima was the extension of his influence which a ceremony of that kind implied 
irrespective of where it took place. Chiefs installed at his instance  would pay him, rather 
than Sabata, fealty.   
 
THE GOVERNMENT EARMARKS DALIWONGA FOR SENIOR CHIEFTAINSHIP 
The installation of Gecelo and Stokwe meant that the ‗Authorities‘ were established in 
Xhalanga and further, that Matanzima‘s efforts had been rewarded. This had been 
preceded by an earlier announcement by the SNA to the effect that  ‗His Excellency the 
Governor-General has been pleased to appoint Kaizer Matanzima as Chief of the 
Natives of Emigrant Tembuland comprising the Districts of St Marks and Xalanga‘.51 A 
little earlier the SNA had pin-pointed  the delimitations of the areas of jurisdiction of both 
Sabata and Matanzima:  
Sabata‘s regional authority will comprise the districts of Umtata, Mqanduli, 
Engcobo and possibly a portion of Elliotdale, while Matanzima‘s regional 
authority will comprise the districts of St Marks and Xalanga (Cala) with the 
possible inclusion later of Glen Grey as well. As soon as this has been done-an 
[sic] event which it is expected will be realised during the next month or two, a 
[sic] recommendation will be made to the Governor-General to authorise 
Daliwonga Kaizer Matanzima to assume the title of paramount chief by reason of 
the extent of his area of jurisdiction, the responsibilities attaching to his office, 
the chiefs subordinate to him and the Native population residing in the areas 
















That the ‗Matanzima affair‘ was intended to be a ceremonial event of celebration by  the 
state is shown in Young‘s remark to the effect that  ‗the installation of Matanzima should 
be a festive occasion attended by at least a member of the Native Affairs Commission. 
Sabata can crown him and he in turn can perform the same on the two newly appointed 
subchiefs-all on the same day‘.53The Nhlapo Commission has confirmed that 
Paramount Chief Sabata was instructed to install Matanzima as chief of the whole 
Western AbaThembuland on 11 June 1958.54 
 
 
Telegraphic correspondence received from Pretoria confirmed that the installation of 
Matanzima was scheduled for 16 July 1958.55 It was to be a realisation of a dream 
about their protégé whom the government had nurtured for so long. Matanzima had, 
with the connivance  of the government, flouted the ‗Authorities‘ and treated Sabata with 
disrespect. The government blamed Matanzima‘s insolence and ill-conceived 
impatience on their failure to reward him accordingly, and they used this as a rationale 
for condoning his behaviour: ‗His continued use of the title [paramount chief] is may be 
due to a sense of frustration that his value and worth is not recognised and that he is 
not being given the full measure of judicial and executive powers allowed for by law‘. 56 
 
The suggestion that Matanzima would install other chiefs, and in this way assume 
Sabata‘s prerogative, so soon after he had himself been made an intermediate chief by 
the same , would make Sabata‘s seniority irrelevant in Matanzima‘s districts. Such an 
exercise would presumably highlight the equality in status of Sabata and Matanzima. If 
this suggestion were anything to go by, the installation of Matanzima, it seemed, might 
well be the first and last honourable function that Sabata was to perform in the so-called 
Emigrant abaThembuland, and during  his entire paramountcy . This would surely signal 
the beginning of the decline of Sabata‘s supreme authority, a political irony of the first 
magnitude. It is through incidents like these that the disunity, destruction and division 
that the BAA wrought in abaThembuland will continue to be judged by the history of 
chieftainship in this country generally. An event of even greater historical significance 















was that the official announcement ratifying Sabata‘s paramountcy was made to 
coincide with the one that related to Matanzima. The notice read as follows: ‗I[t] is 
hereby certified that His Excellency the Governor-General has been pleased to appoint 
Sabata Dalindyebo as Paramount Chief of the Thembu and tributary tribes resident in 
the districts of Elliotdale, Engcobo, Mqanduli, St Marks, Umtata, Xalanga and Glen 
Grey.‖57 The SNA‘s reference to the inclusion of St Marks, Xhalanga and Glen Grey 
seemed  more of a bluff than a reality. Subsequent correspondence from the SNA to the 
CNC of Mthatha confirms this: 
 
[a]s regards Sabata and Kaizer it is felt that Sabata, although appointed 
paramount for the whole of Tembuland, should not be given civil and criminal 
jurisdiction over the districts of St Marks and Xalanga. The reason for this is of 
course that Matanzima will probably be the head of a regional authority 
comprising the districts of St Marks and Xalanga and that he will then be 
authorised by the Governor-General to assume the title of Paramount Chief in 
terms of Section 102 of Proclamation No.180 of 1956. Such an arrangement 
would prevent Sabata from interfering in Matanzima‘s area although it would not 
affect his recognition as the titular head of all the Thembus  who would owe an 
allegiance to him.58 
 
It was thus clear that Matanzima‘s meteoric rise was carefully and systematically 
mapped out by the DNA in Pretoria. This was evident from a letter that Ramsay wrote to 
the SNA advising against any suggestions that Matanzima should pay tribute to 
Sabata‘s regional authority. Ramsay was acting on Matanzima‘s advice against the 
levying of taxes by the ‗Authorities‘ on the grounds that such a move would break up the 
whole Bantu Authority system.59 What Matanzima feared most was the contact between 
Sabata and the Emigrant abaThembu which would come about if the Paramount Chief 
or his advisers were afforded social interaction with the people he considered his 
subjects. It must be assumed that Sabata would not have been reluctant to levy taxes 
on a people he wanted to look up to him as their sovereign. Ramsay himself justified the 
latter thought when he remarked that  ‗Matanzima would probably protest that he is 
being singled out to pay tribute which is not required of other subordinate Tembu 
chiefs‘.60 There was at the same time suggestion that Matanzima might soften Sabata‘s 
heart by making an annual contribution towards his maintenance. Ramsay also 















and statesmanlike in his dealings with Matanzima, a suggestion that the latter had to be 
bribed to do the  proper thing. 
 
THE CHIEFTAINSHIP IN GLEN GREY ON THE EVE OF THE BAA : A THREAT TO 
LOCATION BOARDS 
 
The implementation of the BAA in Glen Grey also initially brought to the surface issues 
that were peculiar to the socio-political situation in the district. Chieftainship in the area 
had been phased out after Gungubele and Stokwe took up arms against the 
government. The end result was that from about 1880 until about 1955 Glen Grey was 
ruled by individuals other than chiefs. The ‗pseudo chiefs‘ were accountable to the 
Location Boards and after them the District Council.61  The political structure of Glen 
Grey as it existed in the mid-20th century was thus not compatible with the government‘s 
designs because it had no ‗tribal organisation‘. For the BAA to be anchored in the Glen 
Grey District it was essential that there should be infrastructural affiliation to a specific 
chiefdom.62 The abolition of the chieftainship in the area at the time when it was done, 
the need to resuscitate chieftainship as the exigencies and politics of governance in the 
mid-20th century dictated, reflected, in a multiple pattern, the ricochetting of government 
experiments. The CNC reinforced the above statement in a letter that he wrote to the 
SNA. He remarked at the time that  
it is the declared policy to revive Chieftainships and there appears to be no 
reason why it should not be implemented in this case. When the Act 38 of 1927 
was promulgated the then Chief Native Commissioner asked that the 
Chieftainships in Lady Frere should be revived but the Department refused this 
application as the policy at the time was to eliminate chieftainships as far as 
possible.63  
 
The region under discussion, whose chieftainship Sir George Cathcart had given to 
Nonesi, was constituted by two groups of amaHala under Rhaxothi and Mfanta 
respectively, amaNdungwane under Ndarala and amaGcina under Tyhopho.64 The irony 
of the first magnitude was that the Location Boards which were once perceived as 
effective weapons with which to thwart chieftainshp, were now proving to be obstacles. 
It thus appeared that the restoration of chieftainship in the Glen Grey District indeed 















seemingly minor problems, some of which had been threatening to plague the 
abaThembu chieftainship for some time. One of these was the status of the ex-regent, 
Dabulamanzi Dalindyebo, whose future was uncertain now that he had vacated the 
paramountcy seat. Dabulamanzi had expressed a desire to be given a place elsewhere 
outside the Dalindyebo territory. The chief magistrate put it thus ‗what he (Dabulamanzi) 
had in mind was that he be allowed to settle amongst the Tembu people in the Lady 
Frere District and that he be granted a Headmanship there‘.65  
 
 
Sabata had arranged to have Dabulamanzi, transferred to Glen Grey.  This seemed a 
good plan because all the stakeholders appeared to be receptive to the idea.66  The 
remark by the CNC, who favoured Dabulamanzi‘s candidature, expressed clearly in a 
letter to the SNA that  ‗in this connection it seems to me that Dabulamanzi Dalindyebo 
the ex-regent of the Tembus---is the most suitable person for the appointment in 
question‘.67 The DNA was confident that Dabulamanzi‘s settlement in the Glen Grey 
District would create a fealty between him and the people and would facilitate the 
government‘s plan to promote the implementation of the BAA.68 This must also be 
understood in the light of ex-regent‘s readiness to bask in the light of the magistrate 
when he held the abaThembu paramountcy.    
 
It appears from the above exposition that the placement of the ex-regent in the Lady 
Frere District, in particular, was likely to expedite the execution of the government 
objectives and to give Sabata a sense of security. It might also revive the patriotism of 
the Glen Grey abaThembu who had long been separated from their kinsmen by colonial 
law, and thwart the resistance of the Location Boards to the revival of identity of 
abaThembu chiefdom. The Location Boards were now criticised for obstructing progress 
as seen in their failure to promote rehabilitation:  ‗these Boards have done nothing to 
justify their continued existence…….their abolition will bring about a complete change in 
the attitude of the people‘.69  The proposed dispensation-the core of which was 
chieftainship- was expected to smother the boards. The CNC reported that the ‗Boards 
will, in any case, have to disappear when Bantu Authorities are established as it will be 















were also criticised for assuming the duties, powers and privileges of headmen, while 
the headmen were criticised for lacking personalities. Chieftainship was suddenly 
commended as both a unifying factor and a force that promoted respect for the old by 
the young and in that way nurtured a familiarity with recognised custom. The NC 
remarked in an apparent touting exercise for the revival of chieftainship 
This disinterested state of affairs on the part of the people immediately struck 
me on my arrival at this station and it occurred to me that if they had a chief 
whom they could respect and could take pride in their membership of the Tembu 
tribe  would do a lot to restore their self respect.71  
 
The NC had earlier written to the CNC and pleaded for caution in the canvassing for 
tribal authorities in Glen Grey.  His pleas were informed by his fear of the steadfast 
opposition of communities in  Glen Grey to the rehabilitation proposals. His unwavering 
commitment to the execution of government policies is reflected in his advice against 
‗the application of compulsion unless the Tribal Authority can be supplied with a police 
force sufficiently strong to enforce its will against the whole populace‘.72    
 
The predominant clusters in the Glen Grey District were the amaHala who were 
presumed to be under the Qadi to the Great House of Mthikrakra, Mfanta, 
amaNdungwane under Ndarala and amaGcina under Tyhopho.73  The nomination of the 
ex-regent as a candidate for chiefstainhip in Glen Grey would accomplish the extention 
of Sabata‘s political authority without altering the geographical boundaries of the Glen 
Grey abaThembu. The possible extension of the abaThembu political authority beyond 
its geographic confines would obviously be a feature peculiar only to the abaThembu 
chieftainship. The standard practice in this case would have been the absorption of the 
Glen Grey communities into the political systems of their geographical context, in this 
case the cis-Kei, though it is doubtful Matanzima would have backed down.    
 
The government also had an option to engage and consult with the local ‗Authorities‘. It 
was politically significant that they avoided employing the services of an amateur chief 
in their commitment to the execution of their aims. At the same time the response of the 















implementation of the BAA reflected different viewpoints that influenced the 
government‘s thinking. The members of Location Boards were resistant because 
accession of ‗Authorities‘ inevitably meant loss of power. The Glen Grey community was 
divided into clans of amaHala and amaGcina, a state of affairs likely to complicate 
matters should a chief affiliated to one of the two clans be appointed without a 
counterpart  for the other clan. The NC for Lady Frere had also expressed doubts about 
the wisdom of such an initiative;   ‗I have felt for some time though that there is not 
much to be gained by appointing a chief for the Hala unless a chief can also be found 
for the Gcina which is a larger clan‗.74 It was in the light of the situation alluded to above 
that the question of resident headmen surfaced and posed a competition to 
Dabulamanzi‘s candidature. The candidates that were identified for chieftainships in the 
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The two royal headmen were aligned with the Glen Grey clans. It soon appeared that 















would find favour with Matanzima whose Great Place at Qamata was reasonably nearer 
than that of Paramount Chief Sabata.   
 
Indications at a meeting that subsequently took place at Manzezulu‘s Mbinzana Great 
Place gave good prospects and possible success for the government‘s objectives. On 
that day, 23 July 1955, the people of the Glen Grey District who paid allegiance to 
Manzezulu met at the Great Place, Mbinzana, and after careful deliberation 
unanimously accepted the BAA.‖77 Resolutions taken at the same meeting appeared to 
rule out chances that Dabulamanzi might ever be posted to the Glen Grey District for 
any purpose. If the posting of the ex-chief regent should fail in favour of a candidate 
other than Sabata‘s choice the already fragile politics of abaThembu chieftainship could 
only be aggravated. The meeting recommended that the proposed ‗Authority‘ should 
take over the functions and duties previously performed by the district council. They 
further requested the government to recognise Manzezulu as chief under the Native 
Administration Act of 1927. At the same time they proposed that he should be head of 
the ‗Authority‘ of the abaThembu in the Glen Grey District. Of the 28 councillors that the 
meeting proposed, 24 were to be nominated by their chief, Manzezulu  ‗from amongst 
the people‘s representatives, to be distributed as far as possible, all over the district‘.78 
The remaining four councillors were to be nominated by the NC in consultation with 
Chief Manzezulu. The suggested seat of the ‗Authority‘ was Mbinzana location where 
Manzezulu‘s home was. The final proposal that ‗Civil and Criminal jurisdiction be 
conferred on Chief Manzezulu‖ was to rubber-stamp the obvious, the crowning of 
Manzezulu as the overall chief of the Glen Grey District,79 this irrespective of the 
diversity of clans resident in the district. 
 
 Manzezulu‘s candidature was justifiable because he was not a stranger to the 
community. From the government‘s perspective any one prospective chief of the Glen 
Grey District who pledged to facilitate the implementation of the BAA would be  its best 
bet. The professed acceptance of the BAA by the Glen Grey people, even as a subtle 
conditionality, was more than the government had bargained for in its bid to resuscitate 















vacant chiefship over the paramount chief‘s candidate (Dabulamanzi) would deprive him 
of access into a district that had not learnt either to appreciate chieftainship or any 
particular holder of such a title. The endorsement of either the headmanship or 
chieftainship of Dabulamanzi over Glen Grey would surely threaten Chief Matanzima.  
Tsotsi has suggested  that the reasons  why  Manzezulu approved of the  BAA, included 
the moral and material support that he received from both the local Bantu commissioner 
and Chief Matanzima  ‗who claimed that  the Glen Grey District was part of Tembuland 
and therefore subject to his authority‘.80The minimal compliance in Manzezulu‘s 
Mbinzana Location against resistance in the greater Glen Grey was attributable, inter 
alia, to the government‘s repressive measures and Matanzima‘s overbearing influence 
and proximity.81 Native Commissioner Blakeway had earlier pointed out that amaHala of 
Glen Grey recognised Matanzima even though he had no jurisdiction over them.82 The 
appointment of his candidate would work in the government‘s favour because it would 
complement his visible efforts in the Xhalanga District where he was manouvering the 
strategic appointment to headmanship of individuals who were amenable to 
government‘s measures. After Blakeway had met the amaHala of Bholotwa and 
Mbinzana he was clear that the amaHala constituency of Glen Grey was more 
interested in the recognition of Manzezulu as their chief than in the so-called benefits 
that would be bestowed by the ‗Authorities‘. It also emerged at the subsequent meetings 
that in other locations other than Mbinzana and Bholotwa most people in the Glen Grey 
District ‗were satisfied with the system of the Glen Grey Act and would not trust 
themselves to Government by fellow Natives [as was implied in government by 
‗Authorities‘]. Many stated that they would require the European officials to control them 
until doomsday‘.83 What was transpiring here was that the government‘s canvassing for 
the BAA was dividing the amaHala from their kinsmen depending on whether they 
accepted or rejected the BAA.  
 
The case of amaGcina appeared more complex because of rival claimants to the 
chieftainship. The contest was between Ngqungqushe and Zwelixolile, both of whom 
were believed to be aspiring for the chieftainship of the Glen Grey amaGcina. Whilst the 















interested in the implementation of Act. That the processes involved in the 
implementation of the BAA were leading to the flaring up of old issues, some from 
unexpected quarters, serves to unravel the complex forces that served to mould the 
abaThembu chieftainship. 
 
There were two factions that constituted the amaGcina cluster of Glen Grey and each of 
these had their preferred candidates. It must be borne in mind that if any of the 
amaGcina contestants were appointed to chieftainship, the chieftainship of the Glen 
Grey would no longer be a sole prerogative of Manzezulu as the secretary of the chief‘s 
council, W.M. Time had endorsed.The NC had informed the CNC in a letter that it was 
visibly clear that ‗Manzezulu has no influence beyond Mbinzana and Bolotwa Locations 
[and for that reason] it would be unwise to accede to their proposals‘84 of making 
Manzezulu a chief of the Glen Grey District where more than half the population were 
amaGcina.  
WE KHONZA (PAY ALLEGIANCE TO) SABATA, BUT WE HLONIPHA (RESPECT) 
MATANZIMA : MATANZIMA OUTWITS SABATA IN THE GLEN GREY DISTRICT  
 
While Matanzima and Sabata jockeyed for the control of the Glen Grey District 
Blakeway had, in the meantime, identified the main clans in the district as the amaGcina 
and amaHala. He was quick to point out that the amaHala of Glen Grey recognised 
Matanzima even though he had no jurisdiction over them. As early as 1934 Whitfield, in 
his capacity as NC, tried n vain to have Manzezulu and Valelo Mhlontlo recognised as 
chiefs by their respective communities.85 Young later remarked to the NC about the 
likelihood of  Sabata and Matanzima being ‗at variance as to who has the biggest claim 
to the right to appoint chiefs, sub-chiefs or deputies in Glen Grey.‘86 Against this latter 
background must be understood the Government‘s sudden about-turn, and opposition 
to the promotion of Sabata‘s interests in the Glen Grey region. Van Heerden, reporting 
on Sabata‘s insecurity, wrote : 
It would appear that Sabata who has no following in the Glen Grey [district]fears 
that Matanzima who is extremely friendly with the Halas is undermining his 
position. This fear is not without foundation but this jockeying for positions by 















establishment of Bantu Authorities. Interference in the affairs of the district by 
people beyond its boundaries is at this stage not advisable and for the time 
being it would be best not to complicate matters by representations such as 
those now made by Sabata.87 
 
This was a subtle vetoing of Sabata‘s plan of imposing Dabulamanzi over the Glen Grey 
amaHala. The subsequent claim by Van Heerden that ―the candidate for the amaHala 
Chieftainship, Manzezulu Mthikrakra is much under the influence of Chief Kaizer 
Matanzima whose great place is only about five miles from his location‖88 was surely 
reason enough to cause Sabata insecurity, as much as it was a hint at other forces that 
were likely to influence the situation for the government‘s political benefit. The chief 
magistrate‘s remark that Matanzima, ‗by virtue of his senior position in the structure of 
the Thembu [sic] ‗tribal‘ complex and his personal prestige, would be the natural mentor 
of nearby Hala groups‘89 could only be conceived by Sabata as one more example of 
the government‘s determination to endorse Matanzima‘s senior chieftainship at the 
expense of his  authority. On being interviewed, Manzezulu and Ngqungqushe, the 
candidates for chiefship in the area, gave a clear picture of how they perceived their 
relationship with Matanzima and the paramount chief . Manzezulu described it thus ;‗we 
khonza Sabata (serve the person of Sabata)  but we hlonipha Matanzima (respect 
Matanzima). Ngqungqushe, the senior Gcina candidate … also described his position 
thus.‘90 This was to say Sabata was an acknowledged political head than an effective  
ruler. This situation could have come about as a result of the distance between Sabata‘s 
Great Place and his constituency in the Glen Grey district. On the other hand, 
Matanzima‘s physical proximity and his overbearing influence, made it impossible for 
the subject communities not to regard him as a practical father.  
 
 
The implementation of the BAA in the Glen Grey District eventually saw the 
intensification of the polarisation of the abaThembu chiefs. It was in this district that the 
final phase of the conflict between the great and the RHH of Mthikrakra was fought and 
won.  In 1959 at a session of the Transkeian Territorial Authorities Matanzima  caused a 
motion to be introduced which called for the incorporation of Glen Grey into the 















his exclusive right to initiate such political matters was not upheld. This was after 
Matanzima‘s Councillors, A. Mgudlwa and George Matanzima had seconded their 
leader‘s motion. When the question of the transfer of Glen Grey from the cis-Kei to the 
trans-Kei was mooted the government‘s stance was one of ‗wait and see‘. The NC 
made it clear that if the controversial region was to be transferred to the trans-Kei and 
subsequently joined to Matanzima‘s domain ‗it will be asking for trouble to appoint 
Sabata‘s nominee‘91in the Glen Grey District. This was another example of how far the 
government was prepared to support  Matanzima at the expense of Sabata‘s interests.  
    
 
While it was public knowledge that Matanzima had no hereditary right in the region, he 
admitted earlier to the NC that he wielded considerable influence in the Glen Grey 
District. In the same letter Van Heerden mentioned that Manzezulu and Ngqungqushe, 
the candidates for chieftaincy in the area, both acknowledged Sabata‘s right to appoint 
chiefs in their area under customary law. Suddenly, however, ill-feeling developed 
between Manzezulu and Chief Sabata, and it became clear that the Paramount Chief‘s 
nominee would not be acceptable in the Glen Grey District.92 The delaying tactics 
adopted by the SNA in the appointment of Sabata‘s brother, Albert Nxeko (Bambilanga), 
as chief over the Glen Grey abaThembu must be understood in this light. While the SNA 
shilly-shallied he, nevertheless, acknowledged Sabata‘s reasons for chosing Nxeko 
Dalindyebo, commenting that ‗the Paramount Chief is of the opinion that such an 
appointment will facilitate the establishment of Bantu Authorities and the transfer of the 
Glen Grey District to the Transkei‘.93 He was, however, careful not to accede to 
Sabata‘s request before he had heard the views of the CNC ‗in regard to the various 
consequences which are likely to eventuate if Sabata‘s request is granted‘.94 This 
approach reveals both the government‘s unwavering commitment towards Matanzima‘s 
interests, and its level of mistrust for Sabata‘s implicit motive for recommending Nxeko 
as an appointee in the Glen Grey District.  
 
In time the government officials threw their support behind Manzezulu and it became 















whole of the Glen Grey District. The subsequent conferment of civil and criminal 
jurisdiction on Sub-Chief Manzezulu Mthikrakra by the Minister of Native Affairs and 
Development ‗under Section 20 of the Native Administration Act of 1927 as substituted 
by Section 1 of Act No. 13 of 1955‘95 was an exercise that was singularly pushed by 
Matanzima with government connivance and without any form of consultation with 
Paramount Chief Sabata.96  ‗[I]t was‘ according to Dennie, ‗Matanzima‘s active 
collaboration with the South African Government in furthering these designs [producing 
chiefs more willing to bend to Pretoria‘s will] which precipitated the conflict between 
himself and Dalindyebo‖97. Evans also reinforces Dennie‘s claim where he refers to 
Ramsay‘s lavishing praise and support on Matanzima in defiance of popular support for 
Sabata and states, further, that the DNA‘s biased actions were designed to forment ill-
will, for ‗[s]plitting Thembuland into two regions to accommodate Matanzima‘s claims to 
authority in districts that had historically fallen under the Paramount Chief‘s domain was 
certain to incite dispute‘.98 The eventual installation without consulting Sabata by Chief 
Daliwonga Matanzima of both Manzezulu99 and Ngqungqushe on 21 July 1958 and 14 
May 1959 respectively100 was proof of the government‘s political obligation to 
Matanzima. The CNC confirmed that Sabata felt undermined and insulted by the 
disregard of his status at a time when he was looking forward  ‗to being inducted in Glen 
Grey and thereafter installing other chiefs‘.101 The feeling of humiliation was aggravated 
by the fact that one of the newly installed chiefs, Manzezulu Ntshiza Mfanta, was 
descended from the Great House of Mthikrakra, and therefore genealogically closer to 
Sabata  than to Matanzima. 102   
CONCLUSION 
The application of the the Bantu Authorities Act in abaThembuland created  a set of 
circumstances that served as a catalyst for  the development of events that affected the 
relationships among the abaThembu chiefs. It is against this background that the 
chapter has portrayed the BAA as a piece of legislation that had the  potential to destroy 
and restore, re-invent, and self-empower.  
 
The chapter has shown the BAA to be a justification for the revival of the indigenous 















the authority of Sabata;  the tool behind the upgrading of Matanzima‘s chieftainship;  
and, eventually, the major destabilising factor in relations between  abaThembu chiefs. 
 
The chapter has exposed the political irony implicit in the fact that the DNA presented 
the BAA as an instrument that was designed to restore and refurbish chieftainship to its 
original status. In the case of Matanzima, though, educational qualifications were used, 
inter alia, as reasons that qualified him, and proved his competence, for a senior 
chieftainship. The chapter has also interrogated the folly revealed in Matanzima‘s failure 
to use education and the innate wisdom which came with it to preserve the intactness of 
abaThembu national institution.   
 
The chapter has also shown that the BAA was an ideal apparatus for accomplishing 
both the political and geographical extention of the boundaries of abaThembuland. It  
has demonstrated that Matanzima‘s pro-activity rewarded him, as  in the end he 
became the sole beneficiary of an extended abaThembuland. 
 
The chapter has also exposed the great significance  of  the role of the amaMfengu in 
the politics of the  abaThembu chieftainship in Xhalanga as well as the divisive role 
cultural and social factors played in the evolution of ‗Authorities‘ in Xhalanga. It has also 
demonstrated that the co-option of certain amaMfengu individuals in the hierarchy of the 
‗Authorities‘ helped erode the core  of indigenous rule and thus  make it more ‗official‘ 
and bureaucratic than was necessary in traditional governance. The chapter has 
revealed that the uncompromising rejection of the ‗Authorities‘ by amaMfengu elements 
inadvertently provided Matanzima with both the political vacuum, rationale and 
opportunity to demonstrate his potential to manoeuevre, manipulate and play one party 
against the other. The chapter has demonstrated the rewards of his efforts in the 
successful installation of ‗Authorities‘ in Xhalanga-Glen Grey districts and eventual 
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CHAPTER  FIVE 
 
POLITICS OF ABATHEMBU CHIEFS PUNCTUATE TRANSKEI’S ROAD TO 
INDEPENDENCE,  c.1960-1976. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The attainment of self-government by the Transkei in 1963 signalled, for the 
Matanzimas and their  few  allies,  the territory‘s commitment to political independence. 
The route to self-government had re-orientated the politics of the abaThembu 
chieftainship within the context of factional politics of chiefs which generally prevailed in 
the Transkei territory in the early sixties. These politics were reflected in the 
incompatible political philosophies of the Transkei National Independence Party (TNIP) 
and its counterpart, the Democratic Party (DP). It is against this background that this 
chapter discusses the consequences of the BAA, and the political environment that the 
NP created for the abaThembu chiefs‘ political activity. An analysis of party politics in 
pre-independence Transkei portrays Matanzima as a puppet   for the Department of 
Bantu Affairs to use in the execution of the Governor-General‘s political objectives. The 
chapter presents Matanzima not only as a major actor on the road to the self-governing 
Transkei but also as an intermediary for both the Governor-General and other compliant 
chiefs.  
 
The chapter reveals through the discussion of the interaction between the government 
and Matanzima that his political activities were circumscribed by the Governor-
General‘s dictates. While the government officials regularly complimented Matanzima 
on his ‗engineered‘ compliance and tractability, they also did not hesitate to hint that his 
power base was NP secured. The chapter describes the NP government as using the 
short-sighted upstart, Matanzima, in fulfilling their long-term objectives. Matanzima is 
further shown to be blindly manipulating situations, individuals and groups to outwit 
Sabata and to invalidate the inequality between them.   
 
The chapter also reveals that by 1963 Matanzima‘s jurisdictional area had been 















regional chieftainship on him as being fair in the case of someone deserving of a 
reward. Against this background Sabata protested that since  
the early ‗60s my close associates have been subjected to arbitrary action  
by the government. I have been persecuted for my political convictions … and 
have been ridiculed and humiliated by junior chiefs who were government 
supporters. I became King of the Thembus with seven districts. Because of my 
uncompromising stand against apartheid, I have ended with only three. 1 
 
are presented as justifiable and legitimate. The chapter shows Matanzima who could 
not, before 1963, get what he wanted without pleading, emerging from the self-
governing Transkei an empowered chief minister cum victor. He is shown using his 
status to launch the self-governing Transkei on the road to independence.  
 
The year 1963 is also depicted as a turning point in Matanzima‘s power contest with 
Sabata who loses all except his paramountcy title, while the challenge of Matanzima‘ 
application for a similar title still looms. Against this background Sabata is shown  
fighting a multi-frontal battle to preserve the ―autonomic‘ image of his paramountcy 
against the reformist traditionalist, Matanzima. The chapter demonstrates that when 
Matanzima is finally made the paramount chief he becomes the first ever to carry that 
title from the RHH of Mthikrakra.   
 
The chapter also demonstrates that Sabata‘s defence of the abaThembu paramountcy 
was motivated mainly by his interest in championing traditional rights. Against this 
background Sabata is shown drifting towards progressive movements in order to secure 
sufficient support to tackle Matanzima on both local and national fronts.  
 
The chapter portrays political parties as platforms which enabled both Sabata and 
Matanzima to fight over the abaThembu paramountcy. In this context Matanzima is 
shown using the advantage of his bureaucratic status to pursue Sabata both as a 
political opponent  and as  a rival in the contest over the paramountcy. Consequentily 
the abaThembu paramountcy is shaken to the core as the major force in it, Sabata, is 
















The chapter finally demonstrates that Matanzima‘s unsolicited initiatives are at all times 
nurtured by self-interest and this obliges Sabata to adopt new strategies or adjust the 
old ones in order to respond appropriately without losing sight of his primary objective. It 
also reveals, through the NP‘s political support for Matanzima‘s collaboration, the 
lengths to which the DNA officials are prepared to go in order to advance Afrikaner 
interests, to bring about the desired outcomes, to combat  ‗undesirable changes‘2  and 
to prohibit  ‗changes that would run counter to the white interests‘.3 
 
THE LEGACY OF THE BANTU AUTHORITIES ACT IN ABATHEMBULAND  
 
The implementation of the BAA in abaThembuland was characterised by concurrent 
and consequential incidents that portrayed it as anathema to certain communities, 
factions of various political affiliations and also organisations that had stakes in the 
developments and activities of the communities. The relentless application of the act 
eventually brought to a climax the polarisation within the ranks of abaThembu chiefs 
and in the process aligned the splinter groups with either Matanzima or Sabata, the two 
most important chiefs in abaThembuland at the time.  
 
It thus becomes clear that the implementation of the act in abaThembuland was 
influenced by issues such as which benefits would accrue to those who aspired to 
greatness, without making clear what additional value those who were already at the top 
of the indigenous hierarchy would acquire. In the ambiguity and lack of transparency in 
issues that were so pertinent to the question of the ‗Authorities‘ and chieftainship 
generally was located a political instrument that would slowly paralyse and eventually 
undo the unity of abaThembu chiefdom. Delius‘s remark that the co-option of chiefs into 
the administrative ranks lessened their dependence on their subjects and strengthened 
the hand of the Governor-General to whom they had now become accountable4 is  
relevant here. It explains that power was able to determine the chiefs‘ attitudes, 
responses and relationships. The administration would employ the power factor to  
diminish Sabata‘s territorially-based political authority, and, in this way, punish him for 
















It must be noted that even the banishment of Sabata‘s ‗Royal Council‘ was 
counterproductive because the rift between Matanzima and Sabata continued to widen 
during the absence of Sabata‘s advisers.  Meanwhile Matanzima was trying every way   
to make life impossible to bear for all those that were associated with Sabata.  
 
An interesting development of the early sixties was the birth in August 1960 of a 
resistance movement that was linked to the activities in abaThembuland of the Liberal 
Party (LP). The inception of the abaThembu movement took place at a meeting that 
was chaired by Anderson Joyi which was attended by several abaThembu chiefs.  
Wilmot Joyi, a migrant worker in Cape Town, and Anderson were arrested soon after 
the meeting.5 Chief Zwelihle Silimela was also arrested for his outspokenness against 
BAA, and he spent 1961 to 1963 in the Fort Glamorgan Prison of East London.6 It was 
in the wake of these arrests that NP Minister of Bantu Administration, De Wet Nel‘s 
office issued the Proclamation R400 which placed the Transkei under the state of 
emergency7 obviously to muzzle, inter alia, the infant resistance movement.  Joyi 
recounted how he, for once, evaded his arrest by two White policemen that Kaiser 
Matanzima had set on him in 1961. He jumped through the window of his rondavel and 
once outside walked straight towards the Bhaziya forest. He came across two 
abaThembu women who were gathering dry cow-dung. They not only  had wrapped 
double doeks around their heads but also wore multiple layers of traditional skirts and 
wraparound pinafores:  
Quick thinking made me ask for a wraparound  from one of them while the other 
parted with one of her doeks. I did not have to bend regularly as if I was picking 
cowdung nkosazana, thanks to my clubfoot. Carrying a reed-basket alongside 
these women saved me from arrest as the policemen walked behind us without 
taking any notice that I was the Anderson they were looking for, uDelagubhe 
ngokwakhe, the real Delaghubhe.8  
 
Despite Matanzima‘s exaggerated claims that his influence was far reaching in the 
Cofimvaba District, the years immediately following the installation of ‗Authorities‘ in the 
Cofimvaba District were characterised by rural restlessness and protests. For this 
reason the magistrate alerted the chief magistrate to the need to protect the 
amaNdungwana chief, Ndarala, the amaGcaleka headman, A. Mfebe and K. Mgudlwa 















to the BAA had also aligned Matanzima with the enemies of the people as against 
Sabata, who was gradually being identified with the popular struggle. Matanzima 
suddenly became a target of anti-government movements like Poqo. This development 
persuaded him to check the activities of organisations he perceived as obstacles to the 
good work that he was personally helping accomplish on behalf of the government.  
 
The activities of the LP, a visible feature of abaThembu politics in the early sixties, 
helped consolidate the resistance to and rejection of the BAA. Against this background 
must be understood how Lewis Majija‘s affiliation with Poqo led to his attack not in 
Ngcobo, his home town, but in a Cape Town township. When he eventually arrived at 
the offices of the LP he reported the loss of his position as headman ‗for failing to 
enforce the culling of cattle and the fencing of communal land, imposed by the Bantu 
Authorities system‘.9 About the same time correspondence from the Transkei 
commanding officer to the chief Bantu Affairs commissioner (Mthatha) revealed that 
Gilbert Hani of Lower Sabalele Location, also linked to Poqo activities, had stirred up 
trouble in the Cofimvaba District and was also found guilty by Matanzima‘s court for 
insulting Chief Matanzima in Cape Town in 1959.10    
 
It was significant that in his ‗Confidential Minute‘ to chief magistrate Jordaan, the Bantu 
Affairs commissioner (BAC) subtly criticised Chief Matanzima for his overweening 
presumption which reduced his personal judgement in controversial situations. 
Jordaan‘s remark was in response to Matanzima‘s request for ‗bodyguards‘ for the 
Comfimvaba headmen, Nqabisile Mnqanqeni, of Location No.1 Ndlunkulu, Sixaba 
Sabata of Location No.2 Qwebeqwebe, and Jonginamba Deliwe of Location 3 Qitsi who 
falsely claimed that their huts had been burnt on 17 May 1961.11 Jordaan commented 
that ‗Headmen who are … just with their followers are popular and will be guarded as it 
should be by their own followers‘.12 It became clear from Jordaan‘s comment that, for 
the government, the devolution of authority implied the cutting of costs and was 
therefore not compatible with incurring expenses that were likely to come about if some 
community leaders were not tactful or just in the discharge of their duties. Even though 















Matanzima insisted that it showed Sabata‘s hand as a primary instigator. He put forward 
jealousy of the ‗trouble free and smooth operation of the BAA‘13 in the two Emigrant 
abaThembuland districts under his own jurisdiction as the reason for Sabata‘s 
surreptitious action. He also claimed that his appointment as chairman of the Transkei 
Territorial Authority was, for Sabata, ‗a bitter pill to swallow‘‖.14 In an obvious attempt to 
make his accusation about Sabata credible and also to demonise and expose him as a 
financial liability, Matanzima stated that ‗Chief Sabata is in debt to the extent of over 
R4,000 and , as his own people in Umtata are very reluctant to assist him in paying his 
debts, he is trying to collect money in this District through his agent Attorney Canca‘.15 
The fabricated arson incident had a bearing on the Matanzima-Sabata power struggle 
because some people in the affected villages of Cofimvaba went to consult with Sabata 
to make him aware that Matanzima was victimising them for refusing to toe his line: ‗the 
people who are complaining and who went to consult [with] Paramount Chief Sabata 
are men convicted in the Chief‘s (KD‘s) court and [their conviction] arose from incidents 
at a meeting held by Chief Matanzima‘.16 The power struggle was exacerbated by the 
PAC-Poqo instigated sporadic outbreaks of popular violence in the Cofimvaba District.17  
 
Vigne has also reinforced the fact that ‗there was a corresponding campaign in and 
around Cape Town, where migrant workers were keenly aware of the situation across 
the Kei River. Maziphathe (Bantu Authorities) was hated and rejected, and the 
Government‘s men, the Matanzimas most of all, seen as self-aggrandizing tyrants.‘18 
Jordaan hinted to the chief magistrate about Matanzima‘s vulnerability: ‗the only person 
in this District who needed protection is Chief K. D. Matanzima in the sense that if he is 
killed his death would be of great propaganda value to the anti-chiefs and the anti-Bantu 
Authority section‘.19 Whilst expressing a view that Matanzima‘s security was the 
responsibility of his subjects Jordaan still suggested that he be supplied with a few well-
armed guards ‗who should be with him wherever he goes‘.20 Jordaan‘s comment was 
also explicit about how Matanzima‘s enthusiastic initiatives had, and were, continuing to 
turn him into to a chief whose authority was only effective because it was backed by the 















the trouble Chief KD Matanzima had in these locations is due to his own fault as 
he held a meeting in this area on his own accord. If the Bantu Affairs 
Commissioner had been present it is doubtful whether there would have been 
any trouble----Chief Matanzima sometimes overlooks the fact the pedestal he 
sits on was created by the influence the Bantu Affairs Commissioner has in the 
District and when he loses that support he is as disliked by his people as any 
other Chief in the Territories.21 
 
Matanzima‘s execution of the measures that were resisted by his people had inevitably 
provoked hatred and rejection of his person from every quarter. His best bet to counter 
such negativity was by aligning himself with the government. Jordaan‘s subtle 
condemnation of Matanzima‘s government-inclined chieftainship, even though it served 
the civil interests well is shown, below, in his preference for a popular chieftainship.  
 
A chief is a personal property of the people and, if they value their Chief 
sufficiently, they will protect him. Naturally to gain the confidence and loyalty of 
the people the Chief must at all times rule his people firmly and justly and they in 
turn will see to his well-being. Once a Chief feels that he is not dependent on the 
loyalty and respect of the people because he feels secure in the protection given 
to him by paid guards he will soon overreach himself and become a despot.22 
 
An observation of Matanzima‘s methods of operation with the government revealed that 
before 1963 the real power remained with the South African government. The 
implementation of the stabilisation measures in the Cofimvaba District also revealed 
Sabata as both an ‗anti-government‘ and an obstructive force there.  Jordaan had 
earlier reported to the CBAC on the bad influence that Sabata was spreading in 
Cofimvaba:  
You are aware of the fact that when Chief K.D. Matanzima and I decided to have 
the District stabilized we held meetings and the residents unanimously agreed to 
our plans. As soon as Paramount Chief Sabata was informed of the progressive 
steps contemplated in this District he sent messengers to stir up trouble in the 
Indlunkulu-Qwebeqwebe areas and before long the residents started agitating 
against stabilization and a crisis  was only averted through prompt action taken 
by the Bantu Affairs Commissioner and Chief K. D. Matanzima.23    
 
It was evident that Matanzima had obviously taken advantage of his ‗on-site‘ residence 
and his rapport with the magistrate‘s office by unilaterally endorsing the implementation 
of the Reclamation measures. Sabata‘s apparent intervention, regarded as interference 















where his power hung by a very thin thread. It is significant that with the support of the 
BAC Sabata‘s influence was eradicated, leading Jordaan to report boastfully that once 
Sabata‘s influence in the Cofimvaba District was eliminated, the people accepted the 
Reclamation and Rehabilitation with whole-hearted co-operation. This was their proof 
that the Paramount Chief‘s interference was divisive and that without it not only was 
compliance with Matanzima‘s orders restored, but also value was added to the  
legislation. The community‘s fear of reprisals by the local chief who, true to Delius‘s 
testimony, relied less on his subjects than on the White officials, especially before 1963, 
was an important factor in the vacillating attitudes of the people to the objectionable 
schemes.  
 
The measures Matanzima used to coerce the Cofimvaba District to co-operate with him 
in the implementation of government plans were employed for personal political gain, 
and provide evidence of his misuse, and the political degeneration of the office of 
chieftainship. Maloka‘s claim that ‘the position of individual chiefs and headmen was 
strengthened vis-à-vis that of commoner‘s‖24 also applies here. It also exposes the 
corrupting effect that Matanzima‘s desperate attachment to personal vanity had on 
indigenous protocol and thus on the relationships of the abaThembu chiefs. Also, his  
self-professed belief in traditional governance and Xhosa nationalism about which he 
personally claimed 
I was swaddled in it since the day of my birth. It has become my appointed task 
to develop it and to sponsor and foster it ---- I subscribe to tribalism and I owe 
allegiance to a tribe, ----I favour tribalism, because I honestly believe it to be the 
conserving power of my people25  
 
had an inherent contradiction. His personal reliance on colonial bureaucracy for both the 
undoing of Sabata‘s influence and the support of his personal authority compromised 
the ethos of his ancestral right. This was manifested in his apparent readiness to 
sacrifice the sacrosanct institution of chieftainship on the bureaucratic altar for personal 
prestige and individual material benefit. 
 
Lodge has confirmed that wherever the rehabilitation exercise was vehemently resisted 















Sabata‘s region was barely touched by the Betterment Schemes by mid-1961 to the 
vociferous condemnation and rejection of these measures at a meeting held at the 
Bumbane Great Place in 1961. Contrary to the developments in Matanzima‘s Emigrant 
abaThembuland, most locations endorsed all the government schemes under duress. 
The implementation of the rehabilitation scheme with effect from 1962, the 
concentration of holdings into smaller economic units with its resultant removal of 
people from their familiar lands to make room for sample irrigation schemes was bound 
to reduce many to pathetic landlessness and inevitably push them towards migrant 
labour.26 Herein is to be found some of the factors that accounted for Matanzima‘s 
unpopularity in his home base, where he was perceived as an accomplice in 
orchestrating the sufferings of those he was supposed to help salvage from an 
unpleasant situation. Sabata, who obstructed the government schemes,  scored points 
as a true national father. Matanzima blamed his unpopularity on Sabata‘s bad influence 
in the Cofimvaba District. The truth contained in Lodge‘s comment in the above context 
must be understood as an endorsement of Ntsebeza and Ndletyana‘s claim. Lodge has 
unequivocally stated that  
In Tembuland proper, opposition to Bantu Authorities was influenced by the 
rivalry between the Paramount Chief, Sabata, and Matanzima, the regional chief 
of the Emigrant Tembu. Matanzima had gained government patronage as a 
result of his support for Bantu Authorities and he was busy expanding his area of 
jurisdiction.-----His ascendancy was feared by Sabata and this helped colour his 
attitudes to Bantu Authorities.‖27 
 
Over and above this, it cannot be denied that there was an extent to which the two 
chiefs were to blame for their progressive split, either from Sabata‘s justifiable insecurity 
or Matanzima‘s unbridled ambition.     
 
 
What can be debated is the extent to which the BAA indirectly complemented the 
primacy of ‗popular legitimacy‘ which, (though inferior in status to its counterpart, the 
bureaucratic chieftainship), was a ‗non-negotiable‘ for indigenous authority, and 
reinforced what Delius has described as ―wider recognition, more power, and better 
pay‖,28 (all of which were ‗bureaucratic incentives‘ designed to embellish a new brand of 















though it bore popular legitimacy, had a political infrastructure that had been negatively 
impacted upon by the reclamation measures, or to settle for the ‗official‘ customary 
institution which had the advantage of strength deriving from its capacity to confer 
political and material power from the unlimited socio-political resources at the Governor-
General‘s disposal. It was this that compromised the NP government‘s politically 
expedient ‗buffer‘ chieftainship which was newly used  to authorise the legitimacy of the 
‗give and take‘ between the chiefs and their so-called benefactor, the DNA.  
 
 
It is in this context that Sabata‘s condemnation of BAA and all it stood for, must be 
understood. He personally viewed the act as a weapon that Matanzima readily used to 
veto his authority in Emigrant abaThembuland. Sabata‘s standpoint conferred on him 
the image of an untainted popular hero and it was probably this ‗political halo‘ which 
endeared him to the anti-legislation group. In the light of the impact of the BAA on the 
relationships between abaThembu chiefs it is not surprising that these political 
organisations  found favour among a  disgruntled populace resentful of the reclamatiion 
schemes. Significantly, Jordaan again hinted at the urgent need to have Matanzima 
guarded during his visits to Queenstown. The chief  was considered to be in danger as 
a result of reports of a violent confrontation between  Poqo insurgents and some of his 
headmen on the boundary of St Marks and Xhalanga Districts.29 The measurement of 
hostility against Matanzima could be gauged from the following excerpt : 
Information to hand is that the organization called Poqo who sent the men to this 
District have all taken an oath that chief K.D. Matanzima and his family, come 
what may, must be killed before Christmas 1962.30    
 
Chief Matanzima did not seem to relent as evident in what Lodge has described as his 
super control of the Transkeian Government which he owed to his enhanced powers as 
the Territorial Chief.31 Against this background must be seen the surfacing of a 
document sub-titled ‗The Transkei and the Western Cape are the battle fields‘ which 
was linked to the African National Congress (ANC. It contained statements like 
we must fight the culling down of stock, rehabilitation, landlessness, forced 
removals of people from their generations old homes, the permanent state of 
emergency in the Transkei, the tyranny people suffer under Verwoedian chiefs 















be left unturned in the massive propaganda campaign. All these must be linked 
up with-----the Pass Laws and Bantu Authorities.32  
 
Another section clearly stated that the Bantu Authorities was one of the focal points of 
the struggle of the ANC.33 It becomes apparent that  Sabata was a popular advocate 
within the political organisations against  Matanzima who was regarded as a general 
enemy of the people. Against this background must be understood the earlier reports of 
attempts on Matanzima‘s life being Poqo-related, as can be seen in an isolated fray 
between Poqo insurgents and the Queenstown police.34  
  
How incidents like the above aggravated the feud between Matanzima and Sabata need 
not be overemphasised. Matanzima emerged a passionate supporter of the 
government‘s brand of chieftainship which he viewed as both a defensive weapon and a 
means to help him rise above others. Sabata appeared to view the paramount 
chieftainship, his natural right, as an office which needed no artificial reinforcement from 
any quarter. It was simply a legitimate tool to sustain chieftainship for, and in, its own 
right, and to uphold popular causes and national interests within the limits prescribed by 
indigenous protocol.     
 
 
The Matanzima-Sabata power-struggle could also be seen in the attitudinal variations to 
chieftaincy in Xhalanga. Ntsebeza has revealed that the expressed support for Sabata 
was merely a technical weapon to exclude the overly visible Matanzima rather an 
embrace of chieftainship,  
We agreed here in Cala that we should support Sabata. We didn‘t support him 
because we wanted chieftanship. We supported him because we did not want 
Matanzima.35  
 
Ironically the amaMfengu aversion to Matanzima drew the government behind him as 
he recommended and sometimes authorised deportations of his and the government‘s 
opponents among them. One of the orders he issued authorised the removal of  
Eugenia  and Abel Mavandla Ntwana  
In terms of Regulation 12 (1) (a) of Proclamation No. R.400 of 1960 I have, by 
virtue of the powers vested in me under the said Proclamation, to order you to 















Emnxe Location, Xalanga District, to Keilands Location in St Marks District and 
to remain in the last mentioned location for an unspecified period.36  
  
The case of Glen Grey District also proved to be an ironic spectacle in that the revival of 
chieftainship there defied Beinart‘s claim that chieftanship is ‗the means for bolstering-
ethnic identities.‘37 This was seen  when Matanzima took the initiative to resuscitate the 
amaHala chieftainship and then included himself  in order  to exclude Sabata in the 
Glen Grey politics of chieftainship.  
 
The controversy surrounding the amaGcina chieftainship also seemed to work in the 
favour of both Matanzima and the government. The amaGcina chieftainship was held by 
Ngqungqushe temporarily, but was contested by Gwebindlala Mhlontlo of iXhiba House 
against the identified candidature of Zwelixolile Mpangele. The perceived indifference of 
Sabata to the matter was conveniently blamed in some quarters. The Paramount 
Chief‘s remark that ‗I am not blind to the fact that someone has come into your midst 
and sowed seeds of dispute [obviously referring, with good reason, to Matanzima]. The 
custom as I see it favours Mpangele‘38was significant for the politics of chieftainship in 
the region because it hinted at the vulnerability of Sabata‘s paramountcy. Whilst 
Sabata‘s active input in the contested chieftainship was apparently desperately sought 
after, there is lack of clarity as to the genuine motives for wanting his involvement. It 
must be presumed that those factions who preferred Sabata wanted him to stamp his 
influence on the region and in this way outwit Matanzima who was determined to pre-
empt his paramountcy on the basis of territorial aggrandisement. It is, however, doubtful 
if Matanzima would have promoted anyone whose prospective chieftainship was 
recommended by Sabata. It is also unlikely that the involvement of the legitimate 
paramountcy whose ‗centrality‘ and universality were being challenged by Matanzima‘s 
application for the same status was drawn into the wrangle for the sake of observing 
protocol. Specific incidents and different strategies were used by parties on both sides 
to continue the power struggle for the mastery of Glen Grey. In the end Matanzima‘s 
manoeuvres yielded the desired result when the amaGcina supposedly voluntarily took 
up the question of identifying Zwelixolile Mpangele as the rightful chief for their sub-















popular in certain circles, the fact that Ngqungqushe Vulindlela and Gwebindlala 
Mhlontlo were claimants to the same chieftainship complicated the problem and caused 
Sabata to shilly-shally.39 Sabata‘s indecisiveness again gave Matanzima a golden 
opportunity to intervene as an interested arbiter in the resolution of the controversial 
chieftainship of the Glen Grey amaGcina. Zwelixolile‘s supporters perceived Sabata‘s 
stalling as evidence of weakness and political incompetence. This thinking, as 
inauspicious as it was for the political fortunes of Sabata later drew the amaGcina chief-
in-waiting, Zwelixolile, to Matanzima‘s side. In his testimony Zwelixolile praised 
Matanzima for his decisiveness as he described him as a worthy overlord:   
That I have seen with my own eyes that Chief  KD Matanzima as he was 
installing Ngqungqushe he---is the right and proper Chief to install me and 
remove Ngqungqushe.----In consultation with my Headmen and people it was 
decided that I should come to the Chief in Qamata to take this matter up. Even 
before the eyes of the Government I know that Chief KD Matanzima is the 
proper Chief to take this matter up.---As I have seen with my own eyes that I 
should pay allegiance to Chief KD Matanzima I promise that I will still ever pay 
allegiance to Chief KD Matanzima.40 
 
Zwelihle‘s preference to have his chieftainship endorsed by Matazima seemed to be a 
tacit acknowledgement of Matanzima‘s super autocratic power. Matanzima would have 
no difficulty in finding an excuse to challenge it, were it sanctioned by Sabata, his 
political rival in the Glen Grey District. Zwelihle could have known of Matanzima‘s 
potential to frustrate Ngqungqushe Vulindlela‘s removal should Matanzima not play a 
role sanctioning his chieftainship of the amaGcina.   
 
Stewart Zote and William Mayongo also endorsed Chief Matanzima as ‗a chief like 
Chief Jonguhlanga‘,  saying, further,  that they paid  allegiance to Chief Matanzima.41 
Mayongo‘s indication of their intention to approach the BAC of Lady Frere to clear the 
way for Matanzima‘s visit to their district‖42 was a promise of a free and safe passage for 
Matanzima and a slight to Sabata‘s paramountcy. Whilst Matanzima was not likely to 
lose anything, even if Ngqungqushe had continued as amaGcina chief, Zwelixolile‘s 
pledge implied a lifetime alliance with his prospective overlord. At the same time Zote‘s 
remark explicitly handed the paramountcy to Matanzima,  while Mayongo‘s implied  that, 















Further, Mayongo suggested that the BAC‘s approval of Matanzima‘s visit implied that 
he was the dispenser of ‗official customary law‘43 in the   Lady Frere District.  
 
DALIWONGA MATANZIMA APPLIES FOR PARAMOUNT CHIEFTAINSHIP  
In April 1962 K.D. Matanzima submitted an application to the BAC for his recognition as 
paramount chief of Emigrant Thembuland. The Emigrant abaThembuland Regional 
Authority was said to have met and to have adopted a resolution which was 
subsequently endorsed on the same day by the Qamata Tribal Authority at its meeting. 
The resolution read: 
This authority resolves that the Government be respectfully requested to appoint 
Chief Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima, Permanent Head of the Emigrant 
Tembuland Regional Authority, as Paramount Chief of Emigrant Tembuland in 
terms of Section 102 of Proclamation No.180 of 1956, as amended.44 
 
Specific reasons were put forward in support of the application to divide the abaThembu 
paramountcy. The first of these related to the historical split of 1865 which was led by 
Rhaxothi, the first bearer of the Matanzima name.  Another reason was to create a 
hierarchical gap between the Emigrant abaThembuland chieftainship‘s status and 
others considered junior to it. The proposal, if approved and executed, would  rank 
Matanzima above the others and, in so doing, make him qualify for a title befitting a 
higher position, one that would equate him to, and therefore compete with, Sabata, the 
natural holder of the most senior chieftainship in all abaThembuland. Matanzima‘s case 
had no precedent in the history of the abaThembu chieftainship. The statement that it 
was not possible to distinguish the statuses of the chiefs Kaulele Mgudlwa and 
Zwelibanzi Ndarala from Daliwonga Matanzima‘s ‗unless the status of the paramouncy 
is conferred upon Chief Matanzima‘45 did not in anyway address the question of 
distinguishing the status of paramount chief Sabata from that of his immediate 
subordinate, Matanzima. Matanzima‘s paramountcy would be a unique creation, one in 
which the paramountcy would be the symbolic pinnacle of a hierarchical structure, 
justifiable not on the basis of indigenous principles but rather by the artificial 
















The tendency of undermining customary dictates was now becoming a dominant feature 
of the chieftainship among the abaThembu in the pre-independence Transkei: in the 
upgrading of a junior chief to the crown status there was concomitantly  a belittling, a 
technical downgrading, of Sabata‘s paramountcy. The further reference to the 
‗diametrical opposition‘ to, and incompatibility of, the policy followed by Sabata with ‘that 
followed by Matanzima and his people of Emigrant Tembuland in relation to the 
Government of the Republic of South Africa‘‖46 was a very convenient argument for the 
advancement of the political and personal interests of both Matanzima and the 
government at that point in time. The government had to consider the possibility of the 
people of Emigrant Thembuland voluntarily opting out of the resolutions ‗passed at 
Chief Sabata‘s meetings‘.47 The attitudes of Sabata and Matanzima, the way they both 
handled their chiefdom‘s traditional affairs and their general social dispositions towards 
each other were also put forward as excuses for sub-dividing the abaThembu 
paramountcy for the good of the abaThembu nation. The resolution concluded by 
clearly stating that the execution of the recommendations of the signatories would be in 
accordance with the provisions of native laws and custom.  
 
 
The timing of the petition for Matanzima‘s paramountcy was propitious when viewed 
from the perspective of the National Party government‘s plans for the reserves. Against 
this background must be understood the call, from a Matanzima-endorsed mThembu 
Chief, Manzezulu, to have the Glen Grey District included in the debates about the 
granting of self-government to the Transkei. The significance of this call from the Glen 
Grey District, a region where Matanzima had recently resuscitated the chieftainships of 
amaHala and amaGcina, was that it was an implicit rejection of Paramount Chief 
Sabata. The community thus technically accepted Matanzima and in so doing  
anticipated the evolution of a new brand of counter-paramountcy within the House of 
Mthikrakra. 
 
ON THE EVE OF SELF - GOVERNMENT  
The operation of the BAA in practice was reflected in a system of local government 















as a whole. This was taken a step further with the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government 
Act of 1959 which provided the constitutional machinery for progress towards autonomy 
as a prelude to full independence.48 In the context of the above developments Carter et 
al have emphasised the political importance of Maninjwa‘s unexpected and abrupt 
motion of April 1961. Maninjwa called upon the South African government to ‗declare 
the Transkeian Territories as a whole a self-governing state under the control of the 
Bantu people‘.49 The motion, which came from the opposition benches,  sparked a lively 
debate among chiefs and headmen of different political viewpoints. While they 
immediately pressurized the government into fulfilling its promise of politically advancing 
Blacks as a separate entity, it soon emerged that the participants in the debate 
interpreted the government‘s promises differently. Such expectations were peculiar to 
party political viewpoints. Sabata and Victor Poto, the paramount chiefs of the 
abaThembu and the western amaMpondo respectively, believed that an ideal freedom 
for the Transkeians would dispense with magisterial rule without necessarily endorsing 
the ‗chief–centred‘ apartheid regime. This system to them would symbolize the  
‗devolution of genuine authority to Africans in the reserves‘.50  
 
The government was less inclined to entertain any devolution of power that would 
compete with, rather than complement, apartheid. The fact that the political initiative had 
originated with the erstwhile opponents of the BAA seemed like a threat to the apartheid 
structure, the core of which was a chief-centred political dominance. The NP 
government needed time to speculate about the probable consequences of Maninjwa‘s 
motion because good news from the opponents‘ camp was not necessarily a guarantee 
of the success of its political plan for the Transkei. It is against this background that the 
debate was adjourned soon after an opportune conversation between Matanzima, Hans 
Abraham, the Mthatha ambassador of the Union Cabinet and two White Transkei 
government officials. The sequel to the well-timed conversation was that Matanzima, 
the presiding officer, adjourned the debate for an indefinite period. The appointment of a 
Recess Committee to study the implications of conferring ‗self-government‘ on the 
Transkei must be seen as a political stratagem, the purpose of which was to plug the 















endorse the ‗unequivocal rejection of the policy of a multiracial society‘.51 The 
adjournment and the Recess Committee had indeed served the purpose of ‗cooking‘ the 
result  to the satisfaction of the patrons of ‗absolute‘ apartheid.  
 
 
That the thinking of the NP government was largely about calming international 
animosity towards South Africa and creating compliant, dependent territories is implicit 
in Verwoerd‘s announcement of 1962: 
This should strongly counteract the international animosity and suspicion which 
have such a detrimental effect on our economy. For this reason it will pay us to 
incur such expenditure. It is also worth a great deal to us if we can create for 
ourselves peaceful neighbours [obviously in the homelands]… who will not look 
to others for assistance. 52 
 
Matanzima‘s steamrollering of the Committee‘s report through the Transkei Territorial 
Assembly must be understood against the background of Verwoerd‘s announcement 
and subsequent endorsement of ‗an apartheid-style constitution which incorporated 
chieftaincy more firmly in the state apparatus while excluding multiracial citizenship for a 
self-governing Transkei‘53. Popular rejection of the proposed constitution by the 
abaThembu and amaMpondo did not elicit any tolerance of their views.54 The rejection 
of the proposed constitution by a faction that had Sabata at its centre portrayed the 
Transkei‘s road to self-government as an additional divisive factor in the Sabata-
Matanzima power struggle. Self-government was subsequently conferred on the 
Transkei Territory in terms of the Transkei Constitution Act 48 of 1963. At the time the 
Transkei consisted of nine regional authorities which included the Dalindyebo Regional 
Authority area. The Dalindyebo region in turn comprised the districts of Ngcobo, 
Mqanduli, Mthatha and the Emigrant abaThembuland Regional Authority which was 
made up of St. Marks and Xalanga. At this time  Matanzima was merely a chairman of 
Emigrant abaThembuland, obviously waiting for the outcome of his application to be 



















RESPONSES OF ABATHEMBU CHIEFS TO THE POLITICS OF TRANSKEI’S SELF-
GOVERNMENT  
 
As soon as the self-government of the Transkei was accomplished, certain issues 
surfaced and these further entrenched the division between Matanzima and Sabata. 
Questions of vital importance arose. These were related to the popular endorsement of 
the Transkei Territory‘s independence; the final verdict on the application for conferment 
of paramountcy on Matanzima; the determination of a ‗legitimate‘ home for the Glen-
Grey District abaThembu and Transkei‘s land consolidation‘. Matanzima confirmed that 
the resolution of the land issue was a pre-condition to independence.  
 
The formation of political parties, another feature of the political activity of the first 
twelve months in a self-governing Transkei, was characterised by dissension. The 
specific events around the formation of parties became pointers to Matanzima‘s 
evolving political career, albeit that it was in the context of chieftainship at the time. In 
this context must be understood the formation, on 7 February 1964, at Chief Victor 
Poto‘s initiative, of the Democratic Party (DP). The mission of this political party was to 
oppose the Matanzima government‘s56 endorsement of separate development, and  to 
campaign for a central role for chiefs in political affairs.57 Seven days later Matanzima 
responded to Poto‘s political party with the formation of a government party, the 
Transkei National Independence Party (TNIP). After the establishment of the parties, 
the DP‘s leadership, Poto, Sabata and Knowledge Guzana met with Steytler of the 
Progressive Party, and forged an understanding between the two parties. The 
Progressive Party‘s patronage of the DP58 supplemented that of LP which had infiltrated 
Transkein politics with Sabata‘s assistance. Vigne has confirmed that Sabata himself 
remained the LP‘s ‗staunchest ally in four years of intense action that were to follow and 
the Party was, through Sabata, to play a major role in important [political] developments 
already beginning‖59 in the Transkei political landscape.  
 
After self-government a critical issue was of the movement towards Transkeian 
independence.  This would be determined logically by the votes received at the polls for 















background to this was the aggressive and competitive campaigns of the party 
leaderships which became a visible feature of pre-independence politics. The ruling 
party‘s enthusiasm in the run-up to the elections was also evident between party 
leaders. Furthermore, the  DP was  receptive to the advice from  the Progressives and 
the LP, as claimed by Carter.60 This definitely posed a threat to the South African 
Government and the Transkei Chief Minister‘s authority, and in this way further 
prejudiced the DP‘s political image. The raid of temporary residence of Poto Ndamase‘s 
son, Chief Tutor Nyangilizwe in Langa Township, occurred in this context. The fact that 
the police sergeant apologised,61 after they had removed, and later returned,  a copy of 
the Constitution of the DP,62  did not erase the perception that there was collusion 
between the TNIP‘s leader, Matanzima, and the apartheid government. Worse still, the 
home, car and offices of Guzana, the National Chairman of the DP,  and the home of 
Alfeus Zulu, the Mthatha Anglican Bishop,  had earlier been raided.63 It thus became 
clear that opposition to Matanzima‘s political dispensation for the Transkei was 
regarded as resistance to the apartheid South Africa‘s  bargaining strategy. Sabata‘s 
refusal to rally behind Matanzima portrayed him as his arch-rival. The disagreement 
between the two cousins on the future political status of the Transkei gave the chief 
minister an unfair advantage over Sabata. Matanzima‘s acquisition of a senior political 
position in the bureaucratic hierarchy, thanks to the Republican Government‘s support 
for his tactics, made it clear that he could use his political rank to manoeuvre and 
facilitate the upgrade of his junior chieftainship.  
 
For the abaThembu chieftainship the implicit historical significance of this situation was 
that if Matanzima‘s gamble were to succeed he would have accumulated personal and 
official power as a political figure. He  would, however,  have lost, in return, a natural 
and vital element of abaThembu chiefly power which it was not his prerogative to 
dispose of. Sabata was thus forced to continue with his multi-frontal fight to prevent the 
decentralisation of his paramountcy office, and to forestall Matanzima‘s attempt to use 
his artificially inflated chieftainship as a generator to prop up  his political rise in  the 















Matanzima‘s political rank was reinforced, it would be easy for him to authorise his 
paramountcy.   
 
 
That justification for Sabata‘s concerns was also evidenced by the fact that the political 
activity of the DP was hampered by financial constraints.64 Reverend Rajuili, the 
Johannesburg branch vice-chairman who already had strong links with the Transvaal 
executive committee of the Progressive Party65 complained that ‗[w]e have to make all 
arrangements ourselves. Unlike the Transkeian Government, we do not have the 
backing of the South African Government.‘66  
 
At this very time Matanzima was busy selling his ‗Bantustan strategy‘ through his vocal 
appeals to the outside world not to condemn a system that would ‗ultimately liberate the 
Bantu people of South Africa‘.67 Whilst he boasted that the Transkei had a constitution 
which had features of both  ‗traditional leadership and Western democracy‘ he also took 
a swipe at the so-called ‗leftists‘ ‗who appear to see nothing good in our own traditions 
[despite the fact that] we have been able to synchronise these two methods.‘68 The 
‗leftists‘ were of course the Progressives and Liberals, and Matanzima‘s remark 
explained the reasoning behind the financial squeeze on the opposition. He enticed the 
chiefs to buy into his scheme and criticised the leaders who wanted to remove the 
whole body of chiefs to the upper house (obviously alluding to Poto‘s senatorial idea) 
where they would not contribute to the legislative deliberations and measures. 
Matanzima overemphasised the role of chiefs in developing the political awareness of 
people and went so far as to say that  ‗once we are convinced that the people no more 
want their chiefs to occupy positions of leadership, we shall give way to the will of the 
people‘.69 He said, further, that in Transkei, ‗we have avoided putting the cart before the 
horse,‘70 implying that in entrusting the chiefs with leadership his government was 
adhering to the proper order of doing things. The fact that he had assumed the 
spokesman‘s prerogative and was prescribing the role of chiefs in the Transkei was a  
self-assumed position which automatically conferred on him a rank superior to that of 

















Sabata, in his own way, did not  make Matanzima‘s political life easy. He backed the 
LP‘s policy71 which reinforced his oppositional stand. He always appeared in the big city 
centres in the company of some Progressives and LP members. Vigne has alluded to a 
tumultuous welcome which Sabata received from abaThembu and other people in 
Johannesburg when he appeared with Ann Tobias of the LP. At the same meeting 
Sabata re-iterated thus his political principle on behalf of abaThembu ‗[we] seek 
freedom from laws which separate us from our fellow South Africans. We seek a state 
…. in which black and white can live and work together in mutual respect‘.72 The Star 
reported that  
Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo, ruler of the large Tembu nation in the 
Transkei and a prominent figure in the Opposition Democratic Party, said today 
that the policy of the Liberal Party – one man, one vote – makes the most appeal 
to me and to many other Africans.73  
 
Sabata‘s comment was in response to a statement in which Sir de Villiers Graaff 
rejected with contempt ‗one man, one vote – over our dead body‘.74 Sabata accused Sir 
de Villiers Graaff of having no ideas of his own, saying that he ‗improved upon the ideas 
of the Nationalist Party‘.75 He summed up by saying ‗Africans would continue to clamour 
for direct representation in Parliament and not representation by Europeans, as 
suggested by Sir de Villiers Graaff‘. 76  
 
 
The report about the plans of the DP leadership to address racially mixed gatherings in 
the large cities as a way of marketing their manifesto could only aggravate the party 
political tensions and provoke the Republican Government. The government viewed the  
tour as a threat to its interests, as it  gave him an opportunity to connect with Liberals 
and the Progressives.77 Verwoerd‘s threat that ―‘it is no secret that the Progressive Party 
and the Liberal Party have a great deal to do with Paramount Chief Poto and his Party‗78 
must be seen as evidence of the insecurities of  the South African government and the 
TNIP. A few days later, Matanzima attributed peace and tranquillity in the Transkei 
territory to the advent of the policy of separate development which  
the people of the Transkei accepted and requested that it be applied….the 















only realistic way of bringing about equality among all races in South Africa on 
the basis of parallel development.79  
 
Earlier, a D.E. Mtsamane of Mqanduli District sent the LP‘s policy booklet entitled ‘Non-
racial Democracy‘ to J. B. Vorster. In a covering letter Mtsamane  warned of the danger 
that the activities of the LP continued to pose to  the South African government : ‗your 
enemy is the Liberal Party which had made a strong attack to break down the 
Government in order to start its own government here……the white agitators had 
combined with Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo‘.80  
 
 
While Matanzima was at pains to counter Sabata‘s undesirable influence by endorsing 
the policy of ‗separate‘ development there came an unexpected and, perhaps, ominous 
attack on his ill-conceived and blind compliance with NP stratagems. Ronald Nkopo, the 
TNIP‘s official ‗ambassador‘ in Johannesburg made disparaging remarks about 
Matanzima, namely ‗Chief Matanzima‘s not a politician but a Government employed 
chief. He prefers the people to respect him as  traditional chief than to fight and 
champion the causes of the ‗underdog‘ or his electorate‘.81 Nkopo was questioning the 
value that chieftainship, Matanzima‘s so-called ‗sacred‘ base, was adding to the national 
struggle. His subtle condemnation of his party leader‘s political naivity was bound to fan 
the feuding in the ranks of abaThembu chiefs. It inadvertently portrayed Sabata as a 
political celebrity because of his political alignment with popular and national causes. It 
also discredited those who championed the idea of pledging more power to the chiefs if 
they backed the TNIP‘s leader in his crusade to promote traditional rather than popular 
‗sovereignty‘. Nkopo further revealed the antipathy of Matanzima‘s presumed 
(Johannesburg) constituency to his ambassadorial mission,  saying that ‗the people will 
not support him because he is not interested in their struggles for human dignity‘.82  He 
also gave an account of an instance when Matanzima, on a recent visit to sell his policy 
in Johannesburg privately ‗asked him  to warn people not to attempt to shake his hand 
because he would not reciprocate‘.83 Nkopo‘s remarks, especially his description of 
‗Black apartheid‘, indicated his support for the DP‘s policy of multi-racialism in 
Johannesburg, and in this way inevitably further pitted Matanzima against the Sabata-















Matanzima had sacked ‗two party men on the Rand‘ and Nkopo was one of these. His 
major sin was his claim that urban dwellers ‗were inclining towards the multiracial policy 
of Chief Victor Poto‘.84 Kotze has confirmed that ‗repeated flouting of party directives by 
the Witwatersrand and Western Cape regional committees of the TNIP always led to the 
dismissal from office‘85 and cited Nkopo as one of the victims.86  
 
Nkopo‘s remarks had clearly provoked Matanzima. He struck back at the DP when his 
government introduced an  ‗emergency regulation‘ embodied in the Proclamation 400 of 
1960. The DP complained, perhaps with good reason that, the emergency regulation 
was being used to break down their structures and efficacy since the passage of the law 
coincided with the DP Congress. When a protest about the Proclamation was made to 
the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Matanzima justified it on the 
grounds that it was intended to ‗protect the Transkei from the infiltration of agitators‘.87 
The DP‘s claim  that it was being victimised was proved correct  in  Matanzima‘s threats 
‗to ban the Democratic Party, and his allegations that it was a bedfellow of 
Communism‘88 all of which were perceived by the opposition members as intimidatory. 
Matanzima seemed to be echoing the claims of Greyling, a Ventersdorp MP, who 
condemned the LP‘s activity in the Transkei and stated further, that they were utilisng 
the Communist weapons to undermine the regional authority of the Republican 
Government.89 This was a subtle suggestion that a self-governing Transkei was no 
different from a South African colony. 
 
 
Against the background of the threat that the Republican government and  Matanzima 
perceived in the leftists‘ activities there surfaced a pressing need to fill-in the 
parliamentary seat of Salakuphathwa Sarhili.90 The test of strength would be exhibited 
in the envisaged election of 25 November 1964 in Gcalekaland (Elliotdale, Willowvale, 
Centani and Dutywa).91 This, the first election since the formation of political parties, 
would gauge the political influence of party leadership in the region of the contested 
seat.92 The RDM report gave an idea of the political importance of the event, ‗the 
Gcalekaland result can influence profoundly not only the future course of the Transkei 















the interconnectedness between the politics of the abaThembu chieftainships and that 
of the Republican government. The TNIP‘s victory would be a set-back for the DP and a 
rejection of the values of the LP whose operations in the Dalindyebo region had been 
sanctioned by Sabata in defiance of the political interests of both the South African 
Government and their middleman, Matanzima. Proof that the activities of the LP in the 
Transkei were anathema to Matanzima was evident in his remark that Vigne was ‗a wolf 
in sheepskin…working for his own people who wish to maintain white domination over 
us on the pretext that he is working for equality in a multiracial state‘.94 The 
amaGcaleka‘s endorsement of either Poto‘s or Matanzima‘s territorial leadership 
through their votes would be a confirmation as to whether they wanted closer 
association, or not, with the ‗white man‘, as reflected in the multiracialism policy 
championed by Poto who represented ‗a platform that stood simply for democratic 
government, in which all the people of the Transkei-Black-White-Coloured groups would 
share‘.95 Sabata also endorsed the DP‘s political philosophy when he declared that ‗we 
seek a state in which the colour of a man‘s skin plays no part in his civic rights‘.96  
 
Matanzima‘s counterproposal was for an ‗all-Black Transkei‘, in which Whites would not, 
at any point in future, be guaranteed rights of citizenship. He also consolidated the 
chiefs behind him and instilled in them the fear that a DP-led government would 
relegate them to political obscurity and ultimately destroy the institution of 
chieftainship.97 The jockeying for dominance of the Transkeian political terrain between 
the Poto and Matanzima factions quickly translated into a Thembu versus Mpondo duel. 
Further, the prevailing tension within the ranks of abaThembu chiefs over the question 
of their paramountcy turned their kingdom into a powerhouse that fuelled the territorial 
political engagements. The packages that each party promised to deliver to the chiefs 
appeared to be a decisive factor in determining both the political leadership and future 
of Transkei governance. Matanzima‘s betting on chieftainship seemed to be the best 
option at a time when power hitherto vested in that institution could not compete with 
what the state conferred on ordinary citizens. Those chiefs who had survived the 
battering that came with the non-indigenous provisions of the BAA were poised to 















He appealed to individual chiefs‘ sentiments, and challenged and interrogated all 
personal ambitions other than his own. His repeated warnings in his election manifesto 
that in Poto‘s government ‘the chiefs would be kicked out‘98 must be analysed within the 




The long-standing institutional problems that had been inherent feature in abaThembu 
chieftainship in pre-independence Transkei were suddenly exacerbated by a peripheral 
power struggle. The institutional chieftainship had hitherto been plagued by forces from 
without and within and now it found itself having to allow its members‘ to be informed by 
either their self-interest or pro-democratic viewpoints. Rider‘s explanation of the different 
approaches of Matanzima and Poto simplifies it all: 
Matanzima went for the backing of the chiefs and entrenchment of their powers. 
The appeal of Poto, as the father figure and man of the people that his 
lieutenants represented him to be, was mainly to the elected representatives.99  
 
Matanzima, who had earlier predicted with confidence that the DP would lose the 
Gcalekaland by-election, had gone so far as to call ‗on the party he thought would lose 
to resign because----it clearly did not enjoy the confidence of the people‘.100 He was, of 
course, proved wrong. The DP victory in the Gcalekaland elections  gave Poto an 
opportunity to reformulate Matanzima‘s words by stating that the victory for the 
Democratic Party was ‗clearly a vote of complete confidence in our policy of multi-
racialism and democracy. By the same token, the by-election showed only too obviously 
that the people of the Transkei reject separate development and everything it stands 
for‘.101  
 
Hans Abraham found reasons for the DP‘s victory in Gcalekaland, in the ‗leftists‘ 
exploitation of the ‗Bantu‘s‘ antipathy towards the Government‘s policy of 
rehabilitation‗.102  Clearly, the partisan role of the South African government was crucial 
in both the struggle for power within the House of Mthikrakra as well as in the territorial 
struggle for the leadership of the Transkei. Whilst the victory came as a blow to the 















to pronounce his status as a political ‗match cum equal‘ to his political rival. He called on 
Matanzima and his cabinet to resign as he reiterated that ‗the election results will…also 
give the Democratic Party the impetus it needs to topple the Transkei Government if it 
fails to resign‘.104  
 
 
Poto‘s order, coming as it did from the DP ranks of Sabata, and supposing it was to be 
obeyed by the Chief Minister, would place the abaThembu Paramount Chief in a 
position of great moral strength, and in that way possibly frustrate Matanzima‘s 
application for paramountcy.  It thus emerged that with the outcome of the election,   
Gcalekaland had become a battleground of contending political factions, and thus 
indirectly a force in the issues that divided territorial chiefs, generally, and abaThembu 
chiefs, in particular, between the Matanzima and Sabata blocs.  
 
To further entice the chiefs while consolidating his grip on them as his support base, 
Matanzima announced in December of 1964  ‗big salary increases for some chiefs and 
all headmen. These increases would also apply to chiefs who were not members of the 
Legislative Assembly‘.105 Herein one sees Matanzima‘s advantage over his political 
adversaries in the authority he was now exercising in the distribution of resources from 
the Governor-General‘s office. Four months later he received a pat on the back for his 
continuous good work for the government. This was when he was presented with a 
horse by De Wet Nel, at the occasion of the centenary celebrations marking the political 
transfer of the Glen Grey abaThembu to the Transkei. While making the presentation 
the minister acknowledged that he knew Chief Matanzima to be an excellent 
horseman‘.106 The horse was perhaps an appropriate gift for a ‗political shepherd‘, 
Matanzima, who was engaged in herding the Glen Grey abaThembu back to their ‗so-
called‘ home. De Wet Nel also announced the government contribution of R400,000 
towards the construction of Cofimvaba Hospital which would be run by the Nederduitse 
Gereformeerde Kerk.107 Gestures like this symbolized material resources that would 
continue to draw the Cofimvaba community closer and closer to Matanzima while 

















Eight months later, however, Matanzima‘s efforts to guarantee himself the chiefs‘ votes 
were together with the amaGcalekaland defeat, politically challenged by TNIP losses in 
Mzimkhulu and amaMfenguland‘.108 The TNIP‘s vigorous election campaign which was 
not matched by campaigning of similar strength from the DP must be seen in the light of 
the above. The NP‘s partisanship of the Matanzima cause was evident in the provisions 
that were made to enable the ‗thousands‘ of voters living far away from home to vote. 
Employers were asked to allow their voter-employees time off to vote at the Reef polling 
stations which were supposed to open from 7 a.m. to 9 p.m. on 24 August. Government 
patronage of the kind mentioned above, gave credence to Rajuili‘s earlier complaint of 
the systematic exclusion of the DP from State benefits. Furthermore, Matanzima‘s 
insistence that the chiefs had him to thank for their enhanced political status which 
qualified them for seats in the Legislative House109 flew in the face of his king and 
cousin, Sabata, who shared Poto‘s sentiments. In another context Kotze plays down 
Matanzima‘s self-praise in his claim that the chiefs would not dare contradict the South 
African government. It is obvious that their rallying behind Matanzima had more to do 
with their determination to bow to that government‘s interests than to  reward him for the 
benefits he had secured for them, for ‗this attitude [of avoiding the collision course with 
the government] accounted for some support from the chiefs for Matanzima who was 
regarded as pro-government in the mid-sixties‘.110 True to Laurence‘s statement, the 
fact that the chiefs were paid by the government made them susceptible to its wishes 
because it had the power to depose them.111 Bhekisizwe Mthikrakra has claimed that 
Sabata, whose accession to power had not been smooth and who did not have 
Matanzima‘s political leverage, spent many nights on Intaba kaMantentente–Mount 
Mantentente - in Tyhalarha. He had installed Chief Vululwandle Mthikrakra to act for him 
while he was actively involved in government politics.112  
 
SELF-GOVERNING TRANSKEI SANCTIONS THE INAUGURATION OF A SECOND 
PARAMOUNTCY IN THE HOUSE OF MTHIKRAKRA  
 
When Matanzima applied for recognition as paramount chief in April 1962 his original 















Xhalanga-Glen Grey districts. Matanzima‘s territory had been drastically increased and 
this eventually resulted in the re-demarcation and adjustment of Sabata‘s territorial 
boundaries. The timing of the application validates Mda‘s claim of a connection between 
territorial size and remuneration as complementary factors in Matanzima‘s  ascendancy 
to paramountcy. The recommendations of Bruce Young which were in favour of granting 
Matanzima the status of paramountcy over Western abaThembuland comprising St. 
Marks and Xhalanga districts113 still applied in May 1965 when the paramountcy petition 
surfaced after three years‘ dormancy. The RDM correspondent reported thus:  
A lifelong ambition of the Transkei Chief Minister, Kaiser Matanzima‘s 
ascendancy to paramount chieftainship is now almost certainly around the 
corner. The Transkei Legislative Assembly will be asked to confer on Chief 
Matanzima the title of Paramount Chief of Emigrant Tembuland.114  
 
Robert  Msengana, an elected member from Emigrant abaThembuland, gave notice of 
a motion in terms of the Transkei Constitution Act, calling on the Legislative Assembly 
to create a paramount chieftaincy for Emigrant abaThembuland and recommended to 
the State President that the title be conferred on Chief Matanzima.115 The Star 
correspondent also reported on the circumstances surrounding the introduction of the 
motion:  
by a Government representative, R. B. Msengana, of the Emigrant 
abaThembuland, a region ruled by the Chief Minister cum Minister of Finance, 
asking that the Paramount chieftainship and sub-chieftainship be conferred on 
the brothers, K.D. Matanzima and G.M.M. Matanzima respectively.116 
 
Their  motion sparked an unprecedented and heated debate because Matanzima‘s area 
of jurisdiction was a sub-region of Sabata‘s greater abaThembuland. The Deputy-
Leader of the Opposition, K.N. Guzana, immediately moved an amendment saying that 
the designation of the Chief Minister as a Paramount Chief in his region, and the other 
designations mentioned in the motion, should be referred to Paramount Chief Sabata 
Dalindyebo of Tembuland.117 The controversy surrounding Matanzima‘s paramountcy 
as well as the subsequent debates about it tended to divide not only the abaThembu 
chieftainship but Transkeian territorial chieftainship generally. Chief D.D.P. Ndamase, 
















bloodshed might follow the elevation of the Transkei Chief Minister….to the 
paramountcy over emigrant Tembuland unless the correct procedure was 
adopted …….because it is against the procedure of African law and 
custom……and it would establish a dangerous precedent and undermine the 
status of the other Transkei paramount chiefs. Tribal subordinates to the 
paramount chiefs would clamour for this elevated status. The Transkei 
constitution makes provision for the creation of paramount chieftainships and 
chieftainships. But the constitution also entrenches African law and custom. Is 
constitutional procedure going to negate what a nation considers its custom?118  
 
Ndamase was clearly warning against the creation of a dangerous precedent which, he 
feared, would ruin the value that acknowledgement and recognition of the existence of 
hierarchy added to the institution of chieftainship. He was upholding the view that 
‗African law and custom‘ should take precedence over constitutional prescriptions of 
colonial origin.  
 
Later the RDM reported on the walkout of opposition party members from the TLA on 
being asked to vote on a motion which sought to confer paramount chieftainship on 
Matanzima. This action was a clear endorsement of Ndamase‘s earlier remark about 
the cultural impropriety of overriding customary procedures. The walkout, a practical 
statement that the opposition would not participate in the voting process, came after 
Guzana‘s amendment, calling for consultation with Sabata, was outvoted by 52 votes to 
37. The pro-government speakers insisted that Sabata‘s involvement was irrelevant 
because  ‗it was not a new paramountcy that was being sought, [but] merely recognition 
of one established 100 years ago. There was no obligation, legal or customary, on the 
Emigrant Tembus to have to approach Paramount Chief Sabata‘.119 In July of the same 
year the World reported that ‗Sabata‘s inkundla has rejected in uncompromising terms 
Chief Kaiser Matanzima‘s claim to the kingship of Emigrant Tembuland and has called 
on him to come to Sabata‘s headquarters here to answer for himself‘.120The decision to 
reject Matanzima was taken by abaThembu from Mthatha, Mqanduli, Ngcobo and Lady 
Frere at a ‗mammoth indaba’ at Sabata‘s Bumbane Great Place.  AbaThembu anger 
could not have been better expressed than in their shouts as they summoned the 
person of Daliwonga: ‗Call Matanzima here. He has no respect for our King and it will 















… Sabata is accepted as the only king of Tembuland. To hell with Matanzima‘, was 
what they  proclaimed. 121 
 
No amount of persuasion would make Matanzima slacken in his efforts to entice and 
rally the chiefs behind him as he cunningly and aggressively carved both his political 
and traditional ascent. A few weeks later he reiterated what he envisaged as the revived 
role of the ‗chiefs-vested power‘ in the Transkei. During a parliamentary debate he 
stressed that ‗the powers of the chiefs…would be increased and would never be 
reduced‘.122Matanzima‘s taking up cudgels for the chiefs while Sabata was, in Carter‘s 
words, regarded as  ‘the foremost opponent of the preponderance of chiefs in the 
TLA‗123 again reduced  the politics of the self-governing Transkei into a battleground 
between the two men. The slightest differences in the political philosophies of the DP 
and the TNIP always degenerated into a self-sustaining struggle to preserve the 
centrality of abaThembu paramountcy against Matanzima‘s efforts to carve an 
independent counterpart, or to create one, in Emigrant abaThembuland. A new 
dimension in the DP‘s criticism of the Transkei Authorities Bill as ‗undemocratic‘ was 
that it was mischievously interpreted by Matanzima as a rejection of chieftainship by the 
opposition. It became clear that Matanzima was determined to empower the chiefs 
enough to oblige them to vote him into a senior chieftainship when the time came. His 
recommendation of more powers for chiefs was meant to encourage compliance with 
the Government schemes and also outwit opposition to the realization of his ambitions 
in the TLA where chiefs were most powerful.  
 
Poto had remarked earlier that he hoped  
 the chiefs on their side will understand that I have no wish to have them thrown 
outside, but if they are going to think only of their own interests, they will not be 
regarded as representatives of the people…I hope you will have no trouble and 
that you will realize you are lost if you stick to the policy of separate 
development.124   
 
Guzana echoed Poto‘s sentiments, declaring that  ‗[c]hiefs who continued to support 
separate development were using a spade to dig their own graves ….those who did not 















opposition argued that the Transkei Authorities Bill (TAB) would lead to a dictatorship by 
the chiefs, and also attacked it for being undemocratic, Matanzima stressed the 
administrative role of the chiefs in local and national affairs, as ‗Transkei‘s people 
looked on the chiefs as the governors of the territory.126 Kotze has reiterated that the 
belief among many chiefs that only Matanzima‘s policy would be tolerated by the 
Republican Government gave him an added advantage.127 He contended that the TAB 
was based on the tradition of rule by the chief and his councillors and further warned the 
opposition supporters that they ‗must respect the traditional leaders. If you do not you 
will find yourself clashing with the people who pay allegiance to their traditional 
leaders.‘128  
 
The K.D. Matanzima party‘s principle about the chiefs was further boosted when G. J. 
Grobler, a prominent Transkei Government official, told an audience of visiting chiefs 
from Zimbabwe that ‗chiefs were elected by God‘.129 Grobler‘s testimony about the 
‗divine right‘ of chieftainship was historically significant for the brand of chieftainship that 
Matanzima was crafting for himself with the backing of the Nationalist government. In 
his address Grobler recommended the BAA on the basis that not only did it allow Blacks 
to control their own affairs but it also fitted in with their socio-political traditions in as 
much as it meant the ‗restoration of traditional Bantu democracy‘.130 Grobler‘s 
controversial speech which emphasised the responsibility that God had prescribed for 
the chiefs:  ‗they dare not sit back….if they fail, they fail not only their own people but 
also the Almighty God‘131 was bound to impact in one way or the other on the rift 
between Sabata and Matanzima. Whilst it upheld the ‗divine mandate‘ of chiefs over 
their wards, and in this way appealed to Matanzima‘s thinking, it omitted the chiefs‘ 
obligation to take their cue from their paramount chief.   
 
K.D. Matanzima benefitted from his use of chiefs to strengthen his political ascendancy 
and   to eliminate the threat that the opposition, which cushioned Sabata, posed. This 
was confirmed in an article in the Star’ which  reported that the support of the TNIP was 
visibly growing due to the influence of the Transkei‘s chiefs and headmen.132 















abaThembuland while several minor chiefs offered themselves for election thereby 
obviously giving Matanzima added political advantage over Sabata. Hans Abraham also 
endorsed the legitimacy of chiefly rule when he asserted that chieftainship  ‗was not 
being foisted on the African people of Africa in general, and the Transkei in particular, 
but was a creation of the African spirit and mother Africa‘.133 He subsequently 
commented that ‗having taken note of the wild schemes hatched by those protagonists 
of so-called democracy, I can understand why they condemn chieftainship, because 
their political creations are nothing but the handmaidens of communism, if not 
communism itself‘.134  
 
Matanzima later took it upon himself personally to pledge support for the South African 
Government in the TNIP‘s election manifesto, promising that ‘in the event of a 
communist or communist-inspired attack on South Africa, the TNIP would pledge its 
support to South Africa‘.135 It must be noted that at the time in which this pledge was 
made Matanzima had been officially appointed as paramount chief of Western 
abaThembuland, with effect from 1 April 1966. 136 Matanzima was  someone not known 
for his compassion, so his subsequent invitation to Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo 
to install his (Matanzima‘s) son, Mtheth‘uvumile (Mthetho), as a regional abaThembu 
chief137 must be seen in the light of his aim to have strategic appointments in his now 
upgraded Emigrant abaThembuland ‗kingdom‘.  
 
 
There does not seem to be consensus concerning whether or not Sabata actually 
installed Mthetho. If we accept the popular assumption that Sabata ignored the 
invitation, his disregard of this ‗pseudo‘ honour was, and is, interesting, as regards the 
politics of the abaThembu chieftainship for a variety of reasons. For one thing, because 
of the Transkei government‘s non-recognition of Sabata‘s paramountcy in Emigrant 
abaThembuland such an installation would not validate the recognition of Mthetho.  On 
the one hand, in issuing the invitation, Matanzima implicitly acknowledged Sabata‘s 
paramountcy. Furthermore, at the time of the proposed installation Sabata and 















quite a huge leap, given the weighting of regional chieftainship in the traditional 
hierarchy, would imply that the abaThembu chieftainship in Western abaThembuland 
was a Matanzima affair. While it was not clear what Matanzima‘s motive was in inviting 
Sabata, the suggestion that ‗if Chief Sabata declines the invitation, the Chief Minister 
will do it‘,138 provided he went ahead and installed his son, would have been a political 
anomaly. A father was not supposed to invest his son with traditional authority while he 
himself was still an active chief. Further, Mthetho‘s chieftainship was not justifiable in 
the light of Mhlathi‘s contention that someone else held Matanzima‘s chieftainship 
during both his terms as premier and later president of the Transkei.139 Ngangomhlaba 
has endorsed the above contention in his admission that his father, Headman 
Thambekile Matanzima, held Matanzima‘s chieftainship from 1963 to 1972 after which 
he (Ngangomhlaba) took over as acting paramount chief and ruled until 1986.140 
Mgudlwa‘s evidence that Mthetho was on the payroll as a chief who ruled until he died 
without having ever been installed141 poses grave questions about the customary 
validity of the current chieftainship of Mthetho‘s son. On the other hand, it becomes 
obvious that Matanzima‘s primary aim in pushing the appointment of his son as regional 
chief was a way of securing the Emigrant abaThembuland for the Matanzima dynasty.  
 
 A FAILED ATTEMPT TO ENTRAP SABATA  
After the endorsement of Matanzima‘s paramountcy and in the midst of debates about 
the indispensability of chiefs in African governance there was a period when reports that 
detailed a plot to kill Matanzima proliferated. Bhekisizwe has given an account of the 
arrival of two White visitors at Sabata‘s Sithebe Great Place. The twosome, who were - 
it later transpired-policemen, met Nkosiyane, Sabata‘s  former secretary. They informed 
Nkosiyane that they had come to advise Sabata of his unpopularity with the ‗Matanzima 
government‘ and their plan to murder Matanzima. Nkosiyane immediately indicated an 
interest in the plan, not having noticed that the conversation was being recorded. The 
visitors later convinced Nkosiyane to call Sabata in order to arrange to talk to him face-
to-face. On being told that Sabata was at Bumbane the policemen asked Nkosiyane to 
accompany them there. Sabata flatly refused even to see his ‗visitors‘ and the 















Sabata‘s refusal even to meet the provocateurs gives the impression that he either 
suspected a trap or simply did not want to be involved in any assassination attempt 
irrespective of whether or not the ‗men under cover‘ were  genuine or not.   
 
 
Mthikrakra‘s narrative is echoed in the report that appeared in the Rand Daily Mail 
giving an account of the arrest under the Transkei‘s ‗emergency regulations of 1960 -- 
which provide[d] for indefinite detention‘ - of five members of the DP.  The five men, L. 
Z. Majija, Nkosiyane, C.N Nogcantsi, Cromwell Diko and Albert Raziya, were arrested in 
connection with an alleged conspiracy to murder. The key person in the extensive 
investigation was a suspected special agent who, it was claimed, ‗had been seen 
frequently in the company of one of the detained men and [was reported] to have been 
present when the Security Branch took the men into custody‘.143 While it made sense to 
arrest the suspects - provided there was overwhelming evidence to justify it - with the 
existence of a probability  that the plot could only have been hatched by pro-Matanzima  
government people, it remains to be asked whether there was a conspiracy to smear 
the opposition party so as to justify the detention of its members in order to eliminate it. 
A subsequent issue of the RDM gave details of how Nkosiyane and Nogcantsi solicited 
the advice of a certain White man as they plotted the death of Matanzima, which would 
pave the way for the election of someone from the DP to lead the Transkei 
government.144 Kotze has also alluded to the High Court conviction of two DP members 
of the Assembly, Nkosiyane and Nogcantsi, on the grounds of their conspiring to kill the 
Chief Minister.145 It must be noted that if these reports were found to be true, much to 
Matanzima‘s gratification, they would surely harm the reputation of Sabata in his 
capacity as a prominent member of the opposition. 
 
THE POLITICAL PACT BETWEEN MATANZIMA AND BOTHA SIGCAU :  WAS  
THE FARM GIFT A FACTOR? 
 
The relationship of Matanzima with Botha Sigcau which had been in existence from the 
early sixties, became a decisive factor in tilting the balance of power in Transkeian 
politics in favour of Matanzima. In respect of  these the Sigcau factor impacted on 















influenced chiefs far beyond his own borders. He had earlier cunningly declined Poto 
and Sabata permission to visit his Qawukeni region to speak about their manifestos.146 
It might have been thought that Botha would back Poto, not only because they were 
both amaMpondo, but also because Poto had supported Botha against his cousin 
Nelson Sigcau during the Mpondo succession crisis of 1939.147 This ‗royal‘ 
understanding, which seemed to complement the Sabata-Poto political affinity, also 




The key question is whether Botha Sigcau‘s support for Matanzima was in any way 
linked to the farm he coincidentally received from the South African Government.  
George Oliver, of the RDM reported the clinching of a land deal by the Transkei 
Government which saw the title of a 2,630 morgen farm near Lusikisiki being granted to 
Chief Sigcau and his successors. The controversial farm was valued by the Transkei 
Chief Agricultural Officer at R10 a Morgen, while an attorney claimed that the same 
farm would probably fetch about R25 a morgen or more if sold on the open market. 
Significantly, the donation occurred at the very time when media reports claimed that 
Botha held the balance of power between Poto and Matanzima prior to the advent of 
self-government in the Transkei.148 The pact between Matanzima and Sigcau would 
eventually earn Matanzima enough votes to outwit Poto in 1963. Nonkonyana and 
Satula confirmed that in the mid-sixties Botha would be seen, especially in the 
evenings, in certain villages of Libode-Ngqeleni districts which fell under Poto‘s 
jurisdiction, urging people to vote for Matanzima exhorting the ―maMpondo! [to vote for 
Matanzima] votelan‘uMatanzima‘ .149It was the same warm relationship between the two 
chiefs that is believed to have been behind the thwarting of the initiative to erect and 
unveil the tombstone of Ngoza, a scion from Mthembu‘s Great House through Mvelase, 
by the Qhudeni clans of the Mbambisa, Mangisa and Dlulane in 1963.150 The land on 
which Ngoza‘s grave still stands, kwesikaNgoza, Ngoza‘s place, is in proximity to 
Sigcau‘s  Great Place. This might explain the complex forces and factors that were 















the Qhudeni clans watching the grave opened negotiations with the Matanzima 
government to erect and unveil the tombstone.    
 
 
As had been mentioned earlier, Poto and the leading members of the DP were to be 
disappointed when Sigcau ditched them. The confirmation that Chief Botha Sigcau had 
accepted the government‘s gift of the Qaukeni Great Place Farm explained the rationale 
behind his equivocal support for Matanzima and the South African government, despite 
his assertion that there ‗was no connection at all between the grant and my support for 
Chief Matanzima…In any case, it was long before the election‘.151  It then transpired 
that the donation which was referred to in the ‗documents that effected transfer to Chief 
Sigcawu and his successors in title‘152 was, in fact authorised by De Wet Nel, the 
Minister of Bantu Administration and Development,  in his capacity as trustee of the 
South African Native Trust which had owned the land.153 The report - to the effect that 
the government had been negotiating the gift for a considerable time before the 
transaction which was finally concluded on 24 July 1963154  - seems to have paved the 
way for an extra-friendly pact between the Sabata-Poto counterparts.  
 
One of the Sunday newspapers, whose chairman was Dr. Verwoerd, reported on Nel‘s 
resentment of the insinuation in the RDM that the Department of Bantu Administration 
(DBA) had  ‗bribed the Transkei Paramount Chief, Botha Sigcawu to support Chief 
Minister Matanzima in the 1963 election ….Plans to make over the land to Paramount 
Chief Sigcau were made seven years before the election‘.155 Significantly, Nel‘s timeline 
coincided with the implementation of the BAA. Bruce Young‘s version that  ‗as long ago 
as 1956, the department had been negotiating with Chief Sigcawu to take over his 
tribe‘s traditional grazing land on the coast near Lusikisiki for experimental purposes‘156 
was slightly different. ‗It was thus in return for this proposal that Sigcau was given the 
2,630 morgen that now forms his Great Place at Qaukeni, nine miles from Lusikisiki‘.157 
Nel subsequently tried to prove that the ‗Government officials‘ varied responses were 
based on valid reasons by remarking in an interview with a Sunday paper: ‗making 
presents of farms to African chiefs was common practice and a custom that dated back 















he stated that grants of land had been made to other chiefs. The association of the two 
leaders was further consolidated by a short-lived marital union, between Sigcau‘s heir 
and one of Matanzima‘s daughters. The wedding was aptly described as  ‗one of the 
most important political ceremonies the country is likely to see in the 1970s, having 
cemented Chief Matanzima‘s ties with Chief Sigcawu, leader of the biggest political 
division in the territory‘.159 The apparent dynastic pact between the Western 
abaThembuland and Eastern amaMpondoland posed a potential threat to Chief Sabata 
but he had no way of countering it. 
 
‘MORE LAND OR WITHDRAWAL!!’. JONGUHLANGA BACKS THE DEMOCRATIC 
PARTY DEMANDS ON CHIEF MATANZIMA  
 
In 1972 Sabata made a revelation which was bound to aggravate the rift between him 
and Matanzima. He claimed to have attended a meeting which approved the 
Bantustan‘s ultimatum to the [South African} government for more land. The meeting, 
according to Sabata, was attended by about 50 TLA members from both the TNIP and 
the DP. He described the meeting as an informal gathering at which Matanzima 
presented a five-page memorandum containing an ultimatum to the government, which 
the opposition members termed  ‗a charge of political dynamite‘. The memorandum was 
said to have contained a clause stating that  ‗unless the Transkei is granted the land it 
seeks it will abandon separate development and join the urban African in his fight for 
representation in the Cape Town Parliament.‘160 Kotze has also referred to the remark 
that Matanzima  made about the land claims at the 1972 annual congress of the TNIP :  
 
The land we claim ….was unilaterally and cynically raped by the Union 
Government….We have as much right to land and financial expenditure as 
he[White person] has. It is the Black sweat which has given him a comfortable 
home while the Black man is living in filthy locations.It is the Black man that has 
contributed principally through his cheap labour to the wealth of the White men 
in South Africa.161  
 
Sabata for his part called on Matanzima to expand upon this. He demanded that ‗Chief 
Kaiser must tell us the full story. He promised that if the Government refused his claims 
for more land he would support the Democratic Party policy and seek full rights for 















the Chief Minister was given a mandate to go to Cape Town to force the land issue with 
the government after he had supposedly appealed, in vain, to the DP to sink their 
political differences and unite with the TNIP on the land demands. He also admitted that 
the DP‘s refusal was based on their principled rejection of the Bantustan concept.163  
 
A month later Sabata addressed a meeting in Soweto and repeated his revelations of 
Matanzima‘s  threats to withdraw his support of the government‘s separate development 
policy,  ‘we were having tea together when he told me about his claims for more land for 
the Transkei‘.164 Sabata made his revelations in response to a question put to him by 
Lennox Mlonzi, the amaXhosa representative in the Soweto Urban Bantu Council 
(UBC). At the same time Sabata warned urban Africans not to accept ethnic grouping  
‘You are one nation, irrespective of your tribal affiliations. Whites in the South African 
Parliament are of different ethnic groups. Why should you allow yourselves to be 
split?‘165 he challenged them.  
 
Without a doubt Transkeian politics in the early seventies were generally stormy and the 
tensions were often exaggerated by the verbal exchanges between the ruling party and 
its counterpart through Matanzima and Sabata. In the midst of Matanzima‘s efforts to 
have the world acknowledge and recognise Transkei‘s self-government, a Sunday 
Times reporter, Caroline Clark, quoted Guzana telling Matanzima to ‗renounce the 
policy of separate development as unworkable or resign as Chief Minister‗.166 Guzana‘s 
challenge, which seemed to echo what Sabata had earlier told a Soweto audience, was 
made in the context of an interview that followed Prime Minister Vorster‘s offer of 
‗independence-without-consolidation of land‘. Clark‘s report quoted Guzana as having 
said ‗Chief Matanzima has failed in his land dispute with the government and has lost 
the faith of the Transkei….He has run up against a granite wall, the Nationalist 
Government, and only the Transkei can suffer. He used threats against the Republican 
Government, and his bluff has failed.‘167  Guzana further called upon Matanzima to put 
into practice his earlier threat of renouncing separate development if Transkeian land 















so, I challenge the Paramount chief to stick to his ultimatum and renounce separate 
development as unworkable, or resign as Chief Minister‘.168  
 
It must be noted, however, that the DP had neither agreed nor committed to joining with 
Matanzima in the demand for land. What Sabata wanted rather was that Matanzima 
should come clean about what he had stated in his ultimatum, and what he was going to 
do about it. Clark was later to report that while Matanzima  indicated his commitment to 
putting pressure on the South African government until the disputed  land –White‘ areas 
in the districts of Matatiele, Umzimkulu, Mount Currie (Kokstad) and Maclear and also 
the White enclave at Port St Johns – was restored, he later he conveniently denied  the 
Transkeian opposition‘s allegations. He disassociated himself from the claim that, in a  
last ditch attempt to gain victory on the land dispute, he had issued an ultimatum to the 
South African Government threatening to renounce separate development : ‗I was 
incorrectly interpreted by the Opposition. I made no such ultimatum and I have no 
intention of taking such a step,‘169  he asserted. He coupled the issue of land with the 
question of repatriation as if to counter Sabata‘s earlier comment in his address at 
Soweto. Jonguhlanga had said that it was  ‗a lie that we want urban Transkeians to 
return to their homeland - we have no work or accommodation for you‘.170 Matanzima 
proposed a condition that ‗unless we receive the disputed land — we will oppose the 
repatriation of our people outside the Transkei to our already overburdened country. 
They will become stateless.‘171 Laurence has confirmed the disputed lands and added 
that Matanzima also demanded the amaXhosa take-over of the White towns that were 
excluded from Transkei control in the 1963 Constitution.172 Chief Mthetho had earlier 
also raised his voice alongside that of his father on the land issue. He referred to the 
much ‗inflated‘ land dispute claims between the Transkei government and M.C.Botha, 
the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, and remarked that, ‘M.C. thinks 
our Cabinet Ministers are his farmboys because he told the Press he was reprimanding 
the Chief Minister‘.173 Mthetho also insinuated that the apartheid government seemed to 
be reluctant to fulfill its earlier promises, for ‘the Transkei has been at a constitutional 















the land dispute against the South African government there was also the question of 
outwitting Sabata for his earlier call on Matanzima to execute his threats against SA.    
 
THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY ARRESTS AND THE ISOLATION OF SABATA  
 
The attitude of the Transkei Government hardened towards the opposition as its 
nominal independence approached and this threatened both the existence and political  
activity of the only official opposition organization. The conflict  between the ruling party 
and its opposition revolved around the acceptance or rejection of the notion of 
Bantustan independence. Matanzima, equivocated between what has been described 
by Streek and Wicksteed as the Matanzima brothers‘ ‗United States of Southern 
Africa‘.175Matanzima‘s critics, according to Kotze, argued that if his rather unrealistic 
land claims were acceded to they would strengthen his power on a tribal basis in the 
Legislative Assembly. In turn, the strengthening of Matanzima‘s  tribal power would 
inadvertently impact on Sabata‘s political weight.  
 
Matanzima‘s eventual opting for (nominal) independence in 1974 once more brought 
him back into the South African fold and thereby aligned his practical thinking with that 
of Pretoria. In it is to be found the germ that nurtured the events that precipitated 
Guzana‘s ousting from DP leadership on the grounds that he was upholding local sub-
national politics.176 Matanzima‘s  stand, in an ironic twist of events, invited visible and 
radical opposition from Ncokazi, who identified the DP, with the ‗Liberation 
Movements‘177 with which he hoped to forge links. Guzana was thus considered no 
match for Ncokazi whose professed aim was to boost the ‗Black Consciousness‘ 
philosophy, much to Matanzima‘s chagrin. He called the TLA a pseudo–parliament and 
insisted that the DP yearned for ‗freedom rather than multiracialism‘.  
 
Guzana had unwittingly tarnished his image in the eyes of his party membership. He 
had helped ‗shepherd‘ the draft Transkei constitution through the assembly, interpreted 
with patience various sections and even moved for their approval,178 this despite his 
initial support of the DP‘s rejection of the principle of independence. This could explain 















who apparently did not have it in his heart to uphold traditional politics and advance with 
enthusiasm the cause of centralised abaThembu paramountcy.179 Matanzima‘s offer to 
Guzana was one way of paralysing the opposition at a time when its numerical 
weakness could well be an assurance to him that he was indeed the Transkei‘s lifetime 
‗Governor-General‘. His subsequent warning to Guzana, whom he preferred as a leader 
of the opposition, to get rid of the dissidents in his party because they were ‗communist 
fellow-travellers; was an outright expression of the rejection of Ncokazi. Any allusion to 
‗liberation‘ meant communism to Matanzima.‘ Therefore Sabata‘s association with 
Ncokazi was obviously perceived as an  identification with the enemies of Transkei‘s 
imminent freedom.   
 
 
Once the question of independence became an issue for debate, one Democratic Party 
member after another was arrested. A few months before independence the Cape 
Times flashed news of the arrest of a prominent DP politician, Ncokazi.180  He was 
arrested in terms of proclamation R400 of the Transkei Emergency Regulations. 
Ncokazi was reported to have, inter alia, accused the ‗Matanzima government‘ of trying 
to get rid of all effective opposition by detaining DP members.181 Kotze has, in 
Laurence, confirmed that Matanzima‘s TNIP did everything in its power to discredit the 
DP as an illegal party whose multi-racial slogan was a symbol of anti-government 
violence.182 The justification for the accusation and subsequent arrests was in Brigadier 
Mattheys‘ confirmation brief of the detention of L. Mpumlwana, I. Nomkruca, N. 
Nogcantsi and later S. A. Xobololo.183 Xobololo was arrested on the eve of his moving 
an ‗amendment rejecting independence because 1,5 million Transkei people living in 
urban areas in South Africa would become stateless on independence‘.184 It must be 
observed that Xobololo‘s statement echoed Sabata‘s sentiments to the effect that 
expatriates would be homeless and unemployed. The Daily Dispatch confirmed that the 
arrests of Xobololo and Chief L.L. Mgudlwa had left the DP with no representation in the 
Assembly. This was after the arrests of Nkosiyane, who was the national chairman of 
the party, Miss F. Mangcotywa, the Secretary of the Dalindyebo region, and her 
















In the midst of the arrests of the opposition members - a daily occurrence for as long as 
there were remaining party representatives – Matanzima engineered the approval by 
the TLA of the Transkei Bantustan‘s constitution within ten minutes. After calling for 
amendments to the draft and waiting a little in silence he declared the Transkeian 
Government‘s satisfaction with the draft in its present form and went on to say that  it 
would ‗now be put to the Transkeian Parliament for formal adoption after 
independence‘.185 Stultz has confirmed that at all the meetings that were held between 
4t May and 27 July 1976 Matanzima excluded the possibility of discussing the principle 
of independence, arguing that, [that] opportunity had existed in March 1974‘.186 Two 
more DP leaders, O. Mpondo of Butterworth and W.D Pupuma of Ngqamakhwe, were 
later detained in addition to those who had been detained before they could be 
nominated for the general election which was yet to come.187 Streek and Wicksteed 
have made a significant comment regarding the fact that the detained DP members 
were in the end released without being charged, despite the accusation levelled against 
the party as being Marxist. The detentions were indeed aimed at stifling the DP from 
operating as the official opposition, obviously because of the anathema that Ncokazi 
had become in the eyes of the Matanzima government. The other ulterior motive which 
informed the arrests was obviously to control at all costs the threat that the same 
government perceived Sabata to be.  
 
Transkei politics of chieftainship generally seemed to be integrated with, and into, the 
swift increase in political activity that was witnessed in the territory during the weeks 
before independence. The RDM reported the uncovering of a ‗Leftist‘ plot that had been 
hatched to disrupt the Transkei Territory‘s official independence celebrations scheduled 
to take place in the month of October. The plotters were reported to have received 
promises of support from anti-independence groups most likely the BCM and the 
Progressives who were operating in the Transkei.188 It was obvious that these groups 
had the sympathy of Sabata for the reason that they, irrespective of their varied political 
goals, supported  his crusade against the man whose political career constantly spelled 
disaster for the survival of his paramountcy. Laurence also reported on the arrest of the 















independence‘. This was Anderson Joyi, who was scheduled to stand as a candidate for 
the DP in the independence election. His brother, Bangilizwe Joyi was also detained. 
The detention of the Joyi brothers, who were eventually released after independence 
without ever having been charged, brought the number of DP detainees to 13. The next 
DP victim to be arrested was Rev S.K. Masela, after a fire had broken out at the 
Clarkebury Educational Institute where he was a warden.189A factor of great political 
significance for the abaThembu chieftainship and Transkei‘s political landscape prior to 
independence was that, with the latest detentions within the DP ranks, Sabata was left 
as the sole top ‗DP man‘ free to raise his voice against the Transkei independence 
exercise.190  
Arbitrary arrests and other factors led to the drastic decline in DP numbers as the 
independence drew nigh and this was accompanied by a similar pattern in the majority 
seats that the party had boasted of in 1963. Tutor Ndamase‘s defection to the TNIP191 
reinforced the strength of his latest political home. His defection obviously isolated 
Sabata whose only option was to be receptive to any school of thought or organization 
that was radical enough to stifle Matanzima‘s plans.    
THE ROAD TO TRANSKEI ‘INDEPENDENCE’ 
The factors that quickened the tempo of events towards independence provided the 
RDM, reporter,  Laurence, with data that enabled him to write a book on what he called  
‗South Africa‘s incipient client state‘ whose road to independence he described as 
‗Transkei‘s evolution to pseudo-independence‘.192 The reporter‘s portrayal of Matanzima 
as the central figure193 in the book, however, is not a true reflection of the events that 
led to the rise to power of the upstart that Matanzima was. It also does not stress the 
impact of Matanzima‘s political manoeuvres on the unity of Transkei chieftainship 
generally, and the abaThembu paramountcy in particular. Ashford‘s description of Chief 
Daliwonga Matanzima as  ‗a tough, single-minded man who saw in South Africa‘s 
apartheid policy a means of achieving his own nationalist ambitions rather than 
resolving South Africa‘s racial problems‘194 appears to be a more pertinent comment. 















role in the further polarisation of the abaThembu Chieftainship and assault on Sabata‘s  
paramountcy.   
 
Ten days before the Transkei hosted its independence celebrations Denis Herbstein 
reported on Matanzima‘s Transkei landslide victory at the Transkei polls. The detained 
DP members lost their deposits and/or were unable to contest the election because of 
their detention. These included no fewer than four abaThembu chiefs. When questioned 
on the possibility of a one-party state, Matanzima remarked that he would regret the 
extinction of the opposition, saying ‗I am afraid the remaining Opposition members will 
probably join the Government, with one or two exceptions‘.195 One wonders if 
Matanzima did not imagine that Sabata would be one of these exceptions. Matanzima 
interpreted the election result as ‗an unqualified victory for the independence of 
Transkei‘ and expected that it would cause the international community to rethink its 
attitude on recognising the Transkei.  
 
The Johannesburg Star condemned the arrests of chiefs and DP members for having 
done irreparable damage to the image of the Transkei, and stated that such arrests 
were a bad omen for future democratic conduct in the new state.196 Matanzima also 
made it clear that those DP leaders and their followers who were in detention under 
Proclamation 400 would not be released even after the elections. 197He proclaimed his 
victory as an indisputable mandate for his party‘s decision to opt for independence  
under the separate development policy. He also emphasised the irrelevance of a 
referendum in a country where the leader, in this case himself, had the visible backing 
of the people for his independence option. Stultz‘s comment about Matanzima‘s 
manoeuvering singlehandedly Transkei‘s independence is of great significance in its 
endorsement of the accusation that he rammed the idea of separate development down 
the chiefs‘ throats and steamrollered the independence process on behalf of the 
Transkeian citizens. He also drew attention to the power that the chiefs had in 
‗Proclamation 400 -  promulgated in 1960 to contain a peasant rebellion -which provided 
the chiefs with arbitrary powers‘198 over their wards. Matanzima obviously failed to admit 















and keep tabs on his arch-rival, Sabata. The opposition‘s engineered failure, prompted 
Matanzima to say, obviously with gratification, that he regretted ‗the  extinction of the 
Opposition‘.199 He also hinted that his party‘s unity could only be tampered with by 
external forces: ‗I cannot see any split in my party unless the English press interferes 
with my people. The English press hates the Matanzima brothers. I don‘t know why‘,  he 
remarked. 200 This was evidently an allusion to the press‘s condemnation of 
developments in the Transkei.  
 
On 20 October 1976, Laurence wrote that Sigcau of Eastern amaMpondoland had been 
unanimously nominated as President of the Transkei by the TNIP.201 It came as no 
surprise that Matanzima chose, as his state president, his partner in championing 
separate development, and one who had helped hoist him up the ladder of power in 
1963. It was clear that Matanzima was at the apex of the territorial chieftainship a 
position that would enable him to reshape and mould the abaThembu chieftainship to 
his liking.  Two days after Matanzima had responded to questions from Steve Kgame 
and Laurence of the RDM on how he would run his Transkei he learnt of the exodus of 
people from the newly acquired districts of Glen Grey and Herschel.202 The exodus from 
Glen Grey was bound to impact negatively on his constituency because it was an 
historical home of the abaThembu. It was clear that the South African authorities‘ bid to 
assuage Matanzima‘s demands for land by granting him the recently annexed districts 
of Glen Grey and Herschel203 had been counterproductive. Matanzima‘s self-
proclamation as an upholder of amaXhosa nationalist principles was far from re-
assuring to the inhabitants of the Transkei‘s latest territorial acquisitions.  
 
 
The very celebration of ‗independence‘ had seemed like a ceremony to further divide 
and mark the progressive split between Sabata and Matanzima. Sabata was reported to 
have questioned Matanzima‘s sincerity in calling for the release of Mandela at the time 
of the Transkei independence.  The paramount chief argued that if Matanzima were 
genuine he would have made the Transkei experiential exercise an 















Matanzima could not afford to agree to Mandela‘s return. If Mandela had 
returned to the Transkei, I‘m sure there is nobody else we would be voting for, 
as Prime Minister or President.204 
 
The irony of Sabata‘s observation was whether, in the event of Mandela‘s release and 
return to the Transkei, South Africa rather than Matanzima‘s Transkei would have 
attracted international recognition. While Sabata pledged that he would continue to fight 
Chief Matanzima, he noted that with his party members behind bars it would be hard to 
tackle Matanzima.205  
 
TRANSKEI IS DECLARED ‘INDEPENDENT’.   
The day of reckoning eventually came when, to the roar of a gun salute and the crackle 
of fireworks, Transkei declared its independence. The new country‘s brown, white and 
green flag was raised in a stadium specially built for the occasion. Diederichs, the South 
African President, handed over a copy of the Transkei Act to the country‘s first Prime 
Minister, Paramount Chief Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima. Diederichs in this way formally 
divested South Africa of all sovereignty over Transkei and pronounced the territory to be 
a sovereign and independent state. Matanzima was presented with a decoration, the 




The chapter has exposed the forces and factors that made pre-independence  Transkei 
politics complex and inflammable. In this context the interactive role between the 
Matanzima-Sabata tussle for supremacy in abaThembuland and the politics of territorial 
chieftainship generally has been analysed. The chapter has demonstrated that this 
interaction was the major force in the evolution of the dual supertribal power blocks in 
the Transkei. The impact of these power blocks on the unfolding abaThembu 
chieftainship and stability of the institutional paramountcy cannot be undermined. Whilst 
they purported to replace the historical Sabata ‗Royal Council‘ of old their supertribal 
profile in the mid-sixties has been portrayed in the chapter as a national feature. The 















independence Transkei as having added value to the Transkei Opposition politics and in 
that way internationalized the Sabata-Matanzima power struggle.  
 
The chapter has revealed that it was the South African government which  made the 
abaThembu chieftainship vulnerable from both within and on the chieftainship‘s 
periphery. The Nationalists‘ determination to preserve White minority rights by 
employing the services of the chiefs who were yearning for their long-lost power has 
been shown to have forged a double-edged sword. AbaThembu chiefs utilised this 
sword to achieve goals peculiar to their individual situations and inadvertently launched 
their national institution on the road to implosion. 
 
The chapter has also demonstrated that chieftainship was very pliable but it would be 
this very attribute that would strip it of its ethos. Sabata has been portrayed in the 
chapter as someone whose standpoint cost him his national fatherhood of the 
abaThembu nation in the short term, in the same way that Matanzima‘s collaborative 




The chapter has identified a common factor in the progressive evolution of the two 
processes of compliance and non-compliance in abaThembuland. It has portrayed the 
way in which these incompatible processes shaped the politics of abaThembu 
chieftainship in the context of Transkei‘s political terrain a limiting factor in the case of 
collaborators. Their freedom will was hamstrung, as was evident in Matanzima‘s 
equivocation on land and other issues on the eve of independence.  
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CHAPTER SIX  
THE FIRST YEARS OF AN INDEPENDENT TRANSKEI: THE WANING FORTUNES 
OF JONGUHLANGA’S PARAMOUNTCY, 1976-1980. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the survival of abaThembu chieftainship during the Transkei‘s 
independence. The main focus is on how the local party politics spill over to the power 
struggle between Sabata and Matanzima and in the way in which that struggle 
dominated the independent Transkei as is seen in Matanzima‘s reactionary rule and  its 
effect on the stability of Sabata‘s paramountcy.      
 
The chapter analyses Matanzima‘s desperation to crush opposition to his government 
and demonstrates his determination to make security of life and freedom of movement 
impossible for Sabata and his party associates. It also interrogates the methods he 
used to keep Sabata under surveillance and to involve himself in his domestic affairs 
ostensibly for the good of the paramount chief‘s family.   
 
The chapter exposes the inconsistencies in Matanzima‘s method of operation – like 
when he condemned Sabata‘s recommendation of Dumalisile‘s appointment as his 
deputy on the grounds he was not  a Mthembu, but readily backed Bambilanga with 
whom Sabata was not on good terms-a strategy he adopted ostensibly to mould  the 
Dalindyebo chieftainship, and to make it fall in line with abaThembu traditional 
procedures when he in fact was nurturing instability in the paramountcy.  
 
Finally it shows that with Sabata‘s deposition and his eventual replacement by his 




















ABATHEMBU CHIEFTAINSHIP IN THE EARLY YEARS OF TRANSKEI’S 
INDEPENDENCE: RESPONSES AND SURVIVAL   
 
Daliwonga emerged from the Transkei independence celebrations probably little aware 
that he had unwittingly reduced the abaThembu chieftainship to an ‗item on auction‘. He 
had done this by his act of ‗bartering‘ the abaThembu chieftainship‘s  consolidated 
status for a personal title worth half its physical image.  
 
The first challenge to Transkei‘s new statehood was the formation of the labour inclined 
Transkei People‘s Freedom Party (TPFP) the purpose of which, in the words of its 
leader,1 Cromwell Diko, was ‗to prevent Matanzima from becoming a dictator‘.2 A 
conspicuous feature of the newly formed party was its Transkei political image which 
was manifested in its bringing together Diko and S. Sinaba from the TNIP3 and Chiefs 
P. Z. Nkosiyane, B. Z. Bacela and D.S. Bacela  from the DP.4  
 
Diko immediately spelled out the difference between his infant party and the TNIP. The 
TNIP had proposed that half the Assembly seats should be reserved for traditional 
leaders and had endorsed a constitution without a bill of rights. Diko claimed that his 
party stood for the election of all National Assembly members, excluding the five 
paramount chiefs, and the inclusion of a bill of rights in the constitution.5 Diko‘s remark  
that ‘these [the chiefs] are the people we don‘t want in Parliament. They know they are 
protected here by being chiefs‘6 proved that Matanzima‘s proximity to the chiefs and 
their politically-engineered support of him put them in a bad light. This view is endorsed 
by Oomen‘s statement that the role which the traditional leaders assumed in homeland 
politics, either enthusiastically or hesitantly, hardly led to an increase in their popularity 
with their subjects7. Evans has also subtly criticised the self-interest which influenced 
the chiefs‘ decisions and political choices in describing the newly independent Transkei 
as a ‗rigged modern state [where] the dominance of chiefs was guaranteed‘. Diko‘s 
castigation of the chiefs immediately drew a hostile response from one of the Mthikrakra 
chiefs who was obviously a beneficiary of the chiefs‘ dominated Parliament.   
Mthikrakra‘s eviction from parliament, to the clapping of the MPs8, can be seen as proof 















MP status in a chiefs‘ dominated House of Assembly entitled them to violate 
parliamentary ethics. 
 
Hardly a month after the independence celebrations press reports confirmed that ‗Chief 
Matanzima, a firm supporter of the tribal system of chieftainship, has also begun to 
wield the axe against the few fellow chiefs who support the DP‘.9 As confirmation of 
these reports, the Matanzima government deposed, without giving reasons and by order 
of the South African state, Chief Mdanjelwa Mthikrakra, a staunch supporter of the DP. 
It was clear that Matanzima‘s harassment of the opposition was a way of gunning for 
the soul of Sabata and also to deprive him of a base from which to challenge the 
government. The deposition and subsequent detention of Mdanjelwa meant that he had 
lost his seat in the Transkei Assembly. A comment that appeared alongside the report 
about Mdanjelwa read  ‗by his actions, Chief Matanzima has shown clearly that he 
intends to rule the Transkei with an iron hand and that he will not tolerate effective 
opposition‘.10 Matanzima also threatened Sabata with loss of his parliamentary seat and 
termination of his chieftainship if he continued to absent himself from the National 
Assembly sessions. A stroke of the pen that confirmed attendance at parliamentary 
sittings was a criterion the Governor-General could use to rule on the competence of 
chiefs and/or to terminate legitimate chieftainships.  
 
After the detention of his party members under Proclamation R400, Sabata claimed to 
have been threatened with deposition by Matanzima if he continued his association with 
the DP.11Matanzima‘s threat to strip Paramount Sabata of his indigenous status 
undemined even the little autonomy that the National Party had accorded the Transkei 
state. It gave credibility to Alexis de Tocqueville‘s comment that ‗if men living in 
democratic countries had no right and no inclination to associate for political purposes, 
their independence would be in jeopardy‘.12 Matanzima capitalised on the fact that 
Sabata‘s status as a member of the House depended on his being ‗sworn in‘. He is 
supposed to have appealed to Sabata ‗to spare at least five minutes to come to 
Parliament for the formal swearing in ceremony… [and] warned that his non-















might have serious repercussions on his chieftainship‘.13 Matanzima‘s claim that reports 
about Sabata‘s indisposition were without substance because ‗he had frequently been 
seen in Umtata while Parliament was on‘14 was evidence that he kept surveillance on 
Sabata whom he was seeking to nail down. Sabata on the other hand, by embarking on 
a cat and mouse game, willfully disregarded parliamentary procedures as a way of 
declaring his dissociation with Transkei‘s new status and its leadership.    
 
Another incident that impacted negatively on Sabata‘s social image was his failure to 
observe customary protocol when he took his great wife, NoMoscow. Her father, Elfers 
Njokweni, subsequently complained to the dictatorial Matanzima who would always 
avail himself of an opportunity to meddle in affairs of any kind where Sabata was 
concerned. Matanzima projected himself ostensibly as a defender of the rights of 
NoMoscow‘s son, Buyelekhaya. He then urged his secretary to ‗draw Paramount Chief 
Jonguhlanga‘s attention to the anomaly as ‗it will be the issue when succession is 
considered by the Tembus‘.15 In the light of the efforts to correct this cultural anomaly, 
must be understood Sabata‘s confirmation, as contained in Matanzima‘s letter to 
Njokweni, of the arrangements for a ‗tribal marriage‘, umdudo, for the month of August 
1971.16 Matanzima‘s treatment of Sabata‘s domestic affairs as state business portrayed 
Sabata as his ward as much as it afforded him the high ground of a moral victory.  
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It must be presumed that Matanzima‘s confirmation of the Christian rites of Sabata and 
NoMoscow and further, that the various houses ‗of Sabata were allocated and given 
statuses in terms of custom by the Paramount Chief of Emigrant abaThembuland on 10 
October 1975 at Bumbane‘17 did not give him the impression that he was the 
‗kingmaker‘ in the House of Dalindyebo. 
 
SABATA-MATANZIMA POWER STRUGGLE ESCALATES DURING TRANSKEI’S 
POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE 
 
Even after Matanzima had achieved his dream of the independence of the Transkei, an 
exercise that had obviously added political value to his paramountcy by making him the 
head of state, it became clear  that none of these accomplishments had given him the 
personal satisfaction of being superior to Sabata.  Sabata also made it very clear, by 
word as well as by his actions, that he did not intend to subordinate himself to Prime 
Minister Matanzima. Matanzima‘s super administrative authority which he could use to 
compel his otherwise recalcitrant cousin to toe his political line proved to be powerless 
in the face of the innate ‗checks and balances‘ that safeguarded the ritual element of the 
indigenous law. The declaration of war against the oppposition as reflected in its 
gradual elimination through the arrests of its members must be seen as Matanzima‘s 
personal strategy to isolate and intimidate Sabata into endorsing the Transkei‘s 
independence.  
 
Matanzima‘s thinking hinted at his subtle intention to make abaThembu chieftainship 
more adaptable to his interests. He presumed that Sabata needed a deputy to be able 
to execute his duties both as a chief and a parliamentarian. He thereupon 
recommended with a measure of subtle force, and with the magistrate‘s backing, that 
Sabata should appoint a deputy paramount chief to act in his capacity at eBhotwe 
(Bumbane Great Place) Tribal Authority to give himself time to attend to abaThembu 
business in his Mthatha town office.18 If were this were to transpire,  Matanzima would 
be granted his wish to monitor Sabata‘s every move at close quarters and to negate any 















would also be able to see for himself if Sabata were taking seriously Matanzima‘s  
warning to cut all association with the DP as a condition for retaining his chieftainship. It 
must be presumed that any appointee deputy for Sabata would require the premier‘s 
approval. Sabata‘s subsequent appointment of Chief Gangathile Dumalisile, a former 
head of the Cacadu Tribal Authority who was a non-Dalindyebo mThembu, seemed to 
correspond neatly with Matanzima‘s BAA era manoeuvres, when he  would strategically 
place chiefs of abaThembu extraction over the non-abaThembu communities of St 
Marks and eventually absorb such communities into his amaHala unit. Here was now a 
non-Mthembu chief appointed over abaThembu. It must be presumed that Sabata‗s 
motive in appointing Dumalisile was to offset President Matanzima‘s schemes because 
Dumalisile was perceived as a person who had no connection with the premier. Once 
Qaba, a government clerk, confirmed the appointment of Dumalisile as Sabata‘s deputy 
and accordingly solicited the prime minister‘s approval, Matanzima immediately raised 
unwarranted concerns :  
 
I am deeply concerned about the Tembu Paramountcy. The Deputy to the 
Paramount Chief should be a person (Chief or Headman) in the Dalindyebo 
Family in order to have the respect of the Tribe. Chief Gangathile Dumalisile will 
be in trouble and will quarrel with the members of the Dalindyebo family. We 
want peace at the Great Place and the Deputy of the Paramount Chief should 
assist him in maintaining that peace.19   
 
Confirmation by Makohliso, secretary  of the the Executive Committee of the Dalindyebo 
Regional Authority, of the recommendation made at a meeting of 13 September  1977  
for the appointment of Dumalisile20 proved Matanzima‘s fears unjustifiable. Matanzima‘s 
mischievious involvement was also suspected when a quarrel  between Sabata and his 
brother, Bambilanga, led to a backlog in the trial of eBhotwe cases. Bambilanga had 
been, hitherto the Paramount Chief‘s deputy invested with civil and criminal jurisdiction 
to try cases at Sithebe Great Place on behalf of the Ebhotwe Tribal Authority. The 
failure to resolve this feud affected the functioning of the tribal court and thus discredited 
Sabata. An even more interesting development was the sudden resumption of duty by 
Bambilanga without any prompting from Sabata. It thus cannot be ruled out that 
Matanzima saw in the brothers‘ feuding an opportunity to fish in troubled waters by 















There was thus a possiblity that Sabata was dealing with a ‗many-headed hydra‘  in his 
misunderstanding with Bambilanga.  
 
Matanzima also willfully obstructed Sabata from sending his son, Buyelekhaya, then a 
minor, to a ‗person unknown to the tribe and family in Botswana for upbringing‘, and the 
the Mthatha magistrate supported him in this.‘21 It must be noted that Matanzima 
already felt threatened by what he believed to be the effect on Sabata of ‗communistic‘ 
thinking. It was therefore understandable why he was intolerant of the idea of a younger 
communist in the making, especially one whom he had recently endorsed as heir to 
Sabata and, in that role, Matanzima progeny‘s future counterpart. The reasons for 
Matanzima‘s fears of what challenges the ‗communist contaminated‘ abaThembu 
chieftainship might pose for his ‗so-called independent domain‘ must be understood in 
the light of what he had achieved for the NP government and for himself.  He had 
effectively, under South Africa‘s patronage, shepherded the Transkei on its road to 
independence with incomparable dividends. It was therefore of cardinal importance to 
close ranks and shut out any threat of communist infiltration to avoid undermining what 
he had worked so hard to achieve. His pretended intention to ‗format‘ Prince 
Buyelekhaya‘s thinking into his model abaThembu ‗royal‘ by protecting him from political 
contamination had more to do with his aim of wanting to monitor both the father and 
son. Every effort had to be made to guard against putting the abaThembu chieftainship 
into enemy hands. Any chief who was like Matanzima would be amenable to the 
political interests of the NP. Should  Buyelekhaya become such a chief then Matanzima 
would have re-invented a new amenable brand of chieftainship. Further, Buyelekaya 
would be more than an appropriate heir for Sabata. The magistrate admitted to also 
having warned Sabata ‗against the dangers of the young future Tembu Paramount chief 
one day returning to Transkei possibly as a terroristically indoctrinated young man with 
the evils of may-be even communism deeply rooted in his very existence: how could the 
powers–to-be then ever elevate such a young man to Paramount Chieftainship under 
such circumstances?‘22 It was of great historical interest for the future relationship of 
Sabata and Bambilanga that the magistrate, by his own admission, saw fit to engage 















Divisive Incidents like the above hinted at a bigger picture in the division of abaThembu 
chieftainships.  
 
MANGCOTYWA TAKES UP THE CUDGELS FOR JONGUHLANGA  
Sabata‘s refusal to co-operate with Matanzima drew George  Matanzima even closer to 
his brother. Evidence that the Matanzima brothers continuously perceived Sabata as a 
threat was seen in the contents of a message from Prime Minister George Matanzima to 
the departmental secretary of the ‗Accounts Section in the Transkei government. The 
premier‘s office instructed the Accounts‘ Section not to  ‗pay Paramount Chief Sabata 
subsistence and travelling allowance paid to Parliamentarians who attend sessions 
because he has not attended this session of Parliament‘.23 Whilst this message showed 
that Sabata was still the target of Matanzima‘s ‗barbed shafts‘, it also confirmed the 
latter‘s determination to reduce his senior cousin to destitution by squeezing him 
financially. One can read in Matanzima‘s instruction his readiness to use his political 
position and power to coerce Sabata to endorse the fait accompli, Transkei 
independence and support it. A veteran civil servant confessed that he processed 
Sabata‘s MP allowances after discovering that the TNIP MPs were always paid their 
daily allowances irrespective of their attendance or non-attendance at parliamentary 
sessions.   
 
Sabata, on the one hand, appeared not to recognise Matanzima‘s newly acquired 
political honours as symbols of equality between them. He instead expressed in 
unequivocal terms his determination to challenge Matanzima‘s conservative policies,   
but admitted that such a task would be handicapped by the inadequate human 
resources of his party.  Laurence quoted Sabata as saying  ‗we are still going to fight, 
though I don‘t know how because most of our people have been detained.‖24The 
justification for his claims was in a letter written by the publicity secretary of the national 
executive of the DP, Florence Mangcotywa, who remarked thus in her letter :   
The political set-up of the Transkei is based on chieftainship. Chiefs are not only 
legislators but also administrators in the rural areas, a system that was never 
employed anywhere according to recorded history. Chiefs are compelled to 
support the Government if not they will find themselves subjected to severe 















   
Mangcotywa substantiated her claims by enumerating the victimization of the 
abaThembu chiefs (Bangilizwe and Anderson Joyi, and Mdanjelwa Mthikrakra). They 
ended up either in exile, as in the case of Mdanjelwa who sought political asylum in 
King William‘s Town, or were banished, as was the fate of the Joyi brothers, who were 
banished to Qumbu and Cofimvaba respectively for refusing to toe the Matanzima line. 
Mangcotywa charged further, with justification, that  ‗the Government says it is boosting 
chieftainship when in actual fact they are consolidating the position of the TNIP‖26 the 
party whose apparent purpose was to advance Matanzima‘s interests. In a desperate 
tone of someone who was disgusted with the tyranny that confronted the opposition 
party members at every turn, and presumably as an apology for Sabata‘s vain struggle 
against Matanzima, Mangcotywa further remarked that  
The people are not prepared to accept bluff because they know who their 
leaders are. We wholeheartedly agree with Paramount Chief Sabata that he was 
robbed of his land because of his political convictions. As the King of the 
Tembus he has jurisdiction civil and criminal over all the Tembu districts 
stretching from Umtata to Lady Frere and Elliotdale.27   
 
It is clear from Mangcotywa‘s statements that the victimisation of the DP members had 
hardened them to the extent of making them unafraid of all reprisals. Mangcotywa‘s 
popular reinforcement of the legitimacy of Sabata‘s leadership over the whole of 
abaThembuland was evidently provocative and a slight to Matanzima. It was also clear 
from her speech that the fight to establish who was superior, Matanzima or Sabata, was 
far from being over and that it would continue for as long as the issues that undermined 
Sabata‘s authority and leadership were not addressed and resolved satisfactorily. The 
immediacy of reaction to Mangcotywa‘s press statement confirmed the seriousness with 
which the prime minister and the Transkei security police viewed her remarks  ‗Miss 
Mangcotywa is misleading the nation by giving them distorted facts‘28  was the  
response from M. Z. Ngceba‘s office which  purported to set the record straight about 
the chiefs referred to as victims in a media statement. He also remarked in a letter to 
the premier‘s secretary, M. Lujabe, that ‗I would be very grateful if your Department 
which keeps records of Chiefs will rebut the statement made by Miss Mangcotywa 















called upon to prove that Chief Mdanjelwa Mthikrakra  ‗was never appointed as a chief 
but acted for his brother…was found guilty on a criminal charge …was never charged 
for political offences.30 The office was further called upon to prove that ―Anderson Joyi 
was never appointed as a chief at any given time‘.31 The testimony from Lujabe‘s office 
with regard to Bangilizwe Joyi was that no person by the name of Marelane (Bangilizwe) 
has ever been designated or even recognized as chief‘.32 The report was also emphatic 
about Mangcotywa‘s misrepresentation of Chief Sabata‘s jurisdictional rights as ‗Chief 
Sabata Dalindyebo could never have jurisdiction over Lady Frere which has recently 
been incorporated to Transkei. It is a blatant lie that he has been robbed of Elliotdale. 
Elliotdale falls under Paramount Chief Xolilizwe Sigcau‘.33  
 
Needless to say Mdanjelwa Mthikrakra and the Joyi brothers were chiefs by birth 
because they were descendants of King Ngubengcuka.34 The repudiation of Sabata‘s 
territorial and political claims was based on the grounds explained by Lujabe thus:  
the region at present known as Western Tembuland has its own paramountcy 
since the pre-independence era.------The paramountcy over Emigrant 
Tembuland (and subsequently over Western Tembuland) was created at the 
request of the said regional authority and was recommended by the then 
Legislative Assembly in terms of section 45(2) of the repealed Constitution Act 
No. 48  of 1963.35  
 
While Mangcotywa‘s descriptive demarcation of Sabata‘s original territory was a true 
historical representation of events there was irony in the government‘s perhaps 
inadvertent endorsement of the claim. The government paradoxically confirmed 
Sabata‘s submissions even though they did not own up to tampering with historical 
tradition to achieve specific objectives or attain the desired result. The security police‘s 
reaction and the response from the premier‘s office confirmed the situation as it was at 
the time of the press statement, but did not  justify  Mangcotywa‘s remarks based  as 
they  were both on the situation and what had caused it.  
 
Mangcotywa‘s remarks on Sabata‘s claims of authority over certain districts of 
abaThembuland brought  forth a response from President Matanzima who addressed a 















I have to direct that you instruct Paramount Chief Dalindyebo to stop causing 
intertribal disturbances by making false claims over the Districts of Xhora, 
Cofimvaba, Cala and Lady Frere vide Imvo Transkei dated 3rd March, 1979. His 
assertions that he fears nobody are noted as a matter of insurbordination 
against the President. Cabinet should at once put him in his place by redefining 
and gazetting Sabata‘s area of jurisdiction of 3 districts of the Dalindyebo region 
only namely Engcobo, Mqanduli and Umtata. I will sign the gazette.36 
 
 It must be noted that Sabata‘s persistent claims and reference to the land demarcation 
and delimitation of the compound abaThembu paramountcy was a historical fact. 
Unfortunately Matanzima viewed it as a personal affront both to his paramountcy status 
and to all that had justified its invention by the South African goverrnment.  
 
Matanzima was particularly irked by Sabata‘s claims to territorial jurisdiction over an 
area which included Emigrant abaThembuland. The remarks belittled his paramountcy 
by portraying him as a chief whose domain corresponded to the level of a district chief. 
What Sabata perceived as historical reality was seen by Matanzima as an interrogation 
of the legitimacy of his paramountcy and therefore as a slight to the person of the 
president. While Sabata drew no parallel between his paramountcy and Matanzima‘s  
presidential status, it suited Matanzima to factor- in his politico-civil status of Governor-
Generalship because it allowed him to be both a pilot and a passenger. It is interesting 
to note that even this latter political advantage which enabled Matanzima to shift 
positions for his convenience did not seem to give him spiritual contentment and ritual 
security as a natural chief. This was the reason he set the Cabinet, over which he had 
absolute control, to fight his otherwise extra-parliamentary battles with Sabata. 
Obviously Matanzima continued to perceive him as a threat because Sabata‘s territorial 
claims were substantiated by history, a factual reality that Matanzima and his NP 
benefactors could neither reverse, modify, nor re-invent. Streek and Wicksteed have 
claimed that it was both the numerical strength of Sabata‘s chiefdom and his popularity 
with his people that pushed Matanzima to try  ‗to win abaThembu chiefs and headmen 
into his camp, and to wipe out the threat posed by those who refuse to come willingly to 

















SABATA JONGUHLANGA ON THE PATH TO DEPOSITION 
A new factor in the ongoing tension between Matanzima and Sabata emerged from a 
rather unexpected quarter. An invitation to Sabata from Caledon Mda of the Transkei 
National Progressive Party (TNPP) to attend a meeting in Qumbu exacerbated the 
tension between the two chiefs. This invitation came after Sabata‘s attendance of 
another meeting in Manzana Location of the Ngcobo District. His attendance here was, 
to the pleasure of his apolitical councillors, uneventful. It had become obvious, however, 
that the harassment of the opposition party members and their allies would be a 
principal item of discussion at the Qumbu rally. Against this background must be 
understood why some of Sabata‘s councillors, including his trusted one, Bhedla 
kaMpulane, advised him not to attend the Qumbu meeting, while others encouraged 
him to attend. In the end Bhedla could only advise his paramount chief against speaking 
at the meeting.  Sabata attended the meeting which was held in Mdeni Village in the 
company of leading oppositionists, Pikashe, Xobololo, Anderson.Joyi and Kati 
(Chamehashini). On the day after the meeting the Daily Dispatch reported on Sabata‘s 
speech at the meeting and showed pictures of the paramount chief hoisting his fist 
among, and with the crowds as they proclaimed  ‘amandla ngawethu/ power belongs to 
us‘.38 The speech, according to the subsequent judgement sheet was made in isiXhosa 
on 30 June 1979 and ‗recorded on a tape recorder by one Xobololo, a member of the 
accused‘s political party‘.39 Sabata was alleged to have stated that  
may it be remembered that he [Matanzima] had declared [that] the Chiefs are 
the cornerstone of his Government but the mystery of it today is that he being 
fully my junior in lineage is not ashamed to set me at loggerheads with my 
brother Bambilanga, in his desire that my Paramount Chieftaincy be transferred 
to him.40   
 
 He was reported to have also remarked that the ‗Transkeian Government is a 
Government that revels in provocations about trifles and that it instigates its people to 
be at loggerheads one with the other‘.41 Sabata also reiterated that he was the  
‗Paramount Chief of Matanzima, having been born his senior, and will forever remain 
so‘.42 According to the report Sabata also claimed that the ‗President visited Pretoria at 
the instance of the White Boers and accepted independence on terms dictated by 















the Transkei body politic as well as trading off Sabata‘s all-embracing abaThembu 
paramountcy for personal political gain. Sabata‘s statement to the effect that Transkei 
people were not free  and that ‗they do not have either freedom or independence; that 
Transkeian passports are valueless documents‘44 was an indictment of South Africa‘s 
grant to Matanzima of a carte blanche to wield his authority in a way that would secure 
his political persona. It was also a censure of Matanzima‘s readiness to facilitate the NP 
divide et impera exercise irrespective of whether he was the only beneficiary. Sabata 
elaborated thus in his speech ‗The freedom we have today is the freedom of 
Nkululekweni(Mthatha ministerial complex), --- where the Ministers and the State 
President reside. ---I am personally not free. Of course we love this independence yet it 
is independence of Nkululekweni‘.45 
 
On the claim of the uselessness of passports he was reported to have called on 
passport holders ‗to hand this useless document back to the Government.----When I 
was in Johannesburg recently for health reasons I intended going to Malawi to get 
treatment from a specialist and I was told by a Pretoria official that Transkei passport 
holders are not allowed entry into Malawi.‘46Sabata based his description of the 
Transkei passports as useless on his personal experiences, declaring that ‗I call upon 
all Transkei passport holders to accompany me and I will lead them to surrender this 
invalid document to the Government.‘47Mthikrakra has also made mention of Sabata‘s 
never-realised intention to attend a meeting in Malawi in 1979 in the company of a 
politicised herbalist Frank Sithole.48  
 
Sabata‘s comments were unpalatable to Matanzima who probably perceived them for 
what they implied, an assault on his presidential dignity. That the remarks provoked 
Matanzima‘s vengeance was evident in the successive orders which originated from the 
offices of one or the other of the Matanzima brothers. The president‘s directive 
instruction to the premier which had been provoked by Mangcotywa‘s claims about 
Sabata‘s land rights was followed by a similar directive, expressing the presidential 
sentiments but this time from the premier to Paramount Chief J.S. Dalindyebo. It was 















their strategic administrative positions were strong enough to help them accomplish 
their desired objective. Sabata‘s attention was drawn to the ‗Republic of Transkei 
Constitution Act No.15 of 1976 wherein your area of jurisdiction is defined as comprising 
the districts of Engcobo, Mqanduli and Umtata‘.49 This had clearly become a desperate 
battle waged by the Matanzimas to retain what had been conferred on them by the NP 
without Sabata‘s approval.  
 
The wrangle over the areas of jurisdiction of the two abaThembu paramount chiefs 
between the presidential office and Paramount Chief Sabata assumed new proportions 
after Sabata‘s utterances at the Qumbu meeting. Against this background must be 
understood the events leading to the raid of Sabata‘s Great Place and his subsequent 
arrest. The ostensible reason for the arrest was obviously the speech that he had made 
at the Qumbu rally.  Although these remarks were serious in their own right, the reaction 
of the Matanzima government was shaped less by the remarks themselves than by the 
history of the conflict between the K.D. Matanzima and Sabata. The conflict was a mere 
symptom and for this reason a lesser problem than its deeper irreversible causes the 
nature of which obviously irked president Matanzima. William Nelani, one of Sabata‘s 
councillors confirmed the detention of Sabata following a raid on his Great Place, this to 
the denial of Colonel Ngceba who was recognized as the President‘s close confidante.50 
The nature of the dispute between Sabata and Matanzima, the incompatibility of the 
offices they held at the time, all presented a situation which seemed at best to 
interrogate the cultural impropriety of the marriage between the bureaucratic and 
traditional offices and at worst to indict the architects of apartheid for ever conceiving 
this trick on the ‗homeland‘.  
 
The arrest of Sabata took place on 26 July 197951 at about 17h00 according to Chief 
Bhekisizwe Mthikrakra.52 The detention was the culmination of a systematic and 
methodical silencing of the opposition party which had slowly but surely punctuated 
Transkeian political activity since the eve of the conferment of the self-government. 
Bhekisizwe has confirmed that Sabata never resisted the arrest except to ask if he 















where he was going. Sabata‘s popularity was reflected in the way in which his subjects 
charged at the police and soldiers who were engaging  with their natural leader as they 
prepared to arrest him.53 Streek and Wicksteed have confirmed the reports of 
abaThembu anger at the detention of their paramount chief. They explain Ngceba‘s 
denial of knowledge about the arrest and Keswa‘s denial of military involvement in the 
detention. The fact that Brigadier Cwele, a mThembu and the first Transkei 
commissioner of police, was retired for having refused to effect the initial arrest on the 
explicit orders of President Kaiser Matanzima54 is evidence of how strong the 
determination of some individuals to support the Sabata cause was. Proof that those 
who executed the arrest were acting only in the discharge of their duties was the fact 
that they told Sabata in no uncertain terms that ‗they had been sent by Ngceba to fetch 
him‘.55 Sabata was placed in Mthatha cells and soon transferred to Sterkspruit prison.56  
 
 
Ntsebeza and Ndletyana have appropriately described the arrest and sentencing of 
Paramount Chief Sabata as one event that sounded the death knell for opposition 
politics in the Transkei bantustan.57 The above claim finds full justification in Streek and 
Wicksteed‘s association of the timing of Sabata‘s  arrest with his new Democratic 
Progressive Party‘s success in forging unity between abaThembu East and 
amaMpondo West. That the Matanzima brothers, who both held mutually 
complementary positions in the Transkei government perceived the new ‗intertribal‘ 
alliance as an historical threat brings to mind the earlier Kaiser Matanzima-Botha 
Sigcau understanding. It is also a strong possibility that they saw it as thwarting the 
Transkei Government‘s apparent plan to bring Sabata down. What the Matanzima 
brothers did not know was that by arresting Sabata they had committed an unforgivable 
act of injustice which focused the public eye on the victim and once more invited the 
interrogation of the merits and demerits of ‗homeland independence‘. The president and 
the prime minister may have successfully eliminated the threat that the opposition 
posed in the House of Assembly, but the public outcry was indisputable proof that 

















Charges against Sabata proved that he was punished more for contesting power 
sharing with Matanzima on an indigenous platform and in a traditional setting than for 
absenteeism from parliamentary sessions. Sabata‘s land claims, particularly over 
Emigrant abaThembuland, violated the president‘s dignity while his rejection of 
independence was interpreted as subverting and/or interfering with the state authority58 
which was wielded by the president through his brother, the premier. It is not clear 
whether Sabata‘s utterances would have been given the same weight if they had come 
before Matanzima had succeeded to the presidency. The question of whether 
Matanzima would have had the audacity to challenge Sabata‘s remarks if he had 
remained an ordinary state ordained paramount chief also arises here.  
 
On 7 August 1979, 12 days after his arrest, Sabata was released on bail of R1000.59 It 
was evident that the tempo of events was quickening from a letter that recommended 
the suspension of Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo  ‗in terms of section 47(1) of the 
Transkei Authorities Act No. 4 of 1965 which was subsequently approved by the Prime 
Minister‘.60 It was confirmed in the same letter that Sabata was being charged with the 
offence of contravening the provisions of section 71 of the Republic of Transkei 
Constitution Act, No. 15 of 1976. He was also being charged for contravening section 3 
of the Public Security Act.61 Another letter which soon followed from the premier to the 
Paramount Chief Jonguhlanga read thus ‗I hereby suspend you from office in terms of 
section 47(1) (b) of the Transkei Authorities Act No.4 of 1965 with effect from 26 July 
1979 pending the outcome of the charges laid against you‘.62 It must be noted that when 
Sabata was served with a suspension letter he was effectively not functioning in his 
capacity as paramount because he was being held as a prisoner in Sterkspruit.63 On the 
day after the suspension the premier‘s office issued an order to the office of the 
Accountant to ‗stop payment of [Jonguhlanga‘s] salary with effect from 26/7/1979. 
Suspension‘.64  
 
The inflexibility of the Matanzimas towards Sabata  confronts the reader of a letter dated 
31 July 1979 which Sabata wrote to the state president from his prison cell. In the letter 















I arrived here on the night of 26/7/79. On that very night elders paid me a visit 
and advised that I should come to you. 
I beg you Sir to allow me to come and personally express these words of a 
humble  apology to you after which I will come back here. 
      I hereby punish myself, and l acknowledge receipt of the Premier‘s letter,     
     (most likely the suspension letter)  about which I do not complain. 





There is no record of a response from President Matanzima to this humble letter which 
was obviously written under the most humiliating conditions. It must be presumed that it 
fell on deaf ears. Sabata probably knew that his cause was forever lost but decided to 
bow to advice from the elders. The visit of the grey-haired councillors or elders, and the 
advice they gave to Sabata serves as a confirmation of the kind of disbelief that 
Ntsebeza and Ndletyana have claimed to have gripped  the abaThembu when they 
heard of their paramount chief‘s arrest. It also shows that Matanzima had gone too far in 
his vindictiveness and determination to bend Sabata‘s thinking and make him comply. 
The letter itself serves as an indictment on Matanzima‘s stoneheartedness.  
 
Lujabe wrote at the same time to the District Police Commissioner, informing him of the 
suspension of Paramount Chief J. S. Dalindyebo. He also directed him to convene a 
meeting of the members of the Dalindyebo Regional Authority to designate  ‗an acting 
paramount chief during the period of suspension of Paramount Chief JS Dalindyebo‘.66  
 
 
The suspension of Sabata was immediately followed by the confirmation, in terms of 
section 66(1) of the Republic of Transkei Constitution Act, 1976 (Act No.15 of 1976 (as 
amended), of the designation of Albert Bambilanga Dalindyebo as acting paramount 
chief of abaThembu chiefdom resident within the area of jurisdiction of the Dalindyebo 
Region. The designation had been confirmed by the state president and the Dalindyebo 
Regional Authority.67 Subsequent correspondence from the Lujabe informed Chief 
Bambilanga of his new status as Acting Paramount Chief.68The district commissioner 















brought to the notice of the public soon,69 a step that was possibly calculated to gauge 
the popular reaction to any appointment in Sabata‘s position.  
 
Matanzima‘s vindictiveness to Sabata is revealed in the instruction to pay Sabata for 
only twenty-six days in July and effect payment for Bambilanga from 3 August 1979: a 
mean saving of seven days‘ pay! He could at least have authorised Sabata‗s payment 
for the whole month of July.70 The next step that was authorised by the secretary for the 
Department of Justice was the conferment of civil and criminal jurisdiction on the acting 
paramount chief in respect of his area of jurisdiction.71 Bambilanga, in turn, appointed 
Chief C. Z. Sangoni to be his parliamentary representative72 and this contradicted 
Matanzima‘s earlier recommendation to Sabata whom he had advised to appoint a 
deputy paramount chief so as to give himself time for his parliamentary duties. It must 
be presumed that this change of practice was one way of monitoring closely the 
activities at the Great Place, especially in the aftermath of Sabata‘s arrest.   
 
 
The trial of Sabata was conducted on I April 1980, in Port St Johns, to avoid a 
recurrence of public demonstration such as had characterised his arrest73. Later that  
month,  after his trial and subsequent conviction,  the prime minister‘s office received a 
letter from attorney Mxenge‘s Durban office in which the attorney argued for the urgent 
re-instatement of Sabata.74 The premier‘s office told Mxenge in no uncertain terms that 
because the criminal conviction was prima facie proof of misconduct, re-instatement of 
his client was not automatic. The attorney was further advised that in terms of the 
Transkei Authorities Act the matter of Sabata‘s suspension had to be referred to the 
Regional Authority for consideration for punitive measures. In addition Mxenge‘s 
attention was drawn to provisions of various sections of the Transkei Authorities Act, 
1965 (Act No. 4 of 1965) in terms of which it was pertinent for the premier to consider 
the matter in the light of section 46(1). An important aspect of the response was the one 
where the plaintiff‘s attorney was advised that the record of the case had first to be 
made available to enable the prime minister to consider the matter.75Subsequent 















charged with the offence of contravening section 71 of Act 15 of 1976 in that 
during the period 30 June to 14 July 1979 and at or near the Mdeni 
Administrative Area in the district of Qumbu, and in Umtata the accused did 
wrongfully and unlawfully commit acts which were calculated to violate the 
dignity or injure the reputation of the President of Transkei.  
 
He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to ‗a fine of R700.00 or 
eighteen months imprisonment of which R200.00 or six months are suspended 
for three years on condition that during that period the accused does not commit 
a contravention of section 71 of Act 15 of 1976.76  
 
While the legal fine must be seen as a sign that the Matanzima brothers were not 
relenting it must be presumed that they also had a hand in the Dalindyebo Regional 
Authority‘s resolution to fine Sabata for misconduct.77 The cabinet resolved, as a matter 
of procedure, to refer the matter back to the Dalindyebo Regional Authority after its 
findings that the fine of R100.00 was inappropriate for the nature of the serious offence 
committed by Sabata.78  
 
The Dalindyebo Regional Authority subsequently resolved at a meeting of 1 August 
1980 that  
Paramount Chief Jonguhlanga Sabata Dalindyebo be suspended from office 
without salary or other remuneration for a period of two years. There were 17 
votes in support of the resolution. A second motion – that  Paramount Chief 
Jonguhlanga Sabata Dalindyebo be dismissed or deposed obtained 3 votes. 
There were three abstentions.79 
 
The chiefs Gangathile Dumalisile, Zululiyazongoma Mnqanqeni and Zwelidumile 
Joyi(Bangilizwe‘s brother), were very vocal in their recommendations that Paramount 
Chief Jonguhlanga be permanently deposed. The three were later rewarded with 
headships of tribal authorities by the Transkei government.80  
 
Of interest in examining the relationship between the Matanzima brothers and Sabata 
was the way in which the state laws were crafted so as to make it easy for them to do 
with Sabata as they pleased. Paragraph 6 in a memorandum to the cabinet, which was 
















Any punishment by the Regional Authority is, in terms of section 46(4) (a) of the 
Transkei Authorities Act No. 4 of 1965 subject to confirmation by the Cabinet. 
Any such punishment may, however, in terms of section 46(5) of the same Act, 
be confirmed or referred back by the Cabinet at its discretion, to the authority 
concerned for further consideration.81 
 
In the light of the above stipulation must be understood the cabinet meeting of 4 August 
1979 and its vociferous feeling about the inadequacy, as a form of punishment, of the 
two year suspension of Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo as well as its subsequent 
resolution  
in terms of section 46(6) of the Transkei Authorities Act No.4 of 1965 that the 
Paramount Chief be dismissed. Ministers have the honour to recommend that it 
may please His Excellency, the President to confirm in terms of section 46(6) of 
the Transkei Authorities Act No. 4 of 1965 the dismissal of  Paramount Chief 
Sabata Dalindyebo from office with effect from 4 August 1980.82 
 
The above developments smacked of KD‘s influence and also give credibility to 
Bangilizwe‘s claim as to his ability to exploit family differences, to turn family against 
family and to divide a family.  
 
The Matanzima brothers went further in building a strong case against Sabata.  A report 
that appeared in Daily Dispatch, purporting to be an account of  Sabata‘s ‗short life 
history‘ as given by George Matanz ma, gave the impression that Sabata‘s  ‗disrespect‘ 
towards Kaiser Matanzima dated from the latter‘s becoming a head of state  
This attitude has resulted in the insults Chief Sabata has directed against the 
State President which have amounted to a treasonable act. As a normal 
consequence to this conduct it has been decided that Chief Sabata cannot hold 
a seat of leadership to people under the head of state and thus has had to be 
deposed from paramountcy.83   
 
Matanzima was obviously uneasy and guilty about the harassment of Sabata as 
evidenced by the following remark that ‗Chief Sabata‘s conduct would have deserved 
the same consequence even if the State President were a different person from 
Paramount Chief K.D. Matanzima‘.84 Of the many claims that Sabata dismissed in his 
so-called ‗short life history‘ as presented by George, was that  he denied ever sending 
his son to Botswana for terrorist training ‗how could I send a 14 year old to be trained as 















Matanzima‘s father, Mhlobo, was ever a paramount chief. While he admitted having 
been dismissed from Bensonvale for misconduct, he at the same time revealed that the 
reason he was not admitted at Lovedale, was not because of misconduct at the 
previous school he attended, as George Matanzima claimed, but that Kaiser Matanzima 
had not fulfilled his responsibility of applying for his admission at the said school.86 It 
thus became evident that George Matanzima had indeed taken the opportunity to 
announce the deposition of Sabata to demonise him.  
 
On 6 August 1980 Sabata signed his receipt of his deposition letter that had been 
written and signed by the prime minister. The actual act of deposition of Sabata ‗from 
your office as paramount chief of the Tembu Tribe, with effect from 8 August 1980‘87 had 
been ratified by State President  Matanzima  ‗under powers vested in him by section 
46(6) of the Transkei Authorities Act, 1965 (Act No. 4 of 1965), after consideration of the 
recommendation by the Dalindyebo Regional Authority‘.88 The deposition letter bore the 
stamp of the district commissioner as well.89 The letter was to be delivered to Sabata ‗in 
the event of his not being there, kindly serve to the spouse or whoever is present and 
report back what you have done‘.90  
 
JONGUHLANGA’S DISAPPEARANCE ENTRENCHES THE PARAMOUNTCY OF 
BAMBILANGA.  
 
When it became obvious that Sabata‘s lot was to be harassment, after his conviction 
and deposition as a paramount chief, he fled his fatherland.  There is more than one 
version about the circumstances surrounding Sabata‘s flight. The common factor in all 
the versions – which could be mutually complementary- is that Sabata escaped from 
Bumbane in a bakery truck91 which , according to some informants,  carried hot bread 
under which the paramount chief hid. When the driver was stopped at a road block, he 
hastened to open the back while remarking that all he was ‗carrying here is nice 
smelling bread‘.92 Sabata is supposed to have alluded to the road block incident with 
great relief once he was outside South African soil.  ‗Yho! I can‘t explain how anxious I 
was, I couldn‘t tell whether my sweating was from hot bread that was packed over me or 















which Sabata‘s councillors prevailed upon him to disguise as a commoner, after which 
he stealthily left Bumbane on foot, evading the police who were looking for him. He is 
supposed to have crossed the rivulet on his Tyhalarha farm and proceeded to climb a 
rather slippery mountain until he found shelter at the home of C.T. Bhinase, a son-in-law 
of Chief Mnqanqeni, one of his councillors. Certain abaThembu and DPP notables 
quickly arranged for the covert transportation of Sabata to Mqanduli from where he 
would be helped to escape.94 This latter part of Nyoka‘s version fits in well with 
Ntsebeza and Ndletyana‘s narrative of events the credibility of which derives in part 
from their informant‘s physical involvement in the act. In this version Sabata is 
supposed to have asked Bhinase to notify Kati and Xobololo about all that had 
happened.95  
 
In Mthikrakra‘s version of events, Sabata visited King Sobhuza of Swaziland soon after 
his conviction. Zilumkele of the Qadi clan from Darhabe and a certain Linda Yekani 
transported the paramount chief on this trip which was intended to afford him an 
opportunity to meet exiled politicians.96 It must be assumed that as in his final 
disappearance, arrangements for such a visit were conducted in utmost secrecy.  
 
Once it became public knowledge that Jonguhlanga had disappeared, the greatest 
concern from some quarters was for his safety. Chief Ngangomhlaba Matanzima  
confirmed in an interview that it was important to establish his whereabouts after he had 
been missing for twenty-four hours.97 At the instance of the prime minister, the 
Dalindyebo Regional Authority was instructed through its secretary to nominate, ‗strictly 
subject to Government‘s approval‘ a new paramount chief.98 Against this background 
must be contextualized the meeting of the Dalindyebo Regional Authority in 
September.99  Ngangomhlaba reiterated that it was customary for the Rhode (Emigrant) 
abaThembu to attend the meetings of their kin, just as it was also a tradition for the 
abaThembu bakaDalindyebo to preside at important meetings of their Western 
abaThembuland kin. In this light must be understood Ngangomhlaba‘s claim that he led 
a delegation, of abaThembu baseRhode which did not include the president and the 















debate became heated, with some attendees recommending that Bambilanga be made 
a permanent paramount chief while others disagreed. Ngangomhlaba has confirmed 
that there was no direct answer to Chief Vulindlela Mthikrakra‘s question:   
Is Bambilanga indeed going to rule? How is his right to rule justified legally and 
customarily in view of the fact that Jonguhlanga whose disappearance is 
regarded as abdication has sons one of whom, Buyelekaya, was identified as his 
heir.100 
 
It soon transpired that the question of the appointment of Bambilanga as paramount 
chief had been caucused and a decision reached in his favour. It was at this point that 
Ngangomhlaba expressed shock and dismay at ‗abaThembu‘s willful decision to appoint 
a permanent king while Sabata was still alive because he had not been reported 
dead‘.101 Ngangomhlaba has confirmed that his argument was based on the principle 
that it was irregular and against the abaThembu custom to meddle with the abaThembu 
line of succession in any Great House. He also acknowledged that before he left the 
heated meeting he uttered a warning, saying  ‗I hope that what you are saying here 
today you will never at any time, possibly in future deny‘.102 In a recent interview with 
this researcher he remarked  that ‗I wonder what those very people are saying today 
seeing that Buyelekaya is in his father‘s p sition‘, 103  as if to confirm that the wheels of 
history have rotated full circle. 
 
The prime minister‘s instruction to nominate a paramount chief  had not fallen on deaf 
ears. In September Makohliso confirmed in a letter that ‗at its meeting held on 24 
September, 1980, the Dalindyebo Regional Authority designated Chief Albert 
Bambilanga Dalindyebo to be paramount chief over the Tembu tribe residing within the 
area of the Dalindyebo Region‘.104 A letter from the district commissioner which was 
addressed to the prime minister‘s secretary confirmed the designation of Bambilanga as 
the Dalindyebo abaThembu paramount chief and had a rider which read thus  ‗Chief J. 
S. Dalindyebo, half brother of paramount chief designate has been deposed and his son 
Buyelekaya is reported to be in military training with terrorists. The designation of Chief 
Bambilanga is recommended‘.105 Indeed paramount chief Sabata was, in time, joined in 
exile by some members of his family, including one of his wives, noCanada,  and son.106 















as was the father to son.107Jonginyaniso has confirmed Joyi-Notununu‘s version and 
added that on being asked why he chose noCanada above his other wives, his 
response was ‗I thought it wise and diplomatic to have her, being the youngest of my 
wives, by my side because I feared that back at home she would not be able to 
withstand the pressure and thus it would be hard to restrain her from telling all‘.108  
 
 
Ntsebeza and Ndletyana have revealed that the ANC had long anticipated that Sabata 
would eventually flee from South Africa. In the latter context the organisational operative  
Ndima ‗China‘ Saliwa,  and Kati, attended a meeting that was scheduled to discuss 
Sabata‘s likely escape out of the country to Lesotho. Sabata was eventually sprung 
from South Africa by the ANC to Lesotho where he was received by Chris Hani in 
whose house he lived.109Mthikrakra claims that for reasons of security, Sabata, who 
time and again in the course of the trip was moved from car to car, crossed the Telle 
River on foot in the company of Xobololo and Kati.110 Qangule, a one time praise singer 
for Sabata,has claimed that in Lesotho the abaThembu paramount chief was welcomed 
by Shakes Phoswa,  with whose family he lived under the protection of the Lesotho 
Government. Moshoeshoe II is reported to have wanted Sabata to stay close to his 
palace for his protection and security, even arranging with the local Christian 
missionaries to accommodate the abaThembu paramount chief. He also personally 
visited Sabata regularly at the missionaries‘ residence. Qangule has claimed further that 
Moshoeshoe subsequently invited Sabata to look after the abaThembu community in 
the Quthing area. While Sabata welcomed the offer he declined to take it up on the 
grounds that  ‗his primary commitment then was for the freedom of the people of South 
Africa because Chiefdoms and Kingdoms could only flourish when human dwellings 
were free‘111 While in exile Sabata lived in different neighbouring countries that were in 
sympathy with the liberation struggle. Qangule claims that when King Sobhuza heard 
about the plight of Sabata he had a special guest house built as a gift to the ‗King of the 
Thembus‘.112 His final destination was Zambia113, the country where the ANC 
















THE INSTALLATION OF BAMBILANGA AND ITS IMPACT ON ABATHEMBU 
CHIEFTAINSHIP 
 
The recommendation and subsequent designation of Bambilanga as paramount chief 
was immediately followed by the announcement of the date of his installation. This was  
‗fixed by His excellency the President as 12 December 1980‘.114 In Makohliso‘s letter 
mention is made of a meeting, to be attended on invitation by heads of tribal authorities 
and selected civil servants, on 3 October 1980 to make arrangements for the 
installation.115 The fast-tracking of events suggests a panic and a desire to erase the 
Sabata line of rulers as a way of making sure that even if he returned  it would not be to 
a vacant paramountcy seat. The evolution of Bambilanga‘s paramountcy, on the other 
hand, a civil affair, defied custom because it reversed the decisions of abaThembu 
elders that had excluded him from being heir in 1928. This development of events 
revealed the strength of the power that Matanzima had at his disposal as President and 
his determination to invest his, and his brother‘s powers in their crusade to finish off the 
Sabata dynasty.  
 
As if to re-invent the Dalindyebo paramountcy and make everything new,  Bambilanga 
would operate from the Sithebe Great Place as confirmed by the secretary‘s instruction 
to deliver the table and a revolving chair to Sithebe.116 It was significant that the Great 
Place was now being relocated to Sithebe, from where Bambilanga had previously 
operated as Sabata‘s deputy paramount chief. Anderson Joyi confirmed that 
Bambilanga threatened with arrest anyone who asked about, or commented on, 
Sabata‘s disappearance.117 At the formal installation of Bambilanga, Matanzima stated 
that Bambilanga‘s mother, noNciba, was Jongilizwe‘s first wife. This was a way of 
emphasising to the audience the legitimacy of Bambilanga‘s paramount chieftainship. 
Matanzima addressed Bambilanga and stated authoritatively that ‗you are the 
abaThembu King. Your heir will inherit the kingdom.‘118 This arrangement purported to 
be a solution when in fact it was a crisis of the first magnitude. The fact that Matanzima 
reiterated the statement that Bambilanga‘s ‗heir will inherit the kingdom‘ portrayed him 
as a self-made abaThembu king-maker. Seemingly of little concern to  Bambilanga was 















abaThembuland counterpart, and was thus of a lower status than Matanzima‘s. General 
Holomisa has confirmed that Matanzima‘s enthronement of Bambilanga divided the 
House of Jongilizwe Dalindyebo locally and the abaThembu on a national level.119Now 
at the stroke of a pen, and to satisfy Matanzima‘s wishes, tradition was turned upside 
down, and the decisions and precedents of abaThembu elders were thrown overboard 
as if they had added no value to custom.  
 
 
In his acceptance speech Bambilanga re-endorsed his benefactor, Matanzima‘s,  claim 
that he was not acting and that he was never going to give up the paramountcy and the 
throne either to Sabata or his heir. Bambilanga‘s rule was perceived by some to have 
been imposed upon them even though they dared not resist his authority.120 The 
erstwhile supporters of Sabata, who were themselves  descendants of Ngubengcuka 
through Chief Gobinamba and Zwelibhangile Joyi, were oncemore  banished from their 
familiar environments. Bangilizwe was sent to Mthingwevu in the Cofimvaba District 
presumably to be under the strict surveillance of Kaiser Matanzima while Anderson was 
initially banished to Mahlungulu Village of Qumbu District, in Chief Majeke‘s territory and 
later transferred to Banzi Location in Cofimvaba District. To remove all inducements to 
their ever returning to their homes possibly to incite the Dalindyebo abaThembu against 
Bambilanga their kraals were burnt down and homes bulldozed.121 Bangilizwe‘s  
daughter returned from Fort Hare in 1980 to find ruins where their home had been. They 
could not even go to their uncle Zwelidumile‘s homestead, because Matanzima had 
turned Zwelidumile against Bangilizwe.122  
 
Subsequent correspondence revealed the premier‘s approval of the appointment of 
Headman Mdanjelwa Mthikrakra, a one-time victim, as deputy paramount chief in 
respect of Ebhotwe Tribal Authority (Bumbane).123 This arrangement meant that 
Matanzima was strategically absorbing and winning over the ex-opposition wounded 

















Soon after Bambilanga was designated as abaThembu paramount chief he applied for 
the employment of five policemen and six guards to guard the Sithebe Great Place, his 
Xugxwala residence and his house on Payne‘s farm, as he had been warned that it was 
not safe for him to leave Sithebe Great Place unguarded.124 The subsequent 
undertaking by the district commissioner to arrange for the employment of guards125 
could be construed as proof that the Matanzima government were aware of the 
irregularities attendant upon the dismissal of Sabata and especially the rushed 
designation of Bambilanga as paramount chief.  
 
 
An interesting development was the subsequent appointment of Acting Chief Mveleli 
Mthikrakra as Bambilanga‘s deputy to try Regional Authority cases at the Sithebe Great 
Place.126 Chief Gangathile Dumalisile, who had earlier been turned down as a deputy 
paramount chief for Sabata, was later recommended by Bambilanga as his 
parliamentary representative.127 This move could be construed as the TNIP strategy to 
appease and win over those that were previously favoured by the now convicted 
Jonguhlanga. Three months later Bambilanga‘s son, Zondwa Mthikrakra, was appointed 
as deputy to his father in respect of the area of jurisdiction of the Dalindyebo Regional 
Authority in Mthatha.128  
 
CONCLUSION 
The narrative of the independent Transkei has reflected both the climax of the feud 
between Sabata and Matanzima as well as the unilateral resolution of the contest the 
build-up to which had been continually re-surfacing in the earlier chapters of this study. 
An interesting aspect which has emerged from the chapter is Matanzima‘s ability to co-
ordinate all state functionaries and engineer the desired outcome.  Prior to his ‗inherited 
Governor-Generalship‘ he depended on the South African government for this kind of 
support.  
 
The chapter has shown Matanzima to be an unrelenting dictator in his pursuit and 















Matanzima‘s exaggerated aversion to communism was aimed at canvassing self-
security than alerting the state to the potential for danger that Sabata was as a result of 
his association with the so-called communists. In the above context this chapter has 
revealed that Matanzima‘s desperation to nail down Sabata was also evidence of his 
personal uneasiness. His efforts to squeeze Sabata financially were meant to make 
Sabata back down and bow down to him.   
 
The chapter has shown that Matanzima‘s readiness to intervene in the Njokweni-
Dalindyebo families‘ marital issue was primarily motivated by a desire to win a  moral 
vistory and positive publicity at Sabata‘s expense.    
 
The chapter has also demonstrated that Matanzima‘s endorsement of Bambilanga as 
deputy for Sabata was aimed at destabilising the Dalindyebo paramountcy. This would 
afford him an opportunity to infiltrate and dominate it. It is therefore obvious that what 
pushed Sabata away brought luck to  Matanzima, but only for a short time. The chapter 
has further revealed that both the unorthodox invention of the Bambilanga line of rulers 
and the fateful demise of Sabata‘s dynasty symbolised Matanzima‘s biased autocracy at 
its best. Both processes however, crowned Matanzima a hero of the moment. This was 
evidenced by the fact that his own paramountcy never enjoyed perfect stability, even in 
his lifetime, because it was not possible to  dismiss Sabata‘s paramountcy as part of a 
mythical past.  
 
The chapter has revealed that the power that favoured Matanzima when he pursued 
Sabata was inherent in the political environment of the time. In the same context the 
chapter has demonstrated that Sabata‘s refusal to succumb to Matanzima  and his 
subsequent flight was what shook the victor‘s pedestal, albeit that he hushed it all up by 




















This study has explored a 20th century paramountcy that endured and survived despite 
the fact that it interacted with parties and forces  whose interests and goals were very 
different from its own.  The interaction of the above forces revolved mostly around the 
instrumentality of power as an important weapon in politics of both the South African 
state and abaThembu chieftainship. This study has analysed the way the South African 
government interfered in abaThembu affairs, and how it used power as a bargaining 
instrument. The interaction of the above parties in a bureaucratic context, and in some 
cases the absence of reciprocity among them, helped create dissonance that is still a 
visible feature of the contemporary abaThembu chieftainship. The study has revealed 
that the South African government was not always consistent in making policy, and was 
often indecisive. This study has shown that these equivocal tendencies nurtured 
contradictory procedures and inconsistent practices which resulted in ambivalence. The 
end result was that the neglect of customary protocol in the implementation of policies 
sent mixed signals to the subjects at a time when the institution of chieftainship was 
generally in a state of flux.   
 
Almost all literature on abaThembu history has praised Dalindyebo, the great son of  
King Ngangelizwe as a model chief. Through the analysis of situations in which  
Dalindyebo shilly-shallied, the study has revealed that he was inhibited more by the  
fear of forfeiting personal benefits than of  any reprisals as a result of his challenging the 
system which impacted negatively on, and affected, traditional governance and popular 
interests. Further, it is proposed that his inability to sustain his grip on any party or 
organisation that wanted to enlist his support turned him into a pawn in the game of 
power politics between the government and the opponents of its policies. Against the 
background described above Dalindyebo‘s position  has been represented as one that 
absorbed the tension and inevitably gave the bureaucratisation and resultant 
marginalisation of chieftaincy the opportunity to take place. 
 
Evidence in the study has shown that Paramount Chief Dalindyebo left behind a 















at a great political cost. Through an interrogation of the problems that surfaced in the 
wake of Chief Dalindyebo‘s death and the way in which these were resolved, the study 
has demonstrated that the abaThembu chiefs were not prevented by a lack of 
precedents from tackling the least anticipated crises. They did not hesitate, either, to 
manipulate indigenous law or to transform it into an ideal instrument that would be 
equipped to deal with unprecedented challenges. The minority of Dalindyebo‘s son in 
1920 was quickly resolved in the seeming unbiased exclusion of David Jongintaba on 
the basis of both his junior status and his unacceptability to Nohajisi, the heir‘s mother. 
 
The study has demonstrated through the regency of Silimela Ngangelizwe129 the utility 
of the Qadi house in any royal household. It has shown that Silimela‘s voluntary 
announcement of his readiness to surrender the paramountcy to Jongilizwe was  
commendable. It indeed proved that the Qadi house had a traditionally established 
function in the Great House of any chief‘s household in the course of whose execution it 
also served as a guarantee of a threat-free environment.  
 
This study has revealed that the pre-mature death of Sampu Jongilizwe Dalindyebo 
probably robbed abaThembu nation of a progressive leader, judging from the fact that 
this former Lovedale activist had, on accession, vowed to improve the image of 
abaThembu governance. The study has revealed that Jongizwe‘s death before the birth 
of his heir was both peculiar and unprecedented in the history of the abaThembu 
paramountcy, and also historically significant in the long delay it pre-empted before the   
paramountcy office could be returned to its legitimate home. This study has argued that 
a lengthy regency was both necessary and justifiable, but that there was no guarantee 
that political imperatives would assure those anxious to secure the paramountcy for the 
House of Dalindyebo.  
 
The study has also shown that the abaThembu elders had neither guidelines nor 
regulated procedures to systematise and standardise the nomination and subsequent 
appointment of chiefs or regents under the 1920 Native Affairs Act. The study has 















loopholes in the 1920 NAA in the election to regency of David Daweti Jongintaba after 
the death of Jongilizwe at a time when his most vocal opponent, Nohajisi had died.  
 
How the identification of the great wife dovetailed with the nomination of the heir has 
informed the conclusion that the status of the one prescribed the rank of the other. The 
study has also shown that Jongintaba‘s accession to regency, itself a reflection of the 
powerful voice of Gadla Mandela which flew in the face of the socio-political and cultural 
grounds for his earlier exclusion, had the potential to generate justifiable insecurity and 
fears in the Great House. It is also argued that Mandela inadvertently facilitated the 
government‘s tampering with customary law in his emphasis of Jongintaba‘s education 
as a factor that counted in his favour in the selection process.  
 
What has also come out in this study is the apparent inapplicability of Comaroff‘s 
warning that ‗the heir must be the eldest son of his father‘s principal wife‘, 130 in a case 
where there was no principal wife at the time of the chief‘s death. The study has also 
shown that Nonesi‘s earlier formula of importing Mthikrakra from a junior house to 
provide Ngubengcuka‘s great house with an heir did not qualify to serve as a precedent 
in this case. The analysis of modus operandi in the case at hand has confirmed the 
abaThembu elders‘ reshuffling and manipulation of procedures and customary 
practices. Their exclusion of the first three of Jongilizwe‘s wives, No-Ashiya, NoNciba 
and NoKapa, until Novoti Gwadiso, the youngest and the last to be married,  had given 
birth violated the primacy of nominating the great wife prior to the nomination of the 
successor. An interesting discovery which surfaced in the study was that the ‗about to 
give birth status‘ of Novoti suddenly became factor in the grading of the wives which 
forced the rescheduling of the meeting until she had given birth. The dramatic turn of 
events that was brought about by the birth of a baby boy, whose mother‘s name 
became Sabata, has been noted as of great politico-historical significance for the future 
of the abaThembu paramountcy  
 
Certain aspects of Jongintaba‘s regency likely to promote insecurity have been 















became a provisional great place was unprecedented, because it actually created the 
concept of a portable great place. This has further informed the conclusion that 
Jongintaba‘s action symbolised a gross neglect of ritual by the very custodians of 
hereditary chieftainship who were known to believe strongly in ancestral immobility.  
The culture of a mobile great place was not likely to enhance the dignity of the heir‘s 
home at a time when Sabata, an heir who had never known his father‘s face, needed to 
be given a sense of belonging. 
  
The study has portrayed the accession of Dabulamanzi to the regency amid 
disagreements about his eligibility for the position as factor that converted the  
paramountcy into a contested prize rather than an object of preservation for the 
abaThembu nation. This study has consistently identified the  subsequent appointment 
of Dabulamanzi who was Dalindyebo‘s son from the RHH as the germ for the 
progressive weakening of the already political fragile abaThembu paramountcy. It has 
also revealed that the abaThembu chiefs who objected to Dabulamanzi‘s appointment 
were primarily concerned with securing the rights of the great house, that is, the 
abaThembu paramountcy, over the likely pretensions of the RHH rather than querying 
the correctness of the appointment of the regent.  
 
The study has exposed the intrinsic strength of the traditional political system that was  
demonstrated in the ‗off saddle/yihl’ehashini’ instruction as well as in Dabulamanzi‘s 
immediate co-operatio  with the abaThembu elders‘ dethronement order. Whilst the 
study has identified a weakening and destabilising factor in the quarter century regency 
period it has also conveyed the idea that the customary deposition of Dabulamanzi in 
September 1949, 131 five years before Sabata succeeded Jongilizwe tells a tale about 
the fragility and vulnerability of abaThembu paramountcy from the beginning to the end 
of the period under investigation. Also argued in this thesis is that the complaint 
attributed to Sabata about the neglect of the Bumbane Great Place reflected badly on 
Dabulamanzi whose makeshift palace was the Sithebe Great Place. The dilapidated 















of Jongilizwe at a time when there was an urgent need for a constant reminder that the 
regency was a temporary stop-gap.  
 
The study has revealed that Sabata and the elderly custodians of the abaThembu 
paramountcy resented Dabulamanzi‘s closeness to the magistrate, and his readiness to 
communicate and execute his instructions which subtly reinforced government-informed 
conditions for Sabata‘s accession. It has been argued that Dabulamanzi‘s seeming 
enthusiasiam for the government‘s pre-conditions for Sabata‘s assumption of the 
paramountcy portrayed him as someone with an ill-conceived self-interest in the office 
which he was expected to help secure as a core institution of the abaThembu nation.   
 
It has also emerged that during the quarter century regency little if anything in the 
consolidation of abaThembu paramountcy was witnessed. This was evident in the way 
the two successive regents invested their energies more in entrenching their personal 
authorities than in securing the national paramountcy for the House of Jongilizwe. 
Consequential upon the complexity of problems associated with the last years of the 
regency, particularly those that coincided with Dabulamanzi‘s term and its rather 
unceremonious ending, the environment surrounding Sabata‘s accession was turbulent 
and administratively laden. He stepped into a paramountcy that had a fundamentally 
weak infrastructure in a traditional sense, and much was expected of him. However,  
Sabata had  little knowledge of how the latest legislative pieces had corrupted the 
indigenous chieftainship he was intent on resuscitating. What little mentoring he had 
had was  what he acquired from the Mgudlwa home.  It certainly appears that neither 
Jongintaba nor Dabulamanzi ever claimed to have brought the heir closer to the 
business of governance. This is not to downplay the mentoring exercise undertaken by 
the Mgudlwa home which was historically regarded as the ‗amaDlomo college‘ for 
mentoring young royals, but rather to highlight the value that hands-on exposure would 
add to the restoration of a paramountcy that had been dormant for a long period.  
 
In the light of the above arguments and comments there might be some logic in  















alia, in the failure of both Jongintaba and Dabulamanzi in their primary responsibilities, 
as well as the defectiveness of the BAA. This legislative instrument was meant to be an 
improvement on the bureaucratic deficiency of the NAA of 1927. Whilst the act was 
designed to transform and/or mould chieftainship, where it existed, to the shape that 
was preferred, and revive and/or invent traditional rule where chieftainship had become 
passive and/or extinct, it is significant that none of these provisions accommodated the 
restoration and revamping of a paramountcy long lost to those for whom it was a natural 
right. 
  
This study has revealed that the first challenge the government faced were the different 
responses of abaThembu chiefs to the implementation of the BAA. It has shown that the 
BAA did not, per se, precipitate the divisions among abaThembu chiefs, but rather 
reinforced them. The study has demonstrated that the vicissitudes of abaThembu 
paramountcy over a sixty year period were a public spectacle that obviously attracted 
the attention of its patrons and interested prophets of doom. Dabulamanzi‘s desire to be 
posted to Lady Frere, which seemed to have Sabata‘s encouragement, and 
Matanzima‘s subsequent and systematic thwarting of the proposal generated questions. 
Matanzina probably realised that facilitating Dabulamanzi‘s entry into the Glen Grey 
politics of chieftainship would help resolve the problems of the abaThembu 
paramountcy and complicate his plan of carving his slice from it. The ingenious 
Matanzima obviously realised that because Dabulamanzi‘s RHH background was 
aligned to the great house of Mthikrakra through Ngangelizwe, it conferred on the ex-
chief regent a seniority which would obscure his own GHH status which was aligned 
with the RHH of Mthikrakra through Rhaxothi Matanzima. If such an arrangement were 
allowed, and provided Dabulamanzi would uphold the historical paramountcy, the 
history of abaThembu paramount chieftainship would probably have taken a different 
course. Matanzima‘s attitude to the paramountcy was later to precipitate a long drawn-
out feud between the Great (Sabata) and Right Hand (KD) houses of Mthikrakra, and it 
had a lot to do with the factors that informed factional and individual responses to the 
Authorities. It is argued that Sabata possibly suspected that the BAA would interfere 















abaThembu nation, as opposed to Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima, whose embrace of the 
act portrayed him as both a tool and a beneficiary of the act.  
 
The study has demonstrated that the BAA in the end became an instrument with which 
the Transkei was pushed through self-government to independence. Though initially 
party politics were dominated by Matanzima and Poto, in time it became clear that for 
Matanzima, his real target in the DP was, Sabata. The study shows that the BAA was 
an instrument purportedly designed to consolidate the ill-conceived paramountcy of K.D. 
Matanzima in the context of the South African government‘s schemes which he had 
facilitated. It has also emerged that the celebration of the Transkei homeland‘s 
‗independence‘ seemed  like a ceremony to mark the climax of the split between Sabata 
and Matanzima, as is shown in  the analysis of incidents that culminated in the events of 
26 October 1976. It is argued that Matanzima‘s post-independence prosecution of 
Sabata, which culminated in the crowning of Albert Bambilanga as paramount chief of 
abaThembu bakaDalindyebo, was aimed at forging alliances within the House of 
Jongilizwe. This divide et impera strategy, which saw the splitting of the House of 
Jongilizwe, was caliculated, inter alia, to  divert Sabata‘s focus from K.D. Matanzima‘s 
manouevres, as much as it was also Matanzima‘s way of sustaining and consolidating 
his fake half-paramountcy.   
 
It has also emerged that the traditional rulers who rose to positions of civil authority 
knew how to wield their double-edged sword to paralyse those whose only recourse 
was to customary instruments. True to Mamdani‘s contention, under the new DNA‘s 
dispensation the traditional institutions were subservient to the state132 and it appears 
that sometimes the civil power was poised to modify them, in the true practice of 
‗employing selective norms‘ to enforce subordination and conformity. In the study the 
Matanzima brothers emerge as accomplices in the government‘s assault on their 
birthright. The subsequent appointment of Bambilanga‘s eldest son, Zondwa, as his 
father‘s deputy definitely tilted the scales in favour of the House of Bambilanga to retain 
the Dalindyebo paramountcy.133 The study presents the appointment of Zondwa as a 















Jongilizwe and this was tantamount to claiming, retrospectively, that Sabata‘s rule had 
been illegitimate. Whatever unprecedented, though customarily rationalized guidelines, 
that were followed before Sabata  was nominated as heir in 1928 were nullified 52 years 
later by one stroke of the pen in an action that  appeared, to echo Evans‘s expression, 
about the ‗bastardization‘ of Sabata‘s paramountcy.   
 
The survival of the abaThembu chieftainship under the House of Bambilanga has been 
analysed in order to trace the origin of, as well as identify, the forces that led to the two 
burials of a man whose deposition and replacement were claimed to have been 
sanctioned by his erstwhile Dalindyebo Regional Authority.134 
 
The events around the return of Sabata‘s body to his motherland, the military 
atmosphere pervading the funeral of this popular and long lost abaThembu monarch  
particularly the disregard of the customary practices in his burial, were all events fraught 
with many ironies. It was the most dishonourable state funeral in its failure to 
demonstrate the honour usually characteristic of such burials, The disregard of the 
customary ritual and sentiments of the family who would never have entrusted the 
funeral arrangements with the dead man‘s arch-rival all turned an otherwise mourning 
event into one of inexplicable ten ion by  the attendees and by-standers. It also showed 
that K.D. Matanzima, in his inverterate hatred for Sabata, embraced with a confident   
sense of victory the moment of gloating over the corpse of a man whose spirit he could 
never  crush in his life time. There was another irony in  Matanzima‘s show of might and 
his wilful violation of indigenous abaThembu rituals. This action  hurt the living and filled 
them with disgust  and also portrayed Matamzima  as a sacriligeous dictator who readily 
used his political position to assail  the national rites, as if to interrogate them for failing 
to facilitate his acquisition of  what he desperately sought to usurp from Sabata.    
 
 The active role of the abaThembu chiefs in the events that led to the exhumation of 
Sabata‘s remains on 26 September135  ‗from a commoner‘s grave‘,136 and the reburial, 
on 1 October 1989, of  ‗the Comrade King‘ at the  ‗biggest funeral in Transkei‘s 















The unnatural impression created by the exhumation exercise on the traditionally-
minded has been noted because it implied the extent to which the Matanzima-led 
government had gone to ridicule even the basic customary rituals attendant upon ‗King‘ 
Jonguhlanga‘s first burial. The fact that Anderson Joyi, the  acting as abaThembu 
Paramount Chief,  had first to appease the amaDlomo ancestors before the digging 
began was evidence that the abaThembu were aware of  how wrong it was to bury King 
Jonguhlanga among women and how  ritualistically important it was to rectify a 
deliberate cultural error.  
 
An examination of the political and emotional impact on the abaThembu chieftainship 
and Transkei chieftainship generally of Sabata‘s reburial has not been exhausted 
because the whole question of deposition, death in exile, posthumous return, burial, 
exhumation and reburial had a lot to do with processes that would be better reversed if 
the abaThembu elders are realistic about the future of their ethnic group and the unity of 
its chieftainship. Unhappiness over the double kingship of the abaThembu does not 
seem to be lessening in its intensity, judging from the recent incidents of flare-ups 
between King Buyelekhaya Zwelibanzi and his now deceased Qamata counterpart,  
Chief Lwandile Zwelenkosi Matanzima. Buyelekhaya‘s statement on 9 July 2007 to the 
effect that the Matanzimas ‗were not kings but ordinary traditional leaders‘138 was 
endorsed by Mandla Mandela when he affirmed that ‗the  abaThembu have only got 
one king and that is Zwelibanzi (Buyelekhaya). We pay allegiance to Zwelibanzi and  
not to any other person.‘139 Also, the remark made by Buyelekhaya at 
Qhumanco(Ngcobo)- where he had been invited to conduct an installation- to the effect 
that he would be ‗downgrading‘ himself if he ever asked for permission from Lwandile 
Matanzima to visit abaThembu traditional leaders140 in that village was very pertinent for 
the way forward of the abaThembu chieftainship. It also sounds as a call to the 
democratic government to fulfill its pledge to undo the repugnant aspects of colonial and 
apartheid chieftainship.  
 
The study has on the whole furnished no evidence that the abaThembu paramountcy 















demonstrated that it was his quiet diplomacy which made him appear amenable to the 
bureaucratic schemes which endeared his paramountcy to colonial and post-colonial  
governments. Silimela, regent following Dalindyebo‘s death, was acknowledged for his 
natural wisdom which helped neutralise the stigma that was associated with the 
unprogressive paramountcy of his predecessor. Silimela‘s accession and peaceful exit 
after just four years of rule is presumed to have endowed the position with the dignity it 
deserved.   
 
The study has shown that Matanzima‘s enthusiastic embrace of the BAA without 
Sabata‘s sanction could only have been motivated by the hope that the paramountcy 
was on the verge of collapse. The study has revealed that the abolition of Sabata‘s 
paramountcy created an invisible vacuum, for Bambilanga, Matanzima‘s BAA 
paramount chief was not, and could not, be the son of Novoti, Jongilizwe‘s  great wife 
without reversing history. The study has depicted Bambilanga‘s parallel paramountcy as 
being simply written off with the posthumous restor tion of Sabata‘s office.  
 
Almost twenty years after the restoration of Sabata‘s paramountcy the Nhlapho 
Commission endorsed the fact that abaThembu historically have one paramountcy, that 
of Buyelekhaya Zwelibanzi Dalindyebo who was appointed on 1 July 1992141:  ‗the 
abaThembu kingship exists under the lineage of the Dalindyebo royal house‘.142    
 
This study has clearly generated more questions than answers as to what would 
possibly shed light on the fractures that exist in the present day abaThembu chieftaincy. 
The primary problem is the urgency and imperativeness of the restoration of co-
operation between the Bumbane-Sithebe paramountcy and its Qamata satellite centre 
of authority. This should, of necessity be preceded by the practical implementation of 
the findings of the Nhlapo Commission which, as we have noted above, nullified the 
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